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A TEXTBOOK OF
INDIAN
ADMINISTP ATTOM
BT
M. R. PALANDE, M.A.
Formerly Professor
of History and Economics,
M» T. B. College, Surat
INDIAN DRANCH
GEOFFEEY CUMBERLEGE
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Ptice Rs 6^4
Oxford University Press, Amen House, London E,C,4
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WBLLINOT^ON BOMBAY CALOUITA MADRAS GAPE TOWN
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First edition, 19*2b
Second revised edition, 19*20
Third edition, 1031
Fourth revised edition, 1933
Fifth edition, 1931
Sixth edition, 1935
Seventh revised edition, 1936
Eighth revised edition, 1939
Ninth revised edition, 1943
Tenth revised edition, 1947
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madras (P.l.C. NO. MS. l) DATED ^5*9' ^94 7 — ^54^*
PEEFACE TO THE TENTH EDITION
Chanoes of very great importance and of a very fundamental
character have taken place in the structure of the Indian polity
during the course of the last few months. An attempt has been
•made to make the information in this new edition as up-to-date
as possible. The Introduction gives a brief survey of all important
developments that have taken place recently, including the
passing of the India Independence Act 1947.
M. E. P.
Bombay
July 1947
PEEFACE TO THE FIEST EDITION
I HAVE attempted in the following pages to describe the growth
of British administration in India from the days of the East
India Company to the present times. The book is mainly
intended for Intermediate Arts students of Bombay University
and I hope it will prove interesting also to the general reader.
It had to be brought out in difficult circumstances. After the
manuscript was handed over to the Aryabhushan Press in Poona^
a disastrous fire reduced, along with many other valuable things,
the printed matter to ashes, with the result that printing had
to be done hurriedly again and the book brought out in less than
a fortnight's time. But for the willing and cordial help rendered
to me by my friends, Mr H. P. Desai, M.A., of the Bombay
Chronicle, and Professor Y. D. Joshi of Surat, and by the manage-
ment of the Bombay* Chronicle Press, the book would not have
seen the light of day so soon. I am therefore extremely thankful
to them.
I must also express my sefnse of gratitude to Professor P. A.
Wadia for kindly going through a large part of the manuscript
and for making valuable suggestions.
Surat, 1926
M. R. P.
I CONTENTS
XV. THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE: GROWTH TILL 1919 . . 120
XVI. TBCB CENTRAL LEGISLATURE : THE EXISTING CHAMBERS 127
XVII. THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE . . . . . . . . • * 143
PART IV
The Federation of Tndi
XVIII. UNITARl AND FEDERAL STATES . . . . 149
XIX. THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT: BEFORE THE MONTAGU- ^
CHELMSFORD REFORMS . . . . 1 52 *
XX. THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT: AFTER THE MONTAOU-
CHELMSFORD REFORMS . . . . . . 160
XXI. REASONS FOR MAKING INDIA A FEDERAL STATE . . 174
XXII. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERATION AND THE
DIS^TRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS ... .. 183
XXIII. THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE . . . . . . 189
XXIV. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE ... . . 2(K)
XXV. THE FEDERAL COURT . . . . 210
XXVI. FEDERAL FINANCE UNDER THE ACT OF 1935 . . 213
XXVII. INDIAN RAILWAYS AND THE FEDERAL RAILWAY
AUTHORITY . . . . . . 217
PART V
The Provincial Government
XXVIII. THE GROWTH AND FORMATION OF PROVINCES . . 224
‘XXIX. THE GROWTH OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS UP TO
THE ACT OF 1919 . . . . 235
XXX. DYARCHY AND IT^ WORKING : 1921-37 . . 242
XXXI. THE PROVINCES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITl'TION . . 258
XXXII. THE AMBIT OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY . . 263
XXXIII. THE PROVINOML EXECUTIVE: THE GOVERNOR . , 274
XXXIV. THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: THE COL \C1L OF
MINISTERS . . . . . . . . 297
XXXV. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE . . . . 311
XXXVI. THE RELATION OF THE EXECUTIVE TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE . . . . . . . . . . 328
XXXVII. THE WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY . . 333
CONTENTS
PART VI
ViKSEUM.
XXXVIII. SUB-DIVISION'S OF THE PROVINCE AND THEIR ADMINIS-
TRATION , . . . 340
XXXIX. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT . . . . . . 345
XL. JUDICIAL ADMINaSTRATION . . . . . . 352
XLI. LAND REVENUE . . . . . . . . 368
XLII. THE PUBLIC SERVICES . . . . . . 377
xLiii. education . . . . . . . . 890
XLIV. FAMINE RELIEF AND IRRIGATION . . 395
PART VII
Enactments and Statutes
XLV FROM 1600 TO 1858 . . . . . . . . 401
XLVi. FROM 1859 TO 1942 . . . . . . . . 411
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . 419
BIBLIOGRAPHy . . . . . . . . 429
INDEX . . . . . • • • • •
iNTEODUCTtON
The /ejection of the Cripps Offer by the Indian political parties
an(^he subsequent 'Quit India’ Besolution passed by the Indian
National Congress in August 1942 led to a deterioration in the
political situation in India. A vigorous campaign was launched
against the Government; all the important leaders of the Congress
were detained in jail without trial for an indefinite period; many
restrictions were imposed on ordinary civic life. Popular govern-
ment had ceased to function in most of the provinces since the
end of 1939 and its place was taken by a purely bureaucratic
' rule. The Viceroy’s Executive * Council had indeed been
^panded and considerably Indianized in 1941 and 1942: but the
discontent of the people against the existing constitutional posi-
tion continued to be as acute and widespread as ever.
In England, a Coalition Government which was in fact pre-
dominantly conservative in character appeared to be firmly en-
trenched in power. This helped to accentuate the sense of
pessynism which had arisen hi the Indian mind because many
leading members of that Govermnent were known to be holding
pronounced hnperialistic views. On the other hand, the vicis-
situdes of World War II and the ideological aspirations and
loyalties that it had inspired were also exercising a powerful
influence on the Indian mind.
§1. HINDU-MUSLIM 'DEADLOCK
Meanwhile, the communal conflict between the Hindus and
Muslims spread more bitterness and antagonism. The Muslim
League, the most representative organization of the Mussulmans
in India, began to propound the two-nation theory insisting that
Miissalmans are not merely a minority but a separate and
distinctive nation with its own religion, laws and culture and
having nothing in common with the Hindus. They demanded
that in the future constitutional set up of India there must be
carved out, out of Indian territory, a separate sovereign Muslim
State which was to be designated as Pakistan. That alone could
assure them their legitimate freedom.
The Congress and the Hindus generally did not accept the
two-nation theory. They held that history belies the contention
that there is nothing common between the Muslims and Hindus.
Centuries of close contact and common life in the same land
had produced in many ways a remarkable synthesis of the Hindu
and Muslim cultures and the last few decades had witnessed
the growth of an Indian nationalism irrespective of religion or
cfommuuity. Besides, a large majority of Mussalmaus in many
parts of the country were originally Hindus who were converted
to Islam. It was urged that religion by itself does not suffice
B
± iNtfeObUCMON
to constitute the concept of nationhood which is much more
generic and inclusive. The Congress was therefore strongly
opposed to what they described as the vivisection of India and
insisted upon the preservation of its political, like its geographical
and cultural, unity.
There was thus a complete deadlock. The Muslims were nofc
prepared to take the risk of throwing in their lot in a consti-
tutional arrangement devised for the country as a whole, because*
they felt they would never get any effective control in its working
Being a numerical minority in the population of the ,whole
country — about nine crores out of forty — they would inevitably
be a perpetual minority in the .Central Government also, however
limited and weak that Centre may be. Under these circufn-
stances, there was no hope for Muslims as such ever getting
a chance of forming and running the government and exercising
real power.
The Congress in reply pointed out that political parties are
formed for the betterment and uplift of the people as a whole.
Their membership is not based on religion, race or community
but on an allegiance to common ideals and programmes and
is therefore open to all. Muslims in such a party, whenever
it secures an electoral majority, are bound to share in its offices
and power. In the opinion of the Congress the approach of the
Muslim League to the problem was fundamentally wrong because
it identified religion with politics and did not appear to contem-
plate an organization, essentially non-communal and non-
sectarian in character, devoted to bringing about the progress
of the people of the country as a whole.
All these factors contributed to make the Indian situation
extremely tense, fluid and unpredictable. They engendered a
sense of frustration, suspense and despondency and a general
atmosphere of uneasiness and uncertainty spread throughout the
country.
§2. FOBMATION OF A LABOUE GOVEBNMENT
IN ENGLAND
The War with Germany came to an end in May 1945. How-
ever the war with Japan continued with unabated fury till the
middle of August. Bather unexpectedly, even in the midst
of the preoccupations of that struggle, Parliamentary elections
were held in England after a lapse of nearly ten years. The
Labour Party obtained a surprising victory at the polls and
captured a large majority of seats in the House of Commons.
A Labour Government with a strong backing in Parliament was
establised in office early in August 1045 .
This was a momentous change which appealed to the imagi-
nation of the Indian people. The Labour Party had the
reputation of holding advanced political views and of being
INTBODUCTION xi
committed to ft policy of implementing socialistic ideals and
programmes. They had often expressed their full sympathy with
and support for the cause of India's freedom and had promised
action to secure it when the opportunity came. Their advent
to ]5ower naturally roused great hopes. A few days later the
with Japan also came to an end and the world heaved a
sigh of relief at the conclusion of such a prolonged aud horrible
calamity.
These forces helped to ease the political tension in India.
Steps were taken to resolve the political stalemate that had
distorted and damaged its public life for over six years. The
imprisoned top-ranking Congress leaders were released; fresh
elections were ordered to be held to provincial legislatures;
Section 93 which had been in operation in most of the provinces
Vince the close of 1939 was revoked; and early in 1946 popular
ministerial governments were established in those provinces after
a lapse of over six years. Mr Attlee, the Prime Minister, gave
the assurance that his Government would take early action to
implement the promises made to India.
§3. THE CABINET MISSION TO INDIA
In piirsuaiice of their policy of speeding up the process by
which India would be enabled to achieve her freedom without
delay, His Majesty's Government sent out in March 1946 a
special Mission to India headed by the Secretary of State and
containing two other cabinet ministers.^ The Mission stayed in
India for three months, held prolonged discussions about the
Indian problem with Indian leaders of all shades of opinion and
endeavoured to help them to arrive at an agreed formula for its
solution. 'Ihey even succeeded in bringing the .Congress and
^Iiislim League leaders to a joint conference in Simla.
Unfortunately, their efforts failed. The gap betw’een the view-
points of the Congress and the League appeared to have
considerably narrow'ed but nonetheless it w^as also found to be
unbridgeable. The League was irrevocably committed to the
achievement of Pakistan; the Congress was strongly opposed to
a division of India, though it unreservedly accepted the principle
of self-determination and expressed itself to be against coercing
any unwilling part of the country into joining the Indian Union.
After the failure of the Simla conference, the Mission and
the British Cabinet considered the future course of action, and
with the full approval of His Majesty’s Government the Cabinet
Mission made tneir famous statement on 16 May 1946. The
proposals made in the statement w^ere not in the nature of a
final political award made by a superior authority. Their object
was to set up in India as early as possible a suitable machinery
Lord Fethick La^^rence, Sir Stafbrd Cripps and Mr A. V. Alexander.
xii INTBOBUCTION
to enable Indians to decide and frame the future constitution of
their country. It was also intended that till such time as the
new constitution could be brought into being there should be set
up in India an Interim Government having active support of
the major political parties and composed of their prominent
leaders.
§4. PBOPOSALS OP THE CABINET MISSION
The long-term constitutional plan devised by the Mission
was a deliberately and delicatelj^ balanced via yneJia bet\\’een
the conflicting claims of the division and unity of India. There
were to be no separate sovereign states of Hindustan and Pakisti 4 P
but one single Indian Union comprising the whole of British
India and such of the Indian States as may decide to join the
Union. However, the authority of the Central Government in
the Union was to be very limited; its powers were to be confined
to the administration of only three subjects — defence, external
affairs and communications with power to raise the necessary
finance. All the remaining subjects, including residuary powers,
were to vest in the provinces who were to enjoy complete auto-
nomy in their sphere.
The really ingenious novelty of the plan (ionsisted in the
introduction of a third intermediate tier betw^een the Centre and
the Provinces, namely the Section and the Group. It was laid
down that practically at the very commencement of the process
of constitution-making, the provinces shall sit in three separate
Sections. The Muslim majority areas comprising the provinces
of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and British
Baluchistan in the West and Bengal and Assam in the East
were to form respectively Sections B and C; the remaining
predoniinantly Hindu provinces were to forin Section A.
The constitutions of the provinces in a particular Section were
to be framed by the Section; the latter had also to decide
whether its provinces should form •a Group and if so frame a
constitution for the Group and determine the provincial subjects
that should be assigned (o it. In Sections B and C Muslims
would have a" majority of votes and therefore the decisive voice;
in Section A the deciding power would lie with the Hindus.
Muslim aspirations behind the demand for Pakistan w^ould thus
be satisfied without the creation of Pakistan; they would have
real power in the framing of a constitution for and control of the
government of the Pakistan areas.
On the other hand, it was also provided that if any pro-
vince was unwilling to continue in a Group it would have the
libert/ of opting out of it as soon as the new constitutional
'arrangements come into opei^tion. Such a decision was to
be taken by the legislature of the province after the first general
election under the new constitution.
INTBODUCTION xiii
The reception accorded to the Mission’s proposals recorded
many fluctuations and vicissitudes. The Muslim League,
though very critical of the rejection of its demand for Pakistan,
accepted the scheme. The Congress did the same with ita
own ititerpretation of the (Jrouping clauses. It asserted that-
thowgh every province had necessarily to be in the particular
Section in which it was placed, no province could be compelled
to join a Group; that would be inconsistent with the principle
of provincial autonomy which the Mission had clearly enunciated.
The. Congress also pointed out another disturbing possibility.
The constitutions of individual provinces and of Groups, if
any, formed by them were to be framed by the appropriate
Sections. If the right of opting out which was conceded to the
provinces could be exercised only after the new constitution had
actually been brought into being, it was feared that the numerical
majority in a Section may so frame the conditions and provisions
for opting out that it may practically become very diflBcult if not
impossible to do so. The right may thus prove to be entirely
illusory. The Congress was therefore insistent that voting in
the Section could not be merely by a simple majority of numbers ;
it must be by the unit of provinces. Such a procedure was
particularly necessary to assure a province such as Assam with
its overwhelming non-Muslim majority that it would not be
compelled against its will to be grouped together with Bengal.
The Muslim League regarded such an .interpretation as
nullifying the long-term plan and the delicately balanced
compromise that it embodied. Voting by provinces and not by
a simple majority of numbers w^ould completely nullify the
reality and effectiveness of Muslim power in the Sections B and
C. The League considered that the Congress acceptance of
the plan was no acceptance at all. As a protest against such
an attitude, the Muslim League Council at its meeting held
in Bombay in July 1946 withdrew its earlier acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission's plan and passed a Resolution recommending
direct action for achieving the goal of Pakistan.
§5. FORMATION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Meanwhile, in accordance with the recommendations of the
Cabinet Mission, strenuous efforts were made to set up a fully
popular government at the Centre. The statutory obligation
that at least three members of the Viceroy's Council must be
officials who had served in India for a period of not less than
ten years was remo\ed by a Parliamentary amendment of the
Act of 1035. Thereafter all the members of Government could
be non-officials. Negotiations were started with both the
Congress and the League to induce them to join the Viceroy’s
Council.
The proportion of seats in the Executive Council to be
xiv TSTBODUCTIOS
allotted to the Congress and the League proved to be a aimcuib
stumbling block. The League demanded parity with the
Congress. It also insisted upon the exclusive right of the
League to nominate Muslim members. These demands were
Tiowever not conceded. Ultimately, an agreement was afrrived
at between the Congress and the Viceroy, and on 2 Septeniber
1946 an Interim Government was formed by Congress leaders
headed by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who was appointed Vice-
President of the Council. The Muslim League held off from
this Council for some time but ultimately came in six. >veeks
later
The follo\^ing is the distribution of portfolios in the Interim
Government : (1) External Affairs (2) Defence (3j Fintfhce-
(4^ Home (5) Transport and Eailways (6) Legislative (7) Indus-
tries and Supplies (8) Works, Mines and Power (9) Education
flO) Food and Agriculture (11) Commerce (12) Labour (13)
Health (14) Communications (Posts and Air). Of these, six
were given to the Congress, five to the Muslim League and one
-each to the other minorities — Sikhs, Parsees and Indian Christians.
The names of these three members were suggested by the
Congress. The Muslim League in their quota included the name
of a Scheduled caste member from Bengal.
The \ihole idea of this arrangement was that in fact if not
in law a real popular Government with full powers would
iunction at the Centre till the introduction of the new consti-
tution and even ’to facilitate that introduction The Vicerov
would voluntarily abstain from using his powders and entrust. the
whole responsibility of government to the Executive Council.
He would reduce himself to the position of a constitutional ruler
and would endow the Council with the status of a responsible
cabinet, functionii^ under the leadership of its Vice-President,
wh(> for all practical purposes would be* the Prime Minister
It was also expected that though members of the Council are
legally irresponsible and irremovable they would consider them-
selves as the servants of the people and act according to their
W’ishes.
The Muslim League has not however accepted the position
that the Council is a cabinet; they are opposed to working on
the principle of collective responsibility and to regard the Vice-
President as the leader of Government. The Congress and the
League sections of the Government are reported to be work-
ing independently of each other. Common meetings of the
whole Cabinet do not seem to be frequent. Congress membere
have publicly complained that their Muslim League colleague^
have not been w'orking in a spirit of co-operation, that the
Central Government has thereby come to suffer from paralysis
in certain respects. Such a Government cannot be described
even as a coalition because the latter presupposes a certair
minimum common ground. It is rather a composite admixture
INTRODUCTION xv
oC elements, a section of which does not intently want to cohere
with the rest to any extent and even to obstruct them.
J6. ELECTION TO AND INAUGURATION OF THE
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
According to the Cabinet Mission’s plan elections to the
Constituent Assembly were held by the newly elected provincial
Legislative Assemblies in October 1946. The League contested
the elections and captured almost all the Muslim seats; but the
League Council’s Resolution refusing to participate in the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly still remained un-
changed. It was the general impression that the League’s
joining the Interim Government automatically implied the obli-
gation of its joining the Constituent Assembly. The Viceroy
stated as much in his letter to Pandit Nehru. Mr Jinnah how-
ever denied that he had ever given such an assurance or that
there was any such an obligation.
The .Congress felt exasperated at this attitude of the League
which it regarded as a deliberate attempt to destroy the Consti-
tuent Assembly, to disrupt the Central Government and foster
administrative chaos. The League on the other hand charged
the Congress y.ith dishonest duplicity in appearing to accept the
Cabinet Mission plan but with an interpretation which killed
its fundamental basis, to the detriment of Mussalmans and their
interests. The situation developed into a first class crisis.
Strong representations were made to His Majesty s Government
either to persuade the League to participate in the Constituent
Assembly or to leave the Interim Government. The Congress
also .expressed its determination to proceed with the work of
the Constituent Assembly whether the League came in or not;
the Assembly was scheduled to meet on 9 December 1946
The British Government then invited the party leaders to a
conference in London and Mr Attlee cabled a personal request
to them to accept the invitation. Accordingly, they left for
England at the end of November and spent a week there in
holding consultations and discussions. History however repeated
itself; no agreement was reached and the deadlock remained
unresolved. On 6 December the British Government issued a
statement clarifying the position of the Grouping clauses and
giving its own authentic interpretation of their provisions. They"
said that the Cabinet Mission have throughout maintained that
decisions of the Sections should, in the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote of the re-
presentatives in the Sections and that legal advice they have
taken has confirmed that view. Therefore that interpretation
must be taken as an essential part of the scheme and accepted
by all the parties. The stand taken by the Muslim League was
thus completely upheld.
xvi INTRODUCTION
In the meantime, the inaugural meeting of the Constituent
Assembly was held in New Delhi, according to time-table, on
0 December 1946. It sat for a fortnight, disposing of consi-
derable preliminary business and adjourned on 23 Decen|ber
for a month. Early in January 1047 the Congress accepted
interpretation of His Majesty’s Government regarding the Group-
ing clauses, though the acceptance was accompanied by a bitter
attack on that Government. It was then felt that the League
members would join the Constituent Assembly, the next meeting
of which was fixed for 20 January. The League leaders were
not however in a hurry to call the Council before that date, and
once again the Assembly met w^ithout the representative
of the League. Further business was transacted at these
meetings.
At last on 31 January the Working Committee of the
League passed a lengthy Resolution reviewing the events of the
past six months, charging the Congress with evasions, equi-
vocations and camouflage, condemning the nature of the \vork
already done by the Constituent Assembly and denouncing that
body and its proceedings and decisions as void, ultra vires, iinalid
and illegal, and demanding its dissolution forthwith.
Even the faintest hope of a compromise between the major
parties was now finally dissipated and the political stalemate
assumed very grave proportions. Communal riots, causing
enormous loss of life and property, had already broken out on
a large scale in different parts of India. The working of an
Interim Government composed not only of such heterogeneous
but mutually hostile elements produced constant friction with
highly demoralizing effects. The battles of the larger political
arena inevitably had their vigorous counterparts inside the
Council chamber. A Government at war within and against
itself could not fulfil even its primary and elementary obligations
to the people at large. It was an. impossible and dangerous
position.
The British Government were now fully convinced that a
solution of the Indian problem by agreement among Indians
themselves was impossible. There was also the criticism in
India that, agreement or no agreement, if the British rulers
were honest and sincere in their intention of transferring power'
to Indian hands they should do so and leave India as soon as
possible. It was even argued that their departure might hasten
the solution of the deadlock when Indians were left to them-
selves. The fixing of a definite date for the relinquishing of
their authority by the existing rulers was bound to bring Indians
fftoe to face with the very difficult problem of filling in the
gap, and create in them a sense of healthy realism and a
chastened mood.
INTBODUOTION xvU
§7. BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S STATEMENT
OF 20 FEBRUARY 1947
His Majesty’s Government then acted swiftly. They had
made up their minds that the promises made to India must be
l4j^iV>ured and fulfilled without loss of time and British authority
over the country be completely withdrawn. Accordingly, on
.20 February 1947, they made the epoch-making declaration
that it was their definite intention to take necessary steps to
effect the transference of power to responsible Indian hands by
a dale not later than June 1948. They also made it clear
that as the existing Constituent Assembly was not fully
^ rq[)resentative, the Muslim League having boycotted it, they
would have to consider and decide to whom to transfer power,
.yhether to one or to more than one authorities. Lord Wavell
was recalled from the Viceroyalty; in his place was sent Lord
Mountbatten entrusted with the task of transferring responsibility
to Indian hands.
§8. DEMAND FOR THE PARTITION OF BENGAL
AND THE PUNJAB
The Muslim League’s uncompromising insistence on securing
Pakistan e\en after this declaration and, in the circumstances,
the clearly discernible likelihood of its being conceded, though
under duress, had an important sequel. The whole case for
the partition of India was that Muslims did not want to live
as a perpetual minority in the country as a whole, ‘as hangers
on of the Jiiajority population', but wanted to enjoy real sovereign
power ill areas in which they were in a clear majority. They
claimed that the whole of Bengal and the whole of the Punjab
must be included in the sovereign state of Pakistan, along with
Sind, North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan and
Assam.
The question of Assam could not really evoke a serious
controversy; it had an -overw^helmingly large non-Muslim
^population and the League’s claim regarding it had no justifi-
cation. The population of one of its southern districts, Sylhet,
had a majority of Muslims. At the most that district could,
if it so wished, be separated from Assam and annexed to the
neighbouring IMusliin majority area of East Bengal after ascer-
taining the wishes of the latter.
The case of Bengal and of the Punjab was much more
complicated and difficult. As the Cabinet Mission pointed out,
there are large non-Muslim blocs of population and territory
in both the provinces; they form substantial minorities in the
respective provinces — 12 millions out of 28 in the Punjab and 27
millions out of 60 in Bengal — ^and in certain wdde areas actually
constitute a majority. West Bengal for instance is predominantly
JE^iiAiu; so is East Punjab predominantly .Hindu and Sikh.
x^m INTRODUCTION
The non-Muslim people of these areas now began to urge
strongly that they would never consent to becoming a perpetual
minority by being forced into the State of Pakistan; that they,
}ike Muslims, were eager and determined to preserve their jown
traditions and culture and maintain their identity; that by the
same logic and reasoning by which India was to be partitions?,
the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal must also be partitioned
to prevent the non-Muslims of those provinces from being sub-
merged into swamped by majority rule. The Muslim League
denounced this move because if successful it would result
in *a truncated,* moth-eaten, dilapidated Pakistan’, instead
of its being ‘viable’. The Congress on the other hand supported
the demand of the partition of the provinces as an inevitame
corollary of the breaking up of India’s political unity.
Within a few weeks of his arrival in India Lord Mountbatten
was able to assess the situation in the country with all Its
implications and complications. He had had interviews and
discussions with party leaders, obtained first-hand information
about the terrible communal riots that were aflBicting many
parts of India and found that the demand for Pakistan had not
slackened but even strengthened after the declaration of 20
February. He ruled out United India as an impossibility in the
existing state of communal passions and in face of the MusHnrt
League’s determined opposition to it. He was convinced that
partition w’as the only way out of the impasse, partition on a
consistent and rational basis, and communicated his viewg to*
His Majesty’s Government who summoned him to London for
personal consultations. He returned to India at the end of May.
§ 9 . BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S STATEMENT OP
3 JUNE 1947
Alter aiscussions with Lord Mountbatteii His Majesty’s
Government agreed to and framed their plan for the division of
India. On 3 June 1947 a statement was issued to the public
explaining the plan and the procedure laid down to implement
it. First of all, public opinion in the provinces concerned waa
to be formally ascertained as to whether there should be partition.
If the repiy was in the aflSrmative, steps w^ere to be taken forth*
with to effect it.
Public opinion wag to be ascertained in the following manner.
The Legislative Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal were to*
sit in tw^o separate sections, one (consisting of members re-
presenting the Muslim majority districts and the other consisting
of members representing the non-Muslim majority districts.
Each Section was to vote on the question whether it desired
partition. If either of them voted in its favour, partition was to
become an accomplished fact as soon as possible. The Sections
had also to decide which Constituent Assebly they wish^ to
INTRODUCTION xix
join — the existing one or a new one. Boundary Commissions ^^ere*
to be appointed to demarcate the exact boundaries of the
separated areas.
The case of the North-West Frontier Province was peculiar.
In the* elections to its Legislative Assembly in 1046 the Congress-
party -had secured a majority of seats and a Congress Ministry
was installed in office. Two of the three representatives elected
by that province to the Constituent Assembly were taking part
in the deliberations of that body. The Muslim League how-
ever started a vigorous campaign against the Congress Ministry.
The situation unfortunately deteriorated to a great extent;
religious passions were roused to a high pitch and bitter
eorntniinal riots broke out in several parts of the province. The
League claimed that the issue of Pakistan must be specificully
pat before the masses of the population for a clear expression
of their opinion.
The geographical situation of the province was also a factor
of considerable importance. It was bounded on all sides by
the Pakistan area — ^Western Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. Its
position as a member of the Indian Union was not therefore
likely to be easy. Lord Mountbatten and His Majesty's Govern-
ment felt that unlike Bengal and the Punjab the procedure for
ascertaining the wishes of this province should be more elaborate
than taking the vote of its Legislative Assembly. They decided
that a referendum under the aegis of the Governor-tTeneral should
be held among those who w ere voters for the Legislative Assembly
on the question whether they wanted to join the existing
Constituent Assembly or a new Constituent Assembly, in short
whether they want to be included in Pakistan or in India.
Provision w^as also made for a referendum in the Muslim
majority district of Sylhet in Assam. If it was decided that
Bengal should be partitioned, a referendum was to be held in
that district under the aegis of the Governor-ijeneral to decide
whether Sylhet district should continue to form part of the Assam
province or should be amalganiated with the new' province of
Eastern Bengal, if that province agreed. If the referendum’
resulted in favour of amalgamation with Eastern Bengal, a
Boundary Commission was to be set up to demarcate the Muslim
majority areas of Sylhet district and contiguous Muslim majority
areas of adjoining districts, which would then be transferred to
Eastern Bengal.
His Majesty's Government also announced that in response
to the desire of the major political parties that there should*
be the earliest possible transfer of powder in India, they were willing
to anticipate the date of June 1948 by the setting up of an
independent Government or Governments even earlier. They
therefore proposed to introduce legislation during the current
session of Parliament for the transfer of power on a Dominion
Status basis to one or two successor authorities as may be-
« INTEODUCTION
decided by the Indian people. This would be without prejudice
to the right pf the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide in
due course whether or not to remain in the British Commons-
wealth.
Ill accordance with the procedure laid down in this stalerhent
the Legislative Assemblies of the Punjab and Bengal lESf in
two different sections, one consisting of the representatives of.
the Muslim majority areas and the other those of non-Muslim*
areas. As result of the voting it was decided that the two
provinces should be partitioned, the actual boundaries being
settled by the Boundary Commission. It was also decided that
the ^Muslim majority provinces of Western Punjab and Eastern
Bengal should not join the existing Constituent Assembly but
ahoidd have another Assembly of their ow'n. The Sind Legi^ative
Assembly took a similar decision and voted for a new Constituent
Assembly. British Baluchistan followed the same line. I^ese
developments took place in the last few days of June 1947,
Early in July, a referendum was taken in the North-West
Province and the Sylhet district of Assam, in the former to
decide whether the province desired to join the existing Consti-
tuent Assembly or a new one and in the latter to decide whether
it should continue to be a part of Assam or should join the
new province of Eastern Bengal. The Congress party in the
Erontier Province boycotted the referendum They had demanded
that the Pathans should be allowed to vote on a third alternative,
namely, a separate Constituent Assembly for the Frontier
Province only and leading to the establishment of a separate
sovereign Pakhtun State. The demand was not conceded.
The Muslim League party alone then participated in ' the
referendum which proved to be against joining the existing Consti-
tuent Assembly and in favour of a new ^ one. The referendum
in ^Ihet district favoured amalgamation ‘with the new province
of East Bengal.
Meanwhile, on 4 July, the Indian Independence Bill was
moved in Parliament and within tess than a fortnight was passed
into an Act. In accordance with its provisions two independent
Dominions, India and Pakistan, were to be set up on 15 August
1047 and all power in regard to them was to be transferred to
their respective popular governments. On the recommendation
of the Congress and the Muslim League, Lord Mountbatten and
Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah were to be appointed Governor-General of
India and Pakistan respectively.
PART I
IiNTHODl (TOKY
1 \ HUlhJ si Of Jill HKIUSII (O'liU SI 01 INDIA
IJ f Mil \ lllsloH^ OI HI! hXijI INDI\ JOMIWI
• 17)7
III INI- l.ltOWIIIol INDISN VDMINlSimilOS I NDfK I Ilf fXsf
INDI \ I OMl W) 17.')7 H )H ]()
l\ Jill I'UI l< \ Ol \SSO<I\IIO\ \\|) nil MOUl n MIMl)
UlloKMs IHOl IMOM II
\ ini' Mo\r\oi (nEiMsnuju hiiokms wd iiiJ' kioin
MNI.s 111 111 sI'ONsIHl I- i,o\H(NMfSJ I'll'J , It)
\l < nil I Msl \Stl S N\ni( H I 1 I) lO lllf \( 1 OI 19V) 41
J. A BKIKF sriiVFY OF TllK
(’OFQFFST OF INDIA
5I. THE HAST INDIA I'OMl’ANV
TiiE rise and j^rowlli of IJrilish adiniiiistralion in India is a
Conquest and ooinparatiN el;^ reeent necniTenee in tlu- pa^os ol^
administration Jiidiaii liistoi-x. It is eloselN coniu'eted uitli llu'
go together establishnuaU of iJrilisli siipreniae\ oxei* this vast
eouiitry. The aoquisition of a hi*» eiu])ire as nalnrallv lol
lowed h\ the development of a eonslitntional structure, (’on
quest, and ^mvernance were parallcd inoMunenls and were also
related to each otlier as caiisi* and etfiad. It will he inlerc‘stiu^
to notice very briefly the- iui])ortant land-marks in tlu' e\])an-
sioii of British authority o\er the Indian continent. Such a
survey will j^i\e the proper hacki^round to a stud\ ol the (‘volu
lion of the Indian administrath e s\stem durin*^ flu* last himdriMl
and seventy years.
One striking peculiaritx ot the conquest of India must he
Establishment rioted at the outset. Tht‘ task was not direct 1>
of the East undertaken and accomplished by tlu' British
India Company l)t*halt oi the British people* It
was not as if the King and Parliament of Kngland had de-
liheratelA set out on tlu ^rand military ad\(‘ntun‘ ot con(|uering
a big dominion he^Mind the seas. The British nation as a nation
was not inspired h> the ideals ot an aggi’essive imperialism, m
those days. The credit for building up the British emipire in
India belongs to a trading cor])oration known in history as the
East India (’ompaiiA . That lamous hod\ was a prixate shan‘-
holders’ concern and was tVamded in England h\ a spea-ial Boxal
(’barter issiuul h\ (^iil*en Eli/aheth in lOt'X). It was intended
to bt* a purely commei’cial organization and was invested with
the exclusive monopoK of trade in eastern waters.
During the first centurv of thd (’ompanv ’s c‘\istt‘nce. India
Powerful rul(*d by mighty emperors like Akhar, Jeliangir,
Mogul Sliah Jehau and Auraiigzeh. The> ereated in the
emperors in mind of tlie foreigiu*r fear and respeed for their
state. Throughout this remarkable period, the
Mogul power was mandiing towards its zenitli and Mogul splen-
dour was rising to its meridian, fn the hla/.e of tlii.s glor\
no eontemporary Indian could have suspected that the rise of
a commercial company in distant unknown England was a very
ominous fatality for India. The event could hardly have e\
cited his curiosity, much le.ss his concern or anxiety.
All the earlier efforts of the (’oinpany’s servants were directed
to the expansion of trade. Tfiey had no political ambition or
SUJtVl^V OV iJJUTIbH CONQUEST OE JNJ)IA
aptitude wliatever. Tlieir attentiou was oiteii loeu^hcd on
The securing from the Indian emperors special traclint>
* factories ’ of privileges and coicessiions. The o?il;v territorial
the Company possessions of the Company at this time were the
‘ factories ’ or commercial stations in different parts ol India,
which were not held in the exercise of political sovereignty but
rather ni the enjoymeni of a civic privilege. Private properly
could be obtained and ovsned b\ the East India ('ompan\
liy an\ citi/.en of the Mogul empire. No other pretensions were
allowed h;\ tlii‘ Indian monarclis
i2\ THE DOWNFALL OF THE MOGUL EMPJPL
The complete disappearance* e)l capable and powerful so\c
*Disintegration ^'^dgiis from tla* Indian ^tage during the eight eentli
of Mogul cent iir\ was ^tarlIing. It created a dange^ou‘^ void
ppwer 1,1 political and .social liic ot India. 'Fhc
Mogul i‘i!ipire seemed to liaxt* fallen into rum. Tlie mechanism
of its centralized control was completely paralysed. Seized h}
tlie forces of disintt‘gratioii, the noble and imposing edifice
which had filled tlu* Indian picture for nearly two centuries
bi'gaii to crumble to [>ieces lulerual rebellions and exlernai
invasions sbaftered the \er\ loundation and tlic fabric of it^
being.
In llus stale ot political confusion, tlici-e arose a keen struggle
Rifalry for existence and a desperate coutc'^t for supre-
empire and mac\. Ambitious \icero\s and generals began t(»
supremacy assert tlu-ir own independence and tlie subject
Hindu states began to regain their fn^edoni. I’lie East India
C'ompanx bad bx iioxx finisJu'd oxer a ceiilnrx of exentful exis-
teiK'O. They liad a(*(]uired a good deal f)f self-confidence and
llieir actixities had sometimes extended beyond the narroxv limit''
of mi‘re trade*. An •intriguing political traiisformatifui scene
xxas being gradually enacted in tlieir imm(*diat(* vicinitx and
tliey began to bi* deeply interested in tlie formations of that
momentous change. The pnjspect of acquiring territory exer-
cised a xveird charm exvn over the East India Uompany, and in
the end tliat commercial body xvas inex’itably draxvn into tlu*
xwtex of Indian politics.
A fairly long and fruitful contact had been establislied
An excellent between tlu* Company and sex^eral ruling princes
opportunity for hi India. Discerning obserx’ers in their service
the Company ]iad been able to gain an accurate insiglit into the
resources and abilities of their royal neighbours. They wen*
astonislied and delighted by the very significant revelation that
governmental authority in many parts of the country had been
fundamentally sapped. It had perceptibly deteriorated into a
condition of final decadence. The traditional pomp and pagean-
try did indeed continue to surround the courts of Indian rulers.
4 INDIAN ADMINIBTBATION
JBut that extornul emblem of glory liad ceased to be the vital
reflection of a strength that was real and profound. Behind its
flimsy gloss was unniistakably lurking a fatal and deep-seated
weakness, a profound and portentous emptiness, that cjearly
foreshadowed the impending doom of most of the Indian States.
This knowledge was particularly tempting to the more rnili-
XMreotors spirits in the employment of the Company,
•opposed to 'Chey beiievcd that the Company could build up
i^gressioD its own empire in India without serious difiiculty.
It was their keen desire to be allow’ed to take a fateful plunge
into that’ stirring adventure. But the Directors in England
were inclined to look upon such projects w ith considerable mis-
giving. They had vci*} little faith in the sobriety and judgement
of their Indian servants. Schemes of territorial aggression
appeared to them to be not only fantastic but full of grave risk.
However, in spite of the persist i*nt opposition of these distant
masters the men on the spot in India managed to indulge in
the fascinating game of empire-building. Their unauthorized
-exploits proved to be extremely opportune and w’cre crowned
with brilliant success.
THE EXTEX8TOM OF BRITISH POWER
The first, serious engagements in which the Company actively
The Carnatic participated W’er4j fought in the (’arnatic between
Ware the years 1740 and 1750. The French were very
active and influential in South India at tliis time and (*onpti-
tuted a strong menace to the ad\anceinent of the British Com-
pany. However, the French ascendancy s(X)n began to decline
and wdthin less than a century it had 1 ‘ompletely collapsed and
vanished. The dreams of Dupleix could not be realized by the
French power. On the other hand Britisli prestige in South
India Was considerably enhanced after the defeat of their most
■capable European rival.
The battle of Plassey which Was supposed to have avenged
The battle the tragedy of the Black Hole^ was fought in 1757
••f Plassey between the Nabob of Bengal and Lord Clive act-
ing on behalf of the East India Company. From the purely mili-
tary point of view , this historic event was little more than a
.short skinnish. The treachery of Mir Jafar who was the Nabob’s
•commander made a decisive contribution to the Company’s
victory. Yet the result of this battle was a change of political
mastership over the extensive provinces of Bengal, Bihar and
* The Occurrence of the tragedy of the Black Hole has l>een (liHputed by
certain eminent writers in recent years. Their chief contention is that there
is BO direct contemporary evidence from either Muslim, Hindu or European
sources to prove the occurrence and that the story was ingeniously worked
lip at a later stage by an o^cial of the Company, Mr Hohvell, whose motive
and veracity are not aliovo snspifion.
SURVEY OE lUUTJHH CONQUEST OE INDIA 5
Orissa. Eew events in history coMld be found to present such
a ridiculous disproportion between the insignificance of the
military effort and the richness of its reward.
The battle of Buxur v\hich followed in 1764 had an import-
The battle ance of own. Two powerful Viceroys, the
of Bazar Nabob ol Bejjgal and the Nabob Vazir of Oudh,
had combined with their nominal master, the Emperor Shah
Aiani, to resist the penetration of an alien intruder into their
dominions. But even the combined strength of these comba-
. tants Was easily shattered by their English enemy. This was
the first occasion on which the Compan;^ was involved in direct
hosiilit^ against the Emperor of India. That august dignitary
*had now shrunk into a pale spectre of his forimr self. But the
defeat of even the titular monarch of Hindustan by the East
TifSia Uompany had its psvcliological value to the victors. In
addition, it yielded very substantial material benefits in the sliape
of Diwani rights which the Emperor was persuaded to grant.
Warren Hastings became (lovernor-t reneral at a time which
The work pro\cd to he (*ritical for the liritisli power in both
of Warren India and America. The Manithas, Ihiidcr All
Hastin^g Tippn Sultan were opponents of a \er\ superior
calibre aiid lia* t'ornpariA s forces were etfectiveh routed h\ them
111 at least two engagi'inenis. The task of Hastings was e^sen
tially to preserve the integrity of the (’oiupanv's possessions and
to prevent them from slipping out of the Company’s hands
He aceomplishod it with (‘onspieuous success, though not with
a partic^llarl^ scrupulous regard for morals. Even in this
respect, however, he was not a greatiu* sinner, but a morf‘
unfortunate victim of circumstances than some of hi^
successors.
Lord Cornwallis \fas a man of will and action ApaH from
The campaigng several innoxalioiis in civil government which an*
of Cornwallis associated witli his name*, he condiuded vigorous
(‘ampaigns against Tippu SiiUan and firmly established Britisli
supremacy over a large* terrilor\ in Soutlj India His powe^r
ful personality gave cousiderahle impetus to Ilit* forward iuom*-
meut of British arms.
The subsidiary alliances of Lord Wellesley marked the begin
. ning of the end of sc\eral Indian kingdoms. Those treatie-s
WH're unique insirument ingenious in design as they W’ere
sueeessful in effect. The victims wlio submitted to their relent-
less operation exhibited an aina/ing lack of undei*standing and
resistance. They failed to realize that protection by the British
Tho gabiidUrj meant subjection to its authority. The
allianeet of incapacity to grasp this simple truth betrayed a
Lord Welloiley dangerous intellectual and moral exhaustion of the
governing classes in India The Nizam, the Peshwa and all the
important Maratlm Stales in central and northern India accepted.
0 liNDLVK ADmJSIlSTJblATiON
sooner or later, the contracts proposed by Wellesley, and thus
voluntarily receded into a condition of political dependence.
Lord Hastings completed the work which was so enthusiastic
Completion of cally begun by Wellesley. With the defeat of the
the conquest Marathas in 1818, almost the ^^hole of India pas&ed
into J3ritish hands. Only the two frontier provinces of Sind
4\nd the Punjab had remained unconquered, but they could not
hold out long. Hardinge and Dalhousie gave a final stimulus
to tlie process of absorption and annexed several provinces m.
<lifferent parts of the country. On the map the red colour had
spread o\er the whole of India before the momentous i)utc
break of the great Indian Revolt in 1857.
Tlie Revolt was the last brave attempt to resurrect Indian
The Indian independejice, but it was doomed to end in utter
Revolt lutilit;s and disaster. The nio\(‘nient did not lack
\igour. It attracted numerous fiery adherents. Bui a domin-
ant, cohesive and intelligent leadership was conspicuously lack-
ing. The organization and equipment of the rebel forces could
not be adequate tor fighting an essentially modern toe. Nor
(lid the tumult possess that innate volcanic strength which
<*hara(*terizes a popular re\olution. The attempt failed to appeal
in some parts of India. The majorit\ of the Indian peoph*
remained comparatively passive, and c\cn indiffenmt, to th<‘
rumblings and flashes of this stormy episode.
Tims, after a long spell of uncertainty and (‘onflict, tht‘
€oncluBion (’onipan> was successful in defeating all its oppo-
nents. Tt was indeed a magnificent acliievement for a (‘oi-pora-
tion of traders operating on foreign soil. The (’ompany’s vic-
tor;\ was at once a glowing com])limeni to its dynamic activity
and a disnuil reflection on the lack of vifality, vision and wis-
dom <So woefully displayed by eontemporary Indian rulers. Nor
could tliere be a iriore melancholy testimony to the eoinplete
absence of political iuitiati\(* and <onscious self-assertion among
the bulk of tlie Indian masses of tliose times than their mec^ha-
uical acquiescence in every luwv phase of governmentfil lif(* that
was ordained for them by their leaders
II. EAKLY HJSTORV OF THE EAST
INDIA C0A1PANY: 1600-1757
1. TIJUEE PERIODS IX THE HISTORY OF
fX^DlAX ADMIXISTRATIOX
As ihu hidicUi Eiupiro was stoa(lil;y built up b> the incesbuiit
The Company hihours of tlie East hitlia (’o)jjpany, that mighty
was a unique t-orporatiou soon actpiired a unique status. Jt
intermediary l)cic*anie lliti grand interni<aliar\ between the Bi’itisli
)uaslers of India and the country tliat was conquered, l^arlia-
iiKUilarN actioji ju respect of Indian governance primarily and
<Rrectly concerned the (’ompain. Tlie p(*ople of Jndia were
only distanllv touched tlirougli lliat jnediuin. The study of
Indian administration lias f)ierefort‘ a close bearing upfui ihc
changing fortunes of the J^ast India Company.
It has been pointed out by Sir (\ P. llbert that the hi.>tor\
•ol llu‘ growth of the Ifritisli power in India can be divid(‘d into
distinct periods. They represent the transition from com-
nierce to cmpir**, from tla* constitution oil a trading corporation
to the <U‘velopnii nt of so\ t'r(‘ignt,\ .
The first of these periods begins with the grant of tlie fiist
The first cliarter to tiu* East India Compain b> Queen
period Eli/<d>cth m ItiUO and co\t‘rs ncarl\ a centinw and
a half till the middle ol the eightei nth centuiy, after which
the ('()mpan\ (li*tinitcl\ tends to hca-onie a ])redominantly poli-
tical body. Dm-ing this period the sole ohje(*t of the (’ompany
wasti’ade, though for achii*ving that obiect the\ were invested
with certain politiiad powers from very lairly stages of tlndr
<'areer. Still, in all essentials, thev wi‘re an a^'^ociation of com-
miu’cial intenvsts. Their activities in India had to be conducted
on the sufferance of native nilers and in subordination to their
authority. 'riu'v imjoved important mercantiu‘ privileges
grant(‘d bv them and lii'ld certain factories or trading stations
m different parts of India. There was aKo considerable riv'alry
l)etw(‘(‘n the English Company and other similar commercial
bodies belonging to diiVerent European nations like the Dutch,
the Portugue.sc^ and the French
The second period begins from the battles of Plasscy and
The second P>u\ar and the conferment of the Diwani rights on
period till* East India Company in ITBo. Tt extends to
the final dissolution of the (‘ompany in 1858, when responsibility
for the governnumt of India was directly assumed by the Crown
and Parliament of Rritain. During this period the Company
acapiired territory after tcTritory fill their supremacy spread
practi(*ally ovt*r the vvhoh* of India. At the same time, they
lost their in(‘n\-int ile privileges and functions hy gradual .stages
8 IN DlAxN ADM INISTK ATION
aud shared their ten’ilorial sovereignty in diminishing propor-
tion with the Grown.
JParliament thought it necessary to interlere m the affairs o£
the Company after that body had undertaken the responsibilities
of territorial government. The first instance of such direct inter-
ference occurred in 1773 when the Regulating Act was passed
for the better management of the (’ompany’s affairs in India.
This period has been described as the period of ])<)able (Toven’j-
ment. The East India Company were the iminediate authority
entrusted with the administration of the country, and ‘^Parlia-
ment exercised supervision over their actions through the Board
of Control which was set up by Pitt’s India Act in ]784. ]\tan>
other Acts were also passed by Parliament to regulate and re-
form the affairs of the Company.
The third and the last iieriod begins ironi iHoH. The inter
The third ujediale agency of tin* Company was al)olisht*d in
P®*f>od that Acar and the system of Double (loxernmenl
came to an end. The Court of Directors and the Jloard of Con-
trol were replac-ed h\ tlie India Council and thi* Secretar;v ot
Stale for India. ^J’he government of India was directly talv(‘n
o\er by the Crown and Parliament of J Britain.
As llhert says, the first period is clearl^ a })eriod ol charters
Features of Thc\> were issued h} tlu* kings of Britain with the
the three approval of Parliament and embodied the privileges
periods and restradions that were defined from time to
time to suit, the requirements of i\ trading corporation. The
second period is marked by Acts of Parliament passed at almost
regular intervals of twenlx years and sometimes even more
frequently. These Acts endeavoured to outline an administra-
tive machinery for the ten’ilorial possessions which tlie Company
had managed to acqjjire after 1707. The third period witnesses
the development of a constitutional aud administrative struc-
ture after the direct assumption of autlioriiv by tlu* Crown ovei
the Indian continent. J^irliamentary Jegislatioii was specialh
undertaken for that piu-pose. in ri*sponso to tlje demands of aii
aw^akened Indian nation.
THE CQARTEHS
The first charter of tlie East India Company was granted by
Elizabeth’s Queen Elizabeth in KKK). It empowered the Coni-
Chsrter pany to assemble in an^ convenient place and
there hold court and ‘make, ordain and constitute reasonable
laws and constitutions, orders or ordinances for the good gov-
ernment of the Company, of all factors and officers and for the
advancement of traffic and trade'. The. direction of the affairs
of the Company w'ns vested in a Governor to be elected annu-
ally by the members, and in tw'onty-four committees^ each con-
sisting of an individual, also annually elected. The total
9
EAliLY IIIHTOIIY OF EAST INDIA COMPANY
uuiuber of members who were originally incorporated in the
Company was 217. Further admissions could be made from among
the sons of the original members or apprentices and factors
specif\lly selected.
The total capital subscribed is stated to ha\e been
Tlierci was no reference to the joint stock principle and apparently
there was equal voting power for all members irrespective of
■ tlieir contributions. The Company then came under the class
of llcgulatcd Companies. The members were subjected to
.certain* common regulations and hud some common privileges,
but eacli tra(l(‘d on his own capital and for each separate
^vovrfige. A group of subscribers v\onld organize a voyage and
accounts \Nere wound up on the return of tlieir ships sent out,
profits or losses being distributed among the organizers. The
eVirlier expeditions were not dirt‘cted to India but to tlie Spice
Islands. The third voyage, airanged in lOOH. was intended to
melude Tndi/i.
In lf)()9 flames I renewed tlic Charter of Klizalieth. In 1G15
Charters of power of issuing cfunmissions to officers em-
the Stuart powering tlumi to inflict punishments tor non-
capital offences and to proclaim niartial law’ was
gi\en to tlic (‘ompaJiN. The Compan\ ’s iijonr)pol\ soon l)(‘gan
to exedte jealous\ ; and eneroaehmmits upo)i their privileges
began to be made* bv an association started b\ Sir W. Courten,
who obtaini'd trom Charles 1 an independent licence to trade’in
the. East, ft was not till IGoT that this rival association v\’as
united with tla* I^asl India Company under tlie Charter issued
by ( ’roil 1 well.
Ill 1G()1 (liurles T1 issued a Charter similar to the oiU‘ issued
hv Cromwell. It legally rec'ognized the principle of joint stock
wliich liad been accepted in practice since 1612. The Company
were also given the right of coining nioiu^y, and jurisdiction over
Engiisli subjects in tlu' east. The Charter ol 1669 granted
Bombay to the East India (’ompaiiy for an annual rent of .tit)
By charters issued in ir)77 and 168"! the Company's prmleges
w'ere further extended. James ll’s Charter of ICiST em-
powered the establishment of !Mimici]);d C’or])ornt]ons by the
( ompaiiy.
During the period 1688-0, the qiU‘stion whether the Company’s
Parliament monopoly granted bv Boyal Charter without the
and the (*onsent of Farliamcnl was legal, v\as discussed
Company's in connexion with the casr of East India Company
monopoly ^ Sandys. The point was argued before the Privy
(\)uncil and the legality of tlie monopoly v\as upheld. The
same question was again raised in 1691 and tlie same verdict
w'Qs given. Parliament, hov\-(‘ver, passed in 1698 the famous
resolution that all subjects had an equal right to trade in the
East Indies and that, as Lord Maeanlay has amplified, only the
10 INDIAN ADMIN ISTRATION
whole legislature could gi\e any persoli or society an exclusi\e
■privilege. The constitutional point was thus finally settled,
though, in practice, the Company's Agents paid no heed to
Parliament s resolution and kept the eastern trade closed to all
but themselves.
By the Charters of 1693 and 1694 cliaiiges were made in tlie
<Charter8 of (*6iistitution of the Company. One vote was given'
1699-4 to each holder of fil,(X)0 stock, but not more than
ten votes could be possessed by one man. The Governor and*
the Deputy-Governor must be holders of £4,000 stock, and a
<"ommittee of £1,000 stock. The Governor's and DepnityT
Governor's tenurt' uas not to be more tlnu) two years. In
1698 the qualification for a vote was reduced to JfeoW stock and
that for a Committee raised to £2,(KK).
In tlie meanwlule, a new company had hc'cn started in 16 H 8
A new rivals of the old one. and after its hicoi*pora-
Company and tion they began to make inroads upon life mono-
•Oodolphin*B poly of tlie old (V)mpnny as Parliament had
Award declared monopolies to be illegal unless granted
by them. Attempts in the direction of a compromise between
the old and the new companies were made, but without niucli
success, fu 1698 the first Parliamentary ineasure was taken
to regulate Indian trade and (*ommerce, when the General
Society was incorporated as a "Regulated Company and jnost of
tlie subscribers of tliis body as a joint stock company. Tliesi*
were steps in th<t‘ direction of facilitating a compromise or a
<*oalition between the old and the new companies, ft was,
however, not until 1708 that the tinal coalition was (‘ffecled
under wluit is known as Godolphin's Awqrd, by whicli the old
Company’s cliarters Vere surrendered and all their powders and
privileges w^ere transferred to the new^ Company under tlie name
of the ' The United (Vnnpany of Merchants of England Trad-
ing to the East Indies
In 1726, in supersession ot tlie existing courts, Mayor s
Later Charters (’ourts were established in municipal towns like
Afadras, Bombay and Calcutta. By charters granted in 1730
and 1744 the exclusive privileges granted to tlie United Com-
pany were extended for further terms. iTie advance of loans
to the state at a low^ rate of interest was the price exacted
for the extension of privileges. Stringent provisions were
passed against interlopers. An Act of 1754 laid clown regula-
tions for the Indian forces of the Company in order that they
should be adequately strengtliened. The charters of 1767-8
allowed the company any booty or territory which they might
have acquired in their struggles wdtli native powers.
EAKLY HIST(JKY OF EAST INJHA COMPANY 11
§3. THE (ONSTJTUTTOX OF THE P]AST INDIA
COMPANY
There were Iwo classes into whicli the iiieiiibers oi the
The Court of Company were divided. The larger class was
Proprietors known as tlie Court of Proprietors and consisted
of all persons who held any aujount of stock of the East India
Company. Till the passing of Pitt’s India Act, the proprietors,
’ as being the body consisting of all shareholders who jointly
o^\ lied ‘the (k)mpan\, uere the final authority in the adminis-
•irafive organization of the Coinpan;s . Their sanction was required
lor (*\ery injportant measure that n|a> luive been recommended
\yffi the Directors. Legislative pov\(‘r was c‘ntirel\ held by them.
They passed all regulations and declared the amount of the
<li\idend. Four meetings of the Court of Proprietors had to
he held regularly during tlie year, extraordinary meetings being
summoned when necessary.
The proprietors were not persons accpiainted witli or experi-
<‘nct‘d in the active management of the business of the Company.
Tliey wei\‘ c.ot the (\>inpany’s executive. They wx^re interested
mon* in the dividends that they hoped to receive on the capital
ih(‘y had invested than in the actual vicissitudes of the Company’s
complex operations. It was believed tliat this detachment en-
gendered in them a sense of irresponsibility and a persistent
teitdencx to demand inerejise of dividends >ear after \ear to the
detriment of the getieral financial interests of the (’ompany.
.\ttempts were made to regulate the voting powers of the
proprii'lors Ironi time to time, by fixing the possession of a
certain minimum amount of stock a^ the necessary qualification
I'or entitling a proprietor to have a vote. Such restricting pro-
posals were made with a \\ew to avoid iiTesponsibility and to
guarantee that the voter who .gave his vole or made any proposal
iK>t do it out of mere frivolity. Hence the A(*t of 17H4
rendered this body impotent by depriving it of the power that
it t'ormerlv possessed, the power of revising and sanctioning th('
actions of tlie Directors. Tlie proprieloi*s llicreafter continued
only to receive whatever dividend was alh^tted to them, till the
t'xpiry of the (’oinpany. They ceased to have any influence as
political or adniinisl rat i^ e factors in the (’ompany’s affairs after
Ihe }eur 1784.
The Court of Directors was the other and the more impor-
The Court of taut body in the constitution of the East India
Direotors Company. Originally, in tlie charter of Elizabeth,
pow’or was given to the proprietors or inenibei*s to elect annu-
ally from among themselves twenty-four committees each con-
•sisting of a single individual. The twenty-four committees or
iiidividuaJs were, in fait, in sole practical charge of the affairs
12 INDIAN ADMINISTliATrON
ot the Oompany and formed the executive machinery and
directing brain.
It would appear that according to the original charter every
Cdmmittoes member, without reference to the quantity of stock
of the he held, was liable to be elected to the committees.
Dlroetora Election to the comniitiees, or— which is the same
thing — to the Directorate^ soon came to Be made dependent
upon the amount of -monetary interest that the individual’
desii*ous of being elected had in the business of the Company.
Thus the Act of 1689 fixed the possession of £2,600 sto*ck as a.
necessary qualification for seeking election to the Directorate.
The number of Directors continued to be twenty-four till J£54^
when i1 was reduced to eighteen, ‘of whouj six were to be nomi-
nated by the Cro\M». Formerly ]>irectors were annually elected
by the Court of Proprietors, but by the Kegulating Act thenr
tenure \\as increased to four \eHrs, a quarler of their nuuiber
being annually re-elected.
Tlfit' Directors diviTled themselves into various committee^
so as to facilitate tlie disposal of tlieir complex work b^ the intro-
duction of the principle of division of labour. To each such
coiijujittee were gi^en important charges like those of political
and mililary matters, finances, revenue, or judicial and legislative
malters. There Mere, for instance, the (’ornmittee of Correspon-
dence, the Committee of LavN Suits, the C’omniittee of Treasur\ ,
the Committee of Accounts, of Warehouses, etc. After questions
had been submitted to the respective committees Mliicli )iad
different jurisdictions, and after investigation and report by the
committees on them,, they were finally put before tiie whole
Court of Directors for formal sanction. Pitt's India Act consti-
tuted a Committee ot Secrecy of three menibers elected by ilu^
Directors from among themselves to can’V on secret correpon
dence^ orders, etc., between England and India.
The Directors had large patronage in their hands, practically
Thelp every appointment iu India being made by them
patronage Nomination to the Governor-Genera Ps post, how-
ever,, necessarily required the sanction of the Home Government,
as also to the posts of the Governor and the Cominander-in-
(Jhief. The various Acts that were passed between 1778 and
1853 left almost untouched this large patronage that it was
the privilege of the Directors to enjoy. It w'as a lucrative pri-
vilege, the annual value of such patronage divided among the
twenty-four Directors and the Governor and the Deputy-Governor
being calculated at £15,000.
The Directors were the persons who made tlie Company.
Thelp They managed the trade, kepi the accounts and
pewePi issued orders to the seTwants in India, dictating to
them the part they should play in the tangled political
situation of India in wdiich they hud to work. Their con-
EAlil.Y EJSl^OilY OF EAST INDIA COMPANY l;<
sent was necessary for the deciaratioa of w^ar or ratihcatiou of
peace. In short, every important matter of administration and
all lines of policy to be adopted by the Company were dis-
cussed and disposed of by the combined council of the Director-
ate. llie highest official in India, the Governor-General, had
to carry out their mandates and often, in cases of difference
between the absentee masters and the servants on the spot, the
. servants had to tender their resignations on acount of the un-
compromising and iinsyinpatluitic attitude of the Board of
.Directors. A huge mass of correspondence containing number-
less dispatches, drafts, orders, minutes and communiques passed
to ijiid fro between India and Englaifd and was the means by
Vhich the Directors exercised their superior authority.
Even after the creation of the Board of Control, though some
ofHlie powers of the Directors were diminished, the importance
of this body in the constitution of the (.^oinpany did not com-
plet.(‘ly disappear. Only, in pursuance of the policy of progres-
sive tightening up rd the Crown’s and Parliament's control over
th(* Indian conslitulion, Ihe Directors were given a somewhat
subordinate position compared with the supreme independence
that was formerly enjoyed by them.
The third agency in the constitution of the Company to
Tlw Governor whicli reference must be made was the Governor
and the Deputy -Gtn’ernor. The Elizabethan charter had
autliorized ihe annual election of a Governor by the members
from among themselves. There were no restrictions in the
beginning as to the kind of person who could stand for election,
'rhe charters of 1098-4, liowever, laid down that the Governor
and the Deputy-Governor must have stock of .4J4,000,
Tlie Governor w'^is, of course, the cliief i-xecutive official of
tlie ('oiTipauy and must have been entrusted with the duty of
seeing that all the wheels of the inachiiuTV of the Company’s
government were moving smoothly and iinclogged. He does
not, however, appear to havp enjoyed any ^L*r^ special po,wer
more than the Directors, though he had a larger share in
the patronage. The dovetailing cjf tlie various parts of the huge
organization of the East India Company must have been, how'-
ever, no mean task, and the efficient and easy dispatch of the
mass of details incidental tiO such an institution must have re-
<]uired some ability and skill.
§4. THE FACTOEIES AND PRESIDENCIES
The Company had to employ their own agents to collecM
The fftctoriei throughout the country the diffei'enl articles of
export- from India. These goods, as also those that amved
in India in ships sailing from abroad, had to be properly ar-
ranged and stocked. Special warehouses w^ere erected for the
purpose; so were counting houses near them. These, togetlier
14
LVDIAX ADAaNlSTKATJON
with the offices of the agents and the apart lueiits for local
business, constituted what was called a factory of the Company,
During the days of disorder that prevailed after the death of
Aurangzeb it became habitual for the Company to fortify these
stations of trade and maintain in them contingents of profes-
sional soldiers.
It was not till 161*2 that Thomas Aldworthe was successful
Their bi establisliing a permanent liritish factory, the
different first of its kind, in Surat, on the west coast ( 5 f
centres^ India, earlier attenipts to do this having proved
futile. During the course of the next few 3 ears subordinate,
agencies were set up in Ahmedabad, Godhra, Caluba 3 ^ Burhan-
pur, Ajmer, and Agra. Pactories were founded at Masulipa^am
and Pettapoli about 1016. In 1640 Fort 81 George was bililt on*
a piece of land secured from a Hindu llaja. That is modern
Madras. It was raised to the rank of a Presidene.v in 165J3. The
important factory at Hooghh' was established in 1651. Dac\ 5 a
and Patna soon followed. In 1686 the Company's agents and
council quitted the factory at Hooghly for political reasons,
and retired to Sutanati (modern Calcutta), whicli became a
recognized British centre after 1690, in which year dob
Charnock ‘ definitely founded the capital of India Bombay
was transferred by Charles II to the East India ('ornpanv in
1688.
The three important lactories of Bombay, Madras a)id
The Cah'utta soon came to be described as Presidencies.
Presidencies Each* of th(*m y\as presided o\er by a President or
Goy'crnor and Council, both appointed by coujmission of tlie
Company. The number of Councillors generally yaried betyveen
nine and tw^elve. Tliey were superior Civil Seryants and
ordinarily" seniority was the only test of promotion. Tlie
Governor and Council jointly- possessed all iulministratiy’e pow"(‘r.
Meinb^i’s of Council y^ere not prevented from liolding subordi-
nate functions. Very* often therefore they distributed all the
most lucrative offices among theinselves.
The Governor or President exercised control over the Com-
Ths paiiy’s seryants lesiding in the factory. He had to
Prssideiit maintain discipline among the younger members.
‘ Fines w’ere imposed for breaches of rules or misconduct such
as drunkenness, dicing, brawling or insubordination.* The
life in a factory corresponded to life in a club with a com-
mon mess, common prayers and common residence. Great
dignity and importance attached to the President's office. He
w'as usually appointed from England and received a salary of
^500 per annum.
Beloyv him were four or five Councillors who were senior
merchants in the service. Still lower in status were the des-
cending grades of merchants, factors and writers. Salaries for
EAIU.Y HISTORY OF EAST JNOIA COMPANY 15
each grade were fixed and proiiioiioii from one to another
Gradation of usually came b} seniority. Besides the regular
lower establishment there was a host of brokers hanging
offleialB about the (\nij|)an\ residence. They Avere irji-
portant persons. Through them alone could be conducted all
the vast trade which it v\as the ambition of the East India ('om-
pany to develop. The factories soon acquired the character and
status of ‘ quasi-colonies \
.The business transacted b\ the Company’s officials in India
Articles of purel;v commercial. The exports from England,
export and the chief articles of which were bullion, lead, quick-
import trade silver, woollen clothes and hardware, arc stated to
have stfTod at about t>60,915 in 1708 and at about I>92,281 per
Ajear* during the next twenty years, excluding bullion, the
average annual export of which (*ame to nearly ^442,850 during
t^e same period. "J’lie chief imports into England from India
consisted of calicoes and f>ther woollen manufactures, raw' silk,
diamonds, tea, porcelain, pepper, drugs, etc Their average
annual value during 17(tH-80 has been calculated at i‘758,042 or
thereabouts.
III. THE GROWTH OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE EAST
INDIA COMPANY : 1757-1858
^1. THE COMPANY’S WAliS IN BENGAL
During the reign of Auraiigzeb * which exhibited the premoni-'
Disrvpfion of sigjis that heralded the breakup of the Mogul
the Mogul Empire ’ the C;ompany’s factories on the ^est coast
Empire were harassed by Shivaji (1664 and 1670), who
also threatened Madras in 1677. Shaista Khan, the Viceroy
of Bengal, oppressed the factories in that province also. The
<3ourt of Directors, dominated by the aggressive Sir Moshiui
Child, determined about 1086 to abandon their traditional poligy
of peaceful commerce and to go in for active reprisals. They
proclaimed their intention of establishing a polity of ci\il and
military power — a ‘ largo, well grounded, sure English dominion
in India for all time to come Judged by the immediate re-
sults achieved these declarations appear ridiculous and in the
nature of brave dreams.
The days of disintegration following Aurangzeb’s death, the
European rise of numerous independent potentates with con-
influeneee flicting interests, the attenuation of the central
sovereign authority in Delhi, constant rivalry with other ambi-
tious European traders, like the French, were circumstances
which helped the Company to get themselves involved in wars
and diplomatic negotiations with native princes. The War of
the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War in which
England and France, fought on opposite sides, were utilized b\
the Eftglish and French factors in India as reasons for fighting
against each other. In 1744 began the Carnatic Wars which
<tmded in 1768. After suffering reverses in the earlier stages,^
the British power ultimately emerged triumphant. The profound
schemes of Dupleix, Clive’s defence of Arcot, the contest with
Lally, the battle of Wandiwash, are events famous in the strug-
gle. The material gain to the English Company was the acqui-
sition of territorial sovereignty over the Northern (Sircars in
1760. French influence was completely destroyed.'
Events were moving fast also in Bengal. During the pros-
Defeat of the perous rule of distinguished Viceroys like Murshid
Nabob of Kuli Khan and Ali Vardi Klmn, comparatively
peaceful relations v^re maintained between the
European settlers and traders and representatives of the Muslim
power. Cassimbazar, Dacca, Patna and Malda were the centres
of British trade and British factories. With the accession of
Siraj-ud-daula to the "office of Nabob or Viceroy, quarrels and
ADMiNlSTKATlON UNDER E.I. COMPANY 17
riicriiuiimtions corrniiencecl. They culminated in the battle ol
Plassey, in which the Nabob sustained a disastrous defeat in-
volving loss of power and, later on, of life. Henceforth the
Nabobs of Bengal became mere instniments in the hands of
llie Company who made and unmade them according to their
-c'onvenience.
In 1757 Mir Jafar granted to the Company an area of 8S2
The Ceded square miles known us the Twenty-Four parganas.
Districti The Company were recognized as the zamindar of
this area paying an annual revenue of Jis. 2,22,958 to the Nabob
•or Nazim. This has been described as the first territorial ac-
<liiisition of the Compan;v in Bengal. The Nabobs had been
himfbled, and though sovereignty <le jure rested with them and
with tlie Emperor, the Company were the real masters of the
situation. In 1700 Mir Kasim who displaced Mir Jafar con-
ferred upoji the Company the Districts of Burdwan, Midnapore
and Chittagong, covering over 8,000 square, miles. That was
tlie price of his elevation to the Xabobship. The grant was
ronfirnred by the Emperor in 1705.
The areas acquired in 1757 and 1760 are known as the Ceded
Districts as distinguished from the Diwani land. In the case
of the Ceded Districts all revenue belonged to the Company in
their capacity as zamindar after the agreed dues to the State
were paid. With Diwani lands it was otherwise. Here the
Emperor was the master of the revenues and the Cojnpany were
m(‘r(‘ly enlrusted with tlie duty of collection and administration.
In .their own zamindari area the Company established theii
•own collecting 3nd adnunistrative agency. In discharging theii
duties as Diwan various experiments were tried, including what
is known as the Double (Tovernmenl of Ijord Clive set up ii:
1705.
The battle of Buxar fought in 1764 was even more significant
The defeat than the battle of Plassey. The latter was a sue
<of the cessful skirmish against a mere viceroy of a pro
Emperor vince. Buxar an the other hand was a struggU
against the titular head of the phantom of a mighty empire,
assisted by his powerful subordinates like the Vazir of Oudl
and the Nabob of Bengal. The Company’s victory over Shal
Alain raised them to a status of pre-eminence and a degree oi
power which they liacl never attained before. There was ever.T
temptation to exploit to the fullest e.xtent the advantages prof
fered by the unique occasion.
§2. DIWANI AND CLIVE’S DOUBLE
GOVERNMENT
As the victors in the battle of Buxar the Company were in
n position to dictate their own terms of peace to the enemies
whom they had so completely crippled. Each of the powers,
the Vazir of Oudh, the Nabob of Bengal and the Emperor Shah
2
18 IN'DIAN ADMINISTBATION
Aluui, who had combined in an endeavour to destroy the Goin-
Thret pany's growing authority, was dealt \\ith sepa-
teparate rately in three treaties that were made with them,
traatles Their new status and relation to the East India
Company were clearly defined. It will bo seen that the, same
degree of severity was not shown to ever}’ one of them.
The Company had no desire at this moment to deal drasbi*
Treaty with eally with the Vazir of Oudh even though tlit^v
the Yaalr of had defeated him. The only action that the}
^®dh took against him was to deprive him of the two
districts of Korrah and Allahabad. Even these districts,,
snatched out of his possessions, were 7iot retained by the Com-
pany for their own benefit. They were handed over to.the^
Emperor Shah Alam who, theoretically speaking, could claim
sovereign rights over them. Thus the Vazir 's discomfiture in
the battle of Buxar did not bring about his total ruin. He was
merely put to the loss of two of his districts and a sum of mr^ney
by way of indemnity.
The Nabob of Bengal stood in a different position. The
Treaty with battle of Buxar was not his ‘ first offence The
the Nabob of Compaii} liad come into contact with him much
earlier, and that (*onta(*t had culminated in a colli-
sion on the field of Plasse} . For over six years after the Nabob's
signal defeat in that engagement he had been held almost in
political bondage and subordination to the Company.
Thus even before the battle of Biivar a deputy or assistant
to the Nabob, called Nail) Subha or Naih Nazim, came t<) be
appointed under the ordei’s of the East India Compaii}. Though
nominally a subordinate, lie was intended to exercise consider-
able restraint on the actions of the Nabob. In fact, if not in
theory, he was the main active force which regulated the ad-
ministration of the province. It was through his agency that
the ^Company could easily influence* and interfere with the
affam of the provincial government.
The audacity of the Nabob in. rising once more against the
PollUeal East India Company and in joining in the inglori
extihotiOB of oiis struggle at Biixar was punished by his politi-
the Nabob cal extinction. The Company did not, indeed,
take the extreme step of abolishing the Nabobship altogether.
The office was maintained, hut no real power or importance re-
mained associated with it. The Nabobs were henceforward
reduced to the status of powerless political pensioners.
It was stipulated in January 1765 that the Nabob should
The Nabob * make over the management of the subedari, wdth
roiigiii Mlia- every advantage arising from it, to the Company,
mat powor by whom an annual pension of 50 lakhs, subject
to the management of their nominees* was to be allowed to
him. The duties of the Nizamat, that is, of maintaining pence
and order in the poovince, were resigned by* the Nabob to the
ADMINISTKATION UNDER E.J. COMPANY 19
Cooipuny under this agreement. The responsibility for pro-
viding an adequate safeguard against internal lawlessness and
encroachments on civic rights and liberties now passed from the
Nabob to the East India Company.
Thtf Company selected Mohammad Reza Khan for appoint
iiient to the office of Naib Subba. The powers of the Viceroy
of Bengal were in practice enjoyed by this man though the
Nabob continued to exist in name. And as the Naib Subba had
now become entirely the creature of the Company, that bod\
could qflfectively control all administration from behind the
Curtain whenever it desired to do so.
Negotiations with the Emperor Shah Alam were conducted
Treatjf with with greater delicacy. He was not treated merely
the Emperor as a fallen and vanquished foe. Great considera-
ti^i was shown to him on account of the exalted status and
dignity which had been associated with his name. It was
agreed that he should receive annually Rs. 26 laklis out of the
revenues of Bengal. He w’as further assigned the provinces of
Korrah and Allahabad out of the dominions of the Vazir of
Oudh. In return he was induced to issue imder his royal insig
Ilia the firman of the Diwani which conferred upon the Coni-
pany the right of collection and administration of the revenues
of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the right of administering
(jivil justice in those provinces. This momentous event took
place in 1765. It is necessary to understand clearly the implica
tioiis of this new acquisition secured by the Company.
tri IMuslim polity the Governor or Viceroy of a province was
The offiee known as the Subedar or Nabob-i-Nazirn. tlf^
of Diwan represented the Emperor in all matters civil or
military. Sometimes Deputy-Governors or Naib Nazims were
appointed to function, for the Nazim who might be otherwise
engaged. The office of Diwan was created by Akbar in 1579.
‘ The Diwan was the finance minister of the province, responsi-
ble for the collection of the revenue, the expenditure of Gov-
ernment money and the dispensation of civil justice. ’ He was
not entirely subordinate to the Nazim and his appointment was
made by the Emperor himself. However, in the province the
Nazim had precedence and predominance as the head. Gradu-
ally Diwans began to grow in importance. The posts of the
Nazim, who looked after general administration, and of the
Diwan, who looked after finances, came to be combined in one
person as in the case of Murshid Kuli Khan in 1718. The
duality of the two offices disappeared and with it also the check
of one upon the other. The succession to the office became
hereditary in the absence of effective control from the Emperors
of Delhi.
In August 1765 Clive revived the theoretical right of the
Emperor to nominate a Diwan, and the office was conferred not
20 INDUN ADMINISTRATION
upon an individual but upon an institution, namely the East
Divani oon- India Company. A distinct and exalted status
toNd on the was thus acquired by that body in the official hier-
•Company archy of the Mogul Court. It legalized their
wielding of political power. The Company henceforth woirld not
4ippear as mere mercenary foreign intrudere. They were deli-
berately invested with the task of revenue collection in the three
extensive provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and with the
administration of civil justice in them. One month after the
Emperor s firman was issued, the Naziuj or Nabob gave.liis re-
cognition to the new Diwan.
It will be seen from this description that two separate con-
tracts helped in establishing the de fario sovereignty of the East
India Company in the province of Bengal after 1765.
(a) The earlier one Avas the treaty signed by the Nabob of
Bengal after his humiliating surrender h\ the
battle of Buxar. By that agreenient the Nabob
was deprived of his Nizam at responsibilities and
powers, which were all taken over by ihe C^/ompam.
The Nizamat powers imposed the duty of main-
taining an adequate police force for the security of life and pro-
perty and enforcement of the law. The\ also included the obli-
gation of maintaining efficient magisterial courts with wide
jurisdiction in all kinds of criminal eases.
The way in which the Company began to exercise their newly
acquired Nizamat powers was simple. They appointed their
■own nominee to hold the office of the Naib Nazim (or Naib
Subba) and through him controlled all the lower officials. He
was the chief instrument of their sovereign authority. The
criminal administration of the province of Bengal was thus
oasily transferred^ into the Company’s hands.
The other contract was made with the Emperor in August
1765. By this agreement, the rights of Diwani over the province
of Bengal were conferred upon the Company. Henceforward it
became the duty of that body to "make proper arrangements for
the collection of land revenue in the province. They had also
to maintain efficient civil courts with wide jurisdiction for the
trial of all cases in which rights of property and inheritance
w'ere concerned. The civil administration of the province of
Bengal was thus deliberately transferred into the Company’s
■ hands.
Once the Diwani was accepted, the problem was liow the
•ftia dllfleiiltj duties imposed by that office could be successfully
admliditor- discharged. On this matter again Lord Clive held
ing Diwani strong views. He was convinced that the Company
were not yet in a position to accept the de facto sovereignty in
its entirety. They did not have a sufficient number of officers
to fill all the higher administrative positions. The majority of
How the
•Goinpuiy*i
SoToreigntj
w^ ostob-
liihed in
Btfigal
ADMINISTEATTON UNDEE E.I. COMl^ANY 21
them were traders and merchants not adequately educated and
certainly not specially fitted either by learning or by experience
for the art of governance. Nor were they distinguished by a
reputation for that strong moral character necessary to resist
the temptation of self-aggrandizement. Also, the people who
were to be governed were so different in language, law’s, culture
aud general tradition^.
’ Lord Clive therefore thought it not only prudent but necessary
GllTe*s . the old indigenous machinery of goveniment
’Double ’ which had existed for centuries and with w’hich
OoToniiDtnt the people w’ere thoroughly acquainted, should
l)e retained as before, though it w’as now to function under new
masters. He adopted the plan of retaining all old offices and
^en all old officers and entrusting" to them their usual duties.
The Nabob’s office was maintained though be bad no pow'er
whatever. Following the old practice a Naib Diwan was ap-
pointed. The choice fell upon IMohanjiiiad Keza Khan who had
already been selected to be the Naib Nazim imposed upon the
Nabob. Under the Naib Diwan there was the usual descending
graduation of native officers.
What happened therefore was this. The rights of the eollec-
How it lion of revenue and administration' of civil justice
worked w'ere legally acquired by the Company. How’cver,
it w'as not thought possible or advisable for that body to exercise
those powers directly. The old administrative structure, at the
head of which stood the ^^aib Diw’an, was maintained as it was.
The English did not begin the collection of revenues; but they
began to sec that they were collected. The old mode of collec-
tion was left undisturbed. All the complex principles and de-
tails of land revenue iijollection were to be observed as before.
Tlie change was at the top, where the Nabob w’os replaced by
the Company. To this body were now transferred all the re-
venues of the provinces. This dual character of the system pro-
posed by Lord Clive led to its description by historians as the
Double Government.
Olive’s plan, though probably inevitable, was none the less
Its diBastrous disastrous, particularly because the Nizamat pow'er
results of the Nabob, that is, the power of maintaining
peace and order and administering criminal justice, have already
been undermined. The Nabob could no longer function as a
corrective to the Diwan. The Company, who had usurped the
functions of the Nabob, satisfied themselves by conveniently
imagining that the appointment of a Naib Subba was equivalent
io providing an adequate and proper administration. The Naib
Subba, w'ho was a creature of the East India Company, could
not afford to displease his masters by taking judicial steps against
English officers even w’hen they were guilty of a breach of the
law. The guardian of the public peace and justice, on account
22 INDIAN ADMIN18TBAT10N
of his impotence, was parodied into, a dismal engine of op-
pression.
Mohammad Beza Khan protested to the Calcutta Committee
Power that ‘ English gentlemen and their gumashtas
dlYoroed from trade in linen, mustard seed, tobacco, oil, rice,
rospoDsiblUtj hemp, wheat, in short, all kinds of grain and other
commodities. They force their purchase money on th^ ryqts.
They do not pay customs duty to the Sircar but are guilty of
all manner of seditious and injurious acts. They ruin ♦eTery-
body and reduce the villages to a state of desolation. 'Verelst,
Sykes, Becher and other contemporaries condemned in the
severest terms the despotic actions of the (’ompany’s merchants
who had lost all fear of control and responsibility. Nobody
dared to exercise any authority against their lawlessness. The
Indian agents employed by them arrogated to themselves a
position of superiority, overawed the Nabob and his officiers and
converted tribunals of justice into instruments of cruelty. The
Naib Diwan and his associates could appropriate treasures with-
out being detected. So far as the protection of the subiect was
concerned all government was dissolved.
The disastrous consequences of Clive’s Double Government
made it necessary that some other method of government should
be devised. In fact, during the next fev^ vears, a number of
short-lived experiments were tried for reforming the administra-
tive system. Some details about them have been given in
Chapter XLI. It is only necessary to^stato here that all autho-
rities' agreed in considering this period to be tlie darkesi in the
annals of the East India Company ’s rule in India
PARLIAMENTARY INQI'IRIES AND
ENACTMENTS ‘
Parliament’s attention naturally came to be directed towards
The Bntflish after the momentous events which changed
" nabobe ' and l^he Company’s status in this unexpected and im-
theip wealth precedented manner. Stirred by the exhilarating
circumstances, the proprietors began to chain a larger dividend in
spite of the Company’s bad finances. Ofticials m the service of
the Company returned home laden with huge fortunes. They
further took the liberty of gratifying their sense of \anity
by making a tangible display of their enviable but ill-acquired
opulence. Reports of Parliamentary Committees appointed after
1769 made the calculation that from 1757 to 1766 the East India
Company’s servants received us presents from the people of
Bengal a sum of not less than £2,169,666. Clive also received
« iagir, the capitalized value of which would have worked out
at about £600,000. In addition to this sum an amount of
£8,770,838 had befcn paid as ‘ compensation for losses inoi^d ’.
Every servant was also engaged in private trade on his ov^n
ADMINISTRATION UNDER. B.I. COMPANY 23
iiccoiint and, by an abuse of the privileges granted to the Com-
pany, extorted large amounts from the poor customers.
Considerable repugnance was excited by the spectacle of
l>help • these English ‘ nabobs Their wealth was
ParlUmeDtary generally believed to have been amassed by bar-
orlties barons and disreputable methods and to be tain-
ted with tyrannical corruption. Lovers of liberty like Burke
made spirited attacks upon the immoral system which could
producp such unscrupulous specimens of administrators.
' William Pitt described the ‘ rapacity, plunder and extortion ’
of the Officers as being ‘shocking to the feelings of humanity and
•disgraceful to the national character *. The question began to
agitate the English public as to whether a trading corporation
sjiould be allowed to liave territorial sovereignty at all.
Parliament therefore appointed a Committee in 1766 to in-
Parliamentary quire into all these matters and make a report on
inquiry and th(* state of the Company's revenues and other
affairs. In the following year, 1767, Parliament
passed five Acts. These prevented the proprietors from taking
<li\ideiuls larger than ten per cent and compelled the Company
to paA £100,000 a >ear to the Treasury for two years, in re-
turn for perrnissimi to retain their territorifil sovereignty. The
K'oniract ^\as renewed for a further term of five years in 1769,
the Company undertaking to make the stipulated annual pay-
ments in return for lh(‘ permission to retain their possessions.
•The assumption, however, on winch such an arrangement
Bad finances based, that the Company’s finances were
of the extrtunelv prosperous, was thoroughly groundless.
Company While the serv^ants of the Companv were amass-
ing colossal 4'oi’tunes,^ tlie ('oinpany themselves were advancing
rapidly tow^nrds hankniptcv. Their ‘ debts ' amounted to about
£6,000,000. Thev luaintnined a large standing army. Their
political expenses continued to he heav'v. Eyder Ali’s victory
m the Carnatic in 1769 and the disastrous famine in the north
in 1770 precipitated the crisis. The Din^ctors approached Lord
North begging for a loan from (xovernment, whidi alone could
save the company.
In 1772 Parliament appointed a Commiltee witli instructions
to hold a secret inquiry inlo the affairs of the Company. The
Company’s request for pecuniary assistance came before Parlia-
ment in 1778, and Lord North’s Government proposed extensive
alterations in the system of the government of the Company’s
Indian possessions. Two Acts were passed by Parliament. By
■one, a loan of £1, -400, 000 at four per cent was granted to tlie
Company, on whose power of declaring dividends some restric-
tions were also imposed. They were obliged to submit their
accounts every half year to the Treasury.
The second Act of this year is the famous Regulating A('t,
24 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
the provisions of which have been discussed elsewhere. This.
TIm Regnlat- is the hrst Parliamentary enactment which tried
iBg kci 1773 to modify the Company's administration in India-
The era of Charters now gives place to the era of Parliamentaiy
Acts. Henceforth a series of statutes were passed, usually each
at an interval of twenty years, when the time came for the*
renewal of the Company's Charter. On each such occasion
the authority of the Crown and Parliament was tightened and
the Company themselves were ultimately transfonned from a
trading corporation into an administrative agency.
The Begulating Act took the first steps in setting up a unified
system of administration for the whole of British Indium 4
Gdvernor-Gleneral was appointed to superintend and control
the governments of the three presidencies. He was given the*
assistance of an Executive Council. A siiprenu^ Court of Judi-
cature, independent of the executive, was also established. The
main skeleton of the present Indian Government can be saiil to
have been originally provided by this important statute. ^
The Amending Act of 1781 settled some of the disputerl
Pitt’s India questions, particularly that about the jurisdiction
Aet, 1784 of the Supreme Court established under the* lie-
gulating Act of 1773. It was, however, Pitt’s India Act of 1784
which placed the Company in direct and permanent subordination
to a body representing the British Government. It created a
Board of six Commissioners for the affairs of India, popularly
known as the Board of Control. The Board was to consist of
the Chancellor and one of the Secretaries of State and four
Privy Councillors nominated by the Crown to hold office during
its pleasure ; but it was never intended that high officers like the
Chancellor or the Secretary of State slipuld take any active
part;,. The Commissioners were unpaid and had no patronage.
They were empowered to superintend, direct and control all
Acts regarding the civil and military administration of the Com-
pany's possessions in India. They were ghen access to and
control over all papers, minutes, dispatches, orders, etc. The
Directors had to give obedience to the Board, which might dis-
approve of or modify the dispatches of the Directors. The
Court of Proprietors lost its chief governing power. It could
not revoke or modify the proceedings of the Court of Directors.
; The importance of Pitt's measure therefore lies in its creation
Importanee of of a separate Department of State in England
the measure under the official style of ‘ The Commissioners
for the Affairs of India ’, whose special function was to control
the .Court of Directors. One of the Commissioners was appointed
President, having a casting vote in matters of difference. He
^ For a detailed account of this and other Acts passed bv Parliament see
Chaptera XLV and XLVI.
ADMINIBTHATION UNDER E.I. COMPANY 25*
later on came to be popularly known as the President of the
Board of Control, and practically exercised all the power Tested
in the Board and acquired a position of supremacy. A Com-
mittee of Secrecy of not more than three members was to be
fornjed out of the 'Directors. Secret orders to India dispatched
by the Board were to "be transmitted by this body. The Act
thus inaugurated what is described as Double Grovemraent in
* the Indian administration. The Company’s oflScers continued
to be in actual charge of the management, while the represen-
tatives of Parliament, sitting in a separate body, controlled all
iniportifnt matters of policy and detail from day to day.
• By the Act of 1793, the two junior members of the Board of
Control were no longer required to be Privy Councillors. Pro-
vision was also made for payment of salaries to the members and
staff of the Board out of Indian revenues.
Measures of some importance were passed between 1793 and
1813 but they need not be described here.
The Act of 1813 was preceded by a searching inquiry into
The Aet rndinn affairs. Wellesley’s vigorous policy had
of 1813 affected the finances of the Company and a Parlia-
mentary Committee sat for four years from 1808 onwards to make
inquiries. In 1812 it issued the famous Fifth Report which is
stated by llbert to be still a standard authority on the ques-
tioJi of Indian land tenures and on the judicial and police arrange-
ments ol the time, Napoleon had closed the Enmpean ports,
and British trade demanded admission to Asiatic ports. The
Company fought hard to retain their privilege and put forth
various arguments against the opening of the doors of the east
to all and sundry. Their opposition was, however, ignored and
llie proposals submitted by the Government were embodied in
thirteen resolutions, on which was based the later Act. Parlia-
ment’s interference now' covered not only the internal adminis-
tration of Indian affftirs but it reduced the Company’s trade
monopoly itself, confining it tb the article of tea in their trade
with India. Parliament's undisputed sovereignty and discretion
to introduce any alterations in the Company’s constitution or
privileges w'ere once more demonstrated.
Twenty years later, careful inquiries were again instituted
The Aet when the time came for the renewal of the Com-
of 1833 pany's Charter. The C’ompany were now com-
pelled to close their commercial business and they ceased to be
a mercantile corporation. They were indeed given a further
lease of life for twenty years, but they became henceforth strictly
an administrative machine, conducted by the Directors and con-
trolled by the Board of Control as representing Parliament.
The Act added a separate Law' Member to the Executive Coun-
cil of the Governor-General, and introduced a highly centralized
system of administration.
■26 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
The Act of 1868 renewed the Charter of the Company, but
■Hm Aet not for a definite number of j’ears. The Indian
of 185S dominions were to remain in the hands of the
•Company in trust for the Crown until Parliament should other-
wise direct. The number of Directors^ was also reduced from
twenty-four to eighteen, out of whom six w^ere to be appointed
by the Crown.
Finally the Mutiny of 1857 gave the death-blow to the exis-
Th« Aet tence of the East India Company. The .Act for
18S8 the Better Government of India enacted that
India should be governed by and in the name of the Qiiteen, and
vested in the Queen all powders and territories that had beWnged
to the East India Company. A Secreiary of State with Coun-
cil was appointed to transact the affairs of India in England.
§4. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER
INDIAN AFFAIRS
It will be clear from this short survey of the growth of the
The Ckmstitu- East India Company's political organization, con-
tion of the sequent upon the territorial expansion of their
Company power in India, that the Company in the nature
of the circumstances had two different sels of officials io trans-
act their business, one in .India and the other in England.
England was the country of the Company's domicile. From it
were derived all their power and privileges. The chief controlling
and directing authority of the Company’s affairs resided in
England and functioned from there. The Company being ori-
ginally a commercial corporation, their constitution w as modelled
on the lines of suoh a body.
ft is interesting to understand liow’ the J^lrliament of England
ParllamenUry exercised its sovereign (control over the affairs of
control the Company so as to inoAfy tlieir Indian policy
in general during the period under survey, 1600 to 1857. It is
evident that occasions for interference did not arise frequently
in the earlier years when the Company were almost a purely
commercial corporation. The business of the Company during
these years had not reached that intricate character which i1
acquired during the later years of its development. The Com-
pany were tjie creation of the English monarch who had endowed
them with a legal existence through the instrmneniality of w
Royal Charter.
Very definite conditions as to the privileges, the constitution
1. The lesuing and the powers of the Company were mentioned
«f Ohartere in these documents, and any transgression of the
limits and restrictions imposed upon the Company wras liable
to lead to the penalty of the dissolution of the whole body. In
the technical sense of the term, the East India Company were
ADMINISTRATION UNDER E.I. COMPAIJY 27
at no time sovereign. Their powers and privileges, even when
great and undefined, were all derivative. And whenever cir-
cumstances in India made it necessary to hold new powers,
request for the grant of such powers had to be made to the
Crown which would then incorporate them in a new Charter.
Thus successive monarchs made additions to the powers and
Kav powers privileges of the' Company in response to changing
granted by environment and on an appeal from the Directors,
the Gharters Such measures appeared with great frequency jind
sometimes at short intervals during the century and a half
following tlie grant of the original Charter of 1600. The increase
,iii powers was often accompanied by detailed regulation about
some section of the administration. The establishment of some
^ort of judicial system for the trial of civil and criminal cases,
the establishment of Municipal Coi7>orations in the important
»<jiticK in the Company’s dominions in India, and the constant
alteration and determination of the franchise for entitling a
person to be a Proprietor having a vote, or to be a Director, or
a Governor of the Company, were matters which were regulated
by the conditions of the Charters.
It wiU be seen, therefore, that though the authority of the
Crown was not directly exercised over the affairs of the Company,
to which certain rights of sovereignty were delegated as a
privilege to be enjoyed under certain restrictions, the fact that
the delegation depended entirely upon the will of the reigning
monarch, who might or might not grant it, put a restraint upon
the actions of the Company and the freedom of their existence.
Ijegally they did not enjoy immunity from superior control.
The control of the Crown did not, however, necessarily mean
Parliament's the control of Parliament. The battle for civic
sanction for rights and liberty which the citizens of England
Gharters successfully fought with their monarchs dining the
period of the Stuarts liad only given faint indications of its com-
ing when Elizabeth granted the Charter which incorporated the
East India Company in 1600. At the time of the Revolution
oF 1688 and even earlier, the right of the monarchs to grant a
ijionopoly through the instrument of a Royal Charter was hotly
disputed and w^as, in the end, emphatically denied. The re-
solution of Parliament in 1693, to w’hich a reference has ah’eady
been made, declaring the equal right of all subjects to trade in
the east, was a reply to the legal claim made on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the Royal Gharters. With this definite shifting
of the centre of political gravity from the King to Parlianienl
and the acknowledgement of Parliament’s undisputed claim,
the Charters w^hich were the foundations and the props of insti-
tutions like the East India Company began to be issued with
the consent and in the name of Parliament. For the monarchs
w^ere substituted the people. The source of authority was
28 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
changed, though the form in which power was delegated and
control was exercised remained the same.
With the growing complication in the Company’s Indian
affairs arising out of their entanglement in the disturbed politics
of the land, and with the assumption by the Company of the
de facto, if not de jure, territorial sovereignty of the vast area
comprised by the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, tjie
nature of Pa^liam^entary control had to be adjusted to suit the^-
requirements of the new situation. The question had to be
decided whether a commercial corporation could be permitted
to exercise territorial sovereignty; whether such inffuenoe would
be benehcial to the people over whom it was exercised or by
whom it was exercised. The constitutional maxim that no
subject can acquire sovereign rights except for the Crown also,
made it obligatory’ that Parliament should investigate very criti-
cally the operations of an institution which had become deeply
involved in politics and military adventures.
From the acceptance of the Diwani in 176o and onwards,
ii. Papliamen- members of Parliament grew more curious about
tary Com- Indian affairs » and their leaders felt a greater res-
mittees ponsibility in respect of Parliament’s supei^dsion
over the Company’s adtninisiration. The most usual method of
exercising this super^’ision was tlie appointment of Parlia-
mentary .Committees to conduct detailed investigations into
Indian affairs from time to time. Investigations of this kind
preceded the Regulating Act, the Act of 1813, the Act of ItJBH,
and so on. Sometimes the inquiry w^as held secretly and every
endeavour w^as made to thrash out all details and thoroughh
understand the circumstances of the Company’s management
and rule. Voluminous documents w^ere later on published re-
cordiog the evidence collected by such Committees.
On receiving the Reports the ministry in charge in England
iil. Parliamen- embodied such of their recommendations as wore
tory enaet- acceptable to it, in •definite proposals for an Act,
and put the Act before Parliament for discussion
and sanction. Between 1773 and 1858 a number of such Acts
modifying, altering and regulating the administration of the
Company’s Indian dominions were passed by Parliament. The
time for the consideration of the Indian question invariabh
arose when the legal period for the currency of the Charter, on
which the very existence of the Company depended, was about
to terminate. From 1773 to 1853 at an interval of every twenty
years, Parliament had necessarily to legislate on Indian matters.
At such times it took the opportunity of reviewing the whole
situation and adjusting its legislation to the needs of the adminis-
tration. Even during the intervals it took the initiative in intro-
ducing measures affecting India in order to correct any defects
which required urgent attention. Thus the Amending Act of
ADMINISTKATION UNDER E.I. COMPANY 29
1781 was passed only seven years after the Regulating Act, and
Pitt's India Act only three years after the Act of 1781. The
Acts went into the details of the administration and circum-
scribed the freedom of the Company in the management of their
internal affairs, to the extent to which these had to be carried
on in accordance with the prescribed Parliamentary rules.
But the most effective instrument by which the Home Gov-
i¥.»The Board eminent exercised its supreme control over the
of Control Company’s affairs over and above the appointment
of Parliamentary Committees Jiiid the enacting of laws, Avas the
creation of a regular Parliamentary agency which w'orked as a
normal Qepariment of Government for the day-to-day supervision
und* guidance of the Company’s affairs both in India and in
England. Committees of investigation and Acts of Parliament
•citine sporadically at intervals of years. Their control, there-
fore, could not have the continuity that is secured by a per-
manent department. Steps w’ere taken to institute such a stand-
ing superintending authority by Pitt’s India Act of 1784.
The Board of six Commissioners which came later on to be
Iti powers known as the Board of ("ontrol was nothing less
than the superimposition upon the officials of the Company of
a board of masters, who were empowered ‘ to superintend, direct
and control all acts regarding the civil and military government
•of Indian territories ’. They w’ere given access to all papers,
■dispatches and documents. The Directors of the Company
had ' to pay obedience to, and had to be bound by the orders
•of the Board, which might modify any communications or dis-
patches issued by them ’.
It will be seen at once that the formation of an authority
with such vast superior powers inevitably degraded the officers
of the Company to #a subordinate position. They lost their
power, independence and initiative. A Committee of secrecy
of three, formed from among the Directors, w'as alone entrusted
with the examination and dispatch of important political and
military documents. The degradation of the Directorate body
as a whole was therefore considerable. The six Commissioners
were to bo named by the Crown.
The President of the Board of Control was almost always
The President a member of the Cabinet and the appointment
of the Board soon came to be recognized to be a party appoint-
ment. The President went out of office and came into office
according to the fortunes of his political party. In course of
time the number of members of the Board was reduced to one.
He continued, however, to be known as the President. Pro-
vision had been made since 1793 for the payment of the salaries
of the- members out of Indian revenues.
The President of the Board had enormous influence over the
administration. He w’as the representative of Pajrliament and
30 1NJL>XAN ADMlNISTKATiOiN
its coubiitutioiittl adviser ou questions connected with India-
With the support of that august body behind him, he could make
and umnake important decisions regarding the Indian Govern-
ment. The fear that he might deprive the Directors of their
lucrative patronage by persuading Parliament to abolislr their
powers tended to make the Directors subservient to his will.
Private discussions between the Chairman of the Directors
and the President of the Board soon became a normal prelimiji-
ary to the disposal of the vast amount of correspondence that
passed in ship-loads between England and India. The practice
also gradually' arose of private communications between the
President of the Board on the one hand and important •officials
in India like the Governor-General and Governors on the olffier.
By this unofficial means the President’s opinion on particular
questions and the general trend of his thought (ionld he ascer-
tained before any action was taken in India.
The system of government wliich was thus inaugurated by
Double the Act of 1784 has been described by writers on
OoYemment the Indian constitution as Double Government
(not to be confounded with Clive's Double Government men-
tioned earlier). As the President had Cabinet status and as
his office had no fixed tenure but changed with his part>, Parlia-
ment was able, if it so intended, to exercise complete and direct
control over Indian administration because of the complete res-
ponsibility of the British Cabinet to the British Parliament and
the consequent responsibility of the President of th(* Board to
the members of that body.
It is true, however^ that as the President’s salary was paid out
of the Indian exchequer and had not to be voted by Parliament ,
there was no routine occasion on which Parliament would havt^
the necessity to consider the Indian question. It w^as not so
with .^ihe other members, of tlie Cabinet /ind departments con-
trolled by them.’ Discussion necessarily arose on matters in their
departments when, at the beginning of the year, demands wert'
made for salaries, and other expenses.
In short, Charters, Enactments, Committees of Inquiry and
the Board of Control were the instruments by which the Gov-
ernment of England exercised its control over and supervised the
administration of the East India Company's territorial possessions
in India.
IV. THE POLICY OF ASSOCIATION AND
THE MOELEY-MINTO REFORMS ;
18fU-19U9
§1. THE KISE OE 1N1>IAN NATlOxN'ALiSM
Thkre wus one remarkable gap in all the legislation tliat was
No mention of passed by Parliament prior to the year 1861. None
India’s pqfiti- of its Acts contained any reference to the political
0^ rights rights or status of the Indian people. The millions
who were governed were not considered sufficiently important
to^deserve specific recognition at the* hands of the parliamentary
legislator, and were ignored in the scheme of the Indian consti-
tutional structure.
By tin* year 1861, the conquest of India was complete. What
Poiioy of was more important, the new order w’as accepteil,
eoneiliation more or less, as an accomplished fact by the
majority of Indians. They appeared to have bowed to the in-
evitable. The defiant and standing challenge of the vanquished
to the sapreiiiaoy of the victor gradually calmed dowm to an
mijqdible murmur of protest. A spirit of resignation and acquie-
scence seemed to pervade the whole land.
A generous gesture from the conqueror at this psychological
moment was bound to produce a very soothing effect. The edge
of Hostiliiy could be softened by a display of friendliness and
sympathy. It was also necessary that the rulers should be fully
acquainted with the trend of opinion among the subjects of the
country. The old Indian methods of ascertaining wliat th(^
people fell and thought had become rather crude and out of
date. Nor could they be properly assimilated and employed by
a foreign bureaucracy.
There w^as another factor .of great importance. After tlie
Retnlto of advent of British rule, and more particularly after
wetteni ‘Macaulay's famous Minute of 1834, the doors of
odueation western education were thrown open in India .
rmportant centres of modern learning, like colleges and uni-
versities, w'cre started in several provinces. They gradually un-
folded an entirely new world before the eager eyes of the
dispirited Indian. It was an exhilarating picture, depicting a
type of moral and material glory which was new to India.
The ideals embodied and inculcated in the new learning were
appreciably different from what the Indian had been accus-
tomed to respect in the past. The inventions of the physical
sciences were an astounding but pleasing novelty. They
brought visions of earthly happiness^ and comfort. The social
sciences also exhibited a striking growth. They began to pro-
432 IN'MAN ADMINISTRATION
pound dogmas which had hitherto been almost completely un-
known. Their interpretation and solution of the problem of
human inequality became more emphatically rationalistic and
fearless.
The history of western countries had also its own inspiring
intplrailon ‘ message to a fallen nation. The romantic stories
irom weitarn of the struggle for popular freedom in nations like
history England, France and America caused deep stirrings
of the soul in a politically degraded people. Liberty, equality*
and democracy became the most vital elements in t^ie new
ideology. The spread of those doctrines gave a new orientation
to social and political thought in India. It supplied a ne^v sense
of values for judging human institutions and human relations. •
In the light that was thus cast by western literature and
The Indian philosophy, the Indian began to discover himself,
national He regained his self-consciousness and recovered
•Congress his sensibility. An intellectual unrest soon began
to be visible in many parts of the country. The formation of
the Indian National Congress in 1885 was the climax of the
growing internal awakening. The Congress expressed and fo-
cussed Indian discontent against the existing conditions. Tla‘
Indian Renaissance eloquently manifested itself through its
impressive medium.
§2. ADOPTION OF THE POLICY OF ASSOCIATION
Parliament had to take cognizance of this psychological trans-
ition. Its attitude had to be adjusted to the new
situation. This did not mean giving countenance
to the Indian- demand for self-government which
soon came to be vigorously put forward by the
Indi^ leaders. In' fact, such a notion was summarily rejected.
Even Lord Morley, who had the reputation of being a left-
wing liberal in his day, could not imagine the possibility of
parliamentary institutions being conferred upon India. It was
felt by the Englishman that India was still for democratic policy.
To speak of parliamentary apparatus as being either demanded
by or conceded to such a backward country was held to be an
absurdity.
But the denial of self-government did not make it necessary to
Laner withhold lesser concessions. The Indian might
isbneassions not be entrusted with power over Indian adminis-
tration, but he could be brought into closer touch w ith its routine.
He might not be allowed to determine governn>ental policy,
but his opinions on some of its simpler aspects could he invited .
Explanations and replies could be officially given to points raised
in his criticism. A common ground could be created on whicli
the official and the ^orii-official could meet more frequently and
influence each other. In sliort, a small fraction of the Indian
TndU oonri-
derad oafit
f6r Mlf-
*gOTepiimeiit
ABSOGIATJON POLICY: M.-M. REFORMS
public* r.oiild be ufisoeiuied fairly (dosely with the administra-
tion of the country.
The polic.> of jissoeiation was thus a very much milder affair
OpportuQitieB than the introduction of a responsible and dcemo-
for contact cratic* government. It involved the c*reation and
the rnidlipiication of contact.s between the rulers aiid their sub-
jects, but not the transfer of political power to the Indian people.
•The main feature of the policy was formation of legislative
councils which contained a small number of non-official Indians.
At a lifter stiige, Indians also eame to be appointed to a few
high offv'cs including juembersbip ol the central :i)id provineial
executive councils. '
To be a member ol ii legjshilixt council jip])cjdcd both to
J^lie head and the heart of Indians: It \\as a new opportunity
it) iuU‘]-])ret the populjir will and t(> xpl.ain ihc ])opul.ir \iew-
point. TJie couiK'ils gjive seo])c both for the satisfaction of
personal ambition and for tlie \ cut ilation of public gric\ances.
The^\ s(*r\cHl as a political training ground, and provided a
Tiiediu}u for the hiw ful cxjacssion ol disconteni against the
actions of the (lovernmciit.
It n)a> be said that three miportjint .Vets were passed by
Aets cf Pjirliamcuit in furtlierauee of lb(‘ policy of associa-
1861, 1892 tiou. The Act of 1861 introduced legislatures of
«nd 1909 the new t,Np(' and made room in them for a small
nominated non-official eJemeni. Xo change was made in this
.irraiigement foV thirty Noars, after whhdi period another Act was
passed in lH9t2. This measure increased the scope of the legis-
laiure’s aeli\ities and strengthened the non-official element by
inaugurating, in an indirect manner, the principle of election.
However, it is the Act of 1909 which may be considered as a
well-de\ eloped product of the poliey of association. The Morley-
Minto Reforms w’liich were embodied in this measure are a
landmark in the histoiw of Indian administration in pre- War days.
( RITiriSM OK THE POLICY OF
ASSOCIATION
Tlie pf))ic^
The leglB-
latures were
not indepen-
dent bodiee
of a.ssoeiation was too meagre and inadequate
to satisfy the political aspiration of India. From
the Indian point of ^iew’ it had grave limitations
and defects The legislative council was merely
an expansion of the executive council. Addi-
tional members were added to the latter when the enactment
of laws was contemplated. The central legislature and most
of the provincial legislatures contained a clear majority of
official members even after the Morley-Minio Refonns of 1909.
The lawmaking chamber had therefore no independent existence.
It W'as merely an in.strument in the bands of the executive
3
34 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
authority and not a restraint on its powers and action's. It could
not sene as a real check on an irresponsible government.
The .structure of the legislative councils was extremel;^ nn-
Thelr . satisfactory' and defective. Till the Act 1892
strueture was they did not contain a single elected member. It
dalbetiie ^Qt the choice of the people but selection by
a foreign bureaucracy that made the Indian legislator. His re-
presentative character therefore suffered from a fundamental
deficiency. . The Act of 1909 admitted the principle of election,
but the total number of elected representatives that it provided
for all legislatures in India put together came to the miserably
small figure of 135, which was not ad(Hpiate to serv'e the d«no*
cratic purpose of voicing and reflecting all the currents of popu
lar opinion. The method of election was also extremely faulty.
The powers conferred on these bodies were very limited and
Their powers ineffe(*ti\e. All laws required their sanction, but
were In- on account of the standing official majority it was
adequate impossible for any measure proposed b.v the* (lov-
ernment to be rejected. The right of asking questions and
moving resolutions was extremely restricted. The council could
discuss the budget to a certain extent, and even divide the hous(*
on some motions that Mere alloMcd on it. But in the nature
of things no division could actually go «igainst the Government.
In addition, na^ a rupee of the income or of the expenditure of
the central or provincial gov(‘rhments^ Mas plaqed under th(‘
direct control of the legislature.
The Morley-Minto liefQrms uere hailed by sonic influential
LimitatiODB of leaders, both in India and in England, .as a con-
tho Morlej- siderable contribution to India’s political advance.
Minto Reforms Great hopes M’ere entertabied about the ucm
regi^ie initiated by them. HoM’ever, practical expericuice soon
shoM’ed that the only net gain of those reforms Mas a little lati
tilde to the non-official Endian to express his disapproval of some*
aspects of the Government’s poficy, and also to make a few
constructive suggestions. But the very exercise of those privi-
leges was distasteful to the elected members because there was
no obligation upon the Government to accept even very modest
proposals and criticisms. They often proved to be only* a cry
in the wilderness.
Those who were optimistically looking forw'ard to the estab-
Ditappolnt- lishment of at least some degree of popular con-
meiift eansed trol over the Indian administration were therefore
hy them disillusioned. It was realized that the totality
of the legislature's pow’ers amounted to little more than the
dubious privilege of an occasional and inconsequential debate
on a few public questions. And that too depended upon the
Government's pleasure. The parliamentary garb of the legis-
lative councils W’as not only deceptive but ridiculous because the
ASSOCIATFON POLICY M.-M. EEFOBMS :J5
bureaucratic govcrument coiunianded a clear niajoritj ot the
votes. There was an air of unreality about the proceedings.
Even sober-minded politicians confessed to a sense of over
whelnring futility in working such a poor sham for representa
tive democracy
V. THE MONTAG.U-CHELMSFORD
REFORMS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT : 1919
§1. THE GREAT WAR AND INDIA’S SERVICES
Within five years of the passing of the Act of 1909, an unexpected
Outbreak of overwhelming catastrophe descended upon the
Ihe Great world. The Great War broke out in 1914, ^and
ever} phase of national and international life was
profoundly influenced by the convulsive forces that were un-
chained. A revolutionary social philosophy swept away the
older ideals and also those individuals and institutions wdiich
typified and embodied them.
As a member of the British Empire, India was called upon
Servieof ^ the side of the Allies. The response
rundmd bj was quick and enthusiastic. All the resources of
the c.oimtry were placed at the disposal of the
British Government, fnditi’s contribution to the War in men,
material and money was remarkably generous. The great
magnitude of her gifts and the unswening loyalty of her people
•<*reated a profound impression on tlie British nation. Admira-
tion and gratitude were universally expressed fdl* the spirit of
friendly co-operation that was di splay e(f by Indians.
The Great War Was described by the Allies as a sort of crusadi*
Threat to against injustice, wrong and tyranny. It was said
ciiUlMtloD to have been provoked by u grave menace to human
<dyilization. The' right of the smaller and weaker nations to
«xist had been challenged. National honoui* and integrity had
been violated. Liberty, equality and democracy, which con-
stitute the essence of civilized existence, were threatened with
ruin.
England and her Allies claimed that their entry into a horrible
Ideali of war was not instigated by selfish motives. They
the Alliot claimed to be pursuing a noble ideal even at a
tremendous sacrifice. Everjthing that was good and pure in
human life had to be saved from destruction. All forms of
unnatural coercion and slavery had to be abolished. The moral
implications of the Allied mission were expressively epitomized
in the single word ‘ self-determination With that inspiring
slogan on their lips, warriors and statesmen bravely set out to
renovate a world in ruins.
India was also participating enthusiastically in the campaign.
Her soldiers werp laying down their lives in defence of the
freedom of other nations, yet her own political status was far
from satisfactory. She was a mere dependency, held in the
BEGINNING OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENI^ 87
grip of a powerful foreign nation. The right of self-government
India*! tiains was empliatically denied to her citizens. A coun-
of pollftleal tr} which was called upon to dedicate men and
dependanea money for the emancipation of niankind was itsell
compfelled to lie in political and economic bondacf*- The anomaly
\\aK glaring.
§2. THE ANNOUNCEMPINT OF 20 AUGUST 1917
A vigorous agitation M'as nalurally started in India for the
Agltaiidn far assertion of her legitimate claims to internal free-
Homa l^nla dorn, or Horne Rule. England conld no longer
refyse to entertain them. To do so Mould have been inconsis-
tent M’iih her altruistic professions. Nor conld the substantial
^ar services of Jn^lhi be lightl\ ignored. This combination of
circumstances induced \\ healthy change in the Englishman’s
attitude towards the Indian demand. The Indian public liad
been long insisting that the final goal oi British pbliey in India
should be clearly defined. Hut it required the shock of a devas-
tating war to induce the British Parliament to comply with tlu-
Tndian demand. On 20 August 1917, tli(‘ Seeretaiw’ of State for
India made n momentous (lecdaration on behalf of the British
Government.
The following important extracts wjlJ explain the natim oi
Mr Montagu*! the ideal as eonlenipluted in the annoimceinent.
announeoment ‘ The poliex oi His Majesty’s Government is that
of the increasing association of Indians in every brunch of the
administration and the gradual development of self-governing
institutions with a view to the progressive realization of res-
ponsible government in India as an integral part of the British
Empire. . . . The j;>rogress in this policy can only be achieved
by successive stages: The British Government and the Gov-
ernment of India . . . must be the judges of the time and llu^
measure of each advance.’
It will be seen that Parliament did not propose to introduce
No immedl- immediateh an\ sweeping change in the method
at! grant oi Indian go\ernanee. The mechanism of bureau-
of !!ll- crutic control was not to bi‘ suddenly transformed
gofernment responsible government. The process was to
be gradual and its tempo w^as to be properly regulated. In fact,
to the Indian mind the parliamentary definition of India’s poli-
tical destiny appeared to be disfigured by many conditional and
restrictive clauses.
However, in spite of these delects, the announcement was a
Prlndple of landmark in the history" of the British admiiiistra-
reoponolbillty tion in India. It signihes a new constitutional era
Mooptod For generations together, the Englishman had pul
his faith in the efficacy and sufficiency of the policy of associa
tion. He sought to provide an effective, even n paternal, go^
;3H INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
ermnent for the Indian people. But he had not acquiesced in
the concept of government by the Indian people. Now for "the
first time it was decided that the Indian was to be allowed to
wield political power in his own right. He was to be given an
opportunity to taste the pleasures and the responsibilities of
parliamentary practice. The formation of responsible ministries
was to be a new featme of Indian administration. The sub-
ordination of the Indian executive to the Indian legislature was
no longer ruled out as an impracticable ambition.
Another important decision was also announced at thi^ time.
Tlie SeoNtary The Secretary of State for India was asked to pay
of State Tialti a special visit to India and to niake personal in-
India quiries concerning its constitutional future. The
Indian problem appeared to be complicated and therefore in-
capable of a ready solution. The Government of India had to
be consulted at every stage. A full and frank exchange of
views between Indian leaders and Parliament's representative
was also considered to be very desirable. It w^as expected to be
immensely helpful in clarifying the issues.
^3. THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT
AND THE ACT OF 1919
Mr Montagu, the Secretary of State, arrived in India in the
Tht Montford "inter of 1917 and stayed in the country till May
Report 1918. Tn company with the Viceroy^ Lord
and the (’helinsford, he visited important cities like
Aet of 1919 Bombay , Madras, Calcutta and Delhi. Evidence
was invited Irom individuals and associations. Numerous inter-
views were granted and deputations were received. The tangi-
ble result of the investigations and of the collaboration of these
twcr authorities was the famous document which is popularly
known after its writers as the Montagu-Chelmsford (or Montford)
Report. It contained a brief historical survey of the Indian
administrative system and a lucid exposition of its growth. Then
followed a discussion of the different proposals for reform-
ing the existing system. The authors also put tonvard a series
of recommendations of their owm for acceptance by Parlianient.
The publication of this historic Report was followed by the draft-
ing of a Bill, its reference to a Joint Parliamentary Committee,
and its final passage into an .Act in 1919. The new scheme
actually began working in the beginning ot 1921.
This Act w as an attempt to implement the promise contained
in the declaration of 20 August 1917. It was essentially a mea-
A truiiitloiial i^urc which created, and served the needs of, a
measure transitional period. The purely bureaucratic
system was to be modified but not to be wholly abolished. The
principle of political responsibility was to be definitely intro-
l^KCiJNNlNG OF liESPONSlBLE GOVERNMENT 39
duced, but the extent a)id the scope of its action were to be
limited. The Indian constitution was to be cut from its old
moorings, but the final destination of responsible government
was to be reached only after several intermediate stages had
been slowly passed.
The Montford reforiiis were the earliest of these halting
<3ombinttioii points, l^he ehanges brought about by their pro-
contraries visions inevitably resulted in the formation of a
hybrid structure. An irresponsible executive was partially
placed ‘at the mercy of a popular legislature. Bureaucracy and
democracy were strangely mixed up and closely associated with
eaclj other. Tt was an unnatural juxtaposition of contraries
Vliich was bound to produce friction. In fact, the consequences
were clearly foreseen and special means were provided to remove
^fie difficulties that were inherent in the working of such an
•odd combination. The Act of 1919 embodied all the peculia-
rities and imperfections that belong to a stage of transition.
There were three main concepts on which the new scheme
Central and based. First, the central and provincial
provineial spheres were demarcated and distinguished from
ftubjeeti each other wdth greater clarity and precision. A
larger ineasure of independence w'as granted to the provinces.
The list of central subjects contained items which required uni-
formity of policy and control throughout India. The list of
|)ro\incial subjects contained items in which freedom and initia-
tive eonld with advantage be left to local authorities.
Secondly, the province was considered to be the most suitable
Dyarchy in unit for beginning the experiment of self-govern-
4he proTinocB ment. Tht* provincial subjects were divided into
two groups. The Resei-Aed half was to be administered by an
irremovable executive council as before. But the Transferred
half w'as given for management to a new’ class of officials called
Ministers. They w^ere selected from among the elected mem-
bers of the provincial legislate e council and were made fully
responsible to that chamber for their actions and policy. The
legislative councils themselves were greatly enlarged in size* and
were provided wuth a substantial majority of elected members.
The franchise for their election w^as considerably low^ered. A
part of the provincial budget was placed under their control.
Thirdly, an attempt was made to give a more effective voice
The oeDiral i^he public in the conduct of the Central Gfov-
legiflature ernment, though no element of responsibility w as
improied introduced in this sphere. The number of Indians
in the executive council w’as increased to three. The central
legislature w’as^also constituted on a more democratic basis.
It was given the bicameral shape. The upper house was indeed
extremely oligarchical in character and retrograde in its outlook
But the lower house w^ns expected to be more representative
40 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
of Indian political talent. A wider franchise was prescribed
for its election. A part of the central budget was made subject
to its vote — an important innovation. The Legislative Assembly
was given many opportunities to c'xnose snd tiritici'/e the atti-
tude of the central executive.
VI. CTRCUMSTANCP^S WHICH LED TO
THE ACT OP 1935
§1. EVENTS B1:TWEEN 1919 AND 19,%
The introduction of the Montford reforms synchronized with
DlMontent a ^ery inauspicious combination of circumstances
In India ’ Tlu* obnoxious Bowlatt x\ct was passed by the
Governn>ent of India in the teeth of popular opposition. It
v^as followed by the proclamation of martial law in the Punjab
and the dismal Jallianwalla Bagh tn^edy. The Muslim public
w’a^ also considerably agitated over the settlement of the Khilafat
question. The discontent roused by the Act of 1919 was natur-
ally aggravated in such an atmosphere of irritation and anger
In fact, all this varied disaffection produced a cumulative effect.
It contributed to the rise of a mighty politic^al ferment w^hich
found vigorous expression in the Non-co-operation movement
started by Mahatma (j^ndhi in 1920
The Refornis A(*t was denounced hy nationalist opinion in
The reforms India as being inadequate, unsatisfactory and dis-
denoNDoed appointing. Even the first Legislative Assembly,
which w’Hs composed entirely of moderates and liberals,^ passed
a resolution as earl> as September 1921 dcunanding an immedi-
ate revision of the iiew^ constitution. Three years later, pome
prominent leaders of the Congress entered the legislatures, and
under the able guidance of Pandit Motilal Nehni the Legislative
\ssembly passed an important resolution. Tt urged the Gov-
ernment to convene a Round Table Conference of Indians and
Englishmen to fonnulate a scheme of if'sponsible government
for India.
The Government then appointed a committee under the
The Mnddiman presidency of Sir Alexander Muddiman to inquire
Committee into the working of the reforms. Its report was
not unanimous. The minority was composed of influential
Indians wdio had actually worked the reforms and could therefore
speak from personal experience about tliem. In a valuable
Tninute of dissent they pointed out the defects inherent in the
mechanism of dyarchy and unequivocally condemned the w'hole
scheme. On the other hand, the majority, which included
Government officials, made certain minor suggestions for im-
proving the working of the system. The Government tabled a
resolution in the Assembly for the consideration of these sug-
gestions. The leader of the Sw^araj party moved an amendment
* The Indian National Congress, ijvhich represents advanced Indian political
opinion, had decided to boycott the Montford Beforros and bad not contested
elections to the new legislatures
42 INMAN ADMINISTRATION
to that resolution, reiterating the necessity of holding a Round
Table Conference. The amendment was carried against the
Government.
The Act of 1919 had provided for the appointment of a
The Bimon Statutory Commission at the end of ten years after
Oommlsfion it was passed. The Commission was intended to
make inquiries into the system of government, the growth of
education, and the growth of responsible institutions in India,
and to recommend an extension, modification, or restriction of
responsible govermnent. Ordinarily, it would have been ap-
pointed round about the year 1930. But, apparently in^ response
to the Indian agitation, llis' Majesty's Government decidjBd to
anticipate that date. In November 1927 they made tBc
announcement that a Statutory Commission under the presidency
of 8ir John Simon would be immediately sent out to India.
Unfortunately, a step which was intended to appease and to
lU bojeott pacify Indian unrest only succeeded in producing
the contrary result, and alienated and embittered Indian feel-
ing to even a greater extent than before. Parliament thought it
proper not to include a single Indian in the personnel of a Com-
mission w’hich w’as specially asked to investigate into and to sit
in judgement upon the political aptitudes, achievements and
aspirations of India. This exclusion was liumiliating to Indian
self-respect and was keenly resented. The Simon Commission
was boycotted even by the Indian Liberals. Its Report, whicli
WHS published in ]93(), was received with a chorus of (*ondeni-
nation.
In the iiieantime, there was a change of government in
The Labour England. The Labour Party was established in
<3fOverninent office if not in power. Great expectations were
raised in India on iiccount of its adveift because it had fre-
quently, professed sympathy with Indian ambitions. The Labour
Ministry soon decided that a Round Table Conference should
be convened to discuss the constitutional future of India.
Indian leaders were invited to participate in its deliberations
and to help in the framing of a suitable constitutional structure.
However, this decision did not convey the clear assurance
The ciril l^hat the ultimate object of Parliament w^as to
Dlsob^euee confer Dominion Status on India. The Indian
Movement ardently looking forward to a declaration of
this kind. To him, the realization of that ideal was a simple
birth-right, not to be questioned, and therefore its omission
from the announcement about the Round Table Conference
was construed as an insult to the Indian nation. The Indian
National Congress declined to take pari in the proceedings of
the Conference and launched the Civil Disobedience Movement
in right earnest. Thousands of Indian men and w^omen inten-
tionally broke certain *laws and thus courted arrest and im-
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO ACT OF 1935 43
prisonment. The country at last came to be governed by a
series of ordinances.
§2. THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCES AND
THE ACT OP 1935
The first Round Table Conference was opened in London
The Gandhi- by King George V in the Second week of Novein-
I^wln Pact her 1930. Its deliberations lasted for ten weeks.
After it had dispersed, a vigorous effort was made in India to
bring about a* reconciliation and truce between the Government
and the ^Indian National Congress. Most of the imprisoned
leader^ and Iheir followers were released. Lord Irwin the
ViT*eroy, held prolonged conversations with Mahatma Gandhi
and a settlement; satisfactory to both parties was ultimately
arri^^id at. The terms of the agreement were* published by the
tjoverninent of India and the Non-co-operation Movement was
called off. Mahatma Gandhi later on proceeded to England to
attend the second Round Table Conference which was con-
vened towards the end of 1931.
But during this interval, an unexpected change had taken
The second pla(*e in the British political situation. The great
economic depression had produced a grave national
<*risis. The Labour Party was disrupted and had gone out of
office. A National Government was specially brought into
existence to manage the affairs of the state. It was predomin-
antly conservative in c-haracter and was not particularly enthusi-
astic to accelerate India's political advance. There was also
^mother very disquieting factor. The differences between
llindihs and Muslims appeared to be quite irreconcilable. An
iigreed solution of the communal problem was found to be im-
possible. The second Round Table Conference therefore ended
inconclusively. The communal question w'as referi’ed to the
arbitration of the Prime Minister.
Jn the meantime, circumstances in India had taken a very
unhappy turn. After the return of Mahatma
Communal Gandhi from England at the beginning of 1932,
Award and the the Civil Disobedience Movement w’as revived and
Poona Pact leader and a number of others were sent to jail.
The Prime Minister’s award on the communal question was
published a few' months later and the world was staggered by the
announcement that Mahatma Gandhi had decided to fast unto
death as a protest against some of the clauses of the award
which referred to the Depressed Classes (or scheduled castes,
also called Harijans) of Hindu society. Hurried conversations
and negotiations were held behind prison bars, and ultimately
an agreement was reached. It w^as embodied in what has been
since known as the Poona Pact. The .Communal Aw^ard was
modified accordingly and the historic fast came to a happy end.
44 liVDIAN ADMINISTRATION
Late in 19ti2, the third Bound Table Conference was con-
The Aet of vened in London. It considered the reports of
IMS various sub-committees appointed previously and
formulated its own recommendations before dispersing at the
end of 1932. These recommendations were considered by His
Majesty's Government, and in March 1983 the latter published
a White Paper containing their own proposals. These were con-
sidered by a Joint Committee of both the Houses of Parliament
in consultation with a few Indian representatives nominated by
the Government. After the publication of that Committee’s
report a Bill was introduced in Parliament to give concrete
shape to the net achievement of such prolonged investigations
and discussions and to translate them into practical feality.
The Bill was finally passed as an Aci in September 1935.
Tims an eventful chapter in the constitutional history of
Ckineluiini India came to an end. The sending oui of the
Simon Commission three years before the appointed date vva^
regarded as a special gesture of parliamentary sympathy with
the Indian desire for a speedy revision of the Montford constitu-
tion. Yet not less than ten years were to ('lapse before any
concrete results could be achieved. The new consiitution was
partially inaugurated on 1 April 1937. It was a long period of
expeclancy and suspense which tried Indian patience, and at the
end there appeared to be no adequate compensation for thc'
delay in the shape of a new constituihuial structure which fuli^
satisfied India’s political aspirations.
§3. THE TWO BRANCHES OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION
Unlike most of the pre-British conquerors of India, the
Neeesffry British did not abandon their country and per-
dualisfri manently settle in the land of their conquest. The
Mussalman invaders of India, for instance, made India their
home even though they originally belonged to Central Asia. To
the British, Great Britain is the vital centre of imperial activity,
that little island is the pqint of convergence of a vast empire.
The British rule over Iqdia from Britain, and the Indian ad-
ministrative structure has therefore to take cognizance of two
distinct entities. One is the country which is governed and th(‘
other is the nation which governs it. The tw^o stand apart from
each other. The distance between them is not only political
and racial but it is also geographical.
The ultimate authority is naturally exercised by the sovereign
Two kinds of people from their island home. They appoint an
anthorlty agent in England to function on their behalf and
to keep in the closest touch with them. In this agent are
vested the supreme powers of supervision over the Indian offi-
cials. He reflects the opinions and moods of the British demos.
(’lii('UMSTA^.C>:s LEADING TO ACT OF W-io 45
On the other hand, the work of actually governing the con-
quered tenitory is entrusted to a body of officers who have to
work and live in India itself. They are the men on the spot
wlm are. in direc't contact with the subject population.
The Indian administrative inacliine is therefore divided into
Two branches branches. One operates in India, and is of
«f adminii- course nnich the biggt'r in bulk and extent. It
Iration is composed of the Government of India and the
l^rovincial Govern me nts. The other operates in England and
serves as the instrument for enforcing the will of the sovereign.
Ft consists of* the Secretary of State, his Advisers, and their
^establishment known as the India Office, in the interests of
^•larity, it is best to niake an independent study of each branch
and^also of their mutual relations, aild this method is adopted
jin tne following pages.
PART II
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION IN ENGLAND
OR
THE ‘HOME’ GOVERNMENT
VII. THE HECRBTAKY OF HT.YTK FOR INDl.V . . . . 47
VIII. THE IXDIA COUNCII. AM> THE SEOKKTARV OF STATE'S .
ADVISERS . . . . . . . . 59
IX. THE HlOH COMMISSIONER FOR INDIA . . 65
X. P.ARL1AMENT AND INI>I\ .72
VII. THE SECRETARY OP STATE FOR
INDIA
§1. QUALDMGATIONS AND APPOINTMENT
The East India Coiupuii^ was abolished in 1858. Control over
Creation of Indian administration was vested thereafter in the
the office , Grown and Parliament of Britain. For the ade-
quate and efficient fulfilment of those resprmsibilities, a new
post of /I principal Secretary o( State was created. To ^im
wore fransferred all the duties and fun(*tions that were formerly
performed by the (V)urt of Direciors rUid the Board of Control.
Likfe’ all British Ministers, the Secretary of State for India is
a representative and a scr\aiit of Parliament. Through him
are exercised the sovereign powers of that supreme body.
The Secretary of Stale must bo a member of Parliament,
Ho muit be sitting either in the House of (V)innions or in the
a member of House of Lords. On very rare o(*casions it may
Parliament happen that he is nominated to office when la* is
not a member of either House. But it is distinctly laid dow*n
that within six months of siadi a nomination he lunst find a
seat for himself in the legislature. This mH\ he done in two
w'ays. A sympathetic* and obliging friend may purposely resign
his own seat in tin* Ilonse of CVniimons and the Secretary of
State may then successfullv (*ontest that vaeanev . Or he may
l)(‘ created a poc^r aJid elevated to the* House of Lords.
The S(*( retary of State is not only a member of Parliament
He is also in but is also gi\eii a place in its inner council, whicli
tbe Cabinet is knowq as tbc ('abinet. Membership of the
Cabinet is an exalted political status. Its altainmeut neces-
sarily implies the possession of several outstanding qualities.
All goyeriimentaL powers in the British democracy an* eont?on-
Irated in the Cabinet. It is an assembly of some of the most
t'fnineni, intelligent and popular polithail loaders in the country.
1’hey belong to tlie same painty and are bound to each other by
an affinity of opinions and principles. The C^ibiiiot can be aptly
described as the primum viohilc of flic British constitutional
machine.
The fact, that the Secretary of State for India is one of the
Quallfieatlons h^reinost constituents of the British Cabinet is
of tbt therefore significant. It automatically prescribes
notary of qualities wliieh tlie holder of that post is expected
to possess. He should have considerable reputa-
tion and influence in tlie public life of Britain. He should bo
closely associated with a political party and prominent in its
counsels and leadership. It is not necessary that he should
have acquired first-hand knowledge of India and its problems.
48 liN pr AN ADMINISTRATION
He is not bupposod to liuve a personal study of the history
jind geography of Jndia or of its political and econoiiiie conditions
before he assumes office. His general intellectual training and
the assistance of experienced permanent officials are expected to
give him a proper perspective in the performance of his (iuties.
Tlie distribution of portfolios among members of the Cabinet
Hig js efiPe(*ted principally on the initiative of the
.appointment leader of the parly in power. It is usually donfe in
(ionsultation with tlie important party lunnnaries. The maxi-
mum r)f efficiency is aimed at in selecting different individuals
for different tasks. The (*hoice of the Secretary of State for
India can be said to be made chiefly by the Prime* Minister
after an exchange of view’s wdth his prominent associates.
§2. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE (’ABINET
Like all Ministers in the Cabinet, the Secretary of State i?»
Prevloni oon- responsible, in the first instance, to his immediate
dNilUtion with colleagues. He mnst keep them adequately in-
wcolloa^oi formed of all new lines of action that he may pro-
pose to adopt in his department. The wider aspects of his policy
must be fully explained to them and discussed with them. Their
assent and support are required for all important innovations.
No decision can be aimoimced as the decision of His Majesty’s
(lovernment unless agreement has been previously reached about
it among the majority of the Cabiiiet. Then only does it be-
come the collective responsibility of the whole unit.
The Cabinet exists and fimctioiis as an indivisible entit\ .
Differtnoes Its members profess the same political faith and
with them ow’e allegiance to the same political party. They
are heirs to a common legacy of the saine traditions and philo-
sophy.^ Disagreement between them would therefore pertain
rather to details and degrees than to fundamental principles.
However, sometimes the unexpected may happen. Serious
differences may arise between the Prime Minister and any ol
his colleagues or between one Minister and the rest of the
•Cabinet. In 1923, for instance, Mr Montagu incurred the in-
tense displeasure of his chief, Mr Lloyd George. As recently as
1936, the repudiation by the Cabinet of the Hoare-Laval Pact
was equivalent to a condemnation of llie Foreign Soerelary, Sir
Samuel Hoare.
Tn such exceptional cases, the only honourable alternative
Their for a dissenting member is to resign liis office,
'eoneequeneeg He must obviously part company with political
comrades when he has ceased to believe in their politics. Both
Mr Montagu and Sir Samuel Hoare, in the examples quoted
'above, tendered resignations of their ministerial office as soon as
« grave divergence wasi discovered between them and their colle-
agues. For the same reason Mr Anthony Eden resigned the
49
THE SECRETAIIY OF STATE FOB INDIA
f)osi of foreign Secretary in 1938. The Prime Minister and
other members of the Cabinet can compel an intractable com-
panion to make his immediate exit from the official fold. No
violently discordant element can be tolerated in the innermost
council of the State.
§3. RESPONSIBILITY TO PARLIAMENT
*As has been stated before, the relations of the Secretary of
Subordination State with Parliament are those of servant witli
to parliament master. Fie is essentially the interpreter of the
parliamentary will and tlie instrument of its authority. His
obedience to that body is absolute and complete. He continues
be in office only so long as Parliament desires that he should
be. Even a faint indication of Parliament’s disapproval of his
ro^lducl IS sufficient to precipitate his downfall. Any member
of that cliamber can put questions to him. He must supply all
information and give satisfactory explanations. His actions can
be Mibiected to the most searching criticism. In the last resort,
lie is liable to dismissal by a vote of the legislature.
In consistence with British parliamentary^ practice, the
Tenure of Secretary of State for India, as a member of the
•office ( abinet, comes into office with his part.y and goes
out with it. The (’abinet works on the principle of joint res-
ponsibility. It remains in power only so long ns it enjoys the
<‘onti(lence of Parliament. There can be no fixity of tenure
under such a system. The life of Parliament' is prescribed to
he fi\e years, unless it is dissolved earlier. So the maximum
period of office that the Secretary of State can enjoy at a stretch
is ti\e years. In actual practice it is found to be much less
h(*('ause it is determined by the exigencies of British polities.
§4. THE UNDER-SECRETARIES AND THE
INDIA OFFICE
Tlie Secretary of State for India, like other Cabinet Ministers,
Two is lielped in his work b,v two assistants who are
-aisiitants known as Uiider-Seeretaries. They are highly
placed officials, but the constitutional position and equipment
of the two Under-Secretaries differ fundamentally. One fills
a political, the other a bureaucratic mle. The purpose they'
serve are not identical but complementary,
Jn qualifications and status, the Parliamentary Under-Seere-
The Parlia- miniature of his master and chief. They
mentary are similar to each other in almost all respects.
Under- except in the degree of eminence and senioril^ .
Seeretary Pjirliamentary Under-Seeretary must be a
member of Parliament. Whenever possible, he is selected from
that House of w’hich the Seendary of State is not a member.
He has to expound the policy and actions of Die Government
4
50 INDIAN AUMINISTBATION
on the floor of the legislature and to do all such work as may
be assigned to him by the Secretary of State. He fonns part
of the Ministry, though not of the Cabinet, and has to accept or
to relinquish office according as his party decides and directs.
In fact, the Parliamentarj^ Under-Secretaryship is often held by
able and ambitious juniors. It frequeiith serves as a stepping-
stone to higher office.
The Permanent Under-Secretary belongs to a different cate-
The Perma- gory. He is not a politician and is debarred from
nent Under- being a member of Parliament. He is. an offi-
SeereUry (.jal of the Civil Service and is guaranteed tixit\
of tenure during good behaviour. At the end of a long and
distinguished serv’ice in his department, he is selected to be il<s
executive head. He controls all the secretariat staff and looks
to the safety and orderly arrangement of the papers and docu-
ments in his charge. The ‘happenings in his administrative*
sphere are intimately known to him. Information about facts
and statistics is always ready in his possession.
The Secretary of State is an intelligent but an ignorant stranger
His uBefulnesfi to his department. Pie is an ever-changing factor
in the governmental picture. The period of his office is preca-
rious. Under such circumstances, the continuity and the length
of service of the Permanent Under- Secretary are of inestimablv
advantage. He becomes an encyclopaedia of expert knowledge*
which the political superior can consult with profit. He sup-
plies the raw material on which decisions and policies can be
based. The fixed and the fluctuating elements are thus happilv
combined in the structme of the administrative system.
P'or carrying on w’ork of a purely routine and adminislrativi*
The India nature, the Secretary of State is required to have
Office fi large official establishment, which is known as
the llidia Office. It comprises clerks, t;ypists, superintendents,
:ic(*ountants, etc., serving in different grades and situations.
Their total number conjes to about 300 and all of them are re-
cruited in Britain. Those who are appointed to posts in the
higher grades are selected as a result of the Civil Service Exami-
nation. The most successful of these civil servants can aspire
to rise to the position of the Deputy Permanent, and eventually
of the Permanent, Under- Secretary of State. Promotion to
these high offices comes by seniority and merit. It is this
secretarial establishment which keeps the executive machinery
constantly and efficiently moving and maintains the continuity
of departmental action.
§5. SALABY AND EXPENSES
The salaries and the office expenses of the Ministers of a
country would natuyally be a charge on its people. Those who
receive services are expected to pay for them. Such a propo-
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOB INDIA 61
sition would appear to be too self -evident to need elucidation.
The natiinJ Yet the justice of this dictum was not accepted
pMltton by the British constitutionalist in respect of the
salary of the Secretary of State for India till as late as the Mont-
ford Reforms.
At least after the abolition of the East India Company in
gi^li^ ' 1858, if not before, the salary and expenses of the
charged on special Cabinet Minister who was entrusted with
Indian the supervision of the Indian Government should
refonnes ^ automatically devolved upon the British pub-
lic. However, Parliament could not resist the temptation of
continuing the distinction which had been introduced at the end
ol thfe eighteenth century. Alone of all the Ministers of the
Crown, the Secretary of State for India was not paid from the
Bspitish Exchequer. His salary was not directly voted b\
the House of Commons but was charged to the revenue^ of
India.
This was an application of the principles of business accoun-
Galling dig- tancy with a vengeance. The expense of keep-
orlmlnation ing the Indian estate was to be debited to the
estate itself. It was argued that the British citizen should not
be financially penalized for creating an agency to supervise the
administration of a subject country. Such a convenient profit
and loss calculation was one-sided and unjust, because it
completely ignored the gains which accrued from the conquest.
In fact, it was typical of the antiquated colonial doctrine which
looked upon a colony or a conquered territory merely as fch(‘
private property of the mother country. That doctrine is now
discarded as being short-sighted and incompatible with modern
political and social tendencies. It must be noted that the
salaries of the Secretaries of State for the Dominions and
Colonies were not charged to the Dominions or the Colonies but
have been contributed by England. Indians bitterly com-
plained against the discrimination of which they were the
victims.
The charging of the Secretary of State's salary" to the ex-
Lesser chequer of the Government of India had another
opportunity for incidental result. Parliament gets the opportunity
Parliamentary of criticizing and controlling departments of public
service in England because it is called upon to
vote expenditure for them, including the salaries of their heads.
That was not possible in the case of the India OflSce. The
Indian question did not automatically come up before Parlia-
ment for discussion when need arose for voting the Secretary
of State's salary at the time of the budget. There was no
questidn, indeed, about the competence of Parliament to in-
terfere in the affairs of its dependency, but the normal and
routine control which follows as a corollary of the power of hold-
ing the purse-strings could not be exercised over Indian adminis-
^2 INDIAN ADMINISTKATION
Oration because of the liiiauciHl independence of the Secretary of
State.
Mr Montagu proposed the necessary inipix)vement in this
Jir Montagu's unseemly position. After the Act of 1919, the
salary of the Secretary of State for India was
accepted as an obligation of the British public and provided by
it. This does not mean that all the expenses of his establish-
ment and office were also being incurred by the British people.
They were a charge upon the rexemies of India, but the British
Treasury made an annual grant-in-aid towards theiir to the
extent of .^150,000.
The Act of 1935 has proposed an interesting changt* ip this
Change made arrangement. Section 280 begins by prescribing
by the Act that the salar}’ of the Secretary of State and also
•of 1935 the expenses of bis department, including the
salaries and the remuneration of the staif, shall be paid out of
monies provided by Parliament. The subsequent clause of the
same section goes on to add that there shall be charged on, and
paid out of, the revenues of the Indian Federation, such periodi-
cal and other sums as may represent the Secretary of State's
expense for perfonning duties on behalf of the Federation.
The change thus introduced may therefore prove to be merely
The change theoretical and verbal. Till the inauguration of
may be only this new system India used to bear the expense of
nominal the India Office, and Parliament was pleased to
make a contribution towards a part of it. Hereafter, Parlia-
ment will bear that burden but may demand a contribution
from India. There is thus a definite alteration in appearances.
But what really mattere to India is the net amount of money
she will be called upon to pay. If in actual practice there is
no substantial decrease in that burden, the only achievement of
the Act of 1935 would seem to be to bring about a somersault
in the constitutional position. The Government of India, ^vho
were the recipients of a grant-in-aid from the British Treasury,
have been transformed into an aiitliority whiclj makes a grant
to the latter. But there is no assurance that the monetary com-
mitments of India will be appreciably diminished.
§6. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
To the Secretary of State is entrusted the duty of managing
Described in those departments* of the Government of India
the Montterd which have to function in England. The Montagu -
Report Chelmsford Report has described bis powers as
they existed when the Report was written. They were extremely
comprehensive in range and included every important item.
All projects of legislation whether in the Indian or in the Pro-
Tincial Legislatures had to go to the Secretary of State for
THE SECRETAKY 0 ¥ STATE FOR INDIA 5 ^
approval in principle. Before him were laid all variations in
taxation or all measures affecting revenues, jneasures affecting
customs, currency operations and debt, and proposals which in-
volved questions of policy or large expenditure. Construction
of pubirc works and railways, creation of new appointments above
a certain grade, raising of the pay of others or the revision of
establishments beyond a certain sum, large charges for cere-
monial or grants of substantial political pensions, grants for
religious and charitable purposes, mining leases and other similar
comtessions, additions to military expenditure, were all matters
in which close restrictions were put upon the powers of the
(rovernnflent of India by the Secretary* of State.
• Tlie Act of 1919 also stated that the Secretary of State may
Defined by superintend, direct and* control all acts, operations
th^Act of and concerns wdiich relate to the government or
the revenues of India. All grants of salaric'^,
gratuities and allowances, and all other payments and charges,
out of or oil the revenues of India, reijnired his sanction. Thi*^
power was to be exercised subject to the other provisions of tlu*
Act- and rules made tlicreiinder.
Tile Act of 198.*) has introduced a new constitutional struc-
Changes made ^un*. The British Indian provinces have been
by the Act shaped into autonomous units. At a later stage,
of 199S these units and the Indian States jnay be joined
ill an All-India Federation under the British Crown. The prin-
eiplc of political responsibility ma^ he introduced in the Federal
(Tovernrnent to a certain extent. Theoretically, this change is
of vital im])ortance. It demands and implies not only relaxation
of control by the Secretary of State, hut a fundamental altera-
tion ill the status of the governments in India. Tliey now derivi*
their power directly from the Crown of England. It w’ould no
longer he correet to describe them as mere agents of the Secretary
of State, even though lie still continues to h(‘ their official
superior.
Sections *278-84 of the Act dcil with the Secivtary of State.
An omission his Advisers and liis Department. They contain
in the Act fairly elaborate pro\ isions conc(*rning se\’eral points.
In none of them, how^ever, is specifically embodied his fonner
pow’(‘r of superintendence, direction and control. The omis-
sion seems to be deliberate and may Imve some value in pure
constitutional tlieory. It may he in accord with the elementary
principles of federal polity. A federated India w’ith its consti-
tuent autonomous units cannot he allow’ed to remain subject to
the daily supervision and eontrol of the Secretary of State. It
must be emancipated from the intrusions of a distant superior.
The Act of 1935 may be said to have brought about this neces-
sary reform by doing away with all reference to the powers of
superintendence, direction and i*ontrol wdth w’hich the Secret ar\
of State* w^as invested by the former Acts.
54 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
However, the practical utility of such an academic negation
Bzteiit of the niay not prove to be great, because it does not
SecireUvy of derogate considerably from the powers of the
8tale*s powers Secretary of State. Sections 14 and 64 of the Act
clearly lay down that whenever the Governor-General or the
Governor * is required to act in his discretion or in his individual
judgement, he shall be under the general control of, and comply
with such general directions, if any, as may from time to time
be given to him by the Secretary of State and the Governor-
General respectively.’
A perusal of the Act will show that thp number of occasions
His inflnenee on which and the purposes for which, these ^utho-
wUl stin be rities are required to act in their discretion or uo
very great exercise their individual judgement is large. No
important subject has been omitted. Defence, external re-
lations, the I.C.S., the Indian Police Service, the Federal Rail-
way Authority, the Reserve Bank of India and the all embracing
Special Responsibilities of the Governor-General and the Gover-
nor, are all subject to the control and supervision of the
Secretary of State. In theory at least, even after the Act of
1935 his views and attitude can affect the whole sphere of Indian
polity.
§7. RELATIONS WITH ADVISERS
The Secretary of State was given the assistance of a Council,
Unhampered known as the India Council, by the Act of 1858,
authority of and this ('’ouncil was closely associated with him
the Secretary m the work of Indian governance. The Secretary
of State State had the power of appointing its members
and of framing rules for the tiansaciion of its business. The
Coui^cil was essentially an advisory body and its opinion was not
bindings upon the Secretary of State except in respect of matters
concerning finance and the Services. The Act of 1935 has
abolished the India Council and substituted in its place a new
body called the Secretary of State’s Advisers. The latter began
to function from April 1937.
The relations of the Secretary of State with his Advisers are
<*learly defined in the Act. He makes their appointment and
determines their number within the prescribed limits. It is
^entirely in his discretion whether to consult or not to consult
with them on any matter. He may call a meeting of all of them
or of only some of them, or may take the opinion of any one of
them individually. Even when their advice is sought and given,
the Secretary of State is at liberty to accept or to reject it. The
views of the Advisers are binding only in regard to questions
which concern the superior Services in India. The authority
of the Secretary of State is thus practically imhampered in spite
of the existence of the body of Advisers.
THE 8ECBETABY OF STATE FOE INDIA
55
^8. BELATIONS WITH THE GOVEENOB-
GENEBAL
The* Secretary of State is the agent of the Crown and Parlia-
The Beoretarj inent of Britain. As such he is invested with sup-
4»f State Is renoie authority over the Indihn Government. He
is answerable to Parliament for the mistakes and
aaperlor misdeeds that may be noticed in the operation of
the department in his charge. It is his duty to adjust the tone
and manner of Indian governance so as to harmonize them with
the wishes and sentiments of Parliament. He is the link be-
tween the British people and the Indian bureaucracy. He stands
higher than the highest official who rules over India in royal
p^pip and magnificence. The Governor- General-in-Council is
required by law to paj due obedience to such orders as he
receives from the Secretary of State.
Legally, therefore, the position is clear. In case of a conflict
The legal between the Secretar;y of State and the Govemor-
P®****®" General, there is no ambiguity on the question as
to who should yield. The Secretary of State’s decision is final.
Tlu* (xovernor-General has either to accept his superior’s mandate
‘or, in the alternative, to resign his office. Theoretically, therefore,
no deadlock (5an arise bet\\een the two authorities because
they arc not co-ordinate. Even such an able and aggressive
V^'iceroy as Lord Curzon had to bow' to the relentless logic of this
c'onstitutional definition. And blrangel^^ enough, his resignation
was destined to be provoked by the unyielding attitude of that
very ministry w’hich, being composed of his friends and parti-
sans, had taken the unprecedented step of sending him out as
Vi(*ero\ for a second time, in recognition of his splendid services.
However, an enuncdation of this legal relationship does not,
The practical by itself, give an adequate idea of the whole
poBition picture. Tl misses a very important aspect of
the practical truth. It leaves unsaid what actually and empha-
iically exists even in the absence of law or in spite of it. Cir-
cumstances dictate their ow’ii conv’entions and ccides vvdiich
contribute substantially to the .shaping of realities. They must
be as fully understood as the letter of the lav\.
It must be remembered that the Governor-General is specially
The Governor- from England to act as the head of a vast
General is bureaucratic government. His selection is made
the man on from the same higher strata of the intellectual and
the epot political life of England from wdiich the Secretary
of State is also drawn. He is the man on the spot in India
and is in direct charge of its huge administrative machine. It
is he who is faced with the difficulties of its working and who has
to grapple with them with tact and firmness. The responsibility
of maintaining peace and order and the duty of conducting the
56 INPIAN ADMINISTRATION
complex operations of government in the vast Indian Empire-
lie heavily on his shoulders.
On the other hand, the Secretary of State is separated by a ^
Tht SAenftary long distance from the actual scene of the exercise
of State la of his authority. He has no personal touch with
far awaj either the Indian official or the Indian citizen. As
a member of the Cat)inet, hh attention is likely to be as much
preoccupied with tlie problems of British politics as with those
of Indian administration. His constant interference with the
work of Indian officers would be, in the graphic analogy of the
Indian proverb, like driving sheep on the ground from the alti-
tude of the camel's back. It would be physically hfipossible
for the Secretary of State not to allow a certain degree of^indt-
pendence to the views and the actions of the Vicero\ .
The intensity of liis control will, of course, ^ary willi llu
IsterftBt of intensity of the interest taken in Indian affairs h\
Parllameni members of Parliameni. If the Bouse ot (’oni-
mons is very keen to know the course ot events in India and to
influence them, the Secretary of State will ha\e to bo parti-
cularly active and vigilant. lf‘, on the other hand, the British
masters choose to remain apathetic and uninterested, their ser-
vant naturally tends not to interfere.
There is also tlie factor of what is known as the personal
Peraonal equation betw’een the Secretary of State and the
oquotion Ciovernor-General. ^Mucli depends upon the rela-
tive strength and qualities of these men. The more energetic
and forceful ot the two personalities will naturally carry the da\ .
Aggressive secretaries like Lord iMorley enunciated and acted
upon the doctrine that the Govennnenl of India were mer“l>
the agents of the Secretary of State. On the other hand, it is
easily conceivable that some brilliant and. capable Viceroys have
successfully dominated the Secretaries of State. If the two-
authorities prove to be equal in gifts and influence, a elasli ma\
sometimes occur. The Governor-General has then hi gi\e way
to the Secretary of State.
After all, the distance between two such very liigh dignitaries
Oifferenoe can only be one of degree. It is created only lor
only of degree ensuring that the constitutional machine does not
eome to a standstill as a result of insurmountable difficulti(‘s.
Otherwise the Secretary’ of State and the Governor-General nn^
e.ssentially co-workers and companions, standing on the Sana*
elevated platform, but with a little variation of tlie levels. Tin*
status of superior and subordinate has not that significance in
their mutual relations which it inevitably has in the lower
official world.
THE SECKETAKY OF STATE FOR INDIA
57
§9. CAUSES OF THE INCREASE IN THE
SECRETARY OF STATE’S POWERS
/
In earlier days, before tho, abolition of the Company, the
i. The aisump- interference of the Home authorities in
tion of Indian administrative details was necessarily less
authoritj by than in later years. Various factors contributed
Parliament brinj^ about a change in the degree of centrali-
zation after the assumption by Parliament of direct responsi-
bility foi* the government of India. The fact of such assump-
tion itsejf was a considerable factor, inaspjuch as the holders
of tl\e new office of Secretary would be necessarily men of
gTeater influence and politicml consecpience in Parliament. Nor
di(^ tile old duality of the President of the Board and the
Directors continue under the new dispensation. The powers of
botli of them were henceforfli centred in one and the same person.
Tli(j India Council was not a body consisting of persons
ii. The ignorant about India and having little leisure t(»
creation of look after Indian affairs in detail as the old Direc-
the India torate had been. For the most part, the (^ouncil
Council consisted of persons who had retired from service
in India and who, l)ecause of their intimate personal knowledge,
could c.Kercise a more stringent control over the actions of
the Indian authorities. Super\ision over the management of
Indian titiaiice and a <*lose scrutiny of (expenditure and income
now became an important duty of the Secretary of State, and
strengthened his control. '
Lastl\, the geograj)hical isolation resulting from the big dis-
iii. The Suez taiice which separates England and India, making
Canal and speedy coinmnnication between them impossible in
electric cable tliosi* days, no longer existed after the eonstriudmn
of the Sue/. Canal in 1809. hi the following years the two coun-
tries were linked by submarine cable, and telegraphic transmis-
sion ot UK'ssages bed ween them became possible. The authorities
in England henceforth issued detailed and positive orders. The
independence of the Government of India as tht‘ dr fario ])ower
on the spot vanished. J^istance and time were no longer serious
o[)siacles to the exereise of close supervision from England. The
Secretaiy of State claimed the anlhority to guide and control
even the details of administration, and friction naturally aros**.
Seendaries Jike Lord Morley t*nimcia1ed and acted upon the
Assertion of do(driiie that tlie Govermnent of India were mere
the Beoretary agents of tlu‘ Government in England. Lord
of State*s Morle> (daiined the liberty of eoiTesponding direc-
l«gal tly with any official in India, a claim wliich was
superiority bitterly resentetl by Lonl Miiito as tending to
demoralize the discipline of the administration. Viceroys like
Lord Elgin and Lord Ripon complained of the excessive domina-
58 INMAN ADMINISTEATION
tion of the Secretary of State. Attempts were indeed made in
the past to enunciate for the Government of India greater liberty
•of action and freedom from the Secretary of State’s overpower-
ing control. Lord Mayo’s Government, for instance, protested
at being required to pass bills like the Contract Act and the
Evidence Act in the form in which the Secretary of State ap-
proved of them, without reference to the Indian Legislature. In
reply, the Home Government proceeded to assert its rights” of
•control in the most emphatic manner. Mr Disraeli’s Government
was equally decided in affirming similar constitutional rights
when Lord Northbrook’s Government attempted to assert the
independence of the Government of India in fiscal matteVs. One
more occasion to define clearly the Secretary of State’s and the
British Parliament’s superior position arose in "1 894 when, at the
time of the debate on the Cotton Duties, Sir H. Fowler laid down
positively that the principle of united and indivisible responsibi-
lity which was recognized as binding upon the British Cabinet
also applied to the Indian Executive Council. In the case of a
•difference of opinion between themselves and the Secretary of
State the members of the Government of India who disagreed
were asked either to act with the Government or to tender their
resignations. Parliament’s and the Secretary of State’s un-
doubted supremacy over the Government of India has thus been
clearly asserted several times.
With the gradual creation of an autonomous Indian Domin-
Deeentrali- unrestricted rights of self -govern -
satioii inent, the Secretary of State must inevitably cease
linevitoble to be invested with that administrative importance
under self- and control which he now possesses. In that event
government possible to contemplate that his office
may be merged in that of the Secretary of State for the Domin-
ions, whose constitutional status vift-a-vis the mother-country has
been amplified by the Statute of Westminster.
VIII. THE INDIA COUNCIL AND THE
rtECBETARY OF STATE’S ADVISERS
The Councel of India
§1. RP]A80NS FOR ITS CREATION
By the* abolition of the East India Company in 1858, a long-
Ignoronevof standing connecting link between England and
the Seoretfiry India was finally removed. It created a perceptible
State alMut gap in administrative arrangements, particularly
Ii^ian affhin because of the disappearance of the Court of Direc-
tors. The newly created Secretary of State for India was not
selected to hold his office because of his special knowledge of
Indian affairs. More often than not, he was totally ignorant
about them. He therefore required considerable assistance and
guidance in the discharge of his duties. The need was all the
greater because of the peculiar political circumstance in which
India was placed.
This conquered country, unlike the Dominions, w’as governed
India had no top to bottom by a foreign bureaucracy. The
rights of self- people of India had not the slightest control over
goYornmont the Government of India. They were permitted
1o enjo} the civic privilege of being compelled to pay taxes and
to obey laws. But there were no representative legislatures in
India to voice popular feelings, to enact laws, to vote expendi-
iure, and to direct the administrative system.
It therefore became necessary to provide some other effecthe
«Ghoek was check oh the actions of Indian officers. Obviously,
required oser they could not be allo\\ed to reign in unbridled
the bureau- authority. That would have been as detrimental
to the interests of England as to those of India.
Ever\ bureaucracy must be ultimately responsible to some
superior authority. Otherwise, there is great danger ot its de-
teriorating into a pernicious tyranny. The Secretary of State
was therefore called upon to superintend the details and the
policies of the Indian administration to a very great extent.
Every important item of legislation, executive action, and finance
was required to be submitted for his previous approval and
sanction. .
The proper performance of such an elaborate duty imposed
a heavy responsibility on the Secretary of State. That superior
parliamentary official was a curious combination of power and
Ignorance. It was prudent to take the precaution that his final
decisions were not vitiated by a lack of proper relation to
realities. Hence, the Council of India was formed. It was com-
60 ^ INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
posed of persons who had to their credit long years of service in
Mm viih India, and had retired from responsible positions.
Indiaii Select and first-hand Indian experience was thus
experisnoe gathered together to be of active help and enlighten-
i**Sf***r ** *® 4 ,***® ment to the Secretary of State. He was expected
to benefit not merely by division of labour but
by a valuable accession of knowledge.
There was another incidental consideration of some impart-
Restraint on ance. Just as it was hazardous to leave the
the Secretary Indian bureaucracy to its own uncontrolled judge-
of State iiient, so also was it a little undesirable to allow
the Secretary of State to ha\e unrestrained authority in an
extensive administration with which he was not personally
familiar. His exercise of that authority had to be prevented
froin developing into a mild type of political absolutism. He
was, of course, responsible to I’arliament. But that august bddy
was not likely to concern itself with his daily routine. The
India (’ouncil can perhaps be conceived as a limited constitu-
tional restraint on his superior powers, without diminishing in
any way his pre-eminence and prestige.
§2. A SHORT HISTORY
The India Council was instituted for the first time by the
The Act Government of India Act of 1858. It consisted of
of 1868 fifteen members of whom eight wen' appointed
by the Crown and se^en elected by the Directors of the East
India Company. The majority of them were persons who had
served or resided in India for at least ten years and had not
left India more than ten years before their appointment. At
least nine members were required to possess these qualifications.
The power of filling vacancies of Crowm^ appointments and of
filling, other vacancies in the Council itself w as vested in the
Crown. The members were to hold office as long as they fulfilled
their duties satisfactorily, but they were debarred from becom-
ing members of Parliament and might be removed from office oi»
an address of both the FTouses of Parliament. Their salary was
fixed at ^1,200 a year. The Council was charged wdth the duty
of conducting, under the direction of the Secretaiw of State, the
business transacted in the United Kingdom in relation to the
Government of India and the correspondence with India. The
Secretary of State was to be the President of the Council with
power to ovemile in cases of difference of opinion and wdth
power to send dispatches to India, without refereiK'e to the
Council, in matters w’hich might be regarded as urgent and
secret. Weekly meetings w'erc held for the disposal of busines.s.
Some of the patronage of the Directors was vested in the Secre-
tary of State in Council.
I Changes were made in the constitutfon of the Council froin
time to Ahrie. Thus the Go<vernment of India Act of 1869'
SECEETAEY OF STATE'S ADVISEES (A
•vested in the Secretary of State the right of filling vacancies in
Further the Council; it also reduced the term of its tenure
4:hanges up to a definite period of ten years. At the same
io 1909 ^ time special power was given to the Secretary of
State to reappoint old members for a further period of five years
for special reasons of public advantage. In 1889 the Secretary
of State was allowed ' to abstain from filling vacancies in the
Council till its number was reduced from fifteen to ten. The
Act of 1907 fixed the number of members at not less than ten
and uot'inore than fourteen, and reduced the term of office from
ten to seven years. The salary of a member was reduced from
to £1,000 per annum. From this year, two Indians
w^re included in the Council as members, one of them beint^ the
late Sir K. G. Gupta.
^‘TJie Act of 1919 introduced further important changes.
^Changes Under that Act (i) the Council of India was to
introduced consist of not less than eight and not more than
bp the Act twelve members, as the Secretary of State might
tof 1919 from time to time determine. The right of filling
a vacancy remained ris before with the Secretary of State. Half
the number of the rii embers had to be persons who had sened
or resided in India for at least ten .\ears and had not last left
its shores more than five years before the date of their appoint-
ment. (ii) The term of office was to be five instead of seven
years as before. The shortening of this period was calculated to
ensure a continuous flow of fresli experience from India and also
to relieve the Indian members of the necessity of spending a
long period of seven years away from their homes in a foreign
country. The Secretary of State’s power of reappointing a
member for a further term of five years, the reasons for which
he had to place before Parliament, was retained; otherwise no
inember of the Council was capable of being nominated again
to that body. Any member was of course at liberty to resign
his membership and any member might be removed from office
by His Majesty on an address from the House of Parliament,
(iii) The annual salary was fixed at £1,200 for each member,
those domiciled in India at the time of thteir appointment receiv-
ing in addition an annual subsistence allow^ance of £600. The
salaries and allowances might be paid either out of the revenues
of India or out of moneys voted by Parliament, (iv) The Indian
element in the Council was increased from two to three mem-
bers. (v) All the agency work of the Secretary of State in
Council was henceforth to be transferred to a High Commissioner
for India. A good deal of the Council’s work was therefore de-
creased. (vi) The concurrence of a majority of votes at a meet-
ing of the Council was required for the following purposes; (a)
grants or appropriations of any part- of the revenues of India,
which meant practically e^’penditure of Indian revenue: (h)
making of contracts for the purposes of the Government of India
62 INDIAN ADMINISTKATION
Act 1919; and (c) making of rules and regulations for the^
Services in order to fix the conditions of their employment and
their position.
The Council of course could not initiate any expenditure.
It was further provided that ‘ the revenues of India s^all be
applied for the purposes of the Government of India alone
After the Montford Keforms, the Councirs control over expendi-
ture on Transferred subjects was almost wholly withdrawn. Nor.
was the consent of the Council required for ‘ votable ’ expendi-
ture on the Eeserved side. Even in the non-votable items of
provincial finance, though its control in theory was unrestricted,
in practice a wide delegation of powers was made to authorities
in India. A large portion of the expenditure of the Central
Government was non-votable and the Councirs sanction watv
therefore extensively required in the case of the Central finances.
The Council worked by the system of committees ; its menr-
Methods of hersi were divided into various groups, and to each
transaeting such group, known as a Committee, was allotted
boainoM the task of transacting business in one or more
departments. For example there were different committees for
finance, public works, revenue, political, military, and legal
matters, stores, etc., corresponding to a similar division of de-
partments in the Viceroy's Executive Council. Each depart-
ment had a Secretary of its own selected by the Secretary of
State. All correspondence and proposals connected with the
different branches of the administration were referred to the
respective committees by the Secretary of the department before
being finally laid before the Secretary of State in Council.
The Committee did all the preliminary work of investiga-
tion and consideration of the pros and cons of proposals referred
to it. The decision ot the Committee was* sent on to the Perma-
nent Uftder-Secretary of State who then referred the matter to
the Secretary of State. The latter either allowed the former to
issue orders or issued them himself, or, if the matter was impor-
tant, ordered the question to be put before a full meeting of
the .Council for final disposal. It was the usual practice to hold
full meetings of the Council every month.
The nomination of members to the Council was exclusively
a privilege of the Secretary of State. The method of its work-
ing had crystallized into a routine, the most prominent part of
which was the formation of committees and the distribution of
departments of Qlovemment among them so as to suit the con-
venience of administration. It was this dilatory routine which
Mr Montagu condemned in his famous speech in Parliament in
1917 as cumbrous and as designed to prevent eflSciency.
It will be easily realized that the Council, as a political
factor, was largely dominated by the influence and importance of
the Secretary of State* This high official with his status of
Cabinet Minister and large powers completely overshadowed its
SEGRETAKY OF STATE’S ADVISERS 63-
existence. It could not be described as being either a legislative
Status of or an executive or a judicial body. Nor could
the Gounoil it be considered as an effective restraint upoii
the actions of the Secretary of State except in respect of rules
and regulations for the Services. In fact it had the distinction
of being an advisory council whose advice might or might not
be sought, and if sought might or might not be accepted by the
liigh official for whom it was intended to serve as a guide.
§p. INDIAN CRITICISM OF THE COUNCIL
Indian politicians were always very critical of the India
Council.* They felt that it served no useful purpose and was
positively injurious to the interests of India. It was therefore
urged that the total abolition of such -an unwanted chamber was
thd-* only effective measure for its reform. I'he following were
the main grounds of criticism.
From the Indian point of view, the composition of the
ItB unhealthy Council was extremel;y unhealthy. An asseiiibh
compoeition of the retired members of the Indian Services ma\
prove to be a storehouse of valuable information. Unfortunately,
it may also represent a mischievous concentration of reaction-
ary opinions and ideas. A conservative outlook is almost an in-
separable feature of the bureaucratic ifiind. It worsens into
obstinacy and intolerance if the bureaucracy is not required to
live in the salutary fear of llie popular will. Indians naturally
disliked the association of the Secretary of State with such a
retrograde influence. If, by chance, he happened to be a mai»
of liberal ideas, the weight of the India Council would probably
be cast in the opposite direction.
There was another vital argument. The grant of political
Incompati- right to. India necessarily implies the withdrawal
bility with the of British control over that country. A .self-
ideal of seif- governing India and a bodv like the India Coun-
gOTernnirat
its special powers and veto, could not
really go together. It was an incongruous combination. As
the status of India approximates more closely to the status of
the Dominions, interference in Indian affairs by Councils and
even by Secretaries of State from outside must cease. The
India .Council was not condemned merely because it w'as a
worthless and costly superfluity which involved an avoidable
waste of money. Its existence w’as fundamentally repugnant to
the concept of political freedom which it is the keen aspiration
of India to achieve at an early date.
The Secret A iiY of State's Advisers
§4. REASONS FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT
The Act of 1935 takes an apparently momentous decision in
regard to the Indian Council. Clause 8 of section 278 lays down
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
thiit the Indin (‘Oiincil should be dissolved. Effect has been
DiMOlution of gi^en to that provision from April 1987, and the
the India Se(*retarA of State has appointed Advisers as ppc‘-
^Council scribed In the Act. The iinprcission therefore
tnay be created that in I'espeet of the abolition ot th*e India
('oiincil, the wishes of the Indian people have been fully com-
plied with. Such a notion would be (’rroiieous. The reform
that is introduced is not so complete.
The Act does not contemplate the transfer of all control
No complete India from the Englishman to the- Indian,
transfer of 'I'he old constitutional logic therefore continues to
power to persist unabated. As long as parliamentary autho-
rH\ is maintained over the Indian (jovernn)eftt
to any extent, the Secretary of State (*annot he relieved of all
his administrative responsibilities. It naturally follows that he
(‘annot be deprived altogeilier of ilie advice of experts who have
a personal knowledge of Indian conditions. If the India Coun-
cil is abolished in deference to Indian wdslies, a substitute has
had to be created to perform its functions. The new body consists
of persons who are known as Advisers to the Secretary of State.
§:>. THEIR CONSTITUTION, QUALIFICATIONS
AND FUNC^TIONS
Appointmeni: The Advisers are to be appointc'd b\ ihe
Constitution Secjretury of State.
.and status Number : Their number is to be not less than
three nor more than six as the Secretary of State may from
time to time determine. A person who before the inaugura-
tion of provincial autonomy was a member of the India Council
— that is before 1 April 1937 — may be appointed as an Adviser
to hold’^ffice for such period less than five years as the Secretary
of State may think fit. During the transitional period till the
actual establishment of the Federation, the }unnbcr of Advisers
is to be not less than eight and not more than twelve as in the
•case of the India Council.
Qualifications: At least one half of the number of advisers
must be persons who have held office for at least ten years unde)*
the Crown in India. They must not have Iasi ceased to perform
in India official duties under the Crown more than two years
before the date of their appointment as Advisers. In practice,
they will be persons who have occupied exalted stations in the
Indian hierarchy juid have retired after a long period of servi(‘c
in varied capacities. It is also ensured thjit their expcrien(*c
should be quite recent and fresh so that the standards of judge-
ment that they Jidopt do not become out of date. The Advisers
■are not capable of sitting or voting in either House of Parliament.
Tenure : The term *of office of an Adviser is to be five years
SECBETARY OF STATE’S ADVISERS 66
and he will not be eligible for reappointment. He will be at
liberty to resign his office at any time, and the Secretary of State
may remove him on grounds of physical or mental infirmity.
Salary : Each Adviser gets a salary of £1,860 a year. If any
of them^is domiciled in India at the time of appointment, he
will get *an additional aubsistence allowance of £600 a year. It
is a welcome financial rehef to Indian members. They are re-
quired to keep two homes, one in India and the other in England.
Their expenses are naturally heavier than those of Englishmen
living in England. Money for this expenditure is to be provided
by Parliament. It will no longer be a burden upon Indian
revenues.
Functtons: The Advisers have no legislative, executive or
judici^ functions. It is their duty to advise the Secretary of
State on any matter relating to India on which he may desire
thdir advice. The powers conferred on him with regard to the
Services (Part X of the Act) are not exercisable by him except
with the concurrence of his Advisers. Members of the Services
in India are therefore assured of adequate protection for their
special rights and privileges, because they are entrusted to the
benevolent care of senior members of their own fraternity
Status : It will be in the discretion of the Secretary of State
whether or not he consults with his Advisers on any matter, and
if so, whether he consults with them collectively or with one or
more of them individually. He also decides whether to act or
not to act in accordance with any advice given to him by the
Advisers. The superiority and independence of the Secretary
of State are thus emphasized. Even the corporate character of
the Advisers is dispensed with.
§6. THE NATURE OF THEIR INFLUENCE
It will be easily seen that there is no fundamental difference
Insignificant between the Advisers and the Indian Council which
power! they have supplanted. The basis and purpose of
the two bodies is the same. The only real power which the
Advisers, like their predecessors, can be said to possess is in
regard to rules and regulations about the Services. They are
liable to be entirely ignored by the Secretary of State even when
momentous decisions are required to be taken by him.
Thus, though the India Council as such has disappeared, a
They deserve very substantial shadow, bearing a close resem-
to be blance to the original, still persists as its successor,
abolished the criticism that was directed against the
India Council also applies to the new creation. The latter’s veto
in the matter of the Services is paradoxical and vexatious when
political power is supposed to have been transferred to responsible
Indian Ministers, and the sooner such an anachronism vanishes
from the Indian constitutional picture, the better for India.
5
IX. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR INDIA
§1. LARGE EEQUIRE14BNTS OF THE INDIAN
GOVERNMENT
Thb post of the High Commiseioner for India was created. for
the first time by the Act of 10X9. There is one striking peculi-
arity of this important office. In the considerations winch have
led to its creation, politics and economics are closely woven
together. The High Commissioner’s duties are partly^ political
and partly commercial. It is necessary to understand the f^ill
significance of such an interesting combination.
The Indian Government, like all governments, requires a
OommoditiM loxge number of different kinds of articles the
used by a periormance of their civil and military duties. For
OoTernment example, the defence forces of the country have
to be adequately equipped with food and clothing, arms and
ammunition, tanks, warships, submarines, aeroplanes, gas masks,
and similar types of modem mechanical contrivances. The
construction and maintenance of big projects like railways, irri-
gation works, telegraph and telephone systems, broadcasting
stations, and hydraulic power-houses, involves the utilization of
an immense quantity of many sorts of materials. Even the
comparatively simpler routine of the administration of modem
days can hardly be carried on without the constant use of sta-
tionery articles like pens, pencils, pins, pape]:, ink, erasers,
typewriters, bicycles, motor cars and buses, steam rollers, elec-
trical goods, steam engines, chemicals, medicines, printing
machinery and a hundred other important things.
How does a Government obtain all this mass of commodities ?
En&ursgemeiit Ordinarily, in a capitalistic community, the state
to national itself does not directly undertake the work of in-
indoflry dustrial production but purchases most of its
requirements from private manufacturers by payment of a
price. A Government with a nationalistic outlook is keen upon
seeing that the needs of the nation are satisfied, in a substantial
measure, by the industry of its own people. The vast expendi-
ture on national purchases can be so organized that it becomes
an effective stimulus for the starting of new industrial ventures
in a country and for strengthening item. The satisfaction of
a nation’s wants can itself be made to constitute a vigorous
impetus and encouragement to its producers. It is particularly
necessary to follow this policy in the case of a backward country
like India.
India is a land endowed with an abundance of natural re-
sources. It also possesses plenty of man-power. These two
THE HIGH COMMISSIONEJl FOB INDIA 67
valuable assetB require to be intelligentiy organized into a pro-
NMd for an ductive combination. The reaidta of such a unit-
•Bll^ftenad ing process would be remarkable. The economic
poU^ and the moral fabric of the community will be
immensely strengthened if the community’s services are re-
quisitioned for the satisfaction of the community's wants. No
force could be mmre powerful for the mobilization of a country’s
creative gifts and their robust consolidation than the collective
will of its people.
The British bureaucracy which rules over India, and its
OoTernment*! British masters who control the Indian Oovem-
IndiffeMaecr ment from their own island home, have not showed
any eagerness to consider the subject of India’s store purchases
in terms of the material advancement of India. Orders for
goolls worth crores of rupees are being placed year after year
outside the country. Bills for their value, swollen by the profits
of a foreign manufacturer and of a number of foreign middle-
men, are being continuously paid. No deliberate attempt has
been made to turn this vast expenditure into an effective instru-
ment for the industrial rehabilitation of the country. Nothing
is more tragic in the history of modern India than this lapse
on the pan of its rulers.
§2. THE METHOD OF PUBCHASE
When a nation decides to purchase commodities from foreign
The proper countries what should be the guiding principle in
method of making the purchases? Obviously, it must be to
purohsse obtain the maximum amount of satisfaction at the
minimum cost. The choice of the purchaser in such instances
cannot be confined to the produce of a particular country. It
ought to be determined* by the advantages that may be offered
in the matter of price and delivery by different dealers. There
will be keen competition among manufacturers throughout the
world to secure orders, and the purchaser will be able, without
sacrifice of quality, to accept tenders which will be the lowest
practicable. Excessive expenditure will thus be avoided.
Foreign commodities required for the Indian Government are
Indian manufactured in Europe and America. It was
pnrehasei therefore considered convenient to arrange to buy
made In them in the biggest commercial centre of the world,
London namely, London. The Government naturally re-
quired an agent and a representative to act on their behalf and
in accordance with their instructions, in that city. To him
could be sent periodic lists of requirements, and he was expected
to procure the necessary articles on the most favourable terms.
Tt would appear to be only in the fitness of things that this
agent should be entirely a servant of the Indian ^vemment,
subject to their mandates and an instrument of their will.
68 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
But tho actual practice developed differently. The Secretary
TiM Itomtarjr of State and his office are located in London. He
^ ttUte as IS the head of the Indian Government and is in
an a|aiit close and constant touch with their ipiportant
activities and problems. He took over the work of purvejdng
to the needs of his Indian subordinates. Whenever the latter
desired to have particular articles, they were asked to communi-
cate with the Secretary of State. He undertook to perfoml all
the agency functions on their behalf, and to make available to
them the different kinds of goods for which they had indented.
The institution of such a system was very unfortupate from
An undeiirable the Indian point of view. The Secretary of State
combliiallon is the political superior of the Government" of
India. His actions and orders cannot be questioned by the
latter, who have to carry them out loyally and ungrudgingly.
The commercial agent of the Indian authorities thus turnecT
out to be a master who dictated and not a servant who obeyed.
He was not responsible to those whose money he had the oppor-
tunity to spend. On the contrary, he cohtrolled their judgement
and discretion and could direct their expenditure into particular
channels. It was a highly anomalous position.
It must be further remembered that the British conquerors
England’s of India, unlike their predecessors, are also great
Indnstrlal captains of industry They were the pioneers of
growth the Industrial Revolution, and have energeticallv
developed their industrial and commercial production. Now
the prosperity and the very existence of an industry depend up-
on the unrestricted sale of the output. If the mass of commo-
dities that it contributes is not quickly disposed of, the whole
mechanism comes to a standstill. It is therefore of vital im-
portance to all producing nations that they should capture mar-
kets to absorb their produce.
Britain was blessed by a fortunate coincidence in this respect.
The gmwih The development of its industry was accompanied
«C iti empire and followed by the growth of its vast empire
Exactly when its capacity to put forth a huge quantity of manu-
factured articles had reached a respectable limit, it acquired
immense areas which could serve as a lucrative field for com-
mercial expansion. England's mastery over a richly endowed
and. thickly populated country like Ladia was established at
this very juncture. It was inconceivable in those days that
the people of a conquered land could be allowed to govern them-
eelves, and the British therefore assumed control over India's
administration.
The Secretary of State is completely subordinate to the will
of the British Parliament. The industrial and commercial mag-
tiates of England aretstrongly represented in that body, and
lEMikturally influence its decisions and policy to a very great
THE HIGH 00MMI8SI0NEB POE INDIA 69
extent. Nor cato their attitude be purely disinterested and
InHuenoa of impartial. As mighty producers, they will vigo-
Its Industrial rously seek markets for the export of their conuno-
magnatii ^ dities. From^ the industrialist's point of view,
England's political domination over India would offer great poten-
tiahties for establishing stable inarkets which would ensure
prosperity to the British manufacturer.
• The fear was often entertained that India's interests as a
Flnandal buyer were not safe in the hands of the Secretary
loss to • of State. It was suspected that he was success-
India ^ fully pressed to give preference to British goods
at higher cost even when the same quality was available outside
Bntain at lower cost. If this were sq it inflicted unnecessary
m6n;|tary loss on India and imposed a drain on its wealth for
the benefit of the conqueror. The position was exasperating to
the Indian mind.
The authorities in India, who were all Englishmen, would
not be likely to feel the injustice so keenly. But even if they
did, they were powerless to prevent it. They could not question
the discretion of the Secretary of State. The combination of
the constitutional superior and the commercial agent was ex-
tremely awkward.
§3. APPOINTMENT OF THE HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOB INDIA
The definition of India's political goal in August 1917 and
Appointment ^he introduction of the ^Ibntford reforms two
of the High years later created a new situation. Those events
Commissioner were illustrative of a change in the angle of ^vision
of the Englishman. The Crew Committee, which was appointed
in 1919 to consider plans for the reorganization of the India
Office, recommended a bold departure from a system ^rhich gave
rise to suspicions in the Indian mind about the intentions and
actions of the Secretary of State. The self-governing Domi-
nions of the British Empire appoint their own officers in
London for the transaction of commercial and also political
business. They are known as High Commissioners. And by
the Act of 1919, matters were set right, at least theoreti-
cally, by India being allowed to appoint its own High
Commissioner.
The High Commissioner for India and his office are stationed
His sUtoa in London. He is selected by the Govemor-
General-in-Council, and his salary is paid out of Indian revenues.
He is entirely a servant of the Gk)vemment of India, amenable
to their discipline and subject to their supervision and in-
struction. The tenure of his office is usually five years. The
office was generally held till recently by very senior and very
highly placed members of the Civil Service like executive
70
INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
couuoillors of the Qjovemor-Qetieral. The tendency now is to
select prominent non-officials to hold it.
The High Commissioner has to perform all those agency
l>iitltts of functions for the Government of India which were
the otfloo formerly performed by the Secretary of State,
It is his principal duty to procure for them and for the Provin-
cial Governments all those articles which they are required to
import from abroad. He is expected to invite tenders for the
supply of goods from all the important producing .countries
and to secure the lowest competitive prices. Irrespective of
political or any other kind of pressure that may be ebcerted on
him from outside, his insistence must be exclusively on India's
gain and India’s benefit. The High Commissioner is also en-
trusted with certain minor duties like looking after the welfare
of Indian students who are prosecuting their studies in England ^
§4. PRACTICAL RESULTS
How far has the primary purpose of the creation of the new
Some office been fulfilled? To what extent has the
pertinent High Commissioner been able to safeguard India’s
qneetione national interests? Are all his purchases in-
variably confined, and allowed to be confined, to the cheapest
markets? Or is he required to observe some kind of preferential
discrimination in favour of British and Empire products^
These are inevitable questions. If they could be answered
satisfactorily, the appointment of the High Commissioner could
be justified and welcomed on practical as well as theoretical
grounds. Unfortunately, all the statistical and other data on
which alone a definite answer to all these questions can he
based are not easily accessible to the public.
It is necessary to emphasize that the Government of India
The iDdian is an alien bureaucracy. It does not symbolize
OoTerament is the Indian people. In such an undemocratic
a bQPMDmey system, the rulers and the ruled are not reallv
equated. In fact, they are likely to be in conflict with each
other on major issues. The outlook of foreign rulers cannot
always be identical with the hopes and ambitions of those
over whom they rule. Their interests may often prove to be
mutually incompatible. The British bureaucracy is naturally
eager to support British industry and British trade. A High
Commissioner who is entirely its servant would hardly find it
feasible to disregard its inclinations. The exercise of a purelv
bureaucratic authority cannot possess the full connotation of
popular control.
Matters stand differently with the Dominions. There is no
arfaficial gulf separating their Governments from their peoples.
Utetr High Commissioners staying in London have come to
THE HIGH COMMIBSIONEB FOE INDIA 71
aoqmre a iinique prestige. They function not only as the com-
Dominloiis mercial agents but, for all practical purposes,
are lelf- as the ambassadors of the Dominions in the
geiemlng , mother country. They are stationed as the
representatives of their people in the imperial capital. Con-
sultations on imperial issues are held though them. They
serYe as the channel of communication between the daughter
countries and the British nation. Usually, they are first-rate
politicians who have been leaders of public opinion in their
country *and have occupied high ministerial office.
§5.* CHANGES MADE BY THE ACT OF 1985
*The Act of 1935 contains an important clause concerning
An important the High Commissioner for India. Section 802
ehange provides that he shall be appointed, and his
salary and conditions of service shall be prescribed, by the
Governor-General exercising his individual judgement. He
has to perform such functions as the Governor-General may
from time to time direct. The authority of the Government
of India, as represented by the Governor-General-in-Council, and
as exercised at present, is thus substituted by the authority of
its individual head.
The change is apparently insignificant, but it may prove
Its reae- to be very far-reaching in practice. It is typical
Uonary nature of the process of neutralizing the grant of power
by the imposition of restrictions which characterizes the
scheme of the Act of 1935. The declared object of that mea-
sure is to transfer political power to the hands of Indians.
Therefore the principle of responsible government is to be
introduced even at the centre. And yet, though the bureaucratic
executive councillors *will be transformed into responsible
Indian Ministers, the Indian Ministers’ political powers are
curtailed in that the Indian High Commissioner will not be
nominated to hold office by them nor wiU he be subordinate to
their mandates. At the most, the Ministers may expect to
be consulted before the Governor-General takes any action in
the exercise of his individual judgement.
In fact, India’s agent in London may not be absolutely
Its praetleal beyond the direction and control of the Secretary
pesnfts ^ of State. The Governor-General, when exercising
his individual judgement, is required to act under the super-
intendence of that supreme Parliamentary head. The very
object and purpose of creating the office of Indian High Com-
missioner may therefore stand in danger of being frustrated.
He will be far removed, and even sheltered, from popular con-
trol, as exercised by and through an elected legislature. Nor
can he acquire that imperial status and importance which the
High Commissioners of the self-governing Dominions have been
.paturally able to achieve.
X. PARLIAMENT AND INDIA
§1. THE LEGAL POSITION
The sovereignty of the British Crown and Parliapient over the
Sovereignty Indian Empire was established by right of conquest,
of the ^ In strict legal theory, there are no restrictions or
Crown and limitations on that sovereignty. The form of the
Parliament Indian constitution is determined by Parliament.
The daily routine of its operation is controlled by Parliament’s
representative and servant, the Secretary of State for India.
Parliament can interfere as freely and frequently as it wills in
the affairs of India. The political, the economic and even the
cultural destiny of the country can be shaped and moulded by
parliamentary command. The British democracy expresses itself
through the British legislature. Therefore, the authority of the
latter is considered to be absolute and complete.
Even during the life-time of the East India Company, this
Control ovor constitutional position was constantly asserted.
East India The Company owed its very existence to a royal
Company charter. Its powers were modified and extended,
from time to time, by further issues of similar royal or parlia-
mentary charters. At a later stage, Parliament began to ap-
point small committee^ of inquiry to scrutinize the details of
the Company’s activities. It also passed a number of Acts to
regulate the method of Indian governance. IMtt’s India Act of
1784 went one step further. It set up a Board of Control over
the Eatt India Company and thus created a regular department
in England for supervising the administration of India from
day to day. The President of this Board soon acquired the
status of a Cabinet Minister.
The Company was abolished in 1858. Since then, the Secre-
Control over ^^^7 of State has been functioning on behalf of
the Secreta^ Parliament. As has been already explained, he
of State ig entirely subordinate to the latter’s direction and
will. It is true that the British democracy is not much in-
terested in the administrative problems of a distant ^dependency.
The indifference of the average Englishman to happenings in
India is only equalled by his ignorance about the Indian
territory and its people. Besides, the extent to which even
the parliamentary masters actually dictate to their own sub-
ordinates has to be determined by considerations of practical
wisdom. All the same, the fundamental constitutional relation-
is beyond any doubt or dispute. The British Parliament,
which represents the British nation, can pass any legislation
PARLIAMENT AND INDIA 78
for India and can effectively control the whole machinery of
its administration.
§2. RELAXATION OF PARLIAMENTARY
CONTROL
However, there is another important consideration which
The ftatue materially affects such a purely legal concept.
the A definition which attributes unrestrained and
Dominlone absolute sovereignty to Parliament in all circum-
stances ^has no correspondence to reality. In respect of the
I^niinions, for instance, it is inapplicable and out of date,
particularly after the enactment of th^ Statute of Westminster.-
ThetjBritish Empire is described as a free association of equal
parijiers and as a commonwealth of nations. Some of its most
important constituents are fully self-governing and independent.
In fact, no momentous decision affecting the Empire is taken
by the British Parliament without the consent of the Dominions.
It is therefore wrong to imagine that Parliament looks upon it-
self as an omnipotent sovereign which can claim and exact
obedience from all its subjects across the seas.
India has not yet been privileged to be in the category of the
India not a Dominions. The Indian Government is not ex-
Dominlon clusively formed by the Indian people nor is it
controlled by them. A bureaucracy wdiich is ultimately res-
ponsible to the British Crown and Parliament but not to the
Indian nation is specially recruited and commissioned to rule
over India. It therefore follow's that parliamentary authority
in respect of Indian governance is not merely fonnal and no-
minal. It is real. Even the Act of 1919 brought about no
derogation in either the Secretary of State s or Parliament's
powers of control over the Government of India. It has been
repeatedly emphasized by the British politician that Parliament
must be the sole judge of the time and of the degree of
each constitutional advance which India may be allowed to
make.
Yet the intentions of Parliament about the political future
PromlM of India were expressed in clear language in 1917.
of self- ^Ir Montagu's famous pronouncement was made
gOTornmeiit vvith the full concurrence and on behalf of all his
Cabinet colleagues. It enunciated the ideal of responsible gov-
ernment for India, to be realized in gradual stages. The Act
of 1919 was conceived as a perceptible step towards that distant
ideal. The Act of 1935 is supposed to be leading in the same
direction. It claims to inaugurate full provincial autonomy and
also to incorporate the dyarchical principle m the structure of
the all-India Federation whenever it is Drought into existence.
The want of political rights and privileges to India would
, necessarily imply the withdrawal of parliamentary control over
74 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
Indian affairs at least to the extent of that grant. If the trans-
DiiiilBstkni of of power to Indians is to be genuine, Par-
Parliamont*! liament cannot simultaneously retain that ve^
powers power in its own possession. In the sphere in
which India is allowed to enjoy the privilege of ruling over
itself, the rule of an outside non-Indian authority like the Brit-
ish Parliament must obviously cease. When the central and
provincial Governments in India become completely subordinate
to representative Indian legislatures, the superintendepce of a
British Minister over those Governments will have to cease.
The logic of such a situation is simple and unimpeachable. If
India is permitted to govern itself, it cannot, at the same* time,
be governed by foreigners. Either the Indian or the English-
man, but not both together, can rule over the Indian continent.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained a definite re-^
Reeommeiida- commendation pertaining to this question. It
tlons in the suggested that in respect of all matters in which
Montfhvd responsibility is entrusted to representative bodies
Report India, Parliament should be prepared to forgo
the exercise of its own powers. That supreme body must set
certain limits to its own authority if India's political advance
is not to be a mere shadow. It would mean for Parlia-
ment a process of self-effacement from the Indian scene. But
it must be deliberately pursued, pari passu with the development
of responsible institutions in India. A progressive increase in
India's political freedom would have to be automatically accom-
panied by a corresponding relaxation in supervision from Britain.
In short, there must be progressive devolution of power to an
Indian democracy.
However, no specific provision for curtailing the authority
The of Parliament or of the Secretary of State was in-
nethod of eluded in the Act of 1919. Such a legal restraint
-eoDTentions is felt to be inconsistent with British constitu-
tional traditions and is therefore repugnant to the British mind.
But what was not effected by the letter of the law was sought
to be achieved by the establishment of conventions. It is
necessary to understand the peculiarities of parliamentary con-
ventions and the manner in which they operate.
§3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONVENTIONS
A convention is a dignified name for a custom, practice or
Vhal Is a tradition which commands general acceptance. The
Mnentloii? term has acquired almost a technical significance
in the language of political science. A convention is not
a law. It is not enacted by a legislature. Its violation is not
followed by a judicial penalty. Yet, it can have the same force
and prestige as a law. A nation, like an individual, may drift
into a certain course of action and may get so accustomed to
PARLIAMENT AND INDIA 75
its routine, that it would make every effort to maintain what
has actually become a part of its normal life. Similarly, a
people may voluntarily agree to abide by a certain code of
conduct* and loyally caiiy out the agreement. It could be
entirely a self-imposed obligation, not enforceable in law, but
because of its invariable and general adoption, it becomes a
vital element in social and political life.
• * Borne of the most important political institutions of Eng>
Example Ic^nd are not known to the English statute book,
of the British They are evolved by and embodied in very strong
Cabinet ^ conventions and traditions which are too firmly
rooted in the country’s life to be disturbed or dislocated
lightly. The Cabinet system and respojasible government of the
parliamentary type have been the essence of British constitu-
tional development during the last two centuries. They are
the most outstanding contribution made by the British genius
to political theory and practice. Yet neither the Cabinet nor
the doctrine of responsibility were formulated by legislative
enactment. They are part of the unwritten law of the land.
As no statutory restrictions were deemed feasible on the
Secretary of State’s powers, it was supposed that he would
voluntarily accept limitations on his power. Two cases were
clearly distinguished in practice and definite action was recom-
mended for each one of them.
The Transferred provincial subjects were avowedly minis-
Transferred terial subjects. Parliament has delegated all con-
Bubjeots trol over them to provincial legislatures. These
latter bodies were purposely democratized and made more
representative in order that they should play their role pronerlv
in the scheme of responsible government. The retention of
active parliamentary Control over these matters was therefore
an evident incongruity. Hence, it was prescribed, by a rule
made under the Act of 1919 that in respect of Transferred sub-
jects the power of the Secretary of State to superintend and
control should be strictly limited to the minimum. It should
be exercised mainly for the purpose of safeguarding the admin-
istration of the central subjects and for deciding matters in
dispute between two provinces.
The central subiects and the Re«jcrved provincial subjects
Central and were in a different category. Here, the ultimate
ReBerred responsibility, legally speaking, was supposed to
BubJeotB lie with Parliament. No relaxation of the Secret-
ary of State’s authority was therefore possible by the
compilation of niles. But the spirit of the Montagu-Chelms-
ford Reforms could not be ignored. The Act of 1919 was stated
to be the first instalment of the gift of political autonomy to
India. It was admittedly a prelude to successive similar instal-
ments, the final stage being the attainment of Dominion status.
.Tn these circumstances, the control of the Secretary of State
76 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
idven in reserved provincial and in central subjects could not
remain absolute and undiminished, as it had been before.
It was therefore recommended that in these subjects also
The there should be some delegation of finangial and
sonvenikm administrative authority to the Government of India
and to the provinces. The adoption of a definite convention
was strongly recommended for that purpose. Accordingly, the
following undertaking was officially given, and it has sifice
been recognized as a necessary feature of the working of the
Indian Constitution. If on any matter of purely Indian inter-
est, the executive governments in India and the Indifin legis-
latures are in agreement, the Secretary of State and Parlia-
ment would not ordinarily interfere with the decisions arrived
at in India, even if their views were opposed to that decision.
Many party leaders of Britain have supported this promise
§4. THE FISCAL AUTONOMY CONVENTION
One particular instance of the operation of such a conveii-
Flsesl tion and the application of the principle of non-
qaestions interference was specifically mentioned by the
Joint Parliamentary Committee which reported on the Bill
of 1919. The belief, it said, was widespread that India's
fiscal policy was dictated from Whitehall and that it was in-
tended to benefit Britain at the cost of India. The Commit-
tee felt that the entertainment of such a belief was quite un-
desirable. It therefore suggested that liberty should be granted
to the Government of India to devise the tariff policy which
seemed to them to be best fitted to India's needs, taking India
to be an integral part of the British Empire.
Here also, the method of relaxing parliamentary authority
The ^ was to be the institution of a suitable convention
eooventioii and not a limitation imposed by law. It was pro-
posed that whenever the Indian Government and the Indian
legislature agreed on fiscal questions, the Secretary of State and
Parliament should not ordinarily interfere.
An important precedent in conformity with this recomnien-
Oeeasion fto dation was established only two years after the
A preeed«nt introduction of the Montford Beforms. The con-
clusion of the Great W^ar of 1914-18 was followed by a big trade
slump and depression throughout the world. Industry was dis-
organized, production had to be curtailed, and incomes dwin-
dled. The Government of India were faced with a grave
&ianoial situation. Their annual budgets present^ a series of
large deficits and their credit had gone very low. Heroic efforts
to be made to restore the equilibrium between income and
eocpenditure. Higher taxation and ruthless retrenchment were
the only effective remecfies for preventing an ugly deterioration
in the finanoiri stability of the country.
PABLIAMENT AND INPIA 77
The Government of lindia were therefore constrained to
Inerease in propose a drastic increase in the rates of customs
Indian import duty levied on all articles imported into the Indian
dntlsB ^ ports. The -proposal was sanctioned by the
Indian *legi6lature. The British industrialist, however, was
greatly perturbed by the whole scheme. A high tariS was
bound to be protective in its effect, at least to a certain extent,
even if the intention of its levy was only to obtain revenue.
A deputation of Lancashire merchants therefore waited
upon Mr Montagu, who was then the Secretary of State for
India, and requested him to exercise his superior powers of
contrpl 8nd veto to kill the Indian scheme. Mr Montagu's reply
Wins unambiguous and emphatic. To him it was enough that
the ^vernment of India and the Indian legislature were agreed
on the tariff issue. He made it clear to the Lancashire deputa-
tion that, in the light of the recommendations of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee, he was unable to interfere in the
matter of the new customs schedule that was proposed by the Go-
vernment of India with the full concurrence of their legislature.
Tills was the first test of the genuineness of Parliament’s
promise and the right precedent was unequivocally established.
Another Secretary of State, Mr Wedgwood Benn, who was a
member of the Labour Government during 1929-31, endorsed
the same policy. But even such declarations could be little
more than a gesture of goodwill. They were marked by cer-
tain inherent limitations.
§5. DEFECTS OF THE METHOD OF
CONVENTIONS
It Is clear that thp autonomy conferred by the method des-
DifficuU cribed in the foregoing pages could not have any
oondltions great practical value. The convention which is
intended to unlock the gates of India’s fiscal freedom can
only operate when certain essential conditions are fulfilled.
And those conditions are difficult of fulfilment in the normal
course of Indian administrative routine.
Thus, at the very outset it is declared indispensable that the
Eelationt of Government of India and the Indian legislature
the Indian must be in agreement with each other. The bare
Goiernment statement of such a requirement is sufficient to
with their expose the inherent improbability of its satisfac-
leglBlatnre Government of India is an irresponsible
alien bureaucracy. It is drawn from a conquering nation and
reflects the views and interests of the British masters of India.
The elected Indian legislature, on the other hand, reflects the
aspirations and the distress of a subject people. It serves as
a vehicle for the expression of the hopes and fears, the ambi-
tions and the restless ferment, of a conquered country.
78 INDIAN ADMINIBTRATION
Those who are in the enjoyment of power are naturally bent
ftmSa tttttal on extending and perpetuating it. Those who
AtiweiiM are desirous of acquiring power are equally natu-
rally keen on disputing the possession of that power by the
present rulers. The aim of all political agitation in India has
been the attainment of swaraj. The relations between the
bureaucratic executive governments in India and the elected
Indian legislatures have not been, and are not likely to be,^
marked by cordial harmony. A convention which presupposes
agreement between two pities which are more likely to oppose
than to agree with each other is an illusion. The precedent
established by Mr Montagu was really too exceptional in the
circumstances of its origin to be capable of frequent repeution.
Other difficulties have also been noticed in the working of
Offidal and convention. The Indian legislatures as con-
nomlnaUd stituted by the Act of 1919 were not composed
msmbsin in entirely of elected representatives. They con-
ths toglslaliir tained a fairly large proportion of official mem-
bers whose votes were directly commanded by the Govern-
ment. There were also the nominated non-officials whose votes
could be influenced by the official whips. The views of the
legislature are evidently intended to be taken as an indication
of Indian opinion in general. It was therefore argued, when
the question of giving preferential treatment to British textiles
came up before the Legislative Assembly in 1980 for discus-
sion, that these official and nominated non-official members
should abstain from voting whenever decisions are to be taken
on controversial issues. However, the Government did not
accept this interpretation of the procedure for ascertaining the
legislature’s wishes an^ have mobilized all their numerical
strength an the floor of the house whenever important issues
were to be decided.
Further, what is exactly connoted by the expression ‘pure-
• Ponly Indian interests’, when India is considered to
l^in be an integral part of the British Empire? In
laterasts * the highly complex life of modem times, the
not oasUj interdependence of even independent nations is
definable ^ striking phenomenon. Any step contemplated
or adopted by one nation has its repercussions on the whole
world.- The economic and political self-assertion of India is
bound to affect other parts of the Empire and also the mother
country. In such a state of things, 'purely Indian interests’
may be discovered to be but an elusive phantom.
The Indian public has not shown any enthusiasm for the
Ab BBsartifai method of conventions. They may work effec-
bAril tively in a free country like England, the growth
of whose polity has beeh going on unhampered for centuries.
But it is not easy to transplant traditions and all the psycho-
PAELIAMENT AND INDIA 7»
logi^ back'ground which creates them. One cannot help
feeling sceptical about the efficacy of a convention which can
deteriorate into a personal idiosyncrasy of the Secretary of
State or become the play of party forces in a foreign demo>
cracy. The foundations ot 'India’s fiscal and political autonomy
must be more solid and abiding.
§6. THE POSITION AFTER THE ACT OF 1985
What is the nature of parliamentary control over Indian
After the ^ affairs since the Act of 1985? What will be the
Federation position of Parliament via-h-vis the Federation
of India^when the latter comes to be inaugurated in accord-
ant^ with the provisions of that Act? Will there still be need
for the enunciation of conventions or has autonomy been con-
fertecP on India in a more direct form? These are perti-
nent and interesting questions and require to be examined
closely.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee which reported on the
View of gave its opinion that with the pass-
the Joint ing of the new Act, the existing convention will
Parllamontary necessarily lapse and that the federal Wislature
Committee enjoy complete fiscal freedom. However,
they were also emphatic in stating that this freedom could not
be utilized for the purpose of injuring and excluding British
trade. They therefore recommended that all doubts in the
matter should be completely removed by the inclusion of a
definite item in the Special Responsibilities of the Governor-
General and by its further amplification in the Instrument of
Instructions to him.
Accordingly, section 12 of the Act which defines the Special
Responsibilities of the Governor-General contains
the following clauses: ‘The prevention of action
which would subject goods of the United King-
dom or of Burmese origin imported into India
to discriminatory or penal treatment.* A whole
chapter of the Act — sections 111-21 — ^is also specially devoted
to an elaboration of the same point. The explanatory comment
of the Joint Parliamentary Committee gives a clear idea of the
Special
Responsibility
of the
Oovernor-
Oeneral
intentions of Parliament.
‘ The imposition of this special responsibility upon the
Olarifieation Governor-General is not intended to affect the
of the issae competence of his Government and of the Indian
legislature to develop their own fiscal and economic policy;
they will possess complete freedom to negotiate agreements
with the United Kingdom or other countries for the securing of
mutual tariff concessions. It will be his duty to intervene in
tariff policy or in the negotiation or variation of tariff agree-
ments only if in his opinion the intentions of the policy con-
80 mpUN ADMINISTRATION
templated is to subject the trade between the United Kingdom
and India to restrictions conceived, not in the economic in-
terests of India but with the object of injuring the interests of
the United Kingdom. The 'discriminatory or penal' treatment
covered by this special responsibility includes both direct dis-
crimination and indirect discrimination. ... In all these res-
pects the words would cover measures which, though not
discriminatory or penal in form, would be so in fact.
‘The United Kingdom and India must approach their trade
The eoneept problem in a spirit of reciprocity, which views the
of reolproolty trade between the two countries as a whole. . . .
The reciprocity consists in a deliberate effort to expand the
whole range of their trade with each other to the fullest possible
extent compatible with the interests of their own people. Tne
conception does not preclude either partner from entering into
special agreements with third countries . . . but it does imply that
when either partner is considering to what extent it can offer
special advantages to a third country without injustice to the
other partner, it will have regard to the general range of benefits
secured to it by the partnership, and not merely to the use-
fulness of the partnership in relation to the particular commo-
dity under consideration at the moment.'^
This exposition clearly shows that the fiscal autonomy which
No absolute will be conferred upon the future Federation of
autonomy India will not be unrestricted and absolute as in
the case of the Dominions. It will be linked up with, and
limited by, the doctrine of reciprocity with Britain. The impli-
cations and the obligations imposed by this doctrine have been
elaborated in very wide terms. It is intended to apply not only
to individual contracts for the import and export of particular
commodities but will comprehend the whole range of relation-
ship between England and India. The important aspects and
consequences of such a position need to be explained at some
length.
The concept of reciprocity implies a voluntary agreement
Raeiprodty between two nations. Each must be free to decide
must be based what will be most beneficial to itself and in the
on free will light of that conviction to enter into specific con-
tracts with the other. The terms of the contract must be
willingly accepted by both the parties. There is no room for
compulsion or force in such an arrangement. It is entirely the
result of friendly negotiations and discussions in pursuit of a
common purpose. A country's participation in a scheme em-
bodying this principle presupposes complete freedom from out-
side control. And as long as that freedom is not predicated
for India, reciprocity is only a euphemism for British dictation.
’ Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee f pp. 205 - 6 .
PABLIAMENT AND INDIA 81
Bection 12 of the Goyemment of India Act makes it clear
Centrol of that in matters where a special zesponsibility of
tho Somtsfy the Gk>vemor-General is involved, he has to act
of atafto in the exercise of his individual judgement. Sec-
tion 14 turther adds that whenever he exercises his individual
judgement, he will be imder the general control and direction
of the Secretary of State. The results of this closely woven
chain of constitutional definition can be easily imagined. Under
its inhibitory action, the fiscal * autonomy’ of India may be
conditioned by the personal prejudices of British politicians and
the odd movements of opinion in the British democracy. That
was t]}ef^efect of the old method of conventions, and it may
codtShue to exist even under the new federal scheme.
The line of demarcation between what is described as the
A difOiidt legitimate ideal of fostering Indian interests and
dlsIlneilOD the mischievous desire to harm British trade will
necessarily be very ambiguous and uncertain. So far as mere
lesults are concerned, the two policies may at times even shade
off into each other. Any effective protection devised in further-
ance of India’s industrial advancement will be intended to
be, and will actually be, a distinct handicap to the foreign
producer.
It is the Governor-General who is empowered to judge the
The task Indian motive and put a correct interpretation on
of Judging the Indian objective and will. It is a matter of
motife ordinary experience that to reach a proper verdict
oven on easily ascertainable facts is difficult enough. A verdict
on the intangible and mysterious complex of inner motives is,
of course, much more difficult, and any definite judgement on
them would inevitably tend to be more subjective than detached.
It must be remembered that the British Governor-General who
will play the role of final judge in fiscal matters cannot help
being solicitous about the welfare and prosperity of his mother-
land. His attitude and actions are bound to be influenced by
the opinions of his people. It is therefore difficult for the
Indian to feel assured of his impartiality, at least so long as the
office of Viceroy is not held by Indians.
There is another aspect of this question which deserves atten-
Mr Nerllld tion. Apart from the purely legal position in such
Ohamberlain's matters, action taken on particular occasions and
Statement in precedents established in the actual working of
the Commons constitutional machine are of the highest
importance. They determine, to a great extent, the shape of
the living reality. Interpretations and conventions will play a
.decisive part in the early stages of the operation of the Act of 1935.
It is therefore desirable to refer here to the reply which lifc
Neville Chamberlain, the British Premier, gave in the House
of Commons in June 1987 to Mr .Churchill’s question regarding
6
82 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
the liimts within which questions relating to events in India may
be answered in Parliament.
Mr Chamberlain said that as long as the Federation of India
is not brought into existence and the Transitional Provisions of
the Act of 1936 continue to operate, the Govemor-General-in-
Council remains responsible, through the Secretary of State for
India, to Parliament, and therefore questions and answers about
the affairs of the Central Government could be asked and giveq
in Parliament as before.
In respect of Provincial Governments he said that, as far as
the Ministers responsible to the provincial legislatures for the
government of the provinces are concerned, it will be‘‘ -jutirely
inappropriate if the House of Commons were to call in que^lon
or criticize by question and answer their policies and activities.
The Secretary of State has in fact no longer any responsibility
in matters within the control of the provincial Ministers.
On the other hand, in the exercise of his special powers the
Governor is responsible to the Governor-General and through
him to the Secretary of State. Therefore, in the Premier’s view,
questions in Parliament on Provincial affairs ought not now to
be regarded in order unless it is shown that either the action at
issue has been taken by the Governor without consulting the
Ministers or against their advice or, in the alternative, that the
Governor is in possession of powers applicable to a case which
he h€is failed to exercise.
Mr Chamberlain also suggested that even this right ought to
be used with discretion and restraint and that His Majesty’s
Government must themselves exercise careful discretion regarding
the extent to which it is expedient in any given case to supply
information about facts and events in an Indian province. Un-
less the new distribution of responsibilities is frankly recognized,
provincial self-government in India cannot work and work well.
This view has generally prevailed and the ministerial side
of provincial administrations is no longer subject to the super-
vision and control of the authorities in the United Kingdom.
PART III
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TODAY
CENTBAL AND PROVINCIAl. OOVERNMENTS AND THE
FUNCTIONS OF OOVEENMBNT . . . . 84
XII. *THB CENTBAX. EXECUTIVE: THE OOVSBNQB-OENEBAU
AND crown’s BBPBESENTATIVE . . . . 87
SBer. THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE: THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 99
XIV. SOME GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING LEGISLA-
TURES . . . . • . . . 110
XV. THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE: GROWTH TILL 1919 . . 120
XVI. THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE : THE EXISTING CHAMBERS 127
XVII. THE RELATION OP THE EXECUTIVE TO THE LEGISLATURE 143
XI. CENTEAL AND PBOVINCIAL GOVERN-
MENTS AND THE FUNCTIONS OP GOVERN-
MENT
§1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN CENTEAL AND
PEOyiNCIAD GOVEENMENTS
India is a very lazgfe country, botli in respect of area and in
Tlie gnat respect of the number of its inhabitants. It is
ilie and not possible to rule over its immense Hugpanse
*wiltj «t from a single headquarters, however centrffiMts
location. A single unified official agency cannot
adequately meet the requirements of a huge and diverse popula-
tion of over thirty crores of human beings. For the purposeg
of governance, it must be, and actually is, divided into severid
territorial units. The formation of these divisions has been
governed partly by historical forces and partiy by considerations
^ race, language, culture, and convenience.
Every territorial sub-division, known as a presidency or a
Tlie ProTlndal province, has a government established in and for
GoTernmeiiis it. The jurisdiction of these governments is stnctly
limited to the provincial sphere, as understood both in the
geographical and in the political sense. The range and bounds
of this sphere are definitely marked. All provmces stand on^
a level of equality in relation to each other and no one pro-
vince is allowed to trespass upon the rights and interests of
another. An administrative system of the same pattern and
embodying the same essentials is provided for every province,
though there may be differences of detail Ao suit local conditions
At the head of aH the provinces stands the largest entity
The Cenihd known as the Government of India. It has a dis-
OoTernment tinct sphere of itp own, and in several important
matters its authority extends to the whole coimtry. The sub-
jects that it manages — ^for example, defence, customs, posts and
telegraphs, railways, etc. — ^have a vital bearing on all parts and
people of the land. It is invested with wide powers of super-
vision and control, because it is intended to serve as the superior
all-India authority.
The Government of India, as the Central Government of the
country, personifies the unity of India^ while the Provincial
Governments represent its diversity. Ilie former deals with
problems which concern the whole nation. The latter are
placed in charge of subjects which can best be managed by the
different parts. For clarity of exposition, it is convenient to
separate me two entities and to aescribe each in detail. The
that connect them and help to co-ordinate their various
activiMes have also to" be properly grasped. Accordingly, this
OENTBAL AND MtOVINOIAL G03rEBNMENT8 85
part of the present work will be devoted to a description of the rise
and growth of the Central Government and its present working.
§2. THBEErOL(D DIVISION OP GOVEBNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS
Writers on political science have classified the functions of
Three kinds government in three broad categories, and even an
of actlYlty ordinary citizen can easfiy distinguish between them
from e\ieryday personal knowledge. They are not of course
entirely watertight compartments, but they correctly indicate the
differ^^ phases of organized social activity. Thus, a govem-
mefff has to (ij frame laws adequately and properly, (ii) carry
out laws effectively and honestly, an^ (iii) interpret laws and
exani^ne their application in a spirit of justice and progress.
A threefold mechanism is usually provided in a modem state
Three for the performance of this threefold duty, the
ijpee of Legislature, the Ministers, and the Judicature,
institutions These institutions are formed on certain definite
principles and are closely woven in the fabric of national life.
It is generally agreed that the Legislature ought to be a large
Principles and representative body, because it is empowered
of their to pass laws which may affect all and which have
formation to be obeyed by all. In determining ideals and
policies and prescribing general restrictions, it is appropriate
that full scope should be given for the expression of the public
will and the divergent view-points that it may include.
On the other hand, the Executive, which is concerned not
with deliberation but with action, must be a small, talented,
disciplined and compact body. If the governmental machine
is to move with speed and vigour and if a high level of administra-
tive efficiency has to be attained, it is necessary to collect a
small number of trained experts and entrust them with the task
of managing routine affairs.
Different considerations prevail in the composition of the
Judiciary. The judge is the guardian of civic privileges, liber-
ties and rights. Particular care must therefore be taken to see
that the judicial authority is constituted by persons who are
learned, fearless and impartial, and whose integrity is above
suspicion.
The study of government ultimately resolves itself into a
Method study of these three constitutional and administra-
sf itadj tive instruments. Their form and their powers
require close attention. Each has to be treated as an inde-
pendent subject for investigation and comment. Then an at-
tempt wiU have to be made to elucidate the manner in which
they stand related to each other.
That is the main scheme of the following chapters. The
Central and Provincial Governments will be studied as two
as IICDIAN ADMINISTRATION
eatities. In the study of each, the executive and the
legi^ative aspects will be distin^ahed from each other and ez>
plained at length in separate ^pters Then an account will
be given of fheir mutual relations. The Federal Court and the
provincial judicature will be described separately in their appro
priate places.
XII. THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE : THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND CROWN’S
REPRESENTATIVE
§1. THE NEW CONSTITUTION NOT YET
EFFECTiyB
The Act of 1985 has proposed certain radical changes in the
Obangq^ade structure of the Government of India. The pre-
byilH^ot sent unitary system will be transformed into a
of 1985 federation. The Indian States will be associated
for ^0 first time with British India in the formation of an all-
Ixidia polity. The principle of responsibility will be introduced
to a certain extent in the working of the central executive.
The central legislature also will be considerably reshaped in
consistence with the federal doctrine.
However, for various reasons, this part of the Act was not
They are to made operative simultaneously with the introduc-
be introdueed tion of provincial autonomy. The legislative
1*^** skeleton of the Indian Federation has been pro-
vided by the Act, but it has yet to be quickened into life. The
Viceroy did make efforts to hasten the advent of the federal
systetn. He sent special emissaries to hold consultations with
the Indian Princes and to assist them in overcoming their
difficulties in joining the new arrangement. But another decisive
event soon intervened to stop discussion of this constitutional
issue. In September 1939 England declared war on Germany,
and since then the whole of the British Empire has been engaged
in a struggle of the greatest magnitude. It was decided that
during the currency of the war the introduction of the federal
scheme should be suspended. It is even probable that in view
of the severe criticism to which the scheme has been subjected in
India, it will be reconsidered at the end of the war and materially
modified in many respects.
As long as the new Act does not come into force in this
Tbe present particular respect, the constitution of the Govem-
Qonstitotion ment of India as framed by the Act of 1919 but
with certain necessary modifications will continue to function.
It has been incorporated in the Transitional Provisions contained
in Part XIII and the Ninth Schedule of the Act of 1935. The
following pages therefore describe at length the unitary Central
Government which is still actively functioning but which may
be superseded by a federal structure at some future date. In
a subsequent part, a glimpse is mven of the future as it is
likely to be if and when the Federation of India is actually
brought into existence.
68
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
§2. THE GOVEENOR.QENERAL AND THE
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
The ejcecutive side of the Central Government is composed
of the Govemor-General of India and his Executive Council.
They are inseparably linked with each other and must work
as a homogeneous body.
But the Governor-General is so dominant in the Indian
constitutional pictiire, that it becomes necessary to study in de-
tail all the lines and colours of ^ individual portrait 'which is
included in that larger picture. He is not merely the part of
a whole but, in a diminutive measure, himself consW'jtea a
whole.
For purposes of explanation, therefore, the executive sme
of the Government of India is split up into two parts. One deals
with the head of that Government and the other is devoted te
a description of his Council.
§3. HISTORY OP THE GOVEENOR-GENERAL^S
OFFICE
As the East India Company was onginally started as a com-
No Ooiemer- mercial corporation with the object of carrying on
'Oeneral trade in eastern waters, it was not found necessary
iMfora 1778 to provide for the appointment of any official like
the Governor-General. Its territorial possessions during the
period were limited to small areas on the western and eastern
coasts of India on which its factories and warehouses were situ-
ated and which had been purchased or rented from Indian pro-
prietors. These possessions were necessary accidents of trade,
and had no political character whatever., Bombay on the west
coast and Calcutta and Madras on the east coast were the chief
trading Centres.
The Charter Act of 1661 allowed the appointment of a
Governor or President in each of the trading centres. He was
assisted by a Coimcil consisting of from twelve to sixteen sub-
ordinate officials who were chosen to constitute the Council
according to seniority. The authority of the Governors or Pre-
sidents-in-Council spread over their respective zones, that is to
say, over the Company's western, eastern and north-eastem
possessions in India. The three Presidencies of Bombay, Madras
and Bengal were independent of each other and had an equal
status. All of them, however, were subordinate to the Company's
Directorate in London and had to carry out their orders and
mandates. The Company's business was simple and of a purely
OOmmercial character. There was therefore no special necessity
appoint a superior official on the*^spot in India to co ordinate
ehd control the affairs of the tirbee PiMidencies.
pircumstances wei^, however, gradually changing. The
THE OENTEAL EXECUTIVE 80
magnificent Mogul Empire had passed its allotted span of life.
The Oompaay and the chapter of its existence was coming to a
close. Anarchical elements began to get the upper
ana ^^nd in many parts of the country, and as the
imperial authority was too debilitated to grant any
effective protection the Company felt compelled to take into
their own hands the task of self-preservation. The necessity
proved to be congenial to the more militant section of the
Company's officials. The justification of self-defence could now
be pleaded for their attempts at aggrandizement. The factories
began to be fortified into fortresses. The Company began to
enfist^sttiies, to weave diplomatic webs, to fight wars and to
acqftffm territories. In short, it initiated the experiment of
empire-building in India. The managezpent of its affairs had to
respond to all the implications of this curious complex of in-
evitability and ambition.
The requirements of a political and military career were
Need for obviously more complicated and onerous than those
unity of of trade. The necessity of governance created new
control responsibilities which had to be carried out success-
fully. It became desirable to co-ordinate the Company's acti-
vities and msdurces in different parts of the Indian continent.
Their efforts required unity of dimction and command in order
that they should not be dissipated in a large number of fruitless
adventures. A sense of oneness/'bad to be inculcated among all
the servants of the Company and coherence had to be given to
their actions. The old independence of the three Presidencies,
with their narrow insular outlook, had to give place to a greater
degree of solidarity in administration and policy.
The Eegulating Act of 1773 gave the impulse towards unifi-
The cation by making the Governor of Bengal the
Regulating Governor-General of Bengal, who with his Council
Aet, 1773 was given power to superintend and control the
government and management of the three Presidencies of Madras,
Bombay and Bengal.
Henceforth it was not lawful for the Governments of the
minor Presidencies ‘to make any orders for commencing hostili-
ties or declaring or making war or for negotiating or concluding
any treaty, without the previous consent of the Governor-General
and Council' except in circumstances of imminent necessity.
Intelligence of all transactions in the provinces relating to the
government, revenues or interests of the Company was to be
constantly transmitted to the Governor*General.
The establishment of such a central authority was an innova-
tion. The provinces or Presidencies had not been accustomed
to the direct control of a superior in the past and it took some
time before the unfamiliar could be properly assimilated. In
spite of the provision of the Eegulating Act, the Provincial
90 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Oovenun^nts continued to take important deciBiye Btepg which
involved the Company in the currentB and cross-currentB of con-
tempdfary Indian polity without any reference to or sanction
from the Oovemor-Qeneral. This defiant insubordination of theirs,
which was not redeemed by successful results, plunged Warren
Hastings into embarrassments and complications from which
he could not easily escape. It is said by his supporters that he
had to expiate many sins which had been committed not by him
but by the unruly and unwise provincial Presidents.
This unsatisfactory state of things, which ga\e an air of un-
ntt's India reality to a definite and deliberate provision of an
Ast, 1784 Act of Parliament, could not continue %Dg. A
special clause was inserted in Pitt’s India Act to emphasize^nd
enlarge the Govemor-Generars supreme power and control over
the minor Presidencies in ail matters of war and peace and
administration. After this Act and during the administration of
strong-willed rulers like Cornwallis and Wellesley this defective
state of things completely disappeared. Henceforth the Govemor-
General-in-Council of Bengal came to be acknowledged as the
head of all the Company’s dominions and administration in India.
With the practical completion of the conquest of the Indian
Thi A«t continent the designation of the Governor- General
of 1888 of Bengal became a misnomer. It was therefore
changed to Governor-General of India by the Charter Act of
18S8. The Govemor-General-in-Council was vested with the
^superintendence, direction, and the control of the whole civil
and military Government’ in India. He continued to administer
directly the Presidency of Bengal.
The Act of 1854 relieved the Governor-General of this last
Hm Aet burden, which was transferred to the newly created
•f 1884 office of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The
same A<A also empowered the Govemor-General-in-Council, with
the sanction of the Home authorities, to ‘take by proclamation
under his immediate authority and management any part of the
territories for the time being in possession of or under the govern-
ment of the East India Company’ and then give all necessary
orders for its administration. The mode in which this power
was exercised in practice was by the appointment of officials
called Chief Commissioners. To these officials the Governor-
General delegated such powers as could be delegated. In this
way * were established Chief Commissionerships for Assam,
Burma, the Central Provinces, etc. Technically, territories under
the administration of the Chief Commissioners were under
the immediate authority and management of the Govemor-
Genend-in-Council. This measure had become necessary on
laiooouut of the ever-increasing additidns to British dominion and
the consequent necessity to mi^e suitable arrangements for their
B^ministration.
THE CENTBAL EXECUTIVE 91
On the abolition of the East India Company after the cata<
EHu 1808 olysm of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the Govern*
— TIosMy ment of India was directly taken over by the
English Crown and Parliament. In announcing the assumption
of the Government of India by the Crown of England in the
famous Proclamation of 1658, Queen Victoria referred to Lord
Canning, Governor-General designate, as the first Viceroy and
Q-ovemor-General. Strictly spe^ng the word 'Viceroy' is un-
known to any of the statutory enactments and therefore to the
letter of .the constitution. Nevertheless it is freely used in prac-
tice. It describes the new exalted status which the Qov^rnor-
Gener^^acquired, when, in addition to being the head of the
Indffln admmistration, he also began to represent and personify
the Crown in the inevitable absence of the king from his posses-
Bion)st> This high position continues to be enjoyed by him till
the present day.
§4. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATIONS AND
TENUEE
The Governor-General is appointed by His Majesty, acting
Appointment on the advice of his Prime Minister. Nomination
and to this high office evidently cannot be determined
qualifleatloni only by academic or professional merits. But there
are certain well-understood tests which must be fulfilled by the
person who is selected. The Governor-General is invariably
picked from the British aristocracy and often possesses high
family connexions. He is a man of social status who has played
a prominent part in British public life. Usually, he has made
his mark as administrator, statesman or politician before he is
invited to go out to India as Viceroy. Generally he has ample
parliamentary experience to his credit. Many holders of the
Viceregal office have previously risen to the position of Cabinet
Ministers. The training and culture of such scions of noble
houses is supposed to impart to them a robust freshness of out-
look and a broad, sympathetic vision, which are particularly
valuable assets to the head of a state.
The office of Governor-General is essentially a non-party
A non-party office. The dignitary who holds it does not change
office with a change of ministry in England. Continuity
of executive government and freedom from the disturbing effects
of purely artificial fluctuations are ensured by this salutary
practice. In recent years, Lord Beading served under three
different ministries and Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax) served
under two. Acute political differences with a new Secretary of
State, who may have come into office after a dissolution of
Parliament and fresh elections, may sometimes precipitate the
resignation of a Gbvemor-General. but such instances are very
rare. Thanks to the high standard of British political sagacity
INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
and public morals, the Gbyemment of India is not allowed to
be turned into a shuttle-cock for the sport of the party leaders
of Great Britain. The Indian question is always declared to
be a question above party. There always seems to be a general
consensus of opinion among British politicians of all schools of
thought about the policy which the British should adopt towards
India.
Till the passing of the Leave of Absence Act in iys4:,'tne
Tenure and Governor-General, the Governors and the Executive
leave Councillors were not entitled to any -leave of
absence outside India. If they had to leave the country for
any reason they were required to relinquish their The
Act of 1924 has now been repealed but its clauses hav^ffeen
incorporated in the Transitional Provisions of the Act of 1935.
According to them, the Secretary of State may grant to the
Governor-General leave of absence from India for urgent reasons
of public interest or of health or of private affairs. The period
of such leave is not to exceed four months and it is not to be
granted more than once during the tenure of office. Suitable
leave allowances are provided for under the rules made by the
Secretary of State.
§6. EELATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL
The duties and powers of the Governor-General are numerous
Ha regnlatas and varied. He is the head of the Indian adminis-
tka work tration and the highest official in the land. He,
tha Council together with his Executive Council, is entrusted
with the task of maintaining peace, order and good government
in India.
The ^vernor-GeneVal is the President of his Executive
Council and has power to nominate a vice-president from among
its members to preside in his absence. He has power* to make
rules and regulations for conducting the meetings of the Execu-
tive Council. He distributes work among its different members.
In case of an equality of votes in the Council on any question,
he can give a casting vote.
He exercises genem supervision over the work of the Execu-
tive Councillors and can make himself closely acquainted with
the details of departmental administration, either directly from
the members or from their immediate subordinates, the Sec-
retaries. These officers enjoy a unique and anomalous consti-
tutional position. They have direct access to the Viceroy over
the heads of their immediate superiors.
In the selection of members to the Executive Council, the
flBs palnmis opinion and influence of the Governor-General
qount for a great deal.^ His recommendations in the matter
generally accepted by the higher authorities. He has also
THE CENTBAL EXECUTIVE OS
the power of appointing Govemora of provinces other than
Bombay, Madras and Bengal. A large amount of important
patronage is thus in his hands. This factor is not particularly
favourable to the growth of that spirit of independence in the
Executive Council which is found to be a characteristic feature
of the British Cabinet.
Till very recently, there was another significant difference be-
Ths Britlih tween the two institutions. Members of the British
Oablnet ii not Cabinet are not life-long bureaucratic servants,
bsreauoratio They are men who follow different professions and
may be lawyers, doctors, industrialists, traders, aristocrats and
even J|gMourerB. They are not expected to be experts in the
adrrtmistrative sphere. They find a place in the Cabinet because
they are the leaders of Parliament and^ in the last instance,
of the^nation.
On the other hand, before the expansion of the Executive
The ExeeatlTO Council of the Governor-General in October 1941,
Gooneil Is that body was composed to a large extent of
bureaoeratic bureaucratic officials. Membership of it was the
prize earned at the end of prolonged service in the different
departments of government. To rise to the heights of an exe-
cutive councillorship was the life-long ambition of every civilian.
To discover administrative talent and to reward it by the confer-
ment of that exalted office was the objective of those who control
the Indian bureaucracy.
Thus, in the fundamentals of its composition and outlook,
Its attitude the Indian Executive Council differed from the
British Cabinet. The former was naturally more susceptible to
superior control. Its members were more subdued in their op-
position to the Governor-General when they disagreed with
him. There was an atmosphere of discipline and submission
in the usual routine of its working. It is otherwise with the
British Cabinet, which has more decided traditions of equality
and independence. It is hoped that the atmosphere of the newly
expanded Executive Council with its larger number of Indians
and of non-officials will be more akin to parliamentary traditions.
The Governor-General of India can, indeed, be technically
The OoYernor- described as only one among several members
General of the Executive Council. He has an additional
dominant or casting vote in case of a tie. Except on
rare occasions on which he chooses to exercise his emergency
powers, he might give the impression of being only first among
equals. However, the president of the Executive Council is
also the Governor-General and Viceroy, and the ramifications
of this combination are extremely formidable.
Warren Hastings was very unfortunate in his relations with
the Executive Council. Some of its members adopted an atti-
tude of implacable hostility to him. Their reckless obstruction
m INPIAN ADMINISTRATION
demoralized the whole administrative machinery and created ub*
sf seemly deadlocks. Cornwallis became wiser by
e#eiriding the sad experience of his predecessor. Before he
tlii Cesnell accepted the office of Governor-General, he made
the important stipulation that the (Governor-General should be
vested with power to overrule the whole or part of his Council
whenever he is convinced of the futility and harmful nature of
its opinion. The demand was granted and Parliament passed
a special Act in 1786 to that effect.
Ordinarily, every measure brought before the Executive
Its ezoep- Council requires the assent of the majority of its
tisnal ms members in order that it should be passed. NjJ^ay
be that the Viceroy finds himself out- voted on occasions . jvor-
mally, he submits to the wishes of the majority. But he has
the exceptional power of overriding and setting aside its deci-
sions. This power is indeed very rarely used. In fact, since
its creation, it has been used only once, in 1879, by Lord Lytton
to reduce the cotton duties. But its mere presence is enough to
chasten any particular petulance on the part of the Executive
^Council.
In a constitution like that of Britain, an internal conflict
The Britisli in the executive will be shifted to Parliament and
vnMe% finally to the nation. A serious dispute cannot
be confined to the Cabinet. The issue will be determined ulti-
mately by national vote. Therefore, it is not necessary to equip
the executive with any extraordinary overriding power.
§6. RELATIONS WITH THE LEGISLATURE
The Governor-General has considerable powers with refer-
Hif poYferB to the legislature. Up to the Eleforms of
OTO the 1919, he was the ex officio president of the Im-
legldatiire - perial Legislative Council. After the introduction
of the Montford Reforms he ceased to have that privilege,
though he still has many powers over the legislature. He can
address both the legislative chambers; he summons, prorogues
and dissolves them; he can extend the period of their tenure
in special circumstances. He appoints a date and place to hold
fresh elections; and also a date and place for holding sessions
of either chamber.
No measure affecting subjects like the public debt or the
revenues of India, religious rites and usages of British subjects,
discipline of the army, foreign relations, provincial subjects and
provincial laws, can be intiioduced in any of the legislative bodies
of India without the Governor-General’s previous assent. He
can stop the proceedings of any of the chambers on any Bill,
olause or amendment, if he feels that the discussion is likely to
alteot the safety and the tranquillity of the Raj. He can send
JBiUi back for reconsideration by the legislature. His assent is
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 95
required for all Bills passed by the legislature before they can
have the force of law. This is true of central as well as pro-
vincialJegislation. He can require certain Bills falling within the
provincial sphere to be reserved for his consideration or for the
consideration of His Majesty-in-Council.
In addition to these more or less routine powers which the
Certification head of an administration must possess, an excep-
tipnal overriding veto against the decisions of the legislature
was bestowed upon the Governor-General of India by the Act of
1919. This weapon was forged on the anvil of the JVflontford
Reforms. It corresponds to a similar veto possessed by him
agains^UEie Executive .Council. ‘Where either chamber refuses
leavtfro introduce or fails to pass in a form recommended by
the Governor-General, any Bill, the Governor- General may
certify^that the passage of the Bill is essential for the safety,
tranquillity or interests of British India’, and thereupon, even
if the legislative chambers refuse to pass such a Bill, it can
become an Act by the mere signature of the Governor-General.
A grave constitutional anomaly was thus created. A single
head of the administration was empowered to defy the opinion
of an elected legislature.
The inclusion of such a provision in a ‘Reforms’ scheme testi-
TraBtltional fied to the imperfect and transitional character of
nature of the the Reforms. Mr Montagu and Parliament did
Refdrms not intend that the Government of India should
be made fully and wholly responsible to the Indian people.
But they were equally emphatic in holding that it could not
continue to be as thoroughly irresponsible and bureaucratic as
it was before the War. They therefore evolved a peculiar plan.
It attempted to combine two systems which are inherently
incompatible. The legislatures were materially increased in size
and were made more democratic and representative. Larger
powers were conferred upon them. They were to be the agency
for the enactment of all laws. A part of the budget was made
subject to their vote and they were thus called upon to supply
a small portion of the resources of the State. Yet the executive
was to be in no- sense subordinate to the legislature. It was to
continue to be responsible only to the extra-territorial sov-
ereignty of an absentee Parliament functioning in a distant
country.
The severe logic of such an incongruous blend of conflicting
Afoldlng constitutional principles is self-evident. A serious
(isadlooki difference of opinion between the two vital parts
of government may lead to a complete deadlock and bring
•the whole machinery to a standstill. An effective authority
has to be provided to bring such an impasse to an end. But,
as the executive is ultimately responsible to Parliament and
not to the Indian legislature, it must be enabled, if necessary, to
06 IITDIAN ADMINISTRATION
assert itself against the latter, for the liquidation of those res-
ponsibilities. Given the hypothesis that full political freedoin
is not to be bestowed upon India, the deduction drawn above is
unavoidable. The irresponsible executive must be also a supe-
rior force in the country's governance.
That certification is meant to be a real "power and not a mere
The povt; ornamental possession is amply proved by experi-
inust be ence. It appears to have been interpreted as a
rarely used normal instrument which can be freely used from
day to day. Yet a constant exercise of such a power cannot
feal to prove irritating to Indian thought and exciting to
Indian sentiment. The goal of British policy in is
stated to be the development of responsible govemmentift all
its fulness at an early date. Therefore, the greatest restraint
must be observed in making use of extraordinary powers. The
freedom of judgement and discretion enjoyed by a single indi-
vidual, whether the Governor-General or Governor, must be
definitely circumscribed and limited. A democratic appear-
ance alone is not enough: the reality of popular control is
infinitely more important.
Besides possessing these powers, the Governor-General is
Ordinances also authorized to make aaid promulgate ordi-
nances for the peace and good government of British India
or any part thereof. An ordinance so made has the force of
law as much as if it were an Act passed by the legislature.
The period of its application is not to exceed six months at a
time, though it can be renewed for a futher succession of such
periods. An ordinance is thus a legislative measure, partaking
of the character of an Act, but emerging from the head of the
executive in his executive capacity. It is of course intended
to be very rarely used. . When the legislature is not in session
and a great emergency suddenly arises, remedial measures can
be immediately adopted by the exercise of such reserve powers.
The recent Civil Disobedience Movement is inseparably asso-
ciated in the public mind with the promulgation of a large
number of ordinances by the Governor-General.
§7. STATUS AS VICEROY AND CROWN'S
REPRESENTATIVE
The Governor-General of India is not only the head of the
Hit powers administration of the land. Over and above that,
and Btatus he personifies in himself the British sovereign and
at Viceroy represents hit master in the unavoidable absence
of the latter from the land of his governance. He therefore
enjoys all the dignity and prestige and special privileges which
the( sovereign himself would enjoy if he chose to stay in India.
He has the prerogative <of mercy and pardon. On behalf of
hit sovereign, he receives homage from the Indian princes. To
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 97
them, he symbolizes the Crown and all the unlimited sovereignty
of the Crown. The emphatic declarations of Lord Reading in his
communication to the Nizam are significant of the same point.
The Oovemor-General represents His Majesty in his dealings
with foreign princes. All the grandeur of royalty attaches to
him as his master's deputy. The sense of detachment that
pervades the environment of kingship, also pervades, to a certain
CKttot, the environment of the accredited vicegerent of that
kingship.
Till the Act of 1935, though the Governor-General was thus
The Orovn’B functioning as the representative of the Crown, the
Repres^i^lative two offices as such were not legally separate from
each other. The Governor- General became ipso facto the agent
and deputy of the Crown. The Act of 1935 has introduced
an important change. It has created a new official post the
occupant of which is designated as the Crown's Representative
as distinguished from the Governor-General of India. It is
only this Representative or persons acting under his authority
that can exercise in India the functions and powers of the
Crown in its relation to the Indian States. The Governor-
General will continue to be the head of the administrative
system of the land. It is lawful for His Majesty to appoint one
person to hold both these offices and normally they will be
and are held by the same man. However, it is now possible in
law for the Crown to appoint two separate dignitaries to perform
the two different kinds of functions that are defined for them.
§8. INFLUENCE
That the cumulative influence of thjs lofty official upon
Hig influence the administration of India is bound to be immense
is obvious. His high social status and rank, his aristocratic
connexions, occasionally his political influence as an active party
leader are circumstances which give him prominence in com-
parison with his colleagues in the bureaucracy of India. His
large powers, ordinary and extraordinary, as the head of the
administration, his exalted social status as the direct representa-
tive of the Sovereign, and the large and lucrative patronage in
his possession, are factors which give him supreme eminence
in the state. A heavy responsibility devolves upon him in
maintaining the safety of the British Raj.
The combination of all these circumstances raises the Governor-
General of India head and shoulders above the other officials
in the land. If he is endowed w’ith a, master mind and an
assertive temperament, his views can colour every department of
administration. If he happens to be a man of convictions, and
capacity, his personality is bound to permeate all important
matters of policy alid detail that come to be disposed of by any
7
98 INPIAN ADMINISTRATION
one hie colleagues in the Executive Council individually or
by all of them collectively.
The Prime Minister of England, presiding over the British
Cabinet, appears to be only first among equals,
vHh the Prims a leader of his peers. The difference between him
Mtnts t sr and his colleagues is created and tolerated only
for the exigencies of smooth constitutional working. The
Viceroy of India has the appearance more of a superior than
of an equal. Constitutionally, the distance between him and
his colleagues is far greater and much more fundamental than
that between the IMme Minister and his colleagues in the
Cabinet.
xm. THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE :
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
§1. GROWTH TU^L THE ACT OF 1936
Befobe the unification of the three Prefiidencies of J^engai,
The Regulat- Madras and Bombay under one central authority,
ing Act affairs in each of them were managed by a Governor
or President with the assistance of a Council of the senior
merchants of the Company. Endeavours at administrative cen-
tralization began with the passing of the Regulating Act. This
measure vested the control of the Company's affairs in India in
the Ijands of the Governor-General and a Council of four per-
sons. The first Governor-General was nominated in the Act
itself. The origin of the Governor-General's Executive Council
thus goes back to the year 1774. The number of Councillors
was to be four. Their term of office was fixed at five years.
The whole civil and military government of the Presidency
of Bengal, including Bihar and Orissa, was vested tin the
Governor-General-in-Council, who was bound by the votes of the
majority of those present at the meeting, the Governor-General
having a casting vote in case of an equal division of opinion.
The unfortunate conflicts between Warren Hastings and
Pitt’s India his antagonistic colleagues in the Council were
Act accentuated by the inherent imperfection of the
Councirs constitution. Therefore it had to be modified in the
light of the experience of the first Governor-General. A clause
was inserted in Pitt's India Act to the effect that as soon as
the office of any one of the Councillors was, for any reason,
rendered vacant, the vacancy should not be filled and the num-
ber of the Governor-General's Council should be reduced from
four to three, an odd number being preferred to an even num-
ber for the more convenient use of the casting vote.
In 1786, on a demand being made to that effect by Lord
Cornwallis before he accepted office, the Governor-General was
given power to override even the majority of his Council on
extraordinary occasions when he felt the use of this power
justified in the interests of peace, tranquillity and good govern-
ment in India.
The charter of 1793 once more affirmed that the whole civil
and military government of the Presidency of Bengal and ‘the
ordering, management and government of all territorial acqui-
sitions and revenues of the Company* were vested in the
Governor-General and three Councillors. If the Commander-in-
Chief was distinct from the person of the Govemor-Gteneral, he
might be specially authorized by the Court of Directors to be a
member of the Council.
100 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Further changes and detailed regulations were introduced
The let by the Charter Act of 18SS, The number of
ef mss ordinary members was increased to four. Three
of these were to be appointed by the Directors from among
the servants of the Company who had at least ten years of
service to their credit. If a man in the military service was
chosen, he was not to hold any command during the continuance
of his ofiBce as Councillor. The fourth ordinary member was to
be appointed by the Directors, with the approval of the President
of the Board, from amongst persons who were not servants of
the .Company, This member was not entitled to sit or vote in
the Council except when the Council wf\s considering the making
of laws and regulations. The Commander-in-Chief, wdienever
the Governor-General himself was not liolding the office, could
also be appointed by the Directors as an extraordinary member
of the Council, having rank and precedence after the GovemSSr-
General.
By the Charter^ Act of 1853 w’as repealed the provision of
the Act of 1833, that the fourth member (that is the Law
Merr^^r) was entitled to attend and vote onl\ in meetings in
which laws and regulations were discussed. The Law Member
became a full member attending all meetings and voting on all
questions considered in any meeting.
The Indian Councils Act of 1861 . increased the number of
Tlie let ordinary members from four to five. Three of
of IWl them were to be appointed by the Secretary of
State-in-Council, and must have served at least for ten years
in India under the Crown or the Company. The remaining two,
one of whom w^as required to be a Barrister of England or
Ireland or an Advocate of Scotland of not less than five years’
standing, were to b^ appointed by Her Majesty under the Boyal
Sign Manual. It was lawful for the Secretary of State to no-
minate the Commander-in-phief as an extraordinary member.
Further modifications were introduced in 1874. Power was
given to Her Majesty to increase the number of ordinary mem-
bers from five to six by appointing a sixth member under her
Boyal Sign Manual. The newly appointed member was to have
charge of the Public Works Department. The clause which
specifically mentioned the department that was given to him
was repealed in 1904.
• The Morley-Minto Beforms of 1900 introduced an innovation.
Act of 1909 There was nothing in the law to prohibit the ap-
pointment of qualified Indians to the Councils, and Lord Mor-
ley, in consonance with the new spirit in which he had enlarged
the legislative councils and bried to associate Indians in the
administration, caused executive action to be taken to include
one Indian in the Executive Council. Since 1909, therefore,
the Govemor-Generaf's Executive Council has invariably con-
THE CENTEAL EXECUTIVE 101
tained at least one Indian. The first to be so appointed was
Lord Sinha.
The composition of the Council as provided by the Govem-
The lot ment of India Consolidating Act of 1915 stood as
of 1915 follows. The Council consisted of ordinary and
extraordinary members if any. The number of ordinary mem-
bers was five or, if His Majesty so desired, six. Three at
least of the ordinary members must, at the time of their appoint-
ment, have served the Crown in India for a period of not less
than ten’ years and one must be a barrister of England or Ire-
land or an Advocate of Scotland of not less than ten years'
standing. If any officer in military service was chosen to fill
the post of Councillor, he was not to hold any command during
^uch service. All the ordinary members were appointed by
His Majesty under the Eoyal Sign Manual. The Secretary of
State could nominate the Commander-in-Chief to be an extra-
ordinary member. If the Council assembled in any pro-
vince the Governor of the province could be an extraordinary"
member.
Finally, the Act of 1919 introduced a few changes. The
The Aot limit on the number of members of the Executive
of 1919 Council was removed. Indian High Court pleaders
of ten years' standing were qualified to be admitted! Governors
of provinces ceased to be allowed to sit as extraordinary mem-
bers when meetings of the Council were held in their territory.
All members, in any number that His Majesty might think
proper, were to be appointed by His Majesty by warrant.
Three of them must have served in India for at least ten years.
One must be a barrister of England or Ireland or an Advocate
of Scotland or a pleader of an Indian High Court of not less than
ten years' standing. As for the qualifications for the remain-
ing members, rules might be made under the Act to determine
and define them.
Provision was also made to enable the Viceroy to appoint
Council Secretaries from among the non-official members of the
Legislative Assembly or the Council of State to assist the
Executive Councillors in their work. The object was to give
opportunities to non-official members to be trained in official
business and to realize the practical difficulties of the administra-
tion. The salaries of the Secretaries were to be determined by
the legislature and they were to hold office during the Viceroy's
pleasure. However, this recommendatory clause ^las not been
acted upon and no Council Secretary has ever been appointed.
Steps were taken to introduce a larger Indian element in the
Executive .Council. A practice was introduced in 1021 to increase
the number of Indian members from one to three and it has
since continued. In strict legal theory, there is no objection
to all the members of the Council being Indians, provided they
102 INDIAN ADMINIBTBATION
are possessed of the requisite qualifications. But in practice no
Indian was appointed till 1909.
It may be noted that the Executive Council as such will
After the Act vanish from the Indian constitutional picture if and
of 1086 when the Federation of India as outlined in the
Act of 1985 is inaugurated. Its place will then be taken by a
body of Ooimsellors and the Federal Ministry. Till that time,
of course, the Council will continue to exist and function. Its
present constitution, which is practically the same as that pro-
\ided by the Act of 1919, is prescribed by the Transitional
Provisions and the Ninth Schedule of the Act of 1935. Till its
expansion which was effected in October 1941, the Council con-
sisted of eight members, the portfolios being distributed among
them as follows: (i) Viceroy and Crown's Eepresentative —
Foreign and Political Departments and Indian States; (ii)
Commander-in-Chief — ^Army and Defence; (iii) Home Member —
General supervision over matters affecting the I.C.S., Internal
Politics, Police, Jails and Law and Justice; (iv) Finance Mem-
ber — ^Finance and Budget; (v) Communications Member — ^Rail-
ways, Roads, Inland Navigation, Posts and Telegraphs, Broad-
casting, Civil Aviation, Ports; (vi) Law Member — Legislative
Department; (vii) Member for Education, Health and Lands;
(viii) Member for Commerce and Labour including Industries,
Insurance, Public Works and Irrigation, Mines und Minerals,
etc. The qualifications of members were the same as those
defined in the Act of 1919.
§2. EXPANSION OF THE COUNCIL IN 1941
An important development in regard to the Governor-
Suspe^on Grenefal's Executive Council took place at the end
of fedmiloii of October 1941 The federal part of the Act of
1935 had not been made operative simultaneously with the
inauguration of provincial autonomy in April 1937. After the
outbreak of the present world war, its introduction was sus-
pended indefinitely, and it was even announced that the whole
question of the future constitution of India would be re-examined
and reconsidered after the conclusion of the war. The proposed
federal executive did not therefore come into existence. It
was to have been composed of Councillors who were to be
responsible only to the Governor-General, and Ministers who
were to be answerable to and removable by the legislature In
spite of its unsatisfactory character, such a measure, if it had
materialized, would have been some advance oyer a wholly ir-
responsible and irremovable Executive Council. But it was
not to be.
There was keen« disappointment in India at this turn of
events. It had been hoped that a national government con-
trolled by the legislature could and would be set up at the
THE OENTEAL EXECUTIVE 108
centre, particularly in view of the grave emergency that had been
Interim threatening the country. The proposal was, how-
reform of ever, ruled out. Parliament was not prepared to
the Gonndl discuss any ^^controversial issue or to initiate any
major change in the constitutional structure of India while Eng-
land was engaged in a life and death struggle. His Majesty's Gov-
ernment were, however, prepared, as an earnest of their desire
to see the Government of India increasingly entrusted to Indian
hands, and to sanction whatever reform was possible as an interim
measure * within the framework of the existing constitution.
The Act of 1919 and subsequently the Transitional Provisions
Under the Aets of the Act of 1935 had removed the restriction on
of 1919 and the number of members of the Executive Council -
193d No definite figure was fixed by Parliament, and
the actual strengtlj of the Council was left to be determined
from time to time by His Majesty in his pleasure. The number
therefore could be increased or decreased without reference to
Parliament. Nor had any Act laid it down that the Executive
Council must necessarily contain a certain percentage of
Europeans. The qualifications prescribed for its membership
had reference to a minimum period of service under the Crown
or a minimum standing as a lawyer. Even before the Morley-
Minto reforms of 1909, it was theoretically and legally possible
for the Council to be composed entirely of Indians, though ironi-
cally enough not a single Indian had actually a place in ii.
After the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms the number of Indian
members rose to three, as against five Europeans including the
Viceroy.
It was felt that even if no radical change could be introduced
Enlargement in the constitutional status of the Council, its sub-
of the Council stantial expansion and Indianization could go a
long way towards transference of authority into the hands ot
Indians, particularly if the Indian members were placed in u
clear majority. Accordingly it was decided to take that im-
portant step, and the decision was announced by the Govern-
ment of India in a communiqud issued in July 1941. The
Executive Council was to be enlarged by the addition of five new
seats, and the appointment of five Indians to hold them was
also mentioned in the communiqud. This meant an increase
in the total number of the members of the Council, excluding
the Viceroy, to twelve, of whom eight were to be Indians — ^that
is they were to be in a majority of almost two to one. The
Council thus expanded and constituted began to function from
October 1941.
The reason given in the Government of India’s communique
Reaioiit for the for the expansion of the Executive Council was
entorgament quite modest — ^merely increased pressure of work
in connexion with the war and the need for the creation of
104 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
some new portfolios. The Secretary of State^ however, in a
speech made in the House of Commons gave a further clari-
fication of the issue. It was, he said, the wish of His Majesty's
Government 'to associate Indian leaders more intimately and
responsibly with the government of their country during the
war. We wished to do so in order to emphasize the undoubted
unity of purpose between Indians and ourselves in this strug-
gle .. . We also cherished the hope that in the process Qf
working together in the common cause, Indian statesmen
would find new bonds of union and understanding ainorig them-
selves ... It would afford a wider range of administrative res-
ponsibility and experience to Indian public men'.^ This of course
is not the democratic and responsible government demanded
by Indians. But it is claimed lhat the new development marks
a change if not in the fonn of the constitution at least in its
spirit. For the first time in the history of British India, the
work of government is entrusted to a body which contains a
majority of Indians, though they cannot be described as the
elected representatives of the Indian people.
The existing distribution of portfolios among members of
Present the expanded Executive Council is as followrs: — ►
portfolios (ij Viceroy and Crown's Representative, (ii)
Commander-in-Chief, (iii) Member for Home Affairs, (iv) Mem-
ber for Finance, (v) Member for Communications, (vi) Member
for Supply, (vii) Member for Civil Defence, (viii) Member for
Information, (ix) Member for Labour, (x) Member for Com-
merce, (xi) Member for Law, (xii) Member for Education,
Health and Lands, and. (xiii) Member for Indians Overseas.
Of these the first fivei portfolios are held by Europeans and the
remaining eight by Indians. The former group contains the
most important departments of State and the fact that none of
them wa^ assigned to Indian members has been widely criticized.
§3. POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND TENURE
The superintendence, direction and control of the civil and
Before the military government of India were vested in the
Aet of 1085 Govemor-General-in-Coimcil till the Act of 1935.
Every local government had to obey that authority and to keep
members of the Council constantly and diligently informed of
all matters of importance in its administration. Subject to res-
trictions imposed by the Secretary of State-in-Council, the
Govemor-General-in-Council was empowered to 'purchase and
seU and mortgage property, to borrow money, and to execute
assurances for that purpose'. The same authority could, with
the previous sanction of His Majesty, constitute a new pro-
vince under a Governor or Deputy Governor or Lieutenant
Governor; could declare^ any tract to be 'backward' and make
^ Tmes of India, 4 August IMl.
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 105
special arrangements for its administration; could create Exe-
cutive Councils for Governors’ provinces and determine the num-
ber and qualifications of their members; could, by notification,
take any part of ifiritish India under the immediate authority
and management of the Governor-General-in-Council and could
alter the boundaries of provinces. It could also constitute local
legislatures for Governors’ or Commissioners’ provinces. It
could alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of Indian High
Courts; could appoint additional judges to the High Court for
a period mot exceeding two years and appoint a judge to act as
Chief Justice when a vacancy occurred and till the vacancy was
permanently filled.
After the introduction of provincial autonomy as envisaged
After the by the Act of 1935, the powers of the Governor-
Act of i935 General-inTCouncil have been necessarily reduced
so as to make them consistent with the autonomous status of
the provinces. The general power of superintendence, direction
and control over the civil and military government in India has
been abolished. The executive authority of the Govemor-
General-in-Council now extends to matters with respect to which
the central legislature has power to make laws, that is, to subjects
mentioned in the Central or Federal Legislative list. It does
not extend, save as expressly provided for in the Act. in any
province in matters with respect to which the provincial legis-
lature has been given power to make laws, that is, to subjects
mentioned in the provincial list. There is therefore a substantial
reduction in the powers of the Central Government. The forma-
tion of new provinces is also no longer within their competence.
In the sphere in which political control has been transferred
to the people of the province the authority of the Govemor-
General-in-Council has* been considerably withdrawn.
The Governor-General-in-Council cannot declare war or
commence hostilities or enter into a treaty without the express
order of the Secretary of State. In any emergencies when hosti-
lities have been already commenced or preparations for them
have been already actually made against the British Govern-
ment in India, the Govemor-General-in -Council can declare war
and immediately send intimation to the Secretar;s of State.
The Govemor-General-in-Council has, by delegation, powers to
make treaties and arrangements with Asiatic States, to exercise
jmisdiction and other powers in foreign territory, and to acquire
and cede property. He also enjoys such powers, prerogatives,
privileges, and immunities appertaining to the Crown as are
'appropriate to the case and consistent with the system of law
in force in India’.
The tenure of office of a member of the Executive Council
has been fixed by a well-established custom at five years. The
Leave of Absence Act of 1924 has now been repealed, but
106 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
According to the Ninth Schedule of the Act of 1985, the
TeaiiM ftod Govemor-General-in-Oouncil may grant to any
member leave of absence for urgent reasons of
health or private affairs. Such leave cannot exceed four
months and cannot be granted more than once during his tenure
of office. Suitable leave allowances have been provided for un-
der rules made by the Secretary of State-in-Council.
§4. METHOD OF WOBKING
Originally the Executive Council of the Governor-General
Before 1861 ‘worked together as a board and decided all
<luestions by a majority of votes'. There was no systematic dis-
tribution of work among its members. Every question that
came up for the disposal of the Governor-General-in-Council
was disposed of by the Council as a whole, sitting collectively.
There was no division of labour, no allocation of departments
to individual members. This sort of working in a mass entailed
enormous delay and began to prove increasingly difficult as the
nature of the Government functions became more complex and
their scope widened. The appointment of special members for
Law and Finance in 1833 and 1861 respectively was an ack-
nowledgement of the unworkable nature of collective council
work. Lord Canning abandoned the system altogether and carried
to a logical conclusion the principle that was initiated in 1833.
He distributed the ordinary work of the departments among
Portfolios the members and laid down that only the more
important cases were to .be referred to the Governor-General or
dealt with collectively. This is what is known as the portfolio
system which continues to exist to the present day. Under the
working of this system* each member, in regard to his own de-
partmentcor departments, has the final voice in ordinary depart-
mental matters. He is councillor and administrator together.
Any subject of special importance or one in which it is pro-
posed to overrule the views of a Provincial Government must
be referred to the Viceroy; and so must matters which originate
in one department but also affect other departments. The
members generally meet in council once a week and discuss
questions which the Viceroy desires to put before them or which
an overruled member might desire Jbo have discussed by the
Council. In any difference of opinion, the decision of the
majority ordinarily prevails, the Viceroy having an overriding
veto in exceptional circumstances.
In the nature of things, the Viceroy's Executive Council
No ooDoettve cannot be described as a cabinet in the British
MipoBsllillity sense. For a long number of years its composi-
-tion was entirely bureaucratic, and even the inclusion of a few
non-official Indians did not make any difference in that status.
It could not have worked on the principle of collective res-
THE CENTBAL EXECUTIVE 107
ponsibility, members coming into and going out of office together
under the leadership of a common leader, and pursuing a com-
mon political programme to which they had pledged themselves
at the time of election. With the inclusion of eight non-official
Indians in the Council, it has been suggested that the cabinet
system of working may, by convention, be introduced. Refer-
ring to this matiter, the Secretary of State said in the House
of Commons^ that the new members would share full statutory
collective responsibility of the whole Council as well as being
responsible for the administration of important departments.
The language of this statement is vague; it is not clear that
collective responsibility as it operates in the British cabinet is
intended to be introduced. Nor does it, seem to be possible as
long Sfe officials are selected to be members of the Council, even
granting that all non-official members, selected individually
and without the unifying influence of party affinity, agree to
abide by the principle.
Immediately subordinate to the member in charge is the
The officer known as the Secretary. He is in charge of
Secretaries the departmental office. His position corresponds,
as the Decentralization Commission has pointed out, to that of
a permanent Under- Secretary of State in the United Kingdom
There is however this difference. In India, the Secretary is
allowed to be present at the meetings of the Executive Council
to furnish any detailed information that might be required re-
garding his own department. Besides, he is required to attend
on the Viceroy usually once a week and to discuss with him
all matters of importance arising in his department. He has
the right of bringing to the Viceroy’s special notice any case
in which he considers the concurrence of the Viceroy with
the member’s action or proposal to be necessary. His tenure
of office is usually three years.
Thus the constitutional position which he enjoys is unique.
He is a subordinate, having the special privilege of direct access
to the superior of his immediate superior. He c.an influence thp
mind of the Viceroy about any matter in his department without
the knowledge of the member in charge. The system is a
remnant of the old days when it was considered desirable to
keep a check over the actions and the departmental independence
of the Executive Councillors. The Governor-General as the
head the administration was therefore empowered to keep in
direct touch with departmental working through the Secretaries.
Indian public opinion is inclined to condemn this sort of consti-
tutional anomaly as likely to encourage mistnist and mis-
\mderstanding, particularly after the admission of Indians to
the Executive Council.
‘ Times of India, 24 Augost 1241.
108 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
§4. COMPABISON WITH BEITTSH MINISTEBS
The student of constitutions will perceive that till very re-
Tlie* eoutiitn- cently an English Minister differed essentially
tioiial position from a Member of the Indian Executive Council.
The former is a politician first and an adminis-
Oetober 1941 trative officer afterwards. Indeed he comes to be
the latter because he has been the former. English Ministers
are not lifelong bureaucratic servants; persons in Covernment
service are precluded from taking seats in Parliament and there-
fore in the Cabinet. Things were different in India till the ex-
pansion of the Council in October 1941. A few Indian public
men could find a place in the Council, if chosen to fill the
appointments by the Viceroy. But others were selected from
the most successful servants in the administration. Elevation
to the Executive Council and enjoyment of the prospects that
it offered were among the principal attractions of the Indian
Civil Service.
The initiative and independence characteristic of a body
like the British Cabinet, which excludes bureaucratic officials
from membership, were naturally absent from the Executive
Council as a whole in India. Nor did its members possess that
sense of equality which permeates the relations of the English
Ministers with their chief, the Prime Minister. The important
patronage in the hands of the Governor-General v as not a
negligible factor in this connexion. There were still higher
rungs in the official ladder than an Executive Coiincillorship,
which might indeed lead to them.
Much of course depended upon the head. He was a stranger
to the land which he was sent out to rule. He set out to work
with a bureaucracy which had crystallized traditions. It supplied
the expeA knowledge about men and things in India, obtained
after prolonged years of service on the spot. The claims of
such a body to be recognized as an authoritati\e and correct
guide could not be lightly disregarded, and sometimes it was
hot the Viceroy but the Council which really ruled. However,
to a Viceroy endowed with a distinct individuality and vigour
of will, the constitutional atmosphere of the Council was con-
genial to the development of his personal influence and the
acceptance of his lead in all matters of policy and detail. How-
ever, the assistance of the Executive Council was indispensable
to the Viceroy in all circumstances. It maintained the continuity
of administration. And except under abnormal circumstances
no Viceroy would think of exercising his extraordinary preroga-
tives in order to override the declared opinion of the Executive
Council. As J. S. Mill said, the advisers attached to a powerful
and self-willed man ought not to be put under conditions which
would reduce them to a cypher.
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE 109
The recent enlargement of the Executive Council and its
Attar substantial Indianization and non-officialization
axpansion have naturally changed its complexion. It has
ceased to be a predominantly bureaucratic body, though a cer-
tain official element still persists in its composition. It is also
true that the non-official councillors are not necessarily required
to be elected members of the central legislature. Nor does the
principle of political responsibility of the parliamentary type
govern its working. However it is hoped that conventions and
traditions that are set up in the performance of its duties will
approximate to the parliamentary atmosphere in all essentials.
XIV. SOME GENERAL INFORMATION
CONCERNING LEGISLATURES
The legislature is one of the most vital parts of a country’s
constitutional system in modem times. The significant position
that it holds in national life must be clearly appreciated. Certain
principles have now come to be specially associated with the
formation of legislative chambers and with the definition of their
powers. The routine of their wwking has also crystallized
along certain broad lines. The law-making bodies of any parti-
cular country have to be judged in the light of these general
standards.
There are two types of legislatures in Indian polity. One
functions for the Central Government and the other for the
provinces. A detailed study of their structure, powers, and
operation may, with benefit, be preceded by a very brief des-
cription of a few main features of legislative institutions, which
will supply a proper perspective for an understanding of their
progressive growth in India and their present value.
§1. IMPORTANCE OP THE LEGISLATURE
In all important western countries the legislature has now
Tiie acquired a peculiar importance. Originally, it was
legldainre pr^ominantly, if not purely, a law-making body,
controls the Its function was to pass measures which required
eiecntlYe force of legality. The business that it trans-
acted pertained primarily to Bills and Acts. From this position
of comparative simplicity the legislature has now evolved into a
body whiqh exercises general control oVer the administration.
The pnnciple and practice of political responsibility^ move
round the pivot of the legislature’s supremacy over the executive.
The powers and functions of the legislature are the touchstone
which assesfses the degree of popular control that obtains in a
constitution. Modem legislatures are not only law-making
bodies: they make laws, they vote grants of the necessary
money; they practically appoint the Ministers, direct, control
and modify their policy, and in case of a disagreement, even
dismiss them. The daily routine of departmental management
is not, indeed, looked after by item, but the general line of
administrative action and the general principles governing the
policy of the state are all inspired and dictated by their opinions
and views. In other words, an all-sided control of the state
vests in the legislature in a form of government which is des-
cribed by constitutional writers as responsible. The English
Cabinet, for instance, is a the product of Parliament and com-
pletely amenable to it.
LEGISLATUBBS 111
This unique importance that has progressively come to be
Btnietare attached to the legislatiure in modern days is the
of the natural consequence of the changed character of
loglilatiiM the structure of legislative chambers. They are
now elected bodies largely reflecting popular opinion and there-
fore casing with them the prestige of being the accredited
mouthpieces of the whole nation. To find the extent and the
reality of the legislature’s predominance over the executive ia
to measure the progress in democratization and responsibility of
that form of polity. The more complete the subordination of
the executive, the greater is the advance in the direction of res-
ponsibility. The legisla/tures in India, therefore, whether in
the Central Government or in the provinces, have to be judged
by this criterion.
§2. THE FUNCTIONS OF A LEGISLATURE
A legislature’s functions and powers can be divided into
I. LegislatlTe different parts. For instance, they can be described
separately as referring to legislation, or to administration, or to
finance. The meaning of the first division is clear. No mea-
sure can obtain the force of legality unless it is passed by the
legislature. Everything that is incorporated into the law of
the land, and obedience to which is required of the citizens, has
to receive the legislature’s sanction before it can be so incorpo-
rated and enforced. Unless otherwise provided, no Bill which
is not voted by the legislature can have application in a court
of law.
The control over administration is exercised in various ways:
ii. Adminis- (i) by moving resolutions, (ii) by moving votes
tratlYe of no confidence or censure, (iii) by moving
adjournments, and (iv) by asking questions and supplementary
questions to elicit information about departmental details.
(i) On any matter of public importance the legislature
ResolutioDB might express a clear opinion after having dis-
cussed the issues thoroughly. This expression of opinion is in
the form of a recommendation to the Government. It has no
binding legal force. It is not a law and has not to pass through
the elaborate procedure to which every Bill is subjected before
its final consummation into an Act. Yet the expression of
opinion has a value of its own. It makes plain the views of the
elected representatives of the people, and therefore serves as
an indicator which records the strength and the direction of
popular opinion. A clear indication of the popular will cannot
be ignored by any executive Government having a sense of
* responsibility. It serves to guide correctly, if not to control
rigidly, any steps that may be contemplated by the executive
authority.
(ii) A vote of no confidence or censure is the most direct
112 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
way of expressing disapproval and of indicating the agency
¥oU of which it is desired to condemn. In a responsible
ooBiiue or no administration, occasions for votes of censure
eenfideneo are rare, for, before matters come to that pass,
numerous indications are given of the existing displeasure and
they are immediately understood. This right is of particular use
in those forms of government where the executive cannot be re-
moved from office by the legislature. A direct and emphatic
condemnation of the actions of irresponsible officials is likely to
serve as a moral restraint upon them.
(iii) Adjournment motions are intended to direct the attention
AdJouramentB of the house and the Government to any extra-
ordinary happening involving public weal or interest that might
take place during the actual session of the council or that may
have taken pliace only a short time prior to the meeting of the
session. Any member may beg leave to move that the regular
business on the agenda be temporarily suspended and that the
house do discuss the extraordinary occurrence, provided the
president allows the motion. The president need not do so if
he feels that the matter, for the discussion of which a temporary
suspension of the regular agenda is requisitioned, is not of
sufficient importance to justify the suspension. Motions for
adjournment save the discussions of the chamber on prominent
and burning topics of the day from being stale.
(iv) The power of asking questions and supplementary ques-
InterpsUation tions is extremely valuable. It serves to throw
important sidelights on the administration b\ enabling members
to elicit information regarding routine departmental manage-
ment. It is useful in exposing any unjust or tyrannical abuse of
the freedom of judgement and discretion that has necessarily to
be allowed to the executive. Any member of the legislature can
put a question on a matter of public interest, subject to its
disallowance by the president, and if the answer given proves
unsatisfactory, either the member who puts the question ori-
ginally, or any other curious or dissatisfied member may put
further supplementary questions. This at times approximates
to a regular cross-examination. Details which are too trivial to
be discussed in the form of resolutions and which are too im-
portant to be completely ignored can be brought up for
public criticism through the exercise of the power of inter-
pellation.
Publicity is the greatest check and the greatest corrective to
the waywardness of all normal governments. Publicity is of
still greater value when the form of government is an irres-
ponsible bureaucracy. Besolutions, adjournments, votes of
censure, questions and supplementary questions are instruments
of publicity, and so long as the working of the Government
has not become mechanical and unhuman, the fear of public
LEGISLATURES 113
criticism and public exposure proves a salutary restraint upon the
actions of Government officials.
The last and most important power that a legislature can
lii. Financial enjoy is control over the purse. The great consti-
tutional struggle in England throughout the Stuart period, and
even earlier, centred round the disputed question whether the
King could levy taxes without the consent of the people and
spend them as he liked, irrespective of the wishes of Parliament.
The most glorious achievement of the popular party in the
struggle was the establishment of the principle that the money
which the king’s authority wanted to collect from the people
by way of taxation must be vot€id by the representatives of
the people assembled in Parliament. Parliament also decided
the manner of its collection and the direotion of its expenditure.
The essence of democracy lies, among other things, in this
undisputed control over the purse that is exercised by the
people through their chosen representatives. The real power of
any legislature is to be measured by the degree of the monetary
powers it enjoys. The English Parliament — or more correctly
the House of Commons — is the sole authority for and the sole
custodian of the finances of the Government of England. The
executive can got only as much money as is voted by Parlia-
ment, and has to spend it on those purposes only for which
it has been specifically voted. Finances are to the State what
breath is to the body, and in responsible forms of governmt^nt
entire control over them is vested in the legislature.
§3. FRANCfilSE AXJD ELECTORATES
Democracies in modern days are representative. A direct
democracy is a ifiiysical impossibility, apart from
consideratrons of its advantages or disadvantages.
In a representative government, the affairs of the
State are entrusted to a few people chosen by the
citizens. In an ideal state of things, every citizen, unless posi-
tively disqualified, has the right of voting in the election of
such persons. The smaller the number of disqualifications and
the larger the number of persons who are authorized to give
their vote, the more representative becomes the character of
the Government.
The right of giving a vote is described, in political science,
as the franchise. Persons to whom the right of franchise is given
are described as the electorate or the constituency. The elec-
torate is' not identical with the total body of the citizens. It
contains only those persons who are allowed to take part,
•indirectly, in the administration of the land.
What sort of persons should be excluded from the enjoyment
of this political privilege? On the answer to this crucial
question depends the degree of the democratic character of a
8
Modern
democracies
are repre-
sentatiYe
114 INDUN ADMINISTRATION
democracy. Certain disqualifications are obvious. Children
Ditqualifiea- and young boys are not, for instance, intellectually
able to understand the problems of govemnient
and to exercise the franchise. Lunatics and madmen come in the
same category. Criminal offenders who have been convicted by
a court of law for crimes against society evidently cannot be per-
mitted to have any share in the formation of the Government.
The same viewpoint holds good in the case of bankrupts. Even
in countries where there is universal franchise, these disquali-
fications are accepted as necessary and desirable.
Most of the representative Governments in the past had
Adult more restrictions than these on the exercise of the
suffrage franchise. Women, for example, v-ere disqualified
on account of their sex even if they possessed the other necessary
qualifications. Poor persons, labourers, and wage -earners were
also regarded as unfit to possess the right of giving a vote
Ownership of a certain minimum amount of property or income
has been an almost invariable qualification to entitle persons
to have the vote. The trend of modern times is to reduce the
amount to as low a figure as possible so as to include in the
electorate the largest number of citii'ens.
Some western countries liaAe abolished property qualification
altogether. They have conferred the right of vote on all citizens,
men and women, who liave reached a certain age, and who are
not debarred otherwise, as for instance on grounds of lunacy,
treason, or bankruptc;>. Conditions in India may be different,
but the Indian electorate is to be judged irom the same point
of view. The Nehru . Report advocated the introduction of
adult suffrage.
§4. ELECTORATES IN INDIA
It will be pertinent to describe here the different kinds
of electorates that exist in India at the present day. They
are mainly based on qualifications either of property or com-
munity or special interests. Residence is also an important
factor.
A general electorate is one in which no account is taken of
the race or community of the voter. The electoral law prescribes
certain property and other qualifications, and all citizens who
General possess them are entitled to vote, irrespective of
electorates caste, creed and religion. Residence in a definite
territorial area, which defines the geographical limits of the
electorate, is of course essential.
In India, the nearest approach to a general electorate is
Hon- found in the non-Muslim constituency. It consists
Moslim of all enfranchised persons, other than Muslims,
oonstitaeney in any electoral area. It may thus be composed
of Hindus, Parsees, Jews, Christians and others, all placed
LEGISLATUKES 115
together in one group, provided they satisfy the conditions about
the franchise.
The concept of a communal electorate is different. Here
Communal the very first condition which is essential to entitle
electorates a person to a vole is that he must belong to a
particular community. Being a member of that community,
he must further satisfy the conditions of the franchise as
ihey may have been fixed by the electoral law. Persons not
belonging to that community are entirely excluded frojn the
electoral p*.
Jn India, communal electorates have been conceded to
Muslims throughout the land, to the Sikhs in the Punjab
and to the Europeans in important cities and plantations. The
voters who vote in these constituencies tod the candidates who
couioi?t these seats must belong to the Muslim, Sikh and Euro-
pc‘an communities respectively. Others can neither vote nor
stand for election in these electorates.
Jl is possible to devise an electorate which is a compromise
Mixed electo- between the gent^ral and communal principles and
rates with combines both of them. That is knowm as the
reserYfld svstem of mixed electorates \vith resen^ation of
scats for particular communities. In such a system
it is not necessary that the voters or electors should belong to
a particular religion or race. The electorate contains the names
of all those w’ho possess the requisite franchise, though they be-
long to different creeds and communities. But it is also laid
down that out of the total number of seats which have to bo
filled by election a certain number must be held by members
of a particular race.
All illustration will make the point clear. Suppose a terri-
torial constituency has been assigned three seats in the legis-
laiure. It may be prescribed that at least one of these three
seals must be held by a Muslim though the electors arc com-
posed of both Muslim and non-Muslirns.
It may happen that in the election the three candidates who
poll the largest number of voles, in consecutive order, arc all
non-Muslime. In that case the third candidate is not declared
lo be elected; but the Muslim (*andidalp wdio has obtained
the largest number of votes, though he may stand much lower
in rank in the numerical order, is declared successful.
On the other hand, it may also happen that in the results
of the election the first three candidates, w^ho poll the largest
number of votes in consecutive order, are all Muslims. The
election of every one of them is, in that case, considered to be
perfectly valid. In addition to the one seat reserved for them,
they are thus enabled to capture the remaining ones.
In a communal electorate the candidate has to win the
confidence of the members of his own community only. In a
mixed electorate wdth reservation of seats, ho has to look for
116 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
votes even outside his community and endeavour to be popular
with all.
In India, the concession of the privilege of reservation of
seats for their own community was granted to the Maratha caste
in the Bombay Deccan in elections to the Bombay Legislative
Council by the Act of 1919. The Nehru Eeport advocated the
extension of the same system throughout the whole country in
place of the present communal electorates. A considerable body
of enlightened public opinion also supports the same view in
the interests of a consolidated Indian nationalism.
Besides these types there is another type known ns ‘special
Bpedal constituencies’. These are intended to represent
«leotoratoB certain special interests in the country in their
own right and independently. The landed aristocracy of the
oountry, the trade and commerce of the country, educational
institutions like universities, are all special interests which have
to be properly safeguarded and w'hich are given special re-
cognition as entities useful and beneficial to the State. They
are therefore very often formed into constituencies by them-
selves. Such a constituency consists of all persons wdio are
united by the tie of common interest, irrespective of com-
munity or race. They are thus different from communal
constituencies.
In India several universities have been given the right of
sending their own representatives to the legislature. Similarly,
European Chambers of Commerce, Indian Merchants' Chambers
and Bureaus, Mill-owners* Associations, Sardars and Inamdars
have been created into constituencies by themselves. Every
person who is a recognized constituent of these bodies can vote
in elections which are held for the return of their representatives.
Comn^unal electorates were first introduced in India in 1909
'Hfliy as the most effective, convenient and satisfactory
«ommiiiiaI means of protecting the interests of minorities,
eleetorates One of the greatest imperfections and dangers of
are created democracy is the possibility of its degenerating
a tyrannical rule of the majority over the minority and the
suppression of the latter. This danger is considered to be
more probable and more acute in a country like India where
the minority is demarcated and distinguished from the majority
not only on social or political questions but on grounds of
difference in religion and historical antipathy. These consider-
ations, it is said, make it necessary to provide some safeguard
against the possible danger, and the safeguard which appeared
to be the most satisfactory and convenient to the British
authorities in 1909 was the splitting up of the general Indian
electorate into two or more parts on the principle of religion and
race. To such exclusively racial electorates was given the right
of sending representatives from amongst themselves. The
LEGISLATURES 117
electorates were generally formed according to the numerical pro-
portion of the race to the total population in a specified area.
Communal electorates have a tendency to emphasize the
Their existing racial and religious differences and to
dangerous perpetuate the cleavage in national life which is
effects created by those differences. They destroy the
sense of comprehensive nationality based on the community
of social and political interest. By putting a premium upon
communality they positively discourage any tendency to fusion
of the fissile elements of the different communities, and en-
gender a narrower and more selfish angle of vision. The
communal and religious antagonism in India is attributed by
many eminent Indians to the existence of communal electorates.
However, they are an accomplished fact in Indian polity and it
is extremely difficult to undo what has been done. They have
acquired the strength of a vested interest. The minority is
reluctant to part with a privilege which has been in its possession.
It will be a long time before the minority can be persuaded to
accept other more scientific and less objectionable devices to
protect its interests.
All persons born in the state are not automatically given
The electoral the right of voting even under the system of adult
franchise. And when the latter is not in opera-
tion, certain propert-y and other qualifications are prescribed by
law to determine the right of voting. A list is made, for a
specific territorial area, of all persons wffio possess those quali-
fications and fire iherofore entitled to exercise their vote. This
list is called the electoral roll.
A preliminary and tentative edition of the electoral roll is
published by the Government and kept open for public inspec-
tion for a staled period of time. It may happen that names of
persons who, by their possession of the requisite qualifications
are entitled to get a vote, have not been included in the electoral
roll through oversight or mistake. Such omissions can be
brought to the notice of the Collector or other authorized official
and rectified by him. A revised and final edition of the electoral
roll is then published and only the persons whose nauics arc
included therein are allowed to vote at the time of election.
§5. THE BICAMERAL SYSTEM
In the bicameral system, the legislature is composed of two
The Upper separate chambers. One of them is known as the
Hoase and the Upper House or the Second Chamber, and the
Lower House other is known as the Lower House or Chamber.
The electorates of the tw’o Houses are not the same. Their
powers, functions and political status are not identical. They
are formed to fulfil different purposes and embody different
ideals.
118 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
The Upper Chamber is intended mainly to represent the
vested interests and the wealth of the land. It consists of the
members of the historical aristocracy, big landowners, wealthy
merchants and other propertied persons. A sprinkling of a
few intellectuals and public workers is also usually added to it.
On the other hand, the tower Chamber is more democratic in
character. It is expected to contain the poorer element in the
community and therefore the franchise for its election is delibe-
rately kept Ibw.
tecause the Tjower Chamber is more representative and
The Loner democratic in its structure it is usually invested
House has with greater political power and control. Jt is
larger povers considered only fair and natural that the body
which reflects in a very groat njeasiire the nation s will should
possess the dominant authority in the state. For this reason
the English House of Commons is empowered to make and
unmake the executive govermneiit in that country and to dictate
to it.
The Upper
Chamber is
intended to
amend and
revise
The Upper Cliamber represents only the privileged few who
form the higher strata of society. Its members are
not expected to be in the closest touch with the
demos, or to give expression to its ambitions and
sorrows. They are therefore precluded from exer-
cising any efTective control over money matters either on the
income or oii the expenditure side. Even in subjects other
than finance the tendency of modern days is to look upon the
fiecond Chamber as a brake and as a restraint on the impulsive-
ness of democra(*y. It is entrusted with the duty of amendment
and revision. It is empowered to compel reconsideration of a
measure which may have been passed by the Lower Chamber
without due cousideration. How^ever, it is not intended that
n body which represents only the aristocracy and the oligarchy
of the land should be permitted to be a permanent hindraiira'
to national progress as visualized by the large majority of
citizens wdio are electors.
Political thinkers are not agreed on the question as to wlielher
two legislate e chambers are necessary or desirable
in a unitary state at all. There are not a few^ who
hold the heterodox opinion that a second chamber
is an nnw^anted superfluity and a nuisance. They
feel that its existence involves an unnecessary reduplication of
governmental work and consequently an enormous w'aste of time,
energy and money. To such critics it appears that the alleged
indispensability of the second chamber is not based on rational
conviction but on prejudices engendered by the superstition of
ControverBy
about the
need for a
aeeond
'Chamber
constitutional orthodoxy.
The framework of indjan polity has been unitary since the
Eegulating Act. Even the Montford Eeforms did not make
LEGISLATURES 119
it federal. However the Act of 1919 introduced the bicameral
Its iutrodoe* system in the coitral legislature of India by the
iion In Indisi creation of the Legislative Assembly and the
■Council of State. It may be conceded for the sake of argument
that the dangers of an upper chamber are not likely to become
serious in a free nation. Hut its blind imitation in a subject
•country may prove perilous to national advance towards auto-
nomy.
The Indian Government has not yet been made responsible
to the Indian people. Conditions in this land are not therefore
similar to those that obtain in a self-governing dominion or a
sovereign state, in the psychological and material environment
of a conquered race the existence of an oligarchical legislative
housej^as a tendency to prove ruinous fo political progress. It
mav detract from the growth of national solidarity.
XV. THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE :
GROWTH TILL 1919
§1. PROM 1600 TO THE REGULATING ACT
As the Montford Report has pointed out, the germ of the
The chapter legislative powers of the Government of India lies
ot Elizabeth embodied in Elizabeth’s Charter which established
the East India Company in the year 1600. By one of the clauses
of this charter the Company were permitted to ‘make, ordain
and constitute such and so many reasonable laws, constitutions,
orders and ordinances as shall seem necessary and convenient for
the government of the same Company and for the better
advancement of their trade’. They might also impose such pains,
penalties, and punishments as might seem necessary or con-
venient for the observation of these laws and ordinances. The
only precaution that was expected to be taken was that their
laws must be reasonable.
Sir Courtenay llbert has pointed out that this power was
similar to the power of making by-laws that is enjoyed by any
ordinary municipal or commercial corporation. The ‘laws’^
must have been, in the nature of things, only regulations for
the guidance of the Company’s servants and officers, factors and
apprentices. No copy is known to exist of any dawns’ made
under the first charter or the early subsequent charters. The
East India Company \^'as only a commercial corporation and
only so much power must have been required and exercised by
it as was necessary to keep the trading affairs of the (’ompany
going properly. No political significance attaches then'tore to
the regi^^lations that might ha\e been issued by them troiu tim(^
to time.
The power of making rules and regulations given in the
Subsequent original charter was rencwved and occasionally aug-
charters inented in the later charter^ whenf^ver circum-
stances demanded any addition to them. The Charter of 1726,
granted by George I, invested in the Governors-in -Council in
the Presidencies the ‘power to make, constitute and ordain by-
laws, rules and ordinances for the good government and reguh-
tion. of the several corporations thereby created and of the
inhabitants of the several towns, places and factories*.
After the grant of the Diwani in 1765, the Company obtained
After the legal recognition and status as the accredited
grant of political agents of the Emperors of Delhi. Con-
Diwsni sistently with this status they had to discharge
certain functions avowedly political and administrative in
character such as the^ management of revenue and judicial
business. This was another source of legislative power now
THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE 121
available to the Company. They inherited all the power that
had belonged to important Viceroys under Mogul rule. In tlm
task of the disposal of administrative business that had now
developed upon them, the Company's officers in Bengal — ^like
Warren Hastings — ^had to make rules and set up courts of law
and to see that proper order was evolved and governmental
organization formed. The Diwani was not a charter granted by
Parliament or by the King of England. Po^^er obtained under
it was obtained from the ghost of a great authority and a great
name whose glory had now completely faded.
It was not till the middle of the eighteenth century, after
the battles of Plassey, Wandiwash and Biixar, that any terri-
torial responsibility was directly assuijied by the Company.
With^he acquisition and gradual expansion of this responsibility,
the need was increasingly felt that the Company should make
proper arrangements lor the regulated governance of the terri-
tories they had acquired. The gradual transition of the Com-
pany from a purely commercial to a politico-commercial body
made it necessary that, for the pro]jer discharge of their new
duties, new and specifically recognized additional powers should
be conferred up(>n them.
§2. FROM THE REGULATING ACT TO THE MORLEY-
MINTO REFORMS
The Regulating Act of 1773 created a Governor- General to
The Regulat- control the Company's dominions in India. To
ing Act this controlling authority, namely the Governor-
General-of-Bengal-in-Council, was given ‘povNer to make rules,
regulations and ordinances for the good order and civil govern-
ment of the Compar\y’s settlements in Bengal’. Curiously
enough, these had to be registered m and approved of by the
Supreme Court.
The Amending Act of 1781 tried to make the issues clear
and to remove obstacles in the working of the Regulating Act.
It also definitely empowered the Governor-General-of-Bengal-in-
Council to frame regulations from time to time for provincial
courts and councils. Copies of these had to be sent to and ap-
proved of by the Directors. It was no longer necessary to
register the Governor-General-in-Council's rules and regulations
in the Supreme Court and to get them approved of by that body.
This is the beginning of those complex legislative powers which
are today enjoyed by the central legislature.
The Act of 1797 expressly sanctioned the exercise of a local
, power of legislation in Bengal. Ic also directed that all regula-
tions of the Govemor-General-in-Council affecting the rights,
persons or property of the natives should be registered in the
judicial department, formed into a regular code, and printed
and published in all the languages of the country. The Act of
122 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
1807 gave to the Govemors-in-Council in Madras and Bombay
the same power of making regulations as was enjoyed by the
Oovemor-General-in-Council in Bengal. Between 1807 and 1833
all the three Councils continued to make regulations and issue
ordinances and add to the volume and complexity of the legal
system. Legislative power was thus vested in and exercisable
by the executive Governments in the three Presidencies.
In 1833 an important innovation was introduced. The
The Act Governor-General *s Executive Council . was in-
of 1833 creased by the addition of a fourth ordinary
member who was not to be one of the Company's servants and
who was not entitled to act as a member except for legislative
purposes. Further, the Goveifnor-General-in-Council was ex-
■clusively vested with the legislative power, and the Provincial
Governments were entirely deprived of it. They were only
allowed to submit drafts of laws which they desired to get passed
for their respective areas. The Govei-nor-General-in-Council
could make laws and regulations for repealing and alteiing any
existing measure, for all persons, places and things, for seiwants
of the Company and for native officers and soldiers in the employ
of the Company. Laws made by the Governor-General were
liable to be vetoed by the Court of Directors or the Board of
Control. The supreme prerogative of the Crown w’as of course
left unaffected. A comprehensive consolidation and codifica-
tion of Indian laws w'as also contemplated. The Indian Law
Commission were appointed and they issued the Indian Penal
Code. The passing of legislation by councils specially formed
for the purpose thus began from the year 1833. Henceforth
‘Regulations’ give place to ‘Acts', a change in name which is
significant of the cluing.e in the character of the source of the
legislatioi^.
The legislative member was made an ordinary member by
The Act the Charter Act of 1853. The Executive Council
1883 was enlarged for legislative purposes by the addi-
tion of the Chief Justice of Bengal, a puisne judge and four
servants of the Company of not less than twenty years' stand-
ing, nominated by the Governments of each of the provinces
of Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the North-West Provinces.
In all, for legislative purposes, there were to be twelve members
including the Go\eriior-General, Coiiirnander-in-Chief and four
ordinary members. The Legislative Council thus constituted
was intended for pureh legislative work. It must be noted that
the Legislative Council as such had no separate existence. As
Strachey points out, there was only one council knowm to the
law. That w^as the Executive Council. Additional members
were invited to join when it met for legislative purposes.
A new phase was opened in 1858. The Mutiny had come
and gone. The East India (Company was abolished and with
123
THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE
it the Double Government introduced by Pitt's India Act of
1784. The Crown and Parliament directly undertook the res-
ponsibility of the government of India.
After the task of the conquest of India was completed the
After the Company’s ^ministration settled down into a
•eonquest was peaceful routine. It was no longer necessary to
complete emphasize the military side of administration, and
attention was naturally directed more towards the problems
of peaceful government. On the abolition of the Company and
the transference of government to the Crown, a new phase was
opened. The ideal of British administration in India was pro-
claimed to be the development and cultural and material
advance of the people of India. The conquering power declared
that ittiooked upon its conquest as a sacred trust, involving the
responsibility of educating and generally uplifting the huge
jiiasses of population that by coincidence of circumstances had
come under its rule. The declared intention was to set up a
peaceful progressive, liberal administration Avhich would more
closely associate the conquered classes with the conquerors and
Impart to them administrative and political training. The
history and progrv'<,s of the Indian legislatures synchronizes with
the history of the progressive stabilization of the British power
in India.
By the Act of 1801, for purposes of legislation the Governor-
The Act General nominat^'d not less than six and not more
of 1861 than twche additional members who took office
for two years. Of these additional members not less than half
w’ere to be non -officials, llie legislature established by the
Act of 1853 ‘had modelled its procedure on that of Parliament
and had shown an iiK'onvenient degree of inquisiti\ eness aiul
independence’. Tlie Act of 1801 expressU limited the function
of the Council to legislation onh . It could not entortain any
Ollier interrogathe or deliberative motion. Measures relating
to the public revenues of India or public debt, religion, military
and nav'al inacters, foreign iclalions, wtre not to be introduced
without the Governor-Gencrars previous sanction. To every
Act passed by the Gouncil the Governnr-Generars consent was
necessary. The legislative powders of the (lovernor-General-in-
Couneil were declared to extend to ‘making laws and regula-
tions for repealing, amending or altering any laws or regulations’
already existing, and to ‘making laws and regulations for all
persons, w^hether British or native, foreigners or others, and
for all courts of justice, and for all places and things within
.the Indian territory, and for all servants of the Government of
India within the dominions of Princes and Stales in alliance
with Her Majesty’.
The powers of legislation taken away from the Provincial
Governments by the Act of 1833 were restored to them. No
134 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
line of demarcation was specially drawn between the central
and provincial subjects. The previous sanction of the Governor-
General was made necessary for certain legislation by the local
legislatures and all Acts passed by them required the subse-
quent assent of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State.
The Act also empowered the Governor-General to establish,
by' proclamation, Legislative Councils for Bengal, the North-
West Provinces and the Punjab. They were established- res-
pectively in 1862, 1886 and 1898.
The Act of 1870 enabled the Governor- General to legislate
in a summary manner for the less advanced parts of India b^^
proclaiming certain areas as coming under this Act and then
making the necessary regulations for their government through the
Governor or other administrative officer who might be in charge.
The Indian Councils Act of 1892 increased the number of
The Act members of the Legislative Councils, introduced
of 1892 changes in the system of nomination and granted
some relaxation in the rigidity of their procedure. The Govcr-
nor-GeneraPs Legislative Council was now to consist of not less
than ten and not more than sixteen additional nominated mem-
bers. The minimum number of non-official members was in-
creased to ten instead of the old proportion of one half of
those nominated. Of these ten, five were to be nominated on
the recommendations of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce
and non-official members of the Legislative Councils of Bengal,
Madras, Bombay and the North-West Provinces. Thus there
was to be an increase in the total number of members and in
the proportion of non-official to official members. A modifica-
tion was made of the system of nomination in such a w’ny as
to introduce the principle of election tentatively in practice.
To this enlarged legislature were given greater powders. The
annual flSiancial statement, the budget, had henceforth to be
regularly placed before the legislature and members were allow-ed
to discuss it generally, and express their opinion on it as a
whole. However, power was not given to move any resolution
or divide the Council on any matter concerned with the bud-
get. The asking of questions >vas authorized by this Act, but
the jiower of putting supplementary questions vrus not conceded.
The Act of 1909 was an important step in Indian constitu-
The Act tional history. That 3 ear saw the introduction
of 1900 of what are knowm as the Morley-Minto reforms.
India had passed through a big wave of nationalistic agitation
and some of her prominent political leaders were incarcerated.
An insistent demand for the recognition of Indian public opinion
as the controlling factor in Indian administration was sought
to be met by the Indian Councils Act of 19(^. The most
important clause of this measure referred to the improvement
of the legislature. The* size of the Councils w^as materially
enlarged, the maximum number of members of the Governor-
THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE 125
General's legislature being raised from sixteen to sixty. They
were to be partly elected, partly nominated. An official majority
was, however, deliberately maintained in the central legislature,
only twenty-seven out of the additional sixty members being
elected, and the remaining thirty- three together with the eight
ex officio members being nominated by the Government. The
principle of election which was only indirectly accepted in 1892
was. now openly and explicitly introduced.
The powers and functions of the Council were increased. The
budget could be discussed very generally under the law of 1892.
Henceforth refeolutions could be moved upon any of its items
and the Council could be divided upon them. Resolutions upon
matters of general public importance might also be proposed
and discussed and a division on them was allowed to take place.
Certaih subjects could not be discussed by the Council at all.
Any resolution could be disallowed by the Governor-General,
who acted ex officio as the president of the Council. Further,
the right of interpellation was extended by allowing the member
who put the original question to ask a supplementary question.
All these reforms introduced by the Act of 1909, though in
No principle themselves marking a distinct step in advance,
of responsi- had absolutely nothing to do with the introduction
of responsible government. Lord Morley’s clear
disclaimer about any intention of introducing parliamentary
government in India is famous. There was no question of sub-
ordinating the executive to the legislature even to a slight
extent. However, there was a distinct endeavour to associate
the latter with the former more closely than before. Opinions
expressed by the elected members of the legislature were ex-
pected 1o indicate clearly the direction of the current of popu-
lar opinion and the Government, if they so pleased, might
modify their policy to accommodate themselves to the popular
viewpoint. The Montford Report clearly states that the Coun-
cils were more effective than they knew.
The exact measure of such indirect influence cannot be
assessed. That it may have been to a certain extent real may
not be denied; nor can it be combated, on the other hand,
that such an influence was bound to be extremely uncertain,
if not illusory, and that its effectiveness, in w^hatever small
degree, was dependent rather upon the courtesy it could evoke
than upon the assertion of a right. Still, the Morley-Minto
Reforms were welcomed by some of the contemporary politicians
as marking a definite step in advance in the history of India's
constitutional development.
§3. AFTER THE ACT OF 1919
Five years after the Indian Councils Act of 1909, extra-
ordinary circumstances arose in the w'orld. The deluge of war
swept away time-honoured institutions and tremendously affected
126 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
the moral and material condition of all important countries*
The Aet India, in common with other countries, came
of 1910 under the influence of the new forces. The
momentous pronouncement of 20 August 1917, which declared
the grant of responsible go^ernment as the final goal of British
policy in India, the visit of the Secretary of State to India and
the passing of the Government of India Act on the lines of the
recommendations made in the Montagu-Chelmsford Eeport, ar©
instances of this influence on the politics of India. The new
Act was passed in 1919 and came into force from 1921.
The problem that was sought to be tackled by the Montford
The Report and also by the Government of India Act
^ complicated one. The continuance of a
in toe ^ purely bureaucratic and paternal administration,
proiineee completely irresponsible to the Legislature, was
inconsistent with the announcement of 1917 and generally with
the spirit of the times. On the other hand, the grant of full
Dominion Status at one stroke %vas regarded as suicidal and
fraught with the gravest danger. Between the two extremes
the Reforms sought a via media. A beginning in responsible
government was to be made under proper safeguards. The
most suitable field for making the experiment w’as considered
to be the province.
The Central Government was to be left out so far as the
Reform of introduction of any degree of responsibility was
toe central concerned. How*ever, the central legislature was
legislature ^ be considerably enlarged and democratised and
larger pow’ers were to be granted to it, so that the n('t practical,
if not legal, result of these altered circumstf-nces w'ould ho in
the direction of making the Government of India more suscepti-
ble to popular opinion. . ^^'ith this end .m view, the whole of
the central legislature w'as thoroughly overhauled. P’or the
first time, a bicameral system w^as introduced, foilowing the in-
variable practice of most of the important western countries.
The old supreme Legislative Council was replaced by tw^o bodies,
one, the Legislative Assembly and the other, the Council of
State.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms have now been superseded
by the Act of 1935. When, in accordance with the provisions
of that Act, the Federation of India comes to be established,
the Central legislature will be constituted on entirely different
lines. However, till the time that portion of the Act becomes
operative, the central legislative chambers as they have existed
since the Act of 1919 will continue to function. Their consti-
tution, powers, procedure, etc., during the transitional period
have been defined in the Ninth Schedule of the Act of 1935.
A detailed account of the ^ two chambers as they exist today is
given in the following sections.
XVI. THE CENTRAL LEGISLATURE:
THE EXISTING CHAMBERS
U. THE COUNCIL OF STATE
The Council of State in India corresi)onds to the upper cham-
Oonstttution bers of other countries. The total number of ita
members is 60. Out of these, 3d are elected by the different
constituencies and 27 are nominated by the Government. Of
the nominated niembcrh, not more than 20 are to be officials.
The Council of State is a part of the central legislature and
its electorate is comprised within the territorial limits of the
whole jpf British India, pjlectioiis are not however held on a
general ticket throughout the area. The existing political divi-
sions are taken as units, and seals are assigned to them aj^proxi-
mately in proportion to their population, to tlieir territorial
extent and so on. The total elected number of thirty-three is
thus distributed among the various i)rovinces which are taken
as electoral uniis. A similar disirihution of nominated seats
also takes place.
The great dmrdty of political and economic conditions in
Franchise the various provinces makes a uniform franchise
for a chamber of the central legislature almost an impossibility.
The franchise for the Council of Htale therefore is different in
the different provinces. The variation is, of course, intended
only to equalize the conditions of the franchise as far as pos-
sible by taking into account the parlicular economic or political
.situation of each province and coiTcc^^ing and modif%ing the
irancliise in the light of those conditions. This body is in-
tended to serve the pip’pose of an upper and revising chamber
and therefore to consist of persons who have large vested interests
in the land. Tliey are expected to he conservative enough to
counterbalance the radical freaks of a demos. The qualifica-
tions are therefore so contrived as to ensure that the majority of
the members will belong to the richest strata of society, a
small number being allow^ed for intellectuals.
In the Presidency of Bombay (i) persons ^ho pay income-
tax on an annual income of nob less than Ks. 30,000, (ii) persons
who are owners of land, the land revenue dues of which are
not less than Bs. 2,000 per year, (iii) persons who are Sardars
or Talukdars or Duinaldars or Inamdars and recognized as such
by the Government, are entitled to have a vole. The object and
the effect of this liigh franchise are clear. It excludes anyone
who is not very w^ealthy or who is not a scion of an aristocratic
family. The intellectual element is supplied by the further
provisions that (iv) all persons who liave been once president or
vice-president of a Municipality, (v) president or vice-president
128 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
of a District Local Board, (vi) persons who have been niembei^
of the Senate or fellows of a University, (vii) persons who have
been members of any legislative body in India, (^iii) persons
who enjoy the title of Mahainahopadhyaya or Shams-ul-Ulerna,
have also a right to vote. These provisions have made it possible
for comparatively poor persons tq contest the seats of the Coun-
cil if they have to their credit some public work and influence as
demonstrated by their possessing any of these qualifications.
In the elections of 1925 the total electorate for the Council
of State numbered 32,126, of which Burma contributed no less
than 15,555. If representatives from Burma are excluded, the
remaining thirty-two members of the Council of State were
elected by only 17,000 voters spread over the whole of British
India. This position had not appreciably changed in the subse-
quent election which was held in 1930.
With the exception of this small intellectual and to a certain
It is an oligar- extent democratic element, the Council of State
4:hioal body has a predominantly oligarchical character. It
therefore possesses all the characteristics that are the distin-
guishing features of oligarchy. It is conservative in its forma-
tion. It is suspicious of progress. Its outlook is generally
narrow. Representing as it does the vested interests in the state,
it is inclined to be self-centred and self-protecting. Not being
returned by an extensive electorate it has a tendency to be
exclusive in its outlook and to be unaffected by the currents of
popular opinion. The small elected majority of five is not
calculated to lessen the consequences of the oligarchical nature
of the body. The tenure of the Council of State is five years.
For any legislature the position and status of the president
President are matters of important consideration and privi-
lege. In the case of the old Supreme Legislative Council, the
Governor-peneral was the ex officio president In the new dis-
pensation' of the Reforms this privilege has been taken away
from the Governor-General. The president of the Council of
State is nominated by the Governor-General, and till very re-
cently he w'as invariably an official. At present, however, a
non-official has been selected to hold that office. The Council
of State is denied the privilege of electing its own president, a
privilege which is enjoyed by the Legislative Assembly.
A reference has already been made to the different kinds of
Fanetlons powers which a legislative chamber can possess,
and powers: The Council of State has been given full legislative
1. LegislatiTe powers. Every Bill wffiich has to be passed into
an Act must receive its assent. Any member, official or non-
official, may introduce a Bill for the consideration of the House
which may or may not pass it. No measure can be incorporated
into the law of the land unless the Council of State has given
its sanction to it. It enjpys in this respect the same powders as
are enjoyed by the Legislative Assembly.
CENTRAL LEGISLATURE: ITS CHAMBERS 129
It can exercise control over the administration by moving
U. Admlnlt- resolutions or adjoiumments or votes of censure,
tratiie or by putting questions and supplementary ques-
tions. Fifteen days’ notice is required for a resolution. The
Governor- General can disallow any resolution if he feels it
necessary to do so in the public interest. Motions for adjourn-
ment must refer to definite matters of urgent public importance
and .of recent occurrence. Questions and supplementary ques-
tions to elicit information on points in the routine of adminis-
tration c^n be put by members to the executive officials. On
matters affecting the relations of the Government with foreign
states or Indian Princes or on those matters which are sub judice,
no questions can be asked and no resolutions can be moved. The
president can disallow a question or supplementary question.
He c^ also disallow a motion for adjournment.
Lastly, the financial powers of the Council of State have to
lii. Finanoial be understood. The Council of State is avowedly
a body of elders, oligarchical in character and serving as an
upper chamber. It has only a remote acquaintance with popu-
lar sentiments and desires. The second chambers in western
countries have not the same thorough control over the nation’s
purse as the loiter chambers possess. They are regarded as
inherently unfitted to exercise this power because of their vested
interests, because of their narrow representative character and
because of the general conservative outlook that pervades all
their thoughts and acts. The House of Lords in England, for
instance, cannot initiate any money bill, and after the legislation
of 1911 cannot claim equal rights with the lower chamber in
financial affairs; it has been disarmed of the privilege of per-
sistently opposing and obstructing the passage of the Finance
Bill after it has been passed more than once by the lower body,
the Commons,
Following this sound constitutional precedent, the Indian
upper chamber is denied certain privileges in financial matters
which are granted to the lower chamber. The budget is to be
presented to both bodies on the same day. Both of them can
discuss it thoroughly, but the voting of particular grants de-
manded by the heads of various departments is a special duty
and privilege of the Assembly. These are not submitted to the
Council of State after they have been voted upon by the
Assembly. The latter body is in this respect supreme, subject
to the certifying veto of the Governor-General.
After the voting of grants, ways and means of revenue have
to be considered. Money has to be found for the expenditure
that is voted, and all proposals for taxation are embodied in a
Bill known as the Finance Bill. This Bill has to be passed by
the Assembly and is then sent up to the Council of State for its
assent like any other legislative Bill. The Council may pass
the Bill as it is or introduce amendments, which must be
9
130 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
acceptable to the originating chamber. In a deadlock the
Govemor-Oenerare extraordinary powers can be exercised for
preserving the proper conduct of the administration.
The Council of State’s financial powers are therefore as fol-
lows. The budget is presented to it at the same time ag to
the Assembly. It has the right to hold a general discussion on
the budget and generally on the financial policy of the state.
Its legislative powers being co-ordinate with those of the Assem-
bly, the Finance Bill, which contains all proposals of taxation,
has to be submitted for its assent and can be modified or even
rejected by it. The power which the Council of State does
not possess is that of voting supplies or grants, demands for
which are made by the heads of the various departments
separately. That is the exclusive privilege of the Assembly.
It is interesting to note that the Council was originally
intended to be a predominantly Government body containing
a clear oflScial majority, so that any measure required by the
Government could be easily passed. The Joint Parliamentary
Committee however discountenanced such a proposal as re-
actionary and discordant with the spirit of the Montford Eeforms.
An endeavour was then made to constitute a real second cham-
ber corresponding to similar bodies in other countries. The
elected non-official majority, though definitely introduced, was
made extremely small, and the franchise was pitched so high
as to ensure an essentially plutocratic character for its major
portion.
The experience of the working of the Council during the
Criticism of last seventeen ^ears hag revealed and confirmed
the Council the existence of the usual antagonism and cleav-
of State age between the view-points of a democratic
chamber and those of •an oligarchical hguse. A cent per cent
increase fa the salt-tax, which was proposed in the budget by the
Finance Member and which was vehemently opposed by the
Legislative Assembly, was approved of by the Council of State.
Nor could the Assembly’s antagonism to the Princes’ Protection
Bill find any support in the Council of State. In fact, a consti-
tutional crisis in the real sense of the word has not yet occurred
at all. On crucial occasions of conflict between the compara-
tively democratic Assembly and the bureaucratic Government^
the oligarchical Council of State has till now invariably thrown
itself on the side of the Government.
Even in free countries, a congregation of vested interests is
always nervous of the progressive democratic impulse, and is
opposed to it. In a conquered country like India the instinct
of self-preservation is immensely strengthened and naturally
induces intense caution on the part of the aristocratic class.
Critics of the Council of State have every reason to deprecate
the formation and constitution of a body which is inevitably
CENTEAL LEGISLATUBE: ITS CHAMBEES 131
'drawn into an alliance with the bureaucracy as against the
declared wishes of the popular chamber.
STATEMENT SHOWING THE COMPOSITION OF THE COUNCIL OF
STATE AS IT STOOD WHEN 1?HE SIMON COMMISSION EEPOETED*
Nominated j
Elected
JD
a
eS
Constituency
‘3
'ffl
d
d
i
ta
m
0
d
o
d
a
d
o
1
"a
d
a
a
1 a
d o
o o
If
S 8
"3
“8
O
QQ
Eh
Government of India ...
IV
11
Madras^
1
1
4
i
7
Bombay
1
1
3
2
• ••
1
8
Bengal
1
1
3
9
1
8
United Provinces
1
1
3
2
...
7
Punjab
1
3
1 1
2*
i
...
8
Bihar and Orissa
1
1
4
C. P. and Berar ...
2*
...
i
a
Assam
1
1 ...
1
Burma
...
...
1
1 *1
2
N.-W. F. Province
1
1
5
1 3
1
Total
17
1
10
16
B
2
1
CO
§2. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
The lower and more democratic chamber in the Indian
Constitution legislature is known as the Indian Legislative
Assembly. This body consists of a total of 144 members of
which 103 are elected and 41 nominated. Of the latter not
more than 25 arc to be.ofl&cials. It is thus evident that both
in its size and in the larger proportion of elected to nominated
members the Assembly is distinguished from the Council of
State. The total number of its members is distributed among
the various provinces according to their population and im-
portance. The existing political divisions of the territory of
India are accepted as the units for its election; and as it is a
body larger and more democratic than the Council of State and
possesses a wider electorate, the political sub-divisions of the
province are further taken as units for the distribution of seats
mi for election, unlike the Council of State for which, in the
non-Muslim constituency, the province as a whole is the unit.
^ Eeport, vol, I, p. 167.
* Including the president.
■ One of these is nominated as the result of an election held in Berar.
* At alternate general elections there are three non-Muslim seats for Bihar
and Orissa and only one Muslim seat for the Punjab.
* The distribution of nominated seats may be varied at the discretion of
the Governor-General but the officials cannot exceed twenty.
182 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Thus the number of elected members representing the Presidency
of Bombay in the Assembly is 16 out of its elected total of 108.
These are elected from constituencies, the territorial extent of
iitrhich corresponds to the Commissioners* Divisions, or, in the
ilrban constituency of the City of Bombay, to the extent of the
<5ity.
There cannot be a uniform franchise for the Assembly
Franohlse throughout India. It varies in the different • pro-
vinces according to local conditions, an attempt being made
to establish similar real conditions in all the provinces. In the
Province of Bombay, (i) all persons who pay income-tax; fii)
all persons who pay an annual land revenue not less than
Bs 37-8 in the Panch Mahals and Batnagiri Districts and not
less than Bs 75 in the rest of the province have been given
the franchise for the Assembly. It will be seen that this franchise
is much wider than that for the Council of State and narrower
than that for the Bombay Legislative Council. Members possess-
ing a wider outlook, and elected from a wider electorate are
required to discuss all-India questions; yet the franchise cannot
be too high if a largely democratic and representative character
is to be maintained. The Assembly must combine in itself the
characteristics of being a well-proportioned all-India body, and
also a predominantly democratic body, unlike the oligarchical
Council of State.
The total electorate for the Legislative Assembly numbered
1,415,892 at the time of the last elections which were held in
the autumn of 1934. Thus its 105 members were returned by
less than fifteen lakhs of voters in British India, the total
population of which is nearly twenty-five crores. There has been
very little change in this position since then. The tenure of
the Legislative Assembly is three years, though the Qovemor-
Geheral can extend it in his discretion. This power has been
exercised year after year since 1937 and the Assembly elected
in 1934 is still functioning today.
It was provided in the Act that the first president of the
Presitot Assembly would be a non-official member of
Parliamentary experience nominated by the Governor-General to
hold office for the first four years. As has been stated already,
the president of the Indian legislature before the Montf ord
Eeforms was the Governor-General efer officio. The president
of the Council of State is a nominated member, and was an
oflScicd till recently. The Assembly has been given the pri-
vilege of electing its own president from amongst its members
since the Beforms. On the expiration of the first four years,
during which the affairs of the Assembly were to be guided by an
experienced and well-informed Parliamentarian and during
wUch conventions and froditions could be set up by him, the
Tight of election was to be exercised and thenceforth the chair
CENTBAL LEGISLATURE: ITS CHAMBERS 188
of the preeddent was to be adorned by one on whom the choice
of the Assembly fell. Sir P. Whyte was the first nominated
president. Mr V. J. Patel was the first elected president and he
was re-elected for a second term of office.
The election of its own Speaker has been an important and
Importanee time-honoured privilege of the House of Com-
ot the offioe mons. The historical evolution of this office is
of .president interesting. From being the spokesman and leader
of his colleagues and a channel of communication between
them and the monarch, the Speaker has now come to be
a non-party dignitary vested with all the intricate functions
and powers that are necessary to guide the deliberations
of a democratic legislative chamber. Constitutionally, the
Speaker's or President’s position carries great responsibilities
with it. He presides over the meetings of the body and can
adjourn them. He maintains order at the time of discussion,
gives his rulings on disputed points of procedure, and has to
dispose systematically of the business on the agenda. He
maintains the dignity of the House by controlling members in
the use of their language; he has to protect carefully the privi-
leges of the House from any outside encroachment. He admits
questions and grants permission to move adjournments. In case
of an equality of votes the president can give his casting vote.
In short, to have its own elected president is one of the most
cherished and one of the most useful privileges enjoyed by a
legislature.
That privilege was conceded to the Legislative Assembly
by the Act of 1919. A deputy-president is elected to preside in
the absence of the president. The salaries of both the president
and deputy-president are voted by the Assembly. Both cease
to hold office when they cease to be members of the Assembly
and may be removed from office by a vote of the Assembly and
with the concurrence of the Governor-General.
The powers and functions of the Assembly are to be con-
sidered in the light of the classification that has
been given already. The legislative powers of
this body are co-ordinate with the powers of the
Council of State. No Bill can be deemed to have
been passed into an Act having force of legality
unless it is passed by both bodies and has received the Govemor-
General’s assent. All legislation must therefore pass through
the Assembly, which can also move resolutions, votes of cen-
sure, motions of adjournment: any of its members can put
questions and supplementary questions in the same manner as
the members of the Council of State. It can thus effectively
establish its supervising authority and critical control over de-
partmental administration and indicate its political predilec-
tions.
Powers and
funotions :
leglslatlYe
and adminis-
tratiTO
184 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
The Assembly has, however, a wider power in the domain
Financial of finance than that possessed by the Council of
jpovm State. The budget has of course to be presented
to this body by the Finance Member as he used to submit it to
its predecessors in ‘pre-Montford-Reform days. It can also
-carry on a general discussion of tbe budget and of the financial
policy of the Government, as before. But now it does not stop
with moving resolutions and dividing the Council on them, 'as
it did between 1909 and the introduction of the Reforms of
1919. For the first time in Indian constitutioaal history, power
is given to the legislature to vote the grants demanded in the
budget. This has to be clearly understood.
The position after 1909 was peculiar. In the first place,
Pre-Reform the Supreme Legislative' Council contained a clear
ofiBcial majority, so that any amounts of money
that the Government wanted could be easily secured by issuing
an executive mandate concerning the manner in which official
members should vote. And even if an official majoriy had not
existed, matters would not have been much better, for the
power that was conceded to the legislature in regard to the
budget amounted only to the liberty of expressing an opinion
on a particular item if allowed to do so. This expressiom of
opinion was not binding upon the Government. It had not the
authority of law.
On the other hand, the power of voting supplies, partially
After the granted under the Montford Reforms, is a different
Reform! thing. It has been already explained that com-
plete control over the country's finance is one of the essential
conditions of parliamentary government. It has not been in-
troduced in the central administration of India. Yet an en-
deavour- is made to create some shadow of parliamentary govern-
ment by conceding to the legislature the privilege of voting a
part of the total supplies required by the Government of India.
The money required for certain items cannot be spent unless
it is voted by the Assembly or is permitted to be spent by the
certification of the Governor-General.
The proposals of the Government for the appropriation of
Non-Totable revenues and moneys are divided into two parts,
items votable and non-votable. Grants coming under
the latter head are not put for the Assembly’s vote, nor can
“they be discussed by the legislature imless the Governor-General
directs. Some very important subjects are included in this
group. Interest and sinking fund charges; salaries and pensions
of persons appointed with the approval of His Majesty or the
Secretary of State, salaries of Chief Commissioners, expenditure
under the heads ecclesiafirtical, political and defence, are all sub-
jects which are non-vocable. They cover about eighty-five per
cent of the total expenditure.
CENTEAL LEGISLATUEE; ITS CHAMBEEB 1B5
Proposals for the appropriation of revenues in the subjects other
Yotable than these specihed ones are submitted to the vote
items of the Assembly in the form of demands for grants.
The Assembly may assent to or reduce or refuse a grant.
Grants that have been thus reduced or rejected cannot be
obtained unless the Governor-General feels that they are
absolutely necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities
towards Parliament and so restores them by his power of
certification. The Joint Parliamentary Committee made it clear
that the power of certification was intended to be real, inasmuch
as voting of the budget was not accompanied by any degree of
political responsibility and the Govemor-General-in-Council
continued to be solely responsible to Parliament for peace, order
and good government in India.
With the creation of an Assembly containing a large elected
non-official majority and possessing a fair representative character
because of its election on a comparatively liberal franchise, and
with the partial grant to this body of the power of voting sup-
plies demanded by Government officials, it is no wonder that
the centre of political importance in the constitution of India
has now definitely shifted to the Indian Legislative Assem-
bly. The Council of State does not enjoy the privilege of
voting grants. It can only approve of and discuss the Finance
Bill.
Besides, the Assembly has power py appoint a standing
Finance Finance Committee, (i) to scrutinize proposals for
Committee new votable expenditure, (ii) to sanction allot-
ments out of lump sum grants, (iii) to suggest retrenchment
and economy in expenditure and (iv) generally to assist the
Finance Department by advising on such cases as may be
referred to it. The Committee consists of ten members elected
by the Assembly with a chairman nominated by the Governor-
General.
At the commencement of each financial year there is also
Committee constituted a Committee on Public Accounts,
on Public consisting of not more than twelve members of
Accounts whom not less than two-thirds are elected by the
non-official members of the Assembly. The Finance Member
IS the chairman, and has a casting vote in case of an equality
of votes. The Committee has to scrutinize the audit and appro-
priation accounts of the Govemor-General-in-Council and satisfy
itself that the money voted by the Assembly has been spent
within the scope of the demand granted by the Assembly. It
has also to bring to the notice of the Assembly every reap-
propriation from one grant to another, every reappropriation
within a grant, and all such expenditure as is desired by
the Finance Department to be brought to the notice of the
Assembly.
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
m
8. PBOGEDDRE op work IN THE CENTRAL
LEGISLATURE
Bummona for meetings . — ^The time and place for the meeting
of the central legislature are fixed by the Governor-General. A
summons to attend the session is issued to each member by tho
Secretary of the Legislative Chamber.
Oath and president* s election . — If a legislature is meeting for
the first time after new elections, its members are first of all
called upon to take the Oath. Immediately thereaifter they
proceed to elect their president and then their vice-president.
Both these elections are not finally valid until they have been
approved of by the Governor-General.
At the commencement of each session the president must
nominate from among the members a panel of not more than
four chairmen.
In the absence of the president, the vice-president presides..
If both are absent they can request any one of the panel of chair*
men to preside over the meeting.
Allotment of days for business . — ^The Governor-General allots
definite days for the transaction of non-official business. On
other days only official business can be transacted unless the
Government otherwise directs.
A list of business, or agenda, is dispatched to each member
before the commencement of the session.
Qworww.— »Twenty-five members form the quorum for a meet-
ing of the Legislative Assembly and fifteen members for that of
the Council of State.
Questions. -^The first hour of each meeting is devoted to the
answering of questions. The number of questions which a parti-
cular member may ask on any day is limited to five. For each
questioncnot less than ten clear days' notice is required ordinarily.
In special circumstances, however, short-notice questions may be-
allowed. The president has power to disallow a question if in
his opinion it constitutes an abuse of the member's right.
Any member may put a supplementary question for the-
purpose of elucidating any matter of fact regarding which an
answer has been given. But such questions can be disallowed
by the president.
Resolutions . — A member who wishes to move a resolution
must ordinarily give fifteen clear days’ notice. The resolution
must pertain to a subject of general public interest and may
be disallowed by the Gtovemor-General. Amendments can be
moved by any member to a resolution. Non-official resolutions
ean be taken only on days allotted for non-official business.
Their order of prioritv is determined by ballot.
Adjournment motions. sheave to propose an adjournment
motion for the purpose ^f discussing a definite matter of urgent
public importance must be asked immediately after questiona
CENTBAL LEGISLATUBE: ITS CHAMBEBS 187
' have been answered. If more than thirty members rise in
support, the president intimates that the matter will be taken
up for discussion at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The debate
must terminate at 6 o'clock and thereafter no question in respect
of that motion shall be put.
Legiilaiion, — Generally, a month's notice is required for
leave to introduce a Bill. Every Bill is required to pass through
the following stages.
(i) A member who wants to move a Bill must first seek leave
of the chamber to introduce it. In doing so he may make a
brief explanatory statement. An opposing member is also
allowed to make a few remarks to explain his position. Then
without further debate the question is put and if the majority
of meipibers are in favour of leave being granted, the mover
forthwith introduces the Bill.
However, the Governor-General may order the publication
of a Bill in the Gaz&tte although no motion has been made for
leave to introduce it. In that case such a motion is not necessary
and if the Bill is afterwards introduced it is not necessary to
publish it again.
(ii) After a Bill has been introduced it is published in the
Government Gazette.
(iii) After a Bill has been introduced and published, the
member in charge moves that the Bill be read for the first time*
Only the general principles are discussed on this occstsion.
Discussion on details is not pennitted.
(iv) After the first reading is passed, any one of the following
motions may be made:
(а) that the Bill be read a second time,
(б) that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee; and
(c) that the Bill be circulated for eliciting public opinion.
If (c) is accepted, the Bill may be referred to a Select Com-
mittee after public opinion has been elicited.
The Select Committee may hear the necessary evidence and
usually has to submit its report, with dissenting minutes, if any,
within two months. The report and the minutes are published
in the Gazette and also circulated among members. The report
is then presented to the legislature by the member in charge
of the Bill with a brief explanatory speech.
(v) After the Select Committee's report is presented, the
mover proposes that the Bill be read a second time. If this
motion is agreed to by the majority, the president has to submit
the Bill clause by clause separately to the vote. Any member
can move an amendment to any clause with seven clear days'
notice. Votes are first taken on the ‘amendments and then on
the clauses as they originally stood or as they have been
amended.
(vi) After the second reading is finished the mover proposes
PElNClPAIi ITEMS IN TfiE REVENtJE AND EXPENDITUEB OP THE GOVEENMBNT OF INDIA
BUDGET ESTIMATES FOB 1538-39 IN THOUSANDS OP BUPEES
186
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
gS
58 gSSSSSSSX
Q '•111' fH COOOO CO
CO 1— I ^ »fi
Js . .
I :|iS : :
O 00 00 (S *
H 8 3 g o. g
^•c a *•« S
3 (0 CD 4)
5 ‘Sira •^'S jo '"3 fc ^
E/? S.s**
SS8S88fe!?.g.gg.SS8glSS
i-r<0»0«Ma<^tfrOl^rHV5P®«CQ'^Cr»cr
oot'-»0'«ne0''^o»o c»«5c»«iico»o»oc^
llgll
! I Mill
535'oIIIIb
.li . .
A “S ® *1
ilSss!
Total .. 1,22,27,72 I Total ... , . 1,22,18,47
CENTRAL LEGISLATURE: ITS CHAMBERS 189
that the Bill be read for the third time. Only verbal amendments
are allowed on this occasion and no notice is required for
them.
Every Bill is required to be passed three times in three
readings as described above.
A Bill passed by one chamber must be sent to the other
chamber and there it has to pass through the same procedure.
• After the Bill has been passed by both the Chambers it goes
to the Governor-General for his assent. Only after that assent
is given 'does the Bill finally become law.
Budget , — ^The budget has to pass through the following
stages :
(i) It must be presented to the legislature on such day as
the Governor-General appoints. A copy of it along with detailed
estimates must be dispatched to each member at least seven days
prior to the first of the days allotted for the general discussion
of the budget.
No diiscussion of the budget can take place on the day on
which it is presented.
(ii) After the budget is presented, the legislative body is at
liberty to discue<» the budget as a whole. The Governor-General
allots a definite number of days for this purpose. This is the
opportunity for members to criticize the general scheme and
policy of the Government and the main principles of administra-
tion. No motion is allowed at this stage and details are
generally excluded from the discussion. The Finance Member
has a general right of reply at the end.
(iii) After general discussion, the voting of demands for
grants is undertaken. Not more than fifteen days are allotted
for this purpose and not more than two can be taken up by
the discussion of any one demand.
On the last of the days allotted for the voting of grants, the
president must stop all discussion at 5 o'clock in the evening
and forthwith put every outstanding demand to the vote of
the chamber.
A separate demand for grant is ordinarily made for each
Government Department.
The legislature can reduce or omit but not increase the
amount demanded in a grant.
§4. CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE TWO CHAMBERS
With the creation of two independent and co-ordinate bodies
Confllctf central legislature, the Government of India
between the Act had to provide for the contingency of a conflict
chambers between the two Houses on any matter of legis-
lation where consent of both the Houses is made obligatory by
law. The contingency of a conflict is inherent not only in
the duality but in the co-ordinate character of the central legis-
140 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
latuxe. Both have equsd status and equal powers, and uncom*
promising differences between them have to be resolved by pro-
viding for some method where this equality will disappear.
Such conflicts have taken place in all bicameral systems of
legislature, and solutions for the consequent deadlock have also
b^n provided. The monarch's unrestricted right of creating
as many peers as he likes has proved the safety-valve of the
English constitution on more than one occasion, though 'the
Parliament Act of 1911 has made resort to this power unnecessary.
Special clauses have been included in the Grovemment* of India
Act of 1919 to end differences between the Indian legislative'
chambers when they arise.
After a Bill has been passed by either of the chambers it is
sent to the other chamber for its assent, without which the
Bill cannot become an Act. If the other chamber accepts the
Bill without modification, there is no hitch. If it introduces any
amendment, then the Bill is sent back to the originating chamber
with the amendment. If the amendment is acceptable to the
originating chamber, matters pass off smoothly. The real con-
flict arises on occasions when a Bill passed by one chamber is
totally rejected by the other or is so altered by it as to prove
unacceptable to the first chamber. Various methods are pro-
vided to avert the conflict or to end it when it comes.
For example;
(i) When a Bill is introduced in either chamber and before
Ramsdiss to it is referred to a Select Committee of the House
and tham in the second reading, the originating chamber
may request, by a resolution, the other chamber to nominate
some of its members to the Select Committee, so that while
the Bill is on the anvil and under the searching consideration*
of the Committee, members of the other chamber can take-
part in the discussion and give expression to their views so as
to enable the Bill to be modified in the light of their opinion.
Id this way future opposition may be anticipated and a pro-
Joist Salaat bable conflict may be averted if the motion to
Otmmlttos appoint a Joint Committee is accepted by both
Houses. On such a Joint Select Committee an equal number
of members from both the Houses will sit; its chairman will be
elected by itself and will have only one vote, and in case the
votes are equal, the question will be decided in the negative.
The time and place of the tneeting will be fixed by the president
of the Council of State.
(ii) When there is a difference of opinion between the
dtlat chambers, they may agree to a Joint Conference
OeatoMBoe where each chamber will be represented by an
equal number of members^ The procedure of the Conference^
leill be determined by* itself. The time and place of its^
meeting will bo fixed by the president of the Council. Am
CENTEAL LEGISLATURE: ITS CHAMBERS 141
amicable settlement may be arrived at as a result of the dis*
cussions in the Conference and the deadlock may be ended.
(iii) As a last resort, if the chambers are in a state of pro-
nounced mutual disagreement, when a Bill as passed by the one
is not approved of by the other and when the latter’s amend-
ments and alterations are not acceptable to the originating
chamber, this last body may report the fact of the disagreement
to the Governor-General or allow the Bill to lapse. In case
intimation of the difference is given to the Governor-General,
ho may ponvene a Joint Sitting of both the chambers by noti-
Jolnt Bitting fication in the Gazette. The president of the
Council of State shall preside and its procedure shall apply.
The members present at a Joint Sitting 'may deliberate and
shall vote together upon the Bill as last proposed by the origi-
nating chamber and on the amendments in dispute’. The
majority of the votes of the total number of members present
shall prevail and the Bill as passed by the majority, with
whatever amendments may have been accepted, will be taken
as if it had been duly passed by both the chambers. It is plain
that in a Joint Sitting the Assembly will naturally be at an
advantage on account of its larger numbers.
A slightly complicated state of things arises in connexion
Certifieatloii with the question of conflict when, in addition
to the will of the chambers, a third force, the will of the
Governor-General, comes into operation. In the cases above
discussed the GovemOr-General was taken to be an impartial
disinterested spectator. But occasions may arise — they have
arisen in recent times — when in the conflict of opinion bet\veen
the two chambers the Governor-General may take a keen in-
terest and may cast in the weight of his authority on one side.
He can then end the conflict bv the use of the extraordinary
constitutional weapons' that are provided for him. The expedi-
ent of a Joint Sitting is useless for his purposes if his difference
is with the Assembly, as that body would command in the Joint
Sitting a majority of votes. When, therefore, the disagreement
between the chambers is complicated by the disagreement of
the Governor-General with either of them, it has happened in
practice that the process of certification has been utilized for
the removal of such a deadlock.
A concrete case will illustrate the point. The Princes* Pro-
tection Bill and the clause doubling the salt-tax in the Finance
Bill of 1924 were disallowed by the Legislative Assembly. The
Governor-General was interested in the passing of these measures.
They were therefore sent up to the Council of State with the
Govemor-General's recommendation about the form in which
they should be passed and were passed by that body. Thus
there arose occasions of conflict between the Assembly and the
Council, with the Govemor-Gteneral interosted in getting parti-
cular measures passed in spite of the opposition of the Assembly.
m INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
tile Bills as passed by the Council of IState were not
accepted by the Assembly, the Govemor-Oeneral exercised his
cextiiying power, gave his assent to them and the measures were
taken to be legally passed. Apart from the usual constitutional
provision of a Joint Select Committee or a Joint Conference or a
Joint Sitting, the Governor-General’s extraordinary executive
authority has thus indirectly tended to serve the same purpose on
certain occasions, when the Governor-General himself .has
espoused a particular cause.
XVII. THE RELATION OP THE EXECUTIVE
TO THE LEGISLATURE
§1. NO PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY
It- has been explained already how a proper understanding of
The executive the relation between the executive and legislative
ought to be* pants of a country’s administration is indispensable
iubordinate for estimating the reality of its democratic charac-
ter. In a country like England with Parliamentary institutions,
the subordination of the executive to the legislature is complete.
And as ^he final goal of British policy in India has been announced
to be the progressive realization of responsible government and
the development of Parliamentary institutions, when the goal
is achieved in practice the subordination of the Indian executive
to the Indian legislature will also be complete. An attempt has
to be made to view in a proper perspective the relations between
the two parts as they exist in the present avowedly transitional
period.
No consideration could of course be given to this problem
before the completion of the Indian conquest and the settling
down of its administration into peaceful routine. In the begin-
ning of British rule, legislatures as separate bodies did not exist
at all. And when they were introduced and as they were pro-
gressively developed during the latter portion of the nineteenth
century, gradual additions wore made to their powers. But the
irresponsible character of the executive administration was
maintained.
Even at the time of the Councils Act of 1909 the intention of
even indirectly initiating something akin to Parliamentary gov-
ernment was expressly disowned. There was no question of the
executive being controlled by the legislature. The latter at the
most could indulge in declamatory rhetoric which very often ‘fell
The position against stone walls’,
beforethe £ts Sir Surendranath Banerji would have said.
Montford The enlargement of the Councils was simply due
Reforms to a desire for the greater association of Indians in
the administration. There was no impulse of any progressive
political principle behind it. The bureaucracy was responsible
only to itself and in the last resort to the distant Secretary of
State and the uninterested British Parliament.
The Act of 1919 introduced many important changes in other
'directions, but so far as the strictly legal position is concerned,
The position it left unchanged the old relations between the
thereaftsr executive and legislative parts of government.
Even after the Act of 1935, the same position will be maintained
144 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
as long as the Transitional Provisions are in operation and the
Federation of India is not introduced.
In strict theory, the Govemor-Oaneral-in-Council continues
to be as autocratic as he was before. Neither he nor his colleagues
are called upon to resign even after a regular vote of censure is
passed upon them by the legislature. Their salaries and rules
of service are beyond the reach of the people's representatives.
They are not boimd to accept any recommendation made to them
by the legislature. Their responsibility is only to the British
Parliament and they hold office during the pleasure of the
Sovereign. The extraordinary legislative veto that is now given
to the OovenK>r-Oeneral, otherwise known as the power of certi-
fication, is intended to act as a corrective to any persistent
obstruction on the part of the legislature. In short, the citadel
of bureaucratic authority, so far as the Central Oovermnent in
India is concerned, continues to be as strongly fortified as before
according to the strict letter of the Constitution.
§2. INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE
This is, however, a purely theoretical position. Matters differ
ns new somewhat in practice, particularly since the Act
status and of 1919. With legislatxires enlarged and demo-
mmm «f the cratized; with an elected non-official majority
^•^******“* created in them; with larger financial and deli-
berative powers conceded to them; and with the Viceroy's power
of certification declared to be extraordinary, the indirect but none
the less real influence of popular opinion as expressed in the
legislature may not be entirely insignificant. The legislature
caimot dismiss executive members but can certainly dismiss
requests made by them for various grants necessary to keep some
of the wheels of the machinery going. The refusal of such re-
quei^ aM the rejection or reduction of any of the demanded
grants may indeed provoke a Viceregal resort to the extraordinary
weapon of certification. That power may also be invoked for
any other similarly rejected legislative measure. But unless
certification ceases to be regarded and used as an extraordinary
weapon and is invested with the routine familiarity that attaches
to all normal instruments of government, administration by certi-
fication will be regarded as imcommon and abnormal.
Public opinion as focussed through representative legislative
ImportsBM of chambers carries a peculiar weight with it. It is
psklle opIiiloB the most disciplined and chastened expression of
a self-conscious public will. To disregard a mobilized and con-
centrated force of this type would prove nothing less than suicidal
to any normal govemnotent. No government with a human,
moral basis and composition can be supported on props which
press down those very moral and human elements that are the
essence of its vitality. * Legally, the Government of India are
entirely independent of their l^slature. In practice, on the
EXECUTIVE ANB LBQ16XATU»E 14i6
other band, they have to be thiiMkimied enough to be susceptible
to popular opinion and endeavour to abide by its wish at least
to a certain extent. Sir Maloohn Hailey, qpeaking some time
back in the Legislative Assembly, was giving a description of
the actual state of affairs when he described ti^ Government of
India as bavins become, after the Montford ^forms, responsive
if not responsible to popular opinion, and its actions as having
become indicative if not reflective of the popular view point.
An incessant use of the privilege of interpellation, of the
InfluSDcs of power of moving resolutions and adjournments, of
publlolty discussing the budget and voting a part of it, and
of the power of sanctioning all legislative measures; in short, an
incessant use of the searchlight of publicity and critical investi-
gation, is believed to go a long way in the direction of strengthen-
ing tne hands of the legislature and making it the centre of poli-
tical influence. The executive government has to gravitate to-
'wards this centre, perceptibly or imperceptibly. The elastic
adjustment of its actions to accord with the surrounding poli-
tical atmosphere may be dissembled by the garb of diplomacy
yet a consolidated, sober and responsible popular will is a force
which can only be disregarded on occasions of the utmost gravity
when an adlnmistrative breakdown appears inevitable.
The degree of the indirect influence of the legislature upon
Uneeptsln actions of the executive cannot be exactly esti-
nsture of mated or evaluated. A reference has already been
Indiroei made to the statement in the Montagu -Chelnisfcvd
•sontrol Eeport before the introduction of the Montford
Beforms that such influence was very real. It may be that on
some occasions the popular view as expressed in the legislature
is respected and action taken in accordance with it. Arter the
'Act of 1919, the legislatures have ceased to be mock bodies; they
have a good deal of representative character and somewhat
larger powers. And, therefore, unless either the executive gov-
ernment has become an inhuman and lifeless machine, a mere
abstraction of power and efficiency, or unless extraordinary vetoes
like certification are domesticated into the normality of executive
powers, the influence of the legislature over the executive can-
not be ignored.
The experience of recent years has however clearly shown
that no reliance can be placed on the effectiveness of such an
indirect constitutional restraint. On more than one occasion, the
views of the Legislative Assembly have been disregarded. Pro-
posals vetoed by it have been restored. Grants refused by it have
been reinstated. Resolutions passed by it have been neglected.
The precarious nature of a power which is allowed only on suffer-
ance and the existence of which is made dependent upon the
frailty of a generous caprice has been amply demcmstratea during
the last few years. Indian publk opinion demands the subordi-
nation of the executive to the legislature as a matter exercised as
10
14A mDUN ADMIMISTBATION
light not merdy allowed as an ambiguous privilege.
And even if the quality a^ the leidii^ of the legiuature's indirect
influenoe be asswted and proved to be great, the fact of its
uncertainty and its allowcmoe by mere courtesy detract to a great
extent from its utlHiy and value.
OQMPOSmON OF THE LEOISLATIVE ASSEMBLY AS IT STOOD
WHEN THE SIMON COMMISSION BEPOETED'
CoQjBtiteeacy
Nomi* ,
nated
Elected
Officials
J!
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
§
2
1
3
si
'§ s
s
16
1
government of India
14
6*
•••
• ••
19
Mitdiu
2
• ••
8
• t •
i
1
i
18
Bombay
2
1
7
4
. .
2
1
2
19
Bengal
2
2
6
6
...
8
1
1
21
United Provinces
X
2
8
6
1
1
19
Punjab
1
2
8
6
2
...
1
15
Bihar and Orissa
1
1
8
3
,,
...
1
14
C. P. and Berar
1
1 *
3
1
...
...
1
7
Assam
1
...
2
1
..
1
5
Burma
1
...
y
...
...
1
•••
5
Uelhi
...
• • •
1 *
,
• • •
...
1
jymmr-Merwara
•*.
...
1 *
...
• ••
...
1
N^-W. F. Province
...
1
••
...
• ee
...
1
Total ...
#
26
15
52
2
9
4
145
r
’ BepM, T6l. I, p. 168.
* Komiiiftted to npresont AsioolAted ChamberB of Commerce, Indiasr
Ohristianai Labour interesti, the AnghvLidiaa qommumty and the Depressed
Gtaaset. The distribution of nominated non-oflicials may be varied by the
Govamor^General at his discietlon.' He official membersnip of twenty-six is
a fixed number though its distribution can be varied by the Governor-General.
9 Nominated as the result of an eleetian field in fierar which technically
ii not Britieh territoiry.
^ Hese five seats are filled noi^Hwmmenal constituencies.
PART IV
THE FEDERATION OP INDIA
xym. UKITABY AND rEOBBAL ETATSS . . . . 149
XIX. THE dnitabt oovbbnuent: before the uontage-
* OHBUI8FOBO BEF0BM8 . . . 152
XX. THE dritaby oovebnment: after the montaoo-
CHELMSFOBD BEFOBMS . . 166
^XI. SEASONS FOB MAEINO INDIA A'FEDEBAL bTATE . . 174
XXn. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERATION AND THE DIS-
TRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS . . 189
XXIII. THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE . . . 189
XXIV. THE FEDERAL LEOISLATURE . . 200
XXV. THE FEDERAL COURT . . 210
XXVI. FEDERAL FINANCE UNDER THE ACT OF 1935 . . 213
XXVn INDIAN RAILWAYS AND THE FEDERAL RAILWAY
AUTHORITY . . 21f
INTEODUCTOEY
One of the basic concepts of the Act of 1935 is the establish-
Tlia federal ment of an Indian Federation, incori>orating British
plan not India and the Indian States. Part II of the Act
jnade operatlre jg devoted to prescribing the details of the federal
structure. But this Part was not intended to be given effect to
simultaneously with the introduction of Provincial Autonomy on
1 April 1937* There were many difficulties in doing so. Lengthy
negotiations and discussions were necessary before the requisite
number of Princes could be persuaded to accede to the Federa-
tion. Besides, the scheme had evoked a very hostile reception
in British India, and it could not have been enforced without
ereating a considerable amount of resentment and bitterness.
Meanwhile, England has been involved, since September 1939,
The Yloeroy’s in a war with Germany, and during the continuance
stotoment of the emergency, highly controversial issues have
naturally been shelved. In the middle of October 1939 the
Viceroy announced that the federal scheme has been suspended
indefinitely. He also stated that His Majesty's Government
will, at the end of the war, be prepared to regard the sc heme
as open to modification in the light of Indian vie^s. Consulta-
tion concerning the modifications with representatives of the
different communities, parties and interests in India was also
promised.
The following pages explain, first, the difference between
unitary and federal states, and then go on to describe at length
the relations that have existed between the Central and Pro-
vincial Governments in India from the ^ Begulating Act to the
Act of 19^5 in the unitary framework of the Indian constitution.
Then follows a brief account of the federal structure that has
been defined in the Act of 1935. However, the reader must bear
it in mind that after the conclusion of the world war and
before the scheme actually comes into operation, it may be
materially altered in many particulars, and therefore the account
given here may ultimately prove to be only of academic interest.
XVIII. UNITARY AND FEDERAL STATES
As it is proposed that the existing unitary constitution of India
should be transformed into a federation in the near future, it
would be helpful to make at the outset a brief reference to those
two ’types of constitutions, and to show the main points of
difference between them. Both types are found to be existing
and functioning in contemporary life. For example, England,
France, Italy, Germany and Japan are unitary states; the United
States, Canada, Australia and Soviet Bussia are federations.
§1. THE UNITABY’ STATE
A unitary state is one in which all governmental authority
One supreme is concentrated in one supreme sovereign body.
SoYereign This body is vested with exclusive control over all
matters, whether civil or military, concerning the state, and can
pass laws, take executive ^action, impose taxation and incur
expenditure in respect of any subject. There are no statutory
limits on it^ jurisdiction and its authority, and it is responsible
for making suitable arrangements for the efficient govemancje
of the whole nation.
It would be, of course, physically impossible for such a
Proviuoes centralized organization to exercise direct admini-
may be strati ve powers over a large geographical area,
formed by it The difficulty becomes all the greater in a country
which is huge in expanse and population. Even in a unitary
state, therefore, smaller territorial divisions have to be, and are,
formed for the convenience of administration. A specific sphere
of activity is demarcate'd for them, and within that sphere they
may be allowed considerable liberty of judgement and action.
Still, the constitutional position is quite clear. These units
Tlioy are or provinces or states are merely the creations of
subordinate the sovereign body, and unquestionably subordinate
to its mandates in all respects. They owe their existence,
powers and status entirely to the central government. By assign-
ing some important administrative work to such political divi-
sions, that supreme functionary does not abdicate any of its ulti-
mate authority but only delegates some of its powers, under
certain conditions, to a subordinate agency. It is free to resume
at any moment what it has thus delegated, and is competent to
exercise over-riding jurisdiction over all the actions and policies
of its subordinates.
In short, in a unitary state there are no equals of the central
government even in a limited sense. Its authority is supreme,
and its will is not hampered by the existence of rights aiad pri-
vileges which it must respect and cannot touch.
150
INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
§2. THE FEDERAL STATE
On the other hand, a federation embodies principles which
are fundamentally different, and results from the operation of
certain psychological and sentimental forces. Even in its consti-
tution there does exist a central government which is possessed
of large powers. But it does not enjoy that all pervading absolute
authority which is postulated for it in a unitary state.
There may be living, in the same neighbourhood, a group
CircnmBtanees small but independent national units, each
vhleh lead to having its own language, racial characteristics, and
a federatloii even religious beliefs. Yet, in spite of these differ-
ences, these states may also possess some common heritage, com-
mon affinities, common economic and political interests, and a
oommon culture in the wider sense. They may therefore feel
attracted towards each other for co-operative action by the
impulse of a larger collective development. Or, even if such
an inner similarity and tendency towards fusion are not present,
the danger of a common enemy who threatens all of them may
naturally tend to bring the neignbours together in a closer
alliance.
Such states, while desiring to preserve their individuality,
A kind o-lso be eager to form a union with others for
certain specific purposes. They may be prepared
«onba«t to part with some of their sovereign powers in
order to facilitate the creation of a large composite sovereignty
which would encompass all of them. A sort of political con-
tract, whether actual or implied, may naturally follow from such
a situation. It would provide the foundation and structure of
a federal polity, and define clearly the relations of the con-
tracting paries.
It be realized that the new political master, in the shape
Authority of ^be central government in a federation, is not
the Central an alien imposition, but is created out of them-
Oovemmont selves by the uniting nations and consists entirely
limited their representatives. The jurisdiction and
authority of this superior are not unlimited, but are carefully
demarcated and defined in the constitution itself. "Within that
sphere, it demands and obtains the unswerving loyalty of all
the constituent units. Outside that sphere, it has no power of
control and cannot interfere with the working of the provincial
governments, which enjoy complete freedom of action and policy.
Thus the provinces in a federal constitution have certain
nights inherent rights and privileges guaranteed to them
guarantssd to by the constitution itself. They are inviolable by
ppoTinoos the central authority. These component units do
not exetrcise their power merely in virtue of delegation by a
superior from whom it, is really derived. The distribution of
governmental work between them and the centre is effected by
UNITABY AND FEDERAL STATES 161
the constitution to the framing of which they have been a party
and to which they have voluntarily subscribed.
The federal arrangement is partioulariy suitable to popula-
Unltj in tions which are not essentially homogeneous and
.diisrsitj yet have so many things in common that they
form a distinct nationality in a broad sense, as is the case with
India. It maintains the independence of the different consti-
tuepts and also brings them under the control of a vigorous
central government. Unity without a deadening uniformity,
•diversity* without disruption, free association without suppres-
sion are the chief objectives and the raitons d’etre of the fedwal
union.
XIX. THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT : BEFORE
THE MONTAGU-OHELMSPORD REFORMS
§1. THE CEEATION OF A CENTRALIZED
GOVERNMENT
It has already been stated that in the earlier days of the
Tha Bafalat- history of the East India Company, the Governors
log M of the three factory areas of Madras, Bombay and
Calcutta were politically independent of each other. But they
had no territory to govern and their duties were of a purely
commercial character. After the Company began to drift in-
to politics and war from the middle of the eighteenth century,
a centralized control over its Indian affairs was found to be
necessary. It was provided in 1773 by the Regulating Act which
made the Governor of Bengal the Governor-General of Bengal.
The Governors of Madras and Bd>ibay were subordinated to
this new superior, particularly in respect of their transactions
with Indian rulers and in questions of war and peace. This
is the beginning of the unitary administrative system in India.
However, it was the Act of 1833 that established a rigorous
Ths Act and all-inclusive centralization. The authority of
•f 1838 the Governor-General was made co-extensive with
all the area comprising the British possessions in India. Even
after the Regulating Act, the provinces of Madras and Bombay
were in the enjoyment of legislative power within their res-
pective territorial limits, and also some amount of freedom
in their ordinary internal administration. Both these pri-
vileges were taken away from them by the Act of 1833. In the
words of the Simon Commission, ‘down to 1921 the Governor-
General-in-Council was, inside British India, the supreme autho-
rity in which was concentrated responsibility for every act of
civil as well as military government throughout the whole area'.
This did not mean that the provincial divisions were no longer
Bubordination considered necessary or that they were abolished,
tf the In a country of large distances and population like
Provliielal India, their existence was both essential and in-
GoicmmcBts evitable. They ‘had most important work to do,
for in their hands lay the day-to-day task of Administration,
and not even the remorseless energy of a Curzon could inquire
into and seek to supervise all the countless matters which made
up so burdensome and multifarious a charge. But these provin-
cial governments were virtually in the position of the agents of
the Government of India. The entire government system was,
in theory, one and indivisible. The rigour of a logical applica-
tion of that conception to administrative practice had gradually
THE UNITAEY GOVEBNMENT— I 158^
been mitigated by wide delegation of powers and by customary
abstentions from interference with the agents of administration.
But the principle of the conception was still living and operative,
and it blocked effectively any substantial advance towards th3
development of self-governing institutions/^
It is thus clear that the Indian provinces did not possess any
Ne fedtfal degree of federal inviolability or independence,
•tatas ^ They were entirely subservient to the Central
Government. There was no sphere, however small, which could
be said to. have been reserved for their exclusive jurisdiction nor
were any rights recognized as inhering in them. The old Presi-
dencies of Madras and Bombay had certainly a higher status than
that of the Lieutenant-Governors* and Chief Commissioners'
Provinces which were subsequently created. They had a more
elabohite system of government and even retained some of the
relics of the independence which they had enjoyed before the
Eegulating Act. But these were only minor concessions, which
did not affect the fundamental position that the Govemor-General-
in Council was the unquestioned supreme authority in all matters
over the whole territory of British India. The provinces were
regarded merely as the creations of the Central Government.
The only considerai ion which weighed in fixing their boundaries
w^as administrative convenience. Their number could be re-
duced or increased, their territorial limits altered, and the arrange-
ments of their governance varied and modified, by the Govern-
ment of India if they chose to do so subject of course to the
sanction of the Secretary of State.
It is necessary to understand the relations between the Central
Relations Provincial Governments under these circum-
between the stances in greater detail. As the Montagu-
Central and Chelmsford Eeport has pointed out, the bonds-
Provincial that connected the Government of India with
Governments local Governments were woven of three different
strands, legislative, financial and administrative. Control was
exercised in regard to all these three heads, and it will be con-
venient to describe each one of them separately. The point to
be remembered is the conception of the Government of India
as one indivisible whole, responsible to the parliament of Britain
for the proper discharge of its duties. The financial strand is
obviously the most important; it also detennines to a consider-
able extent the scope of control and supervision in the legislative-
and administrative spheres.
.^2. CENTEAL CONTEOL OVEE PEOVINCIAL
FINANCE
The East India Company was a commercial corporation and
its accounts were maintained on commercial principles. This
* Simon Commission Report, Vol. I, p. 112.
154 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
'Was the foundation for the policy of centralized finance even
aftei^ the commercial character of the East India Company had
'Oentral disappeared and it had definitely assumed political
^eontrol orer responsibility. Pull control over the revenues of
ProYinoial the whole of India was retained by the Central
XI Government in its own hands, in theory at least.
*CeniraUsatioii sources of income and all the amounts
of such income, collected in any part of British India,, were
•credited to the Government of India's treasury. Be venues
from all parts of the country converged into one reservior and
from this reservoir money flowed back in large or small amounts
to serve the diverse needs of the administration, including ex-
penditure of the provinces. It is obvious, therefore, that the
provinces in this instance were merely managing agents for the
Government of India. The sources of taxation, the amount of
i>axation, the manner of collection and the authority for expendi-
ture were all dictated from headquarters. The Provincial Gov-
ernments had simply to do as they were asked. They had no
interest in the collection of taxes. As the executive agents of
iihe Government of India they mechamcally carried out their
superiors’ mandates.
The Government of India distributed money among the
Dlftrlbation of various provinces to enable them" to fulfil the
moooy among obligations delegated to them for the convenience
^the provinoos of administration. The principle of distribution
was not to make the grant proportionate to the amount of in-
come yielded by the province. The needs of the province were
considered, and the grant was fixed at a figure approximately
•commensurate vnth the needs. Such wholesale centralization, in
^ extensive country like India, imposed an extremely heavy bur-
den of financial administration upon the Government of India^
Geijpral Strachey 'pointed out how the distribution of the
public income degenerated into a scramble, and how, very often,
that province which was aggressive and loud in its protestation
got what it wanted and not the one which was more needy but
less vocal. Local economy brought no local advantage, as all
surplus accumulated with the Government of India. Therefore
the incentive to avoid waste was absent. Local growth of income
and larger realization of money from local taxation could not
serve as a means to improve local conditions, as all money collec-
ted, from whatever source and place, was directed to the treasury
of the Government of India. In the absence of any stimulus to
the development of local revenue, the general interest in the
improvement of the public income was reduced to the lowest
level.
After the completion of the conquest of India and with the
end of the Mutiny, the military bias of the adminis-
SEtton: 1870 tration gi;adually disappeared. The financial res-
ponsibilities assumed by the Government of India were extremely
THE UNITABY GOVEBNMENT— I 165
diffictilfc to discharge. The unwieldy centralized system did not
Confer the benefit either of greater economy or of greater efficiency.
It only caused embarrassment to the Government of India and
created just grievances among the provinces. ‘The Provincial
Governments were allowed no discretion in sanctioning fresh
charges. If it became necessary to spend £20 on a road between
two local markets, to rebuild a stable that had tumbled down
or entertain a menial servant on 10«. a month the matter had to
he formally reported for the orders of the Government of India.'
Lord Mayo's Government made the first attempt at decentra-
Lopd Mayo's lization. Large financial power and responsibility
schomo were delegated to the Provincial Governments.
Certain departments like police, jails, education, medical services,
hospitols, sanitation, registration, printing, roads and com-
munications, civil buildings, were given for management to the
provinces on certain conditions. Departmental receipts from
these heads were allowed to the provinces, and in addition a
fixed grant of money totalling altogether Bs. 4,68,87,110 was
annually assigned to them. With this income they were to
cover the expenses of management. Discretion was left to the
provinces to obtain a larger revenue by additional taxation and
better management. Income from the remaining sources and
the administration of the remaining departments was retained
for the Government of India.
It must be clearly understood that this process of decentrali-
No federal zation was not based on any principle of federal
tinanoe finance. It was not intended to invest the pro-
vinces with any degree of financial. independence. The scheme
of provincial devolution as initiated in 1870 was inspired only by
considerations of administrative convenience and facility. The
Central Government weVe not voluntarily abdicating any of their
functions but simply transferring them to subordinate agents in
the interest of division of labour, which led to administrative
efficiency. Even in those subjects, therefore, which were ‘pro-
vincialized’, the Governor-General’s superior control and super-
vision were expressly maintained. However, in spite of its
various defects and shortcomings, the scheme, on the whole,
realized the aim of its author. It helped to bring about greater
harmony between the Central and Provincial Governments. It
allowed greater freedom and scope to the provinces and encour-
aged them to undertake works of provincial utility and benefit.
The next step in the direction of devolution was taken in
1877 1877 in the time of Lord Lytton. To the depart-
ments which were given over to provincial man^ement in 1870,
several new ones were now a^ded. These included excise,
stamps, law and justice, and some other items varying from
province to province. Instead of making any corresponding
addition to the earlier fixed grant for meeting the expenditure,
166 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
]!ev€nues from these departments were allowed to be kept by the
im>vince8. Any surplus above the estimated income was shared
to the extent of half with the Government of India; the latter
^fIso undertook to meet deficits to the same extent if and when
they occurred. This did not amount to conferring powers of
JSkosh taxation upon the provinces but w’as intended to improve
the quality and the economy of the administration. Contracts'
on this basis were made with each province separately, and ‘they
Were to have a duration of five years.
Assam and Burma were backward provinces and were treated
differently. Instead of a fixed allotment, Assam was given a
share of the land revenue of the province. Burma was similarly
given a share of the land revenue and also of the income from
forests, the export duty on rice and the salt tax. The new
principle in the settlement of these two contracts was that, in-
stead of making a fixed assignment of money to make good the
excess of provincial expenditure over provincial income, a share
in the imperial revenues was granted. The principle adopted
here was later on extended to other provinces. Sir J. Strachy
and Lord Lytton were the sponsors of this change.
Lord Bipon and Major Baring introduced further improve-
ments Arrangements with the different pro-
vinces needed co-ordination. The experience of the new arrange-
ment soon began to indicate that, financially, it had not
proved as successful as it was expected to. When the time
came therefore for renewing the settlements of 1877 some im-
portant modifications were introduced. The original lump
grants made since the time of Lord Mayo were abolished.
Instead, all revenues from certain specified heads, like civil
departmental receipts or civil buildings, were made over entirely
to the provinces. Of' the remaining heads, which had been
already transferred to the provinces, forests and registration
were divided almost equally between the two contracting parties
and the deficit that was still left in the provincial budgets was
not made good by the grant of lump sums but by a fixed share
of the land revenue.
The division of Government departments into three groups
OsDtral, dates from this time. Heads like defence, foreign
PtOYlodal ani relatiotns, customs, currency, etc., were purely
Dirided hsads imperial; heads like land revenue, registration
and forests were divided; and some minor heads like civil build-
ings and civil departmental receipts were purely provincial.
The Provincial Governments were relieved of any burden resul-
ting from the occurrence of calamities like war and famine,
unless the calamities were of an exceptionally severe character.
The contracts of 1882 were quinquennial.
From 1884 a necessary minimum balance had to be main-
tained by the Provincial Governments with the Government
THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT— I 157
of India. The latter often usurped the balances accumulated with
1897 great difficulty by the provinces, and this caused
•considerable embitterment and ill-feeling. However settle-
ments were renewed at the end of each five years witnout any
great change of principle. The position in 1897 was as follows.
Generally speaking the Provincial Govermnent retained the
whole of the receipts from the provincial rates, courts of law,
jails, ^police, education, medical and local marine services, minor
irrigation works, certain State railways and major irrigation
works, buildings and roads, stationery, etc. Stamps, assessed
taxes, forests and registration receipts were divided half and
half; of excise and land revenue three quarters were taken by the
Government of India and one quarter was allowed to the pro-
vinces. On the expenditure side, the 4 )rovince 6 had to incur
expenditure on most of these heads and generally had to pay
a share in the cost of collecting. The share was prof)ortional
to their receipts from the various departments.
The settlements being quinquennial, the dread of a revision
1901 at the end of the fifth year was a standing cause
of restlessness. It marred the continuity of provincial admini-
stration. Any contemplation of great projects of development
was utterly impossible. After the cessation of their exchange
trouble, the Government of India were persuaded to reconsider
the question. Lord Curzon's Government therefore in 1904
tried to remove the defects of the existing system. The old
<iivi8ion into imperial, divided, and provincial heads was of
course continued, but the respective shares of the two powders
were revised. Expenditure on purely imperial heads was to be
incurred as before entirely by the Government of India. Ex-
penditure incurred on the divided heads was to be divided
between the provincial and central administration. The settle-
ments were declared to he quasi-permanent and were to be re-
vised only in grossly unjust or extremely difficult circumstances.
The old uncertainty, the danger of appropriation of the pro-
vincial resources by the Government of India and consequent
absence of any incentive to economy now disappeared. A greater
certainty and freedom w ere allowed to the provinces in financial
matters.
Lord Hardinge's Government took the final step in the
1919 development of the system. The quasi-permanent
settlements were declared to be permanent in 1912. It w^as
laid down that the Provincial Governments were not to budget
for a deficit except under abnormal conditions. The Govern-
ment of India curtailed their intervention in the making of
provincial budgets. The unseemly quinquennial conflicts, which
’ punctuated the relations of the Government of India with the
provincial administrations ^p to 1904 and which had practically
ceased after the introduction of the semi-permanent settle-
ments of that year, were now given a decent burial.
168 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
The position, therefore, before the Montford Eeforms can be*
Hie Msltloii summed up thus. Subjects erf all-India importance-
requu^ a uniformity of policy and administra-
Meottord tion like defence, foreign relations, customs, posts
Refopms: and telegraphs, mint, famine relief, railways and
irrigation were declared to be wholly central sub-
jects; income from them, expenditure on them,
and executive control over them vested exclusively in the Gqvem-
ment of India.
The second group of subjects, known as Provincial heads,
ppoiindsl consisted of a few departments, the revenue from
sobjeels which and expenditure on which were wholly the*
concern of the province. All civil departmental receipts and
those from public works departments came under this category.
The administration of the other departments in this group,
which included jails and police, education, medical, printing,
roads and civil buildings, was primarily vested in the provinces;
the Gbvemment of India interfered to enunciate important
principles of policy, or to revise and check actions of the pro-
vincial executive if they were wrong or mischievous.
The last group consisted of what are known as the Divided
DMded heads. In it were included subjects like land re-
sobjeets venue, stamps, excise, income-tax, forests, regi-
stration, irrigation, etc. Eevenues from these sources were
divided in a certain ratio between the Central and Provincial
Oovemments, the ratio of the share of one to the share Of the
other being fixed after a comprehensive deliberation. The ex-
penditure in these departments was also shared; and so was
administrative control over them. The provinces took the
initiative in local management and the Government of India
retained their general supervision and guiding control. As the
Government of India had a share in ^e revenue, they had a
strong motive for interfering even in the details of the adminis-
tration. They exercised a close supervision over land revenue
settlements and over works in which expansion and development
depended upon capital outlay.
It is thus easily intelligible, how, apart from the admini-
strative control directly enjoyed as such by the Government of
India over the Provincial Governments' actions, a good deal of
indirect but very real administrative control followed as an in-
evitable corollary of the then existing financial organization.
The Government of India retained complete control of all
Powers of taxation imposed in British India. It was thought
taxatloii politically inexpedient to allow any large freedom
to the provinces in this matter as long as the provincial admini-
strations were irresponsible bureaucracies. Superior control
from above was the only safeguard sjigainst unjustifiable or mis-
taken actions of these lofilcifids. Hence it was expressly laid
down that no province could* without previous sanction of
THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT— 1 159^
the Governor- General, consider any Bill or measure affecting'
the Government of India's revenues. Even in those resources
which an ingenious Provincial Government might seek as not
coming within the bounds of this inhibiting clause, the Central
Government could exercise its controlling power by what were
known as ‘instructions* to provincial administrations. They
required all projects of law to be approved of by the Secretary
of State. A proposal for provincial taxation would have, there-
fore, to bo referred for sanction to the Government of India,
the Finance Department of which would analyse it carefully.
Even the budgets of Provincial Governments, before their sub-
mission to provincial legislatures, had to be submitted in their
draft form to the Central Government, ;which could introduce
any alterations or additions in them. The subordination in which
the Provincial Governments were held was thus close and the
scope of their action was much limited.
The provinces were never allowed to borrow on their own
Powers of credit in an open»money market. They could not
borrowing pledge their solvency in order to find effective
means of self-expansion and improvement. It was thought un-
wise to concede this power in any measure to any authority
other than that of the Central Government. The market for*
loans was believed to be limited and sensitive, and it was feared
that credit was likely to be impaired by indiscreet ventures.
The Decentralization Commission considered this question and
declined to relax the rigidity of this rule.
Lastly, through the instrumentality of various codes and in-
EzeontiYe structions, such as the Civil Service Regulations,
instructions Civil Accounts Codes, Public Works Codes and the
and codes like, the Central Government's control over the
provinces was immensely strengthened in practice. These
codes imposed definite restraints upon the powers of provincial
administrations to create new appointments or increase
emoluments of the existing ones. Competitive and ruinous
generosity between the provinces had to be stopped. A mass of
regulations affecting recruitment, promotion, leave, foreign ser-
vice, and so on had arisen out of this necessity. The control*
over provincial expenditure from above exercised with such
strictness and rigidity was intended to make good the lack of
effective popular criticism. In the absence of powerful local
legislatures, the necessity and the value of such control were
regarded as above dispute.
It must be emphasized that the process of decentralization
Nosrlnoiple^ initiated by Lord Mayo and developed thereafter
of federalism by his successors was purely a matter of internal
arrangement between the Government of India and the Pro-
vincial Governments. It did not require the sanction of Parlia-
ment and was not enacted by parliamentary legislation. The
ICO INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
fieb^me did not owe^ its origin to the ideals of federalism ; it was
inspired and permitted only by considerations of administrative
convenience and efficiency. The Central Government did not
abandon any of their financial or political powers, but merely
transferred them to subordinate agents in the interests of division
of labour. Their ultimate superiority, however, remained un-
affected and unquestioned.
§3. CENTBAL CONTEOL OVEK PROVINCIAL
LEGISLATION
The power of making regulations was extended to the Presi-
PmliifitoJ dencies by the Charter Act of 1807. However,
^Matiireg not with the gradual tightening up of the control of
central authority, the importance of this power
was gradually diminished. In 1838 all legislative power be^
longing to the Presidencies was taken away, and the Go\emor-
Gener^-in-Council’s laws were made binding upon the whole
of the land, including the provinces. This gave an extensive
jurisdiction to the central law-making authority. The right of
independent legislation was restored to the provinces in 1861,
but the Government of India's legislative authority continued
concurrently to extend to the whole of India as before. In
local matters indeed, freedom began to be allowed to the pro-
vincee to pass their own legislation. Yet in the theory of the
constitution, till the Reforms of 1919, the Legislative Councils
w’ere only enlargements of the executive government for purposes
of law-making. Legislative power residing in them as distinct
from the executive Provincial Governments was not recognized.
The provincial legislatures, therefore, did not possess any
genuine independence.
Subfect to certain restrictions, local legislatures in the pro-
Delegailon of vinces were allowed to make laws for the peace
powers to the and good government of the provinces. The
profioees central legislature could not efficiently cater for
the needs of distant provinces. Therefore it delegated its
function, subject to its superior control, to provincial legislatures.
All-India subjects like customs, public debt, currency, coinage,
posts and telegraphs, defence, central taxes were of course
excluded from the provincial sphere. Local Councils were also
not allowed to amend any Act of Pariiament or to repeal or
alter without previous sanction any Act of the Govemor-
' General's Legislative Council. Previous sanction of the Governor-
General was necessary to consider any law affecting religious
usages of any class of British subjects in India or theu regulation
of patents and copyrights or the relations of the Government with
Princes of Indian States. These restrictions would not appear
to be stringent. Yet in practice they limited the freedom and
-discretion of Provincial Governments to a great extent.
THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT— I 161
As the Montford Report has pointed out, most of the pro-
Hanv laws vincial legislatures were very young institutions
weM Uready and a great part of the field which would have
passed by the been otherwise covered by them had been already
Centr^ filled by the Governor-General's Legislative Coun-
Legislature which of course was the elder body and always
possessed concurrent legislative power for the whole of India.
Comparatively fewer things were therefore left to the discretion
and disposal of the newer bodies. Besides, the necessity and
the desirability of having a uniform policy in important matters
induced the central legislature to take comprehensive action
in them for the country as a whole. Foj instance, the Penal
and Procedure Codes and the Evidence Act; laws for prisons;
laws jfibout marriage, minors, succession; civil laws regulating
-contracts, trusts, transfer of property, easements, arbitration,
otc.; business laws for patents, trade marks, weights and
measures, insurance, insolvency; laws for forests, mines,
factories, wireless, electricty; labour laws about breach of con-
tract, emigration, apprentices, etc.; legislation about public
health, poisons, leprosy, lunacy, epidemics; laws about religious
endowments, charitable societies, plays, cinematographs, motor
vehicles, ancient monuments and treasure troves — on all this
miscellaneous mass, legislation was passed by the Government
of India. Laws were also passed by them on subjects essenti-
ally their own, like military and marine, foreign relations,
currency and finance, customs, tariffs, etc.
Legislation on the subjects in the miscellaneous list given
above could have been undertaken by the provinces. There
are precedents in western countries to show that legislation
in these subjects may not necessarily have the uniformity that
accompanies centralized* control. Still, it was considered that
on the whole such uniformity would conduce to greater national
benefit. The Government of India therefore undertook legisla-
tion themselves and laid down the principles of policy and
administration in all of them. This directly reduced the sQppe
of action and legislation of the Provincial Governments.
Over and above these circumstances, the cumulative effect
Previous
sanction of
the Secretary
*of State and
Oovernor-
«Oeneral
of which was greater control exercised by the
Central over Provincial Governments in matters
of legislation, there was another factor of con-
siderable importance and effect. The previous
sanction of the Government of India and the
Secretary of State was declared necessary for all
projects of provincial legislation before their introduction. Even
'private Bills could be brought under the operation of this exe-
cutive control by the fact that leave for introducing the Bill
had to be given by the Council. As in many of the Councils
ithe Provincial Governments could, if they chose, successfully
11
162 INDIAN ADMINI8TBATI0N
oppose the granting of such permission, the Government of’
India, by executive direction, could compel the Provincial
Government to oppose such a measure. Moreover, in the case
of all private Bills which affected revenues, the sanction of the
Government of India to their introduction was necessary. The
assent of the Governor-General to all provincial legislation after
it had been passed by the Provincial Tjegislatures was also
necessary. The necessity of the previous sanction of^ the
Government of India to the very introduction of legislative pro-
jects effectively curtailed provincial initiative and scope of in-
dependent action. The Decentralization Commission came to-
the conclusion that a substantial measure of legislative devolution i
was necessary in the interest of the administration of subject'-
of local importance.
§4. CENTEAL CONTKOL OVEE PEOVINCLIL
ADMINISTEATIOX
It is not necessary to repeat that the responsibility for the
After the administration of the whole of British India was
Regulafing enunciated first by the Eegulating Act and then,
more comprehensively and emphatically, by the
Act of 1833. The idea of centralization was new, and Warren
Hastings found great difficulty in exacting obedience from the
Governors of Madras and Bombay to the orders of the Gover-
nor-General. For some time after the Eegulating Act, the con-
trol of the central authority over the provinces was more or less
nominal. The aggressive and unwise polie} of the Bombay
and Madras Governments involved the Governor-General in
pohtical and financial difficulties. The geographical isolation of
the provinces, which were separated from the seat of the central
authority by a wedge of independent territory, helped in the
attenuation of the power of the Central Government over them.
It was only when the task of conquest was completed and conti-
guous boundaries connected the central authority's dominion
with that of the provinces that the latter came under effective
central control. Lord Wellesley declared that ‘all measures
relating to the general defence and protection of India, to the
levying of war or making of peace, to the general administration
of revenue of all Presidencies, and, finally, to every point affecting
the general interests, whether civil, military or political, of the
Coilipany's possessions, form the exclusive duties arising out of
the superintending powers of the Govemor-General-in-Councir.
After 1833, centralization became complete. It was of course
After 1838 indispensable that for conducting the daily routine
of administration in such a vast country, the Central Govern-
ment should place certain powers in the hands of the local
Governments, and to sUow them to function in their own way*
No single administration could support the Atlantean load — to
THE UNITARY GOVEENMENT—I 16S
‘use the graphic expression of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report —
of the government of a huge and newly-conquered dominion.
But it was clearly laid down that the Governor-General should
keep himself fully infonned about the doings of the subordinate
Governments and correct them if necessary. As early as 1834
the Court of Directors wrote to Lord William Bentinck, ‘with res-
pect to that portion of government which you fully confide to
the local authorities, it will be your duty always to have before
you evidence sufficient to enable you to judge if the course of
things in ‘general is good, and to pay such vigilant attention to
that evidence as will ensure your prompt interposition whenever
anything occurs which demands it*- All the newly acquired
provinces were supposed to come under the direct authority of
the Governor-General-in-Council, and ke exercised it by dele-
gating the necessary functions to subordinate officials like
Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners.
In the administration of subjects which were of all-India
Supervising importance, and control over which was kept
powers entirely in the hands of the Central Government
— defence, the States, currency and coinage, tariff and customs,,
post and telegraph, railways, etc., — there was no question of the
provinces coming into tte administrative picture at all. But
even in respect of those subjects in which authority was delegated
to and shared with the provinces, and in which primarily the
local Governments W’ere intended to bear the burden of admini-
stration, the Government of India kept on actively functioning.
They did not, indeed, act directly or adopt measures on their
own initiative. But their power was effectively wielded as a
supervising and appellate authority. Their departments exer-
cised constant control over the day-to-day operations of similar-
departments functioning in the provincial areas.
For example the Home Department of the Govern^^nt of
Method of India supervised the administration in the provin-
control ces in subjects of law and justice, police, jails,
internal politics, medical services, the Indian Civil Service in
the provinces, etc. The Revenue Member supervised similar
administration in the subjects of land revenue, surveys, forests,
agriculture, etc., and the Finance Member that in opium, stamps,
income-tax, etc. The Education Member supervised education,
local self-government, sanitation, etc. In all these departments
the primary jurisdiction belonged to the Provincial Government,
but the Government of India could interfere, either on their own
initiative or in their appellate capacity. The degree of this
interference and control would obviously vary with the circum-
stances of each case.
In many respects India is one single undivided country and
in these respects a uniformity of administration was extremely
desirable. In questions like the development of trade, industi^^
164 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
and science, the tendency was towards the formulation of a uni-
Unlforai policy, even a uniform administration. In
aetton cases like these the tendency to concentration
Jiooeuary was inevitable. It helped to combat any unhealthy
divergence in the conditions of the various provinces. It
avoided dissipation of energy and money in dispersed efforts
that could not in fact succeed alone. It must also be remember-
ed that the main Services which carried out the mandate of the
Provincial Governments were recruited by the Secretary of State,
and their terms of service were fixed by him. So that on many
<luostion8 concerning them the Provincial Governments could
not interfere at all.
There was one more force which indirectly helped the process
Central of centralization The Government of India
control as a thought it necessary to exercise control over the
corrsetiTe provinces from above, to give them the benelil
that comes from detached judgement of a problem of admini-
stration. The authority on the spot, with its excessive attention
to detail and its saturation in the colour of its immediate sur-
roundings, may not always be able to form a proper judgement
and take a bold stand. The Government of India, standing
apart from and above mere details, could make a comprehensive
survey of the whole problem and enunciate and enforce fresh
principles. Their superior authority was believed to prove a
beneficial corrective to the narrow-visioned concentration on de-
tail which the Montagu-Chelmsford Report pointed out as being
the penalty of absorption in the task of day-to-day administration.
The responsibility Of the Secretary of State to Parliament
and the consciousness that to that body they were accountable
for the peace and good government of the whole land, impelled
the Government of India to exercise close supervisory control
over the provinces and to maintain a high standard of public and
personal morals. In the absence of popular control, their control
from above had a salutary restraining effect.
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report has pointed out that the
Complete administrative control exercised by the Govem-
eentralisailon ment of India over the provinces was too general
and extensive to admit of any analysis. They ‘ have regarded
themselves in the past as distinctly charged with the duty of
framing policy and inspiring reforms for the whole country '.
Their legal supremacy in all matters connected with provincial
administration was clearly defined in a section of the Act of 1915
which the Simon Commission has quoted. * Every local govern-
ment shall obey the orders of the Govemor-General-in-Council,
and keep him constantly and diligently informed of its proceed-
ings and of all matters which ought, in its opinion, to be reported
to him, or as to which «he requires information, and is under his
superintendence, direction and control in all matters relating to
THE UNITAEY GOVERNMENT-I 165
the government of its province.’ It is no wonder that with such
wholesale and absolute powers conferred upon the Central
Government, the Indian constitutional framework became
entirely unitary in character
XX. THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT: AFTER
THE MONTAGU-CHELMSPORD REFORMS
§1. SEPAEATION OF CENTRAL AND
PROVINCIAL SPHERES
The authors of the Montagu-Chelnisfurd Report regarded
Introduction of the provinces as the proper domain for constitu-
rcBponsibility tional experiments. The first steps in the intro-
duction of responsibility were to be taken in them, and a new
standpoint altogether was now introduced in the considera-
tion of the question. Mr Montagu visualized the provinces as
autonomous self-governing principalities, united by and under
a strong Central Government. Responsibility in the provincial
administration was incompatible with bureaucratic control from
above. The largest possible measure of independence in legisla-
tion, administration and finance had to be conceded to the
provinces in the inevitable logic of this new angle of vision. This
independence and freedom is connoted in the now familiar
expression ‘ provincial autonomy \ Indeed there was no idea of
oreating a federation; it was expressly disavowed. However, a
large measure of liberty was now to be extended to the provinces,
not only for the administrative convenience of the Government
of India, but in response to the urgent call for such a liberty in
the interests of an all-sided provincial development and the
growth of self-governing institutions.
Endeavours were therefore made, by framing Devolution
Rules, to demarcate the legislative sphere of the Government
of India from that of the provinces. As far as possible, each
was to be made independent of the other. Their respective
spheres of action were to be clearly distinguished. The old group
of divided heads, which had interlocked their mutual interests,
their dual control, and their joint responsibility, and had en-
gendered a good deal of bitterness and ill-feeling, were now to
be abolished. In short, the two jurisdictions were to be main-
tained as distinct as possible. The central and provincial bu-
dgets were to be separated, the former recording only direct
transactions of the Government of India. The new view^point
inclined in the direction of the utmost relaxation of the control
of the Government of India over the provinces in all provincial
matters and in the acknowledgement of the provinces as the only
proper centres for effective popular development.
With the idea of giving effect to this new principle, inquiries
The eeiitpal were instituted to explore methods for the bifur-
and proYineial cation of central and provincial functions. As a
tots result of* the inquiry and on a discussion of the
general bearings of the question, it was found possible to prepare
THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT— II 167
two separate lists of administrative subjects, and to hand over
one to the Central and one to the Provincial Governments.
As far as possible, the lists were to be iputually exclusive. There
was to be the least possibility for the two authorities to come
into conflict on common ground. The principle of division was
of course the most obvious one, namely the necessity of unity
of control and uniformity of policy in central subjects on the one
hand, and the desirability of provincial and local freedom on
the other hand.
Questions of all-India importance, like defence and foreign
relations of India, or those like customs, posts, telegraphs and
(‘urrency, in which a uniformity of principle and a sameness of
administrative system are of paramount importance, would
iiaturfeilly lie within the Central Government’s sphere. On the
other hand, in questions like education and local self-government,
or agriculture, diversity of management might be allowed — ^nay,
might be necessary — on account of the great diversity in local
conditions. Such departments might best be left to be entirely
administered by local administrations. After the Government
of India Act of 1919, the old divided heads were abolished.
Thus only two distinct lists now remained, the central and
Chief heads provincial. The central subjects comprised, among
in the others, the following departments: defence; exter-
two lists iial relations; relations with Indian States; rail-
ways, shipping and navigation; posts and telegraphs; customs;
cotton excise duty; salt tax; income-tax; currency and coinage;
public debt of India; opium; copyright; emigration and immig-
ration; archaeology; ecclesiastical; the Public Services Commis-
sion; census and statistics, etc. The important subjects in the
provincial list were education, local self-government, medical
administration, public • health and sanitation, irrigation, land
revenue, famine relief, agriculture, co-operation, forests, excise,
industries, police and justice, w^eights and measures, etc.
The compilation of these separate lists was followed by con-
sideration of the possibility of relaxation of administrative,
legislative and financial control over the provinces. On each
of these points definite recommendations were made and were
iiccepted as matters of constitutional practice, if not as the letter
of the law.
§2. RELAXATION OF FINANCIAL CONTROL
(rival improvements were made in the financial powers c!
New souroei the Provincial Governments under the new
«f income scheme. In the first place, the central and
provincial budgets were entirely separated and the former em-
braced only the direct transactions of the Government of India.
Definite sources of income w^ere allocated to the provincial
jidministrations. Receipts from provincial subjects, a list of
198 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
which has been already given, a share in the growth of the revenue
from income-tax collected in the provinces, proceeds of new
taxation which the Provjncial Governments might impose or of
the loans which they might float, balances standing to the credit
of the provinces at the time when the Government of India Act
came into force, were some of these allocated sources.
The power of borrowing, which had never been enjoyed by
Power of the provinces before, was now conferred iipon
borrowliig them. Loans might be incurred to meet capital
expenditure on any work of a material character, or a project of
lasting public utility, if such an expenditure could not be met
out of current revenues. They might be incurred for irrigation
purposes or for maintaining famine relief works or for the
repayment or consolidation of earlier loans. It was laid down
that the previous sanction of the Govemor-General-in-Council
for all loans floated in India, and of the Secretary of State for
all loans floated in England, was necessary. These authorities
might fix the amount of the loan and the conditions on which it
was borrowed.
The power of taxation, which in pre-Eefonns days, was
Power of exclusively possessed by the Government of India
tozatlon was now delegated to the provinces. They could
now impose taxation without the previous sanction of the
Governor-General under the following heads: a tax on land put
to uses other than agricultural; a tax on succession; a tax on
gambling; a tax on advertisements; a tax on amusements; a
tax on any specified luxury; a registration fee; and a stamp
duty. The Presidency of Bombay exercised this power and
inti^uced the entertainments tax and enhanced the Court fees.
However, certain restrictions and limitations still continued
Prsflndal, to be exercised over provincial expenditure. The
oontribotiolis most important of these was the newly created
obligation of what are known as provincial contributions. In
the new dispensation of decentralized finance and of a complete
separation of imperial from provincial heads, it was found that
the Central Government could not be self-sufficient. The
resources handed over to it as its own did not suffice for its
expenditure. The only suitable and simple remedy to make up
its deficit was to ask the provinces to make compulsory annual
payments, which would be put as a first charge upon their
revenues. The total amount of such a deficit was estimated to
be ten crores. This sum was distributed among the provinces
according to their capacity as judged from various standpoints.
It was an extremely difficult and intricate task and a special
committee under the presidency of Lord Meston made definite
recommendations about the distribution. They recommended
two schedules. One prbvided for a transitional period of seven
years and suggested definite sums to be collected from every
THE UNITABY GOVEBNMENT— li 16»
province in each of the seven years. This period was regarded
as necessary for equalizing provincial conditions and correcting
diversity. The second schedule gave the permanent and stand-
ard ratio at which each province should be taxed in order to-
wipe out the central deficit. The details are given below.
PER CENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEFICIT IN SEVEN CONSECUTIVE
YEARS BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST YEAR OF CONTRIBUTION
. (rounded off TO EVEN HALVES)
In the financial year 1921-2 contributions were to be paid
to the Govemor-Qeneral-in-Council by the local Governments
mentioned below according to the following scale:
Name of provinca
Madras
Bombay
Bengal
United Provinces
Punjab
Burma
Central Provinces and Berar
Assam
Contribution (in lakhs of rupees)
348
66
63
240
175
64
22
15
Every province complained against inequity of the Meston
Their Award, and officials and non-officials condemned
abolition with equal severity the unwisdom of the contri-
butions. The Beforms Inquiry Committee also wrote against
the arrangements. A revision of the Meston Settlement, if not
its complete abolition, was unanimously and persistently
demanded by both official and non-official opinion in the pro-
vinces of India. Ultimately, Sir Basil Blackett, Finance Mem-
ber, announced in his budget speech for 1928-9 * the complete
and final remission of provincial contributions To the extent
of this remission a larger margin was left to the provinces out
170 INDIAN ADMINISTEAl'ION
of ’which expenditure on nation-building departments could be
incurred.
The great defect of the distribution of departments between
Defeet of the Central and Provincial Governments introduced
the Montford by the Montford Reforms was that it allotted to
the centre all the elastic and expanding sources of
income and left to the provinces items of taxation which were
both inelastic and unpopular. The exchequer of industrially
and commercially advanced provinces could not benefit by the
growth of their income because income-tax and customs were
central subjects. On the other hand, the Indian public had
long been demanding a reduction in land revenue, and the adop-
tion of a policy of total prohibition which would result in an
extinction of the excise revenue. And these very sources of
income were made available to popular Ministers for carrying
out their programmes of nation-building activity.
But it must be said to the credit of the Montford plan that
Merit of it constituted a definite advance, in practice if not
the Montford in law, towards a federal system. It endowed
the provinces with a distinct if not inviolable
personality, and gave them considerable independeiv^e in finan-
cial matters. The Act of 1919 did not indeed itself prescribe
the allocation of central and provincial subjects, but left it to
be done by Buies made under the Act. But, as the Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee which considered the '^ite Paper of 1933
has stated, though the separation of revenues then effected was,
in legal form, merely an act of statutory devolution which could
be varied by the Government of India and Parliament at
any time, nevertheless, from the practical point of view, a federal
system of finance can be said to have come into existence after
the Montford Reforms. It has been further modified and legally
incorporated as an integral part of the constitutional structure
created by the Act of 1935.
§3. RELAXATION OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
Steps were taken also in the direction of legislative devolu-
PreviouB tion. As has been already noted, the liberty of
sanotion legislation that was gi;anted to the provinces in
and Yeto earlier years could not be utilised to the fullest
extent because the field which would have legitimately fallen to
Provincial Governments had been already covered by imperial
legislation. After the Montford Reforms, it was enunciated that
the previous sanction of the Governor-General was not necessary
for legislation in purely provincial subjects. However, (i) for all
legislation which aimed at repealing or modifying laws passed
^fore IMl, unless otherwise declared by the Governor-General-
ixj-Council; (ii) for all Ibgislation which was likely to affect cent-
red subjects or foreign relations or the discipline of His Majesty's
THE UNITARY GOVERNMENT— 11 171
military, naval or air forces; and (iii) for all legislation upon
provincial subjects which were in whole or part subject to Indian
legislation, the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-
Council was made obligatory. Besides, copies of all Acts which
received the Governors* assent had to be sent to the Governor-
General for his assent, and until that was given, an Act did not
get legal validity. An Act of the provincial legislature assented
to . both by the Governor and the Governor-General could be
reserved for the assent of His Majesty-in-Council. In such cases
tlie Act did not have validity until His Majesty's assent had
been notified by the Governor-General.
The minority report of the Reforms Inquiry Committee
CritioiBm suggested measures for the enlargement of legis-
of prev^us lative devolution. The poWer of veto which rested
sanction with the Gk)vernor-General was justified as cons-
titutionally indispensable. It exists in all responsible systems
of Government and is very sparingly used. The obligation of
previous sanction was, however, another matter. The area of
the application of this restricting clause should be as much
<;ircumscribed as possible. Liberty ought to be allowed to the
provinces to legislate without interference on all matters which
are strictly provincial but on which laws have been already
passed by the central legislature. The minority recommended
that the spheres of action in regard to legislation of the Central
and Provincial Govemmjfents should be clearly defined as is done
in Canada or Australia. Following further the Canadian model,
the residuary power should be left with the central legislature.
The majority report of the Reforms Inquuy Committee also
recommended that the existing stringency of control of the
Central Government over provincial legislation, arising out of
the provision for previous sanction, be modified by changing
the rules.
§3. RELAXATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
The Simon Commission has described how certain provincial
Central matters were made subject to central legislation
legislation for and how they covered a wide category of provin-
Provincial cial activities. The borrowing and taxing powers
matters local self-governing bodies, factories, labour
questions, infectious diseases of men, cattle and plants, stand-
ards of weights and measures, were subjects which were dealt
with more by the central than by the provincial legislatures. A
new Indian .Factories Act, a Trade Union Act and a Workmen’s
Compensation Act were passed by the central legislature for the
whole country, while their administration and enforcement were
wholly provincial. This device has enabled the Central Govern-
ment to secure co-ordinating power in legislative matters, and
they further strengthened it by tours, conferences and exchange
of communications.
172 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Begarding the relaxation of administrative control, it waa
pointed out that, after the introduction of partial responsibility
in provincial administrations, they would be naturally divided
into two parts, one bureaucratic and the other popular. In the
former part, they would function as agents of the superior central
administration. In the latter part they would have to be amen-
able to the Legislature’s will.
It was laid down that in this popular side of provincial
In Transferred administration, that is in those subjects which
Subjeoto were transferred to the popularly elected •ministers,
the Central Government should not ordinarily interfere. Even
on occasions when it was felt that the steps contemplated by
the ministers were likely to prove injudicious and harmful, the
Central Government was enjoined to try persuasion only and to
allow the liberty of committing mistakes as the best method of
learning wisdom. In all such matters, therefore, interference
from above was strictly limited to those extreme and extra-
ordinary circumstances in which the interests of the whole of
India were jeopardized or conflicts arose between province and
province. The Qt>vemment of India had not abdicated their
responsibility for the peace, order and good government of the
land. There was therefore no legal restraint upon their pow ers
of interference even in the self-governing half of the provincial
administrations. These powers were mostly used to bring about
a co-ordination between the policies and activities of different
provinces, for pooling their experience or initiating a joint policy.
Conferences of Ministers and the establishment of bodies like
the Imperial Council of’ Agricultural Besearch are instances in
point.
A slightly varying convention was recommended for the
In Resenretf bureaucratic half of the Provincial Governments,
SnbjMif doing the agency work for the Government of
India. The departments represented by this portion were
known as Beserved. Here no transference of control and
management from an irresponsible executive to a body of res-
ponsible ministers had taken place. It w^as therefore thought
consistent with constitutional theory that the only safeguard
against the vagaries of an irremovable executive would be its
subordination to a superior power. This latter was represented
by the Government of India and therefore they retained in the
reserved half a greater power of interference than in the trans-
ferred half. The Simon Commission has stated that the control
of the Centre over the ofBcial part of a Provincial Government
was exercised most fully and constantly in the sphere of Law
and Order. This was done through the Central Home Depart-
ment, which was charged with general responsibility for internal
affairs.
All the same, the fact that provincial legislatures were greatly
enlarged, the fact that franchise for them was kept fairly lowv
THE UNITAKY GOVERNMENT— II 178
^he fact that these very legislatures had been thought fit to
■enjoy the rights and privileges of political responsibility, had
When the tended to give them a unique importance,
legislature As the ultimate aim of British policy was
and exeoutlYe avowedly the full development cf responsible
institutions, it was recommended that the inter-
ference of the Government of India even in the Reserved half
of .prov'Mcial administration should be restricted only to cases
of unixiipeachable necessity. Particularly when the Eicecutive
and the Legislature in a province were unanimous in their
opinion on a certain problem, the Central Government's veto
should not be ordinarily exercised at all. Thus a larger
measure of liberty was allowed to the provinces, if not by an
alteralgon of the letter of the law, by ^e institution of sound
constitutional conventions.
After the Montford Reforms, therefore, the relations of the
Central to the Provincial Governments were con-
beginning of siderably altered. The grant of greater autonomy
proTinelal to the provinces necessarily meant a diminished
autonomy control from the top. A clear demarcation of the
spheres of their activity and a definite allocation of legislative,
administrative and financial responsibility to the provinces
were deliberate steps in the direction of their emancipation
from unnecessary and inconvenient restrainte imposed upon
them by the central authority. Numbers of such restrictions
continued, indeed, to exist even after the Reforms. Attempts
were made and agitation was carried on to remove them. The
importance of the Act of 1919, however, consisted in the definite
acceptance of the principle of provincial freedom and independ-
ence in order to secure a proper and all-sided development in an
extensive and diversified, country like India.
XXL EEASONS FOR MAKING INDIA
A FEDERAL STATE
There seems to be a general consensus of opinion both among
Federal Indian and British politicians that the proper form
prindple of government for a country like India is a feddra-
generally tion. It is true that the particular fedej:^! scheme
accepted which has been formulated by the Act of 193o
has evoked fierce attacks and criticism from almost aU political
f iarties in India and has been rejected by them. Yet even
eaders of the Indian National Congress have made it clear
that their opposition is not directed to the federal principle as
such. Some of them have advocated its positive adoption. It
is therefore necessary to refer to the special circumstances which
make it inevitable, in the view of many responsible persons, tha<
a new type of constitutional framework should be created for
India.
§1. THE SIZE AND VARIETY OF THE COUNTRY
The first consideration is the immense territorial extent ol
Immense area country. India has been described as a sub
of the ^ continent, and its area is practically equah to the
country whole of Europe without Russia. The government
of such a vast geographical expanse by a single unified authoritv
would present many difficulties, even if it is assumed that
its inhabitants are thoroughly homogeneous in point of race,
language and religion. A highly centralized government
operating for such ah extensive region might prove to be
at once inadequate and excessive from the point of view of the
needs of its provinces. Distance would make it difficult to esta-
blish continuous personal contact between the rulers and the
ruled. In short, the task of administration might prove to be
too unwieldy for the machine set up to carry it through.
India is not only a country of continental dimensions but is
ItBdiYcrBe extremely varied in the composition of it^,
population population. Its huge area presents striking varia-
and other tions of cultural and economic development, li
conditions abounds in numerous races, speaking different
languages and professing different religions. There are Hindus,
Muslims, Parsees, Christians, etc., and also the Bengalis, Hindis,
Punjabis, Gujeratis, Marathas, Canarese, Telugus, Tamils, etc.,
the religious and provincial divisions not being mutually exclu-
sive. Each one of these units has a distinctive group conscious-
ness, distinctive traditipns and ambitions. The Indian peopL
as a whole do not possess that inner affinity and coherence which
are contributed by a common language, a common race and a
MAKING INDIA A PEDEBAL STATE 175-
tJomrnOn religion. On the other hand, many European countries
are compact racial and linguistic units and some of them are
also very small in size.
It must be further remembered that India is a land of great
Its tvofold antiquity. Its history has left an impressive
political variety of legacies to modem times. This ancient
dliUion country has witnessed the rise and fall of many
ernpires and the changing vicissitudes of fortune of many per^
BonaUties and peoples. Such an eventful existence has naturally
tended to .produce many permutations and combinations of poli-
tical arrangement. The British conquest of India has, for in-
stance, resulted in a new division which is represented by two
bold colours on the Indian map: the red depicts what are known
as the ^British Indian Provinces and the yellow depicts what are
known as the Indian States. The respective status of these two
units has to be taken into account when the future constitution
of India is under consideration.
§2 THE INDIAN STATES
The ancestors of the present rulers of most of the Indian
Their origin Stat^^s were either independent kings or powerful
and successful ministers, administrators or generals. In the
political cyclone that swept over the country during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many such potentates
perished. Those who believed in the wisdom of bowing to the
storm could survive the great upheaval, but with lessened dig-
nity and stature. They submitted to the conqueror, and were
permitted to continue a diminutive existence on condition that
their loyalty was unequivocally transferred to the new masters.
There are in all about 600 such States, covering a total area
of about 7,00,000 square miles and with a population of nearly
80 millions. Some are very small with an income of only a few
thousand rupees a year. Others like Hyderabad, Baroda, My-
sore, Kashmir, Gwalior and Travancore are as big as some of
the independent countries of Europe.
The constitutional position of these States is rather peculiar.
Their They have lost their supreme sovereignty. Therf-
ConstitutioMl is no international recognition of their independ-
position ^ ence. Their defence and external relations are
entirely in the hands of the suzerain. On the other hand,
in purely internal matters, the more important Slates are in
full enjoyment of all the authority that is associated with
government, while the powers enjoyed by others are more rest-
ricted. Even in this sphere, the Paramount Power can and
does interfere to prevent a State from falling into administrative
disordeiv or financial chaos, but such interference is infrequent
though it is never ineffective.
The control of the Crown over the Indian States is exercised
176 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
by and through its representatives, the Viceroy and the Govern-^
Chmgelnihe ment of India. The latter has been entirely
ehanSter bureaucratic in form and concept till now. But
«ttlie the political advance of British India necessarily
implies an important change. The purely
inoia bureaucratic system will ultimately be trans-
formed into a government of the responsible type. Under such
changed conditions, other things remaining the same, the
Crown’s control over the Indian States would automatically pass
into the bands of the Indian legislature.
Such a transition would be natural. Jt does not embody any
nothing manifest impropriety or injustice. The East
nntowapdin India Company was not a sovereign body. It
the change signed treaties and engagements with Indian
rulers, directly or by implication, on behalf of the Crown. The
succe^rs of both the contracting parties are entitled to claim
all that had belonged to their predecessors. It is on the strength
and in the exercise of that claim that the present rulers of Indian
States are enjoying their patrimony of power, prestige and
privilege.
The Government of India became successors and legal heirs
The eonetita- to the East India Company. If they inherited all
lional logic its liabilities they were also entitled to inherit all
its assets. As the agents of the Crowm, they have been exer-
cising, when necessary, superior control over the Indian States.
They ought to be entitled to do so in the future also, irrespective
of any alteration in their own status. The Government of
India continues to be the Government of India, whether it is
composed of an alien bureaucracy or of a popular Indian demo-
eracy. A transition towards the latter status is in itself no
justification for depriving that body of its inherited powers.
Howe^r, the rulers of the States hhve been looking at the
The States problem in a different light. Their attitude be-
Semand trays distrust of a Government of India which may
'Safeguards be formed and conducted on democratic principles.
They seem to be afraid of its possible encroachments on their
internal autonomy, and insist on being provided with ample
safeguards to remove that danger. It is their view that the
special prerogatives and privileges of their order mu^ be held
io be sacrosanct and inviolable under all conditions. They
must not be made even remotely liable to modification or sub-
traction by a popular Indian Government.
8uch an opinion is based on the concept that the treaties,
'ngulflesDee engagements and sanads existing between the
••fhpsaiiss Indian States and the Paramount Power have a
iuidsanads -^^ide significance. On the one hand, they enun-
ciate the unconditional loyalty and subordination of the States
to the British Crown. On the other hand, they also convey the
•solemn assurance given by the British Crown that as long as the
MAIQNG INDIA A FEDERAL STATE 177
States continue to be loyal to the overlord, their rights and
internal sovereignty will be respected and preserved intact. The
political advance of India as a whole or of British India only
must not diminish the strength of that vital guarantee.
The rulens of Indian States are therefore opposed to joining
Thesftatos the Indian Federation unless they feel confident
are autocraeiee that their present independence will be maintained
in ‘an its fulness in the federal arrangement. They are averse
to particip.aiing or acquiescing in India's political freedom except
on those terms. It must be remembered that most of the
Indian States are, in their internal affairs, undiluted autocracies.
They are under the personal government of rulers whose autho-
rity is not hampered by any effective constitutional restraint.
The subjects of States have no decisive voice in their adminis-
tration. They cannot vote taxes or regulate expenditure or
control the executive and the legislative machine.
This gives rise to a situation which is both anomalous and
An anomalous perplexing. The absolute rulers of the States
situation seem to prefer the superior control of a foreign
bureaucracy to the domination of an Indian democracy. An
assurance of their internal sovereignty by the British Crown
and Parliament may produce a strange result. It may serve as
a bulwark against any agitation for popular rights and liberties
inside the States. It may help, ironically enough, in streng-
thening and perpetuating a form of government which is essen-
tially feudal in its concept and undemocratic in its structure,
end which is being deliberately banished from British India.
§3. THE BRITISH INDIAN PROVINCES
The Bril^ish Indian Provinces represent that part of the Indian
Strong unitary dominion which was not only conquered but an-
gOTornment nexed by the British power. It wns placed under
the direct rule of British officers. The Regulating Act, and
more particularly the Acts of 1833 and 1858, established in
British India a highly centralized unitary government. All
civil and military authority was concentrated in its hands. Pro-
vinces had indeed to be formed and Governments established
in them. But all of them derived their power from the Central
Government and only performed such functions as were delegated
to them by that authority.
Decentralization was begun by Lord Mayo in 1870 and it
Bacentra- reached a fairly high stage in the separation of
lixation central and provincial subjects in the Montford
Reforms. But even that scheme did not confer a new status
upon the provinces. The Government of India were neither
required nor permitted to abandon any of their final respon-
sibilities. Transfer of power by and from them was merely
devolution and delegation. It did not create co ordinate entities
12
178 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
but only subordinate agencies in the shape of provincial author!-
ties.
Constitutionally, the British Indian Provinces or British In^a
Control of are subject to the final authority of the British
parliament Parliament which can act through its agent, the
Secretary of State for India, The form of their governments^
the structure of their executive, legislature and judicature,
are prescribed by Parliamentary Acts. Even the daily routine
of their administration was under the general control and
supervision of the Secretary of State till the introduction of
Provincial Autonomy in 1937. It is the British Parliament
which determines the nature of the Government that shall be
established to function in British India. On the other hand,
the rulers of Indian States are immune from this kind of inter-
ference and control, because their relations with the sovereign
power are determined by treaties, charters and sanads. Parlia-
ment cannot pass Acts bearing upon their internal affairs, nor
can it dictate the framework of their administrative system.
§4. THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF INDIA
Thus there are two constituents which make up political
Two distinct India today. One is the group of Indian States,
entities the rulers of which are exercising extensive rights
of internal sovereignty. They would have to sacrifice a portion
of this sovereignty in order to join an All-India Federation.
Secondly, there are the efficiently organized British Indian
Provinces whose powers are theoretically wholly derivative, and
therefore liable to be modified, reduced or withdrawn ‘by the
Central Government, They have not to part with anything
for the sake of the Federation because they possess nothing.
On the othjer hand, by being incorporated into it, they will
gain an authority and a status which they have never
enjoyed.
It is generally acknowledged that behind all the racial, lin-
Elsmsnts guistic, religious and political divergence that is
of unit j presented by the Indian panorama, there is an in-
herent oneness, a fundamental unity. GeographicalJy, India
has been a distinctive coherent whole from historical times and
that in itself is a great uniting factor. Politically, it has lived
at intervals under the unifying influence of a single imperial
authority. Its economic problems, particularly in modem days,
have a range which extends to the whole land, and demand
a solution which is conceived on a national basis. Above all,
among very large portions of its population there has existed
such a close affinity in intellectual and emotional outlook, in
cultural development and spiritual allegiance, that they feel
themselves to have been made in the same basic mould and io
belong to the same family.
MAKING INDLA A FBDEEAL STATE
179*
The Indian States cannot, therefore, be ignored in the evolu-
The States responsible government for India. They
are not cannot be permanently set aside. Though in a
foDdamentallj separate category of their own, they are part and
different parcel of the same motherland. Between them
and British India there is a complete identity of interests, and
also of race, language, culture and historical traditions. Their
diMciilties and their problems, both in times of peace and in
times of war, are common. It is merely an accident, however
important, that certain groups of Indians, occupying certain
portions of Indian territory, live under a ijifferent constitutional
arrangement. The cleavage that is thus created between peo-
ple who are organically one in all respects is quite artificial and
has no correspondence to the fundamental reality.
At the first Bound Table Conference in London, several
Opinion of prominent Princes proudly declared that they were
the prinees Indians first and Princes afterwards. Nor are the
subjects of Indian States in any sense different from their
neighbours and brethren in British India. The Indian nation,
in the larger sense, must be considered to be one and indivisible,
whatever may be ihe nature and the degree of the autonomy
conferred upon its units. British India and Indian India are
two parts of the same entity.
Those who frame a constitution for India have to take into
Adoption consideration these peculiarities. The Indian state
of the ought to be an expression of Indian life. There
federal ideal must be diversity in it and also a fundamental
unity. The form of the Indian government must embody and
be consistent with that contradictory dualism. It should faci-
litate the growth of the individual component units and also of
the whole nation. Many Indian and British statesmen feel
that this ideal can be best achieved by a federal constitution.
It can secure to the provinces all the necessary freedom to
develop in their own way and to govern themselves, and also
provide a strong central government to guard and advance the
interests of all.
§5. OBSTACLES TO AN INDIAN FEDERATION
A great obstacle to the introduction of the federal system for
No compnl- i'tie whole of India is the constitutional status of
Bion for*^ the Indian States. They cannot be compelled to
States part with even a fraction of their sovereignty by
Parliamentary enactment. That sacrifice can only be spon-
taneous and voluntary. Till a few years ago, it was not expected
that many Indian Princes could be persuaded to merge some
aspects of their individuality in the larger Indian whole. How-
ever, there was an agreeable surprise at the first Round Table
Conference in London. The Princes who were present at that
180 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
conference gave their enthusiastic support to the federal prin-
ciple. They even declared their willingness to accept a
constitutional scheme which is fundamentally based on that
ideal. Yet the actual terms on which they would be prepared
to join the Federation have been the subject of a long contro-
versy, and no satisfactory agreement has been reached till now.
A lesser and a purely theoretical objection was envisaged by
A themtieal constitutional purists. -Writers on political scietice
obJeeUoii have described one characteristic feature of a
federation. It is formed, they say, as the result of a deliberate
combination of states which are sovereign. These states must
choose to sacrifice their independence in the cause of a new
corporate existence. It therefore seems to follow that where
there are no independent sovereign states pre-existing, a federa-
tion cannot be brought into being. For instance, Mr Montagu
expressed the view tibat the truly federal element cannot enter
into Indian polity. * There is no element of pact. The govern-
ment of the country is one; the Local Governments are literally
the agents of the Government of India. The last chance of
making a federation of British India was in 1774 when Bombay
and Madras had rights to surrender. The provinces have now
no innate powers of their own and therefore nothing to surrender
in the foedus.'^
However, it is obvious that political theory, like all social
Politloal theory, must take cognizance of the facts and in-
iheory cannot terpret reality. A social science is the summation
bo too rigid of human experience. Its method is mainly in-
ductive. The formulas ommciated by such a science cannot
be completely rigid, but must have the elasticity of a living
organism. Its generalizations may sometimes prove to be inad-
equate, because a particular type of experience has been exag-
gerated into a universal law. Emphasis must be given not so
much to the form, as to the spirit, of the regulating causes and
conditions.
It may be that in the past federations have mostly been
Peealiar formed by independent states relinquishing a part
condition of their sovereignty and creating out of themselves
of India a new composite sovereign to whom they trans-
ferred their allegiance. It may also be that once a federation
was started, the further tendency has inevitably been towards
centralization. But conditions in India are different. With its
dimensions of a subcontinent, and its population equal in number
to one-sixth of the human race and extremely diverse in charac-
ter, India requires a constitutional structure which can satisfy a
double purpose. In the first place, democratic self-government
with its effective popular control must become in practical ex-
perience a living reality. This means that the territorial area
^ Montjora neport, p. 78.
MAKING INDIA A FEDERAL STATE
181
of the governmental unit, without being unduly wide and
unwieldy, should be so prescribed that a continuous and active
contact can be maintained between the electors on the one hand
and the legislators and ministers on the other. Secondly, suf-
ficient elasticity must be provided for adjusting local peculiari-
ties and local requirements. An omnipotent unitary government
controlling a heterogeneous subcontinent obviously cannot be
fitted for this task. Its mere existence, which is due to the
ac(}idents of history, cannot be pleaded as an argument against
its radical, reform. The process of constitutional progress in
India therefore will have to be the reverse of what has happened
in other countries. An Indian federation must evolve out of the
existing unitary framework.
It does seem a little odd that the chances of establishing a
Two oon4|- federation of India should appear to have been
tlons necesBary irrevocably lost because, in the circumstances of
* 1774, the Parliament of Britain thought it wise to
rederation p^^gg Regulating Act for the better government
of India I Constitution-building evidently cannot wait for such
a scholastic inflexibility to relent and to leave the way open
for natural adjustments and growth. Two factors are neces-
sary to bring the federal doctrine into play and both of them are
found in India. There is therefore no theoretical or practical
difficulty in giving a federal shape to the Indian polity. The
first of these factors is the existence of separate groups of human
beings, differentiated from each other by language and race,
but each distinct in itself. The second is a keen desire on the
part of these groups to coalesce to a limited extent and also to
retain th^ir individuality in the amalgamated whole. The poli-
tical independence of these groups may be usual but is not
indispensable. It is infinitely more important that they should
be well-knit racial, linguistic or cultural units, and further, that
they should sincerely aspire to combine into a common nation-
hood.
§6. ARGUMENT AGAINST AN INDIAN FEDERATION
There is an influential school of political thought in India
which is keenly opposed to the incorporation of
the federal principle in India's constitutional struc-
ture. It does not welcome the abolition of the
unitary system for the following reasons:
First, it is contended that India has been torn
by dissensions for centuries. The separatist and narrowly selfish
tendency has dominated the whole course of Indian history and
its results have been fatal. A century of strong, centralized
government, with its uniformity of law, policy, and executive
action, has fostered the concept of a common Indian nationhood.
Its disappearance may encourage an ugly reversion to disinte-
It will
dlBeoarage
the lense of
a common
natlonalltj
182 INDIAN ADMINI6TEATI0N
grated national life and give a setback to the forces that make
for a fusion of discordant elements.
Secondly, it is pointed out by these critics that a federation
Its formatioD on really sound lines would be impossible in India
will be in actual practice. The rulers of States 'vvho are
impracticable already enjoying autocratic powers over their sub-
jects will not agree to descend to a status of perfect equality
with the other constituents, namely, the British Indian Pro-
vinces whose people enjoy considerable civic freedom* and
political power. They will demand certain special assurances
and safeguards. To concede such extraordinary privileges would
inevitably negative the federal doctrine. On the other hand,
to refuse them would scare the Princes away from the proposed
federal union.
There is very great force in these arguments. The evils they
envisage are quite real. However, the balance of consideration
seems, on the whole, to lie in favour of federation. The point
cannot be elaborately discussed in these pages.
XXII. ESTABLISHMENT OP THE FEDEEATION
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS
§1. CONDITIONS TO BE FULFILLED
As it was decided that a federation was the most suitable form
New itatue of government for India, provision was made for
Uia its establishment in the Act of 3 935, There was no
jroYinoes ^ difficulty about the incorporation of British India
in the new arrangement. Constitutionally speaking, the British
Parliament is considered competent to prescribe, by an Act,
the political status and the administrative machinery of the
British Indian territory. But as the federation is to consist of
provincfjs which are intended to be autonomous and self-govern-
ing, it was felt that their old status of dependence on and
subordination to the central government must cease. They
could no longer be looked upon as mere agents of a political
superior from whom their powers were derived.
Section 2 of the Act therefore clearly lays down that all
Resumption rights, authority and jurisdiction, hitherto belong-
of powers irig to His Majesty the King, Emperor of India,
by the Grown which appertain or are incidental to the govem-
ment of the territories in India, are exercisable by
re s r u on Majesty, except in so far as is otherwise
provided by the Act. All powers hitherto enjoyed by the Sec-
retary of State acting singly or in council, by the Governor-
General acting singly or in Council and by any Governor or
Xiocal Government are supposed to have been resumed by the
Crown. The Central and Provincial Governments have thus
been reduced, in their relation to each other, to a position of
equality in negation. T\ie powers so resumed are taken to have
been redistributed by the Crown between the Federal or Central
Government on the one hand and the provinces on the other.
Both these entities now operate directly on his behalf and as his
representatives and derive their authority from the same source.
The provinces have therefore obtained a co-ordinate, and not a
subordinate, status in their relation to the Federal Government.
The position of the Indian States is quite different. They
The acoession subject to legislation by the British Parlia-
of the States ment, and are assured of their internal sove-
mnet be reignty by the treaties, sanads and usages which
voluntary govern their relations with the Crown. The
Crown does, of course, enjoy rights of paramountcy over them,
But it cannot resume in respect of the States those powers which
it could resume in the case of British India. The States cannot
be compelled to join the Indian Federation by Parliamentary
‘enactment. They must join it of their own accord and of their
184 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
own free will. The Act of 1935 does not actually inaugurate
the Federation of India. It lays down the method and procedure
by which the accession of the States may be effected if and when
their Rulers think it fit to accede. It also prescribes the con-
ditions which must be satisfied before the Federation can come
into existence.
According to Section 6, a Ruler who decides to enter the
The Instrument Federation has to execute what is called aii Instru-
of Accession ment of Accession which is acceptable to His
Majesty, and which will be binding upon the Ruler, his heirs
and successors. He will declare through this Instrument that
he has acceded to the Federation and that, subject to the
terms of the document, the federal authority shall function m
his State to the extent to which he has accepted the Federation.
He will also undertake to give due effect within his State to
those provisions of the Act which are applicable to it. The
Instrument will specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as
those in which the federal legislature may make laws for his
State, and also the limitations, if any, on the power of that
legislature. By a supplementary Instrument the number of such
matters may be extended.
His Majesty is free to accept only such Instrumcnib or supple-
Its form and mentaiy Instruments as he considers it proper to
eontent to do. The Joint Parliamentary Committee suggested
bo common that the Instruments should in all eases be the
same in form though the list of subjects accepted by a Ruler
as federal may not be identical in every case. They were
also of the opinion that there should be a kind of standard list
of such subjects and that it should be accepted by all the
federating States, deviations from it being permitted in excep-
tional cases. This would ensure the maximum amount of
uniformity in the federal sphere, consistently with the divergent
claims of -the uniting parties.
Section 5 lays down the following two conditions which must
The Proportion be satisfied before the Federation can come into
of States vhleh existence : (i) States, the Rulers of which are en-
mast accede titled to choose not less than 52 members of the
Council of State, and (ii) States, the aggregate population of
which amounts to at least one half of the total population of
all the States put together, have to decide to accede to the
Federation. Thus the new constitution cannot become an
active reality unless a substantial portion of the States’ area
and people are brought within its orbit. It has been found by
the experience of the last few years that the task of securing the
accession of the Princes is full of difficulty. A draft Instrument
has been presented to them, by the Viceroy as the Crown’s
Representative, and endless discussions have been held on its
clauses and wording. But no agreement is yet reported to have-
been reached.
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS 185
After the accession of the requisite number of the States has
Pioolamatlon been signified, it would be lawful for His MAjesty
In His to declare by Proclamation that from an appointed
day the Federation of India under the Crown
has been inaugurated. But before the issue of such a Pro-
clamation an address in that behalf must be presented to His
Majesty by each House of Parliament. The authority of the
British people is thus again emphasized. It will be realized
that* the British Indian Provinces, whether Governors* or Chief
Commissioners’, are to be incorporated in the Federation by the
provisions of the Act. Their accession is not left to their volun-
tary action or choice as in the case of the States. It is ordained
for them by Parliament.
After the establishment of the Federation, requests from
After twenty Rulers for admission have to be triinsmitted to
years " His Majesty through the Governor-General. If
a period of twenty years has elapsed aftei> the establishment,
such requests will have to be endorsed by each chamber of
the federal legislature. This time-limit will have a salutary
effect. It will tend to check frivolous vacillation on the part
of some of the Princes and help to complete the federal picture
at length within a period of twenty years after it is brought
into being.
§2. THREE LISTS OF SUBJECTS AND
RESIDUARY POWERS
A federal structure must necessarily provide for two distinct
Two spheres divisions of the governmental sphere. It has to
of gOTernment take cognizance of the provinces (or the federating
units) and the central organization under which they are united.
The jurisdiction of th^ two authorities requires to be clearly
defined. This is usually done by the following method. Certain
specified subjects are assigned to the provinces and the rest are
then given over to the centre; or the process may be reversed,
and particular subjects may be allotted to the centre and the
remainder placed under the authority of the provinces. Only
one list, enumerating particular items, is necessary under this
arrangement. The other group of subjects is automatically
prescribed in a general but a negative manner. It consists of
an undefined and unparticularized mass of all those items which
are not included in the list that is specially prepared.
A more elaborate course is followed in India. An exhaustive
Three Uste and specific list is drawn up for the Central Goveni-
of subjects ment and another is similarly drawn up for the
provinces. A third large list is further prepared for the con-
current jurisdiction of those two authorities. This is expected to
be a useful device for securing uniformity in certain matters
without introducing centralization. It is expected to counteract
186 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
the tendency towards a vexatious multiplicity of law and prac-
tice which would hinder the growth and consciousness of a com-
mon nationality. The three lists have been given in the
Seventh Schedule of the Act of 1935.
In spite of the punctilious care with which the lists have been
Residuary compiled by men of experience, it may happen
jMvers that certain items have escaped attention. En-
tirely new circumstances and responsibilities may also arise
•subsequent to the preparation of the lists and they will have* to
be assigned. A federal constitution must therefore provide for
an allocation of residuary powers either to the provinces or to
.the centre.
The whole trend of modem life is towards integration.
Modem Scientific inventions are reducing time and dis-
'tendeney tance and bringing all humanity into one orbit.
The federal sphere has been constantly widening in those
countries which havje that form of government. Political writers
have even stated that the federal stage may inevitably lead
to the unitary stage. The impulse for union cannot abruptly
or arbitrarily stop. The opportunity for mutual contact and
understanding that a federation provides is bound to create closer
bonds and bring about a greater coherence among the constituent
units.
Unfortunately the dispute assumed a communal aspect in
Communal India when the proposal for allocation of the resi-
differences duary powers came up for discussion. The Hindus
in India generally favoured the strengthening of the centre
and leaving the residuary powers to it. On the other hand the
Muslims preferred the opposite course as being more desirable
in the interests of minorities. Parliament had to give its deci-
sion on these conflicting claims, and it came to the comfortable
conclusion that residuary powers could- most safely and con-
veniently rest neither with the centre nor with the provinces,
'but in effect with the Governor-General I Section 104 of the
Act says that the Governor-General may empower either the
federal or the provincial legislature to enact a law with reference
iK) any matter not enumerated in the Central, Provincial and
Concurrent lists.
The following are some of the important items in the Federal
The Federal Legislative List, which contains in all fifty-nine
LegislatiYe subjects: His Majesty’s naval, military and air
forces borne on the Indian establishment in naval,
military and air force works; local self-government in canton-
ment areas; external affairs; ecclesiastical affairs; currency and
•linage; public debt of the Federation; posts, telegraphs, tele-
phones, wireless, broadcasting, post-office savings bank; federal
Public Services and Federal Public Service Commission; Benares
Hindu University and Aligarh Muslim University; survey of India;
.And historical monumei^s; census; admission into and
DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS 187
emigration and expulsion from India; federal railways; maritime
shipping and navigation; major ports; aircraft and air navigation;
lighthouses; copyright and inventions; cheques, bills of exchange,
etc., arms and ammunition; opium, so far as regards cultivation
and manufacture; petroleum; corporations; development of
industries; labour in mines and oilfields; insurance; banking;
customs duties; excise duties on tobacco and other goods manu-
fact\u’ed or produced in India except (a) alcoholic liquors, (b)
opium, Indian hemp and other narcotics, and non-narcotic drugs,
(c) medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol; corpo-
ration tax; salt; state lotteries; naturalization; taxes on income
other than agricultural income; taxes on capital; succession
duties; stamp duty on bills of exchange, cheques, promissory
notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, ipsurance policies, etc.;
termirug,! taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or |ir;
taxes on railway fares and freights.
The following are some of the important items in the Provin-
The ProTinclal cial Legislative List, which contains in all 54
LeglBlatiTe items: public order and justice and courts; police;
prisons, reformatories, etc,; public debt of the
province; provincial Public Services and the Provincial Public
Service Commission; land acquisition; local government; public
health and sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries; education;
communications; irrigation and canals, etc.; agriculture; land
tenures, agricultural loans, etc.; fisheries; weights and measures;
forests; gas and gas-works; development of industries in the
province; trade and commerce within the province; intoxicating
liquors and narcotic drugs; unemployment and poor relief;
theatres and cinemas but not the sanction of cinema films for
•exhibition; betting and gambling; co-operation; land revenue;
excise duties on alcoholic liquors for human consumption, opium,
medicinal preparations containing alcohol; taxes on agricultural
income; taxes on land and buildings; charities and charitable
institutions; duties in respect of succession to agricultural land;
capitation taxes; taxes on professions, trades callings and em-
ployments, subject to section 142A of the Act;^ taxes on animals
and boats; taxes on advertisements and sale of goods; local
cesses; taxes on luxuries, entertainments, amusements, betting,
gambling, etc. ; stamp duties on documents not mentioned in
the Federal List; tolls; taxes on vehicles whether mechanically
propelled or not; taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity;
universities, except those at Benares and Aligarh.^
The following are some of the important items in the
Concurrent Legislative List, which contains in all 36 items:’
^ As amended by the India and Burma {Miscellaneous Amendments) Aet^
IWO.
The last three items were added by the India and Bwmka (Miscellaneoit/s
Amendments) Act, 1940.
188 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
otiminal law; criminal procedure; civil procedure, evidence and
^ oaths; marriage and divorce, adoption, etc.; wills,
Oraeamiit intestacy, etc.; transfer of property other than
Legislative agricultural land, registration of deeds and docu-
ments, etc.; trusfts and trustees; contracts;
bankruptcy; non-judicial stamp duties; legal medical and other
professions; newspapers, books and printing-presses; lunacy;
poisons and dangerous drugs; boilers; European vagrancy;
factories; welfare of labour; unemployment insurance; trade
unions, industrial and labour disputes; contagious, diseases;
electricity; inland shipping and navigation; sanctioning of
cinematograph films tor exhibition; detenus.
XXllI. THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
§1. THE POSITION AND POWERS OF THE CEOW^T
The Bovereignty of the British King is supposed to extend
Saieielgnty to the whole of the British Empire, and he auto-
of the Grown matically becomes the legal head of every system
of government and administration that may be created for the
different component parts of that empire. Constitutions of self-
governing Dominions like Canada and Australia have been
framed on the basis that the King is their supreme sovereign.
The same is also true of what are known as the Crown Colonies.
By thd Act of 1935, British Indian Provinces and the Indian
States are to be federally united under the British Crown. The
King will become the highest legal dignitary in the Federation
of India as he is in the existing unitary government of the coun-
try-
But it is an invariable dictum of the British constitution that
Constitutional the King never acts except on the advice of his
position responsible ministers. All his powers are exer-
cised for him by them. In matters pertaining to the Dominions
he is advised by the Dominions’ Ministers who are responsible
to their own legislatures and peoples; in respect of territories
which do not enjoy rights of full self-government, advice is
tendered to the ^vereign by Ministers who are responsible to
the British Parliament and the British nation.
As the Joint Parliamentary Committee remark, -The doini-
Two sources nion and authority of the Crown extends over the
of his powers whole of. British India. It is derived from many
sources, in part statutoiy and in part prerogative, the former
having their origin in Acts of Parliament, and the latter in rights
based upon conquest, cession or usage, some of which have been
directly acquired, while others are enjoyed by the Crown as suc-
cessor to the rights of the East India Company. ’
In the federal constitution w’hich is envisaged by the Act of
Statutory 1935, certain powers are spe^jifically vested in the
powers Crowm. For example, the appointment of the
Governor-General, the Governors and the Commander-in-Chief is
to be made by His Majesty; he has to issue Inslruments of
Instruction to the Governor-General and the Governors; many
orders-in-council pertaining to various subjects have to be issued
by him; he can disallow laws passed by either the federal or
.provincial legislatures; Instruments of Accession executed by
Eulers of States have to be approved of and accepted by him;
it is in his power to issue a proclamation establishing the Federa-
tion of India. This is not an exhaustiv* list; other powers
have also been mentioned in the Act as being exercisable
190 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
by His Majesty with reference to the government of British
India.
Among the prerogative powers of the King may be mentioned
PrerogatiTe the control of foreign policy including the right
powers to cede territory or annex it; right to escheat gold
and silver mines and treasure troves; immunity from civil or
criminal proceedings ; right to grant honours ; right to grant par-
don, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, and so on.
Though the Indian States were allowed to retain their internal
Paramonntej sovereignty to a great extent by the treaties that
were made with them by the East India Company in the process
of conquest, the Crown has always been considered to have the
rights of Paramountcy over them. The relations between the
States and the Crown are not on a purely contractual basis.
The authority of the suzerain has been continually clarified and
enlarged by the Crown's exclusive right of interpreting the old
treaties in the light of modem conditions, and by the custom,
practice and usage of the political department of the Govern-
ment of India. Even the Butler Committee could not define
the scope of paramountcy in a particular formula. * The relation
between the Paramount Power and the States they said, ‘ is
not fixed, rigid or static, but adaptable, mobile or dynamic in
character. Paramountcy must remain paramount.’
It must be clearly understood that all these powers, though
technically vesting or inhering in the Crown, are
powers are expected to be directly exercised by him at
not actually his own free will or discretion. In the British
ezerelsed by
the Grown
of the state.
constitutional philosophy, the monarch is not sup-
posed to play an active part in the administration
Many powers are nominally held by him; but they
are actually exercised on his behalf by Ministers who are, in Ihe
last resort, responsible to the people. In the case of India, the
powers assigned to or enjoyed by His Majesty will, not be exer-
cised by popular Indian. Ministers but by the Secretary of State
for lindia and the British Cabinet, who are the servants of the
British public.
§2. INTRODUCTION OF DYARCHY
The Act of 1935 was not intended to satisfy India's demand
No immediate immediate introduction of full-fledged res-
grant of ponsible government, both in the federal centre
full self- and in the provinces. Parliament was not pre-
gOYernment pared to accept the claim for such a wholesale and
radical alteration of the Indian constitution. In spite of the
keen demand of the Indian people, no new preamble, stating
clearly that it was the intention of Parliament to confer upon
T-ndia at an early Mate Dominion Status of the Statute of
Westminster variety, was framed for the Act of 1935. The
THE FEDEliAL EXECUTIVE 191
utmost concession that was shown to Indian opinion was to
keep unrepealed the halting and unsatisfactory pronouncement
which had formed the preamble of the Act of 1919.
The changes proposed in the new Act are inspired by a res-
Introduction tricted ideal and toned down by numerous limita-
of partial tions. The principle of responsibility will be
reBponBibllitj introduced in the Federal Government to a small
extent, but otherwise its bureaucratic character will be main-
tained. To put it briefly, a dyarchical system will be established
in the federal sphere. The use of that expression has been
scrupulously avoided in the Act, though the Joint Parliamentary
Committee freely mention it in their Eeport.
At the head of the Federal Government will be the Governor-
Governor- General of India and Crown’s Eepresentative.
General The two offices were not distinct till the formu-
and Crown'B lation of the federal scheme. The Crown’s
RepreBentatlve authority and jurisdiction over both British India
and the Indian States were exercised by the Governor-General-
in-Council under the general supervision of the Secretary of State.
But now they have been separated. The Crown's Eepresentative
alone will heroaftf‘r perform the duties and functions of the
Crown in its relations with the Indian States. The federal
Ministers will have no voice in these matters. It is lawful for
His Majesty to appoint one person to hold both the offices, and
normally speaking the Governor- General and Crown’s Eepresent-
ative is expected to be one and the same man.
Subjects in the Federal Legislative List will be divided into
Reserved and groups. One, which may for convenience be
Traneferred called Eeserved though the word is not used in the
BubjectB will comprise defence, ecclesiastical affairs,
external affairs except the relations between the Federation and
any of the Dominions in the British Empire, and tribal areas.
The other, which may similarly be designated as Transferred,
will include all the remaining federal items.
The Eeserved departments will be administered by the
CounsellorB Governor-General with the advice of a new type
and Ministers of officials called Counsellors. They will not fonn
a council like the present Executive Council, and will not be res-
ponsible to the federal legislature but only to the Governor-
General. The Transferred departments will be administered
by him with the aid and advice of a Council of IVBnisters who
will be members of the federal legislature and responsible to
it. The budget will be common to both the parts of govem-
m.ent, and the same legislature will make laws for both.
In studying the federal executive, attention will have to be
paid to the Governor-General, Counsellors and Ministers, and
to their collective working under the dyarchical plan. This is
done separately in the following sections.
192 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
§3. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL
The Governor-General of India will, as now, be appointed
Appointment by His Majesty on the advice of the Prime Minister
of Britain, and will be expected to possess the same qualifications
that are possessed by him today. The Viceroy or Crown’s Repre-
sentative will, as a normal practice, be combined in his person,
and he will continue to enjoy immense authority and prestige.
The importance of the office and of the personality which holds
it will not diminish even after the inauguration of the Federation.
The Governor-General will have many powers, ordinar;y and
7<jipee extraordinary, in the executive, legislative and
vayi of financial domains of government, as he has at
ozerelilng present. But a new feature of the Act is that
three different ways for the exercise of those powers
have been defined. These ways apply to all departments of gov-
ernment whether Reserved or Transferred and cover the whole
sphere of the civil and military activity of the State.
(i) Acting in his discretion. In some cases, the Governor-
General has to act in his discretion; in doing so he need not
consult his Ministers at all (though he is not definitely prevented
from consulting them), and may take decisions on his own
responsibility. It has been calculated that no less lhan 94
different sections of the Act make a mention of this power and
direct the Governor-General to exercise it. They refer to
practically every important governmental activity and include
subjects like the Reserved departments, rules for the transaction
of ministerial business and keeping the Governor- General in-
formed about certain matters, assent to Bills, summoning legisla-
tive chambers for a joint sitting, suspending the constitution,
control over the actions^ of the Provincial Governments, tlie
Reserve Bank, and the Railway Authority.
(ii) In his individual judgement. In some cases, the
Governor-General is asked to exercise his individual judgement;
in doing so he is expected to take the advice of his Ministers,
but need not necessarily accept it and act accordingly. This
power is mentioned in 32 different sections of the Act and they
also concern many important subjects, including items like the
special responsibilities, the Advocate-General, appointments and
postings of certain officials, the High Commissioner, etc.
(iii) On the advice of Ministers. In the cases that remain
the Governor-General has to act on the advice of his Ministers
and therefore their advice must be sought and accepted. The
field for action that is left after the above deductdons are made
is extremely limited. ^
It is laid down in section 14 that when the Governor-General
is required to act in his discretion or in the exercise of his
individual judgement, he ^ shall be under the general control
•of the Secretary of State and shall comply with such particular
THE FEDEBAL EXECUTIVE 193
^irdctions as may from time to time be given by him. Parlia-
Snbopdlnatlon mentary authority over a large field of Indian
^ to the administration is thus maintained even in the new
constitution, and the representatives of the
® Indian people have been deprived of an effective
voice in those matters.
The Governor- General may appoint Counsellors, not exceed-
Relations ing three in number, to assist him in the adininis-
wlth the . tration of what have been described here as the
exeeutlTe Reserved subjects of the Federation. His relations
with them are not defined in the Act, and the method of
their working will obviously be determined by conventions and
practice. But it is clear that they will have no kind of veto
over any of the actions of the Governor- General.
The Governor-General has also been given the power to’
appoint a Financial Adviser who shall hold office during his
pleasure, and whose salary and other conditions of service will
be determined by him.
Technically speaking, it is the Governor-General wffio has
to choose and summon the federal ministers. But as they must
enjoy the confidenr'o of the legislature, his power in this res-
pect may, hi practice, prove to be severely limited. Jfe has
however the right to preside over their meetings in his discretion,
and to make rules of business for them.
The Governor-General has been given considerable powers
Relations over the legislature. He can summon, prorogue,
with the and dissolve the Federal Assembly He can make
legislature rules of procedure for regulating the business
before either house. His ])re\ioiis sanction is required for the
introduction of many important kinds of Bills,’ and his assent
is required for all Bills passed by the legislature before they
can become Acts. He may reserve certain Bills for the assent
of His Majesty. The power to summon joint sittings of the
two chambers of the federal legislature is vested in him
In addition to these powers, the Governor-General can issue
ordinances, either on the advice of his Ministers or in his
discretion. He can also pass wdiat wdll be known as the Governor-
General’s Acts entirely on his own authority and without any
reference to the legislative bodies if he thinks it necessary
to do so. This ^is of course an exceptional and a veiy compre-
hensive power, and takes the place of the existing method of
certification.^
‘ As for example. Bills pertaining to coinage or currency, the Beserve
Bank, the Federal Bailway Authority, the Federal Court, the jPublic Service
Commission and Bills which are intended to repeal, amend or affect any Act
of Parliament extending to British India, or Govemor-Oyn^ral’s or Governors*
Ants or Acts relating to police force or matters wher^ the Governor-Genera)
has to act in his discretion, etc.
* Government of India j4ef, 1986, sections 42-4.
194 INDIAN ADMINISTKATION
The provincial Governors and Governments are under the
Oonirol control of the Governor-General in several res-
oYer the pects. Section 54 lays down that when the
provinces Governor is required to act in his discretion or
to exercise his individual judgement, he shall be under the
general control of the Governor-General and shall comply with
such particular directions as may be given by him from time
to time. A large field is covered by this provision. It has heen
calculated that there are about 43 sections of the Act in which
the Governor-General’s superior powers in respect of c^^rtain
provincial matters have been specifically mentioned. BesideSr
section 126 (clause 5) definitely empowers the Governor-General,
acting in his discretion, to issue orders to a Governor as to how
the executive authority in the province should be exercised for
‘preventing any grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of
India.
Over and above all these powers, the Governor-General has
Special been invested with what are described as Special
RespoDBibilities Responsibilities This legislative innovation is a
unique product of the Act of 1935. Section 12 defines them
as follows* (a) prevention of any grave menace to the peace or
tranquillity of India or any part thereof; (b) safeguarding of the
financial stability and credit of the Federation ; (c) and (d)
safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the minorities and
the rights and interests of the Ser\ices, (r) preventing discrimi-
nation against the United Kingdom as mentioned in sections
111 to 121 of the Act; (/) preventing goods of United Kingdom
or Burmese origin from being subjected to di^crimiiicition or
penal treatment; {g) protection of the lights of anv Indian
State or its Ruler; (h) securing the duo discharge of those func-
tions which have to be exerci^scd in lus disto'ction or in his
individuiU judgement.
These Special Responsibilities have to be fulfilled by the
Governor-General exercising his individual judgement whenever
he thinks any action in that legard is necessary.
It will be seen that every important aspect of administration
Concentration — peace and order, finance, the Services, fiscal
of power freedom of India, minorities, discrimination agaiAst
Britain — has been included in the above enumeration. It re-
presents a great concentration and combination of over-riding
powers, both tangible and intangible, defined and undefined.
Their frequent or infrequent exercise will appreciably affect
the value of the new constitution.
It must also be clearly understood that the formulation and
definition of special Responsibilities is not merely equivalent to
reserving a certain number of departments for the Govemor-
General’s or Governor's exclusive jurisdiction, as is done in
dyarchy. The division introduced by them is not departmental
105
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
dnd physical. It should rather be described as psychological.
Tlwy apply Special Responsibilities lead to and liave to be
to the whole fulfilled by the functions of interpretation, judge-
sphere of rrient and opinion. They are intended to cover
gOYernment whole domain of administration, whether
ministerial or bureaucratic, federal or provincial. There is no sub-
ject which is beyond their reach and range, no executive action
which is immune from thir control.
If for any reason the ecaistitiitional machinery provided by
Issue of ' work and any of the wheels of
proclamation government threaten to become immobile, the
In an Governor-General has been given special power to
emergency combat the situation. Section 45 prescribes that
if the Governor-Genera] is satisfied that a situation has arisen
in which the government of the Federation cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of the Act, he may issue
a Proclamation, and thereby (a) declare that his functions
shall, to such extent as may be specified in the Proclamation, be
exercised by him in his discretion, (6) assume to himself all or
any of the powers vested in or exereisablie by any federal body
or authodrity.
The Proclamation may contain such incidental and conse-
quential provisions as may be necessary or desirable for giving
effect to the objects of the Proclamation. The operation of any
provision of the Act relating to any federal body or authority
may be suspended in whole or in part, excepting the provisions
that relate to the Federal Court.
Such a Proclamation has to be communicated forthwith to
the Secretary of State and laid by him before each House of Par-
liament. It will cease to operate at the expiration of six months,
unless Parliament by resolutions approves its cc ntinuauce for
further periods; but in no case shall it continue for more than
three years.
Laws made by the Governor-General in virtue of the powers
assumed by him by such a Proclamation shall have effect for two
years after the Proclamation has ceased to have effect. But
they may be repealed sooner or re-enacted by the legislature.
Thus all the powers of the Federation cun bo taken over by the
Governor-General in a grave emergency.
§4. THE COUNSELLORS AND FINANCIAL ADVISE?
For the administration of what has been described as the
Appointment Reserved part of the Federal Government, section
and number n of the Act has provided for the appointment
di a separate set of officials. They are to be known as Coun-
sellors. They are to be appointed by the Governor-General and
their number is not to exceed three. Their salaries and con-
ditions of service will be prescribed by His Majesty.
196 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
It will be seen that the appointment of Counsellors is not
Probable made obligatory upon the Governor-General, though
eompoBition of course it is unthinkable that he would not
appoint them. The tenure of their office is not fixed by law nor
are their qualifications defined by it. The Act has not said
that they will form a Council and therefore they will have no
corporate existence as the Executive Council today has or the
federal ministry may come to have Functions in respect, of
the Reserved departments — ^that is defence, ecclesiastical affairs,
external affahs except relations with the Dominions, • and tribal
areas — are to be exercised by the Goveraor-General in his dis-
cretion; but he must have the assistance of men of experience,
talent and representative character in the performance of the
task. It is therefore not unlikely that most of the Counsellors
will be members of the I.C.S. of long standing and service.
Whether an Indian will be appointed to the post can be shown
only by experience. But in any case, the Counsellors* opinions
are not binding upon the Govenior-General and they are not
intended to exercise any constitutional restraint over him.
In addition to these Counsellors, the Governor-General is
Financial empow^ered by section 15 to appoint a Financial
AdYlser Adviser. It will be his dutv to assist the Governor-
General in the discharge of his Special Responsibility for safe-
guarding the financial stability and credit of the Federal Govern-
ment, and also to give advice to the Federal Government upon
financial mattei*s if he is consulted He will hold office during
the pleasure of the Governor-General, who will also prescribe
his salary and other conditions of service. It is provided that
after the appointment of the first Financial Adviser, tlie
Governor-General should consult his Ministers in making sub-
sequent appointments to .the office.
The Financial Adviser must not be confounded with the
Finance Minister, who will be in charge of the Finance De-
partment, and as a member of the federal ministry will be
responsible to the legislature for his actions. What exactly will
be the relationship of the Financial Adviser to the constitutional
machine, wiiether his presence will facilitate the exercise by the
Governor-General of his special powers, can be seen only by
experience. But it is possible that the creation of this new
office may bring about some conflict of jurisdiction and com-
plicate tlie process of Government in the federal sphere.
Though defence is a Reserved subject under the Governor-
Oommander- General, the Act has made specific provision for
io*Chlef the appointment of a Commander-in- Chief of His
Majesty's Forces. Section 2 lays down that he will be appointed
hy His Majesty by warrant under the Royal Sign Manual, and
section 232 lays dowm that his pay and allow^ances and other
conditions of service will * be such as His Majesty-in-Council
may direct.
THE FEDEEAL EXECUTIVE 197
§5. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
For the administration of the siibjerts which have not been
Scope for Reserved, section 9 of the Act provides that there
minletepial shall be a Council of Ministers. They will aid and
authority advise the Governor-General in the exercise of his
functions except when he is required to act in his discretion.
But the scope for ministerial authority will not be large because,
ns has been pointed out already, the discretionary powers of
the Governor-General are very wide and include the manage-
ment of such important subjects as defence and external affairs,
and the numerous reservations, safeguards and exceptional
powers with w^hich the Governor-General is invested under the
Act.
The Ministers will be chosen and summoned by the Governor-
Appointment, General, but as they are to be responsible to the
qualifications federal legislature he v^ill not hiwe au unfettered
and salary choice. He must accept those asIio have a ch ar
majority of votes in the legislative chambers. There can be
no academic or any other si^ecific qualifications prescribed for
Ministers, but they must be Jiiernberb of one or the other house
of the legislature and liave the solid support ot the majority of
their votes. ^linisters would in fact be prominent members of
the party in power and many of tliem would he among the
foremost political leader- of the country. Their salaries will
be fixed by an act of the legislature) thoii 4 ?h the amountb paid
to individual Ministers would not be annually voted at the time
of the budget. In fact, they have been put in the non-\otable
list. The salary of a Minister will not be varied during his
term of office. If a Minister has to be censured, it cannot be
done by proposing a cut in his sahuw at the time of the pass-
ing of the budget; a direct motion of no-confidence w'ould have
to be moved for that* purpose.
The Ministers will be sworn in i\^ a council and the Govenior-
CollectiTe General ma\ [>iesidc o\er it in his discretion,
responsibility Tliere is no mention of the office of Prime Minister
ill the Act, but the Instrimauit of Instructions to the Governor-
Geiioral says that the latter, in the selection of his Ministers,
should consult the person who in his judgement is most likely
to command a stable majority in the legislature. This implies
that there will be a loader of the Ministry who will function as
the Prime Minister. The same Instruction adds that the
Ministry should include, as far as possible, representatives of
the federated States and members of the important minority
communities, and that it should be able collectively to command
the eonfidonce of the legislature and bo possessed of the sense
of joint responsibility. The parliamentary system and party
government may thus be introduced in the federal sphere. How-
eVer, difficulties may be experienced in maintaining the homo-
198
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
geneity and discipline of a party and at the same time including
in the Ministry representatives of the minorities and the States
in spite of the fact that such persons are not members of the
party concerned and are beyond its direct control.
The number of Ministers is not to be more than ten. No
Allocation such limit has been put down in 'the case of the
of portfoUos provincial Ministers. Allocation of portfolios will
be technically the duty of the Governor- General though in
practice it w ill devolve upon the Prime Minister. . However,
the rules of business must include provisions requiring Ministers
and secretaries to Government to transmit to the Governor-
General all the information about matters specified in the rules,
or any other information that may be required by him. They
must also bring to his notice any matter which involves or is
likely to involve any of his Special Responsibilities.
§0 THE WORKING OF DYARCHY
The experiment of dyarchy was tried in the provinces for
sixteen years after the introduction of the Montford Reforms
and w^as proved to be incapable of yielding really satisfactory
results. It was therefore given up in favour of provincial
autonomy. The same system is however proposed for the federal
centre. The question that naturally arises is whether it has
chances of better success in the new sphere that is designated for
its operation.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee were clearly of the
View of opinion that so Iona as some political powers are
the Joint to be withheld from India, such division in the
Parliamentary functions of government \^olIl(l be inevitable. But
Committee they urged that gi\en the desire and the will, ovc'U
a divided govemmient of this t;vpe can work smoothly and give
excellent results.
The Counsellors and Ministers in the Federation of India
Different have a fundamentally different status. The
BtatuB of former wdll be bureaucratic in composition and
Counsellors outlook and will not be subordinate to the legis-
and Ministers lature. The latter wdll be the representatives and
servants of the public and fully responsible to the legislature.
The spheres of their activities have been marked out and defined.
But it is recognized that, in the nature of things, there cannot
be a watertight differentiation between the spheres and functions
of government. Hence extraordinary and overriding powers have
been gi\en to the Governor-General to settle all points of dispute
and administrative difficulties and deadlocks.
It is also recommended that the Reserved and Transferred
halves should not look uppn themselves as strangers to each
other or even as rivals of each other. The working of the
government should be based on the concept that they are part-
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 199
ners in a coinmon cause and ought to take each other into
CommoB confidence. The practice of mutual consultation
consultation and exchange of opinion and advice between them
recommended must become common, so that they ca*
effectively influence each other’s policies.
The Governor-General is specially instructed in his Instrument
Instructions Instructions^ to inculcate the spirit and tradition
to the of collective responsibility among his Ministers, and
GoYernor- also to encourage the practice of joint consultation
General • between himself, his Gounsellors and Ministers
1’his is particularly emphasized in the case of the department
of defence; the views of Ministers should be asf*ertained when
the appointment of Indian officers to the Indian forces or the
employment of Indian forces on service outside India are cori-
eerned. It is also one of the Instniclions that the federal
department of finance should be kept in close touch with the
finan(*e of defence, and that the estimates of proposed expendi-
ture for defence should be laid before the legislature after consul-
tation with the Finance Minister and the Ministr\ .
These Instructions are quite (dear and s])(‘cilic, and if carried
Inherent hi letter and spirit will give very salutary
defects of resulcs. But the e(|ui])oi>e s*‘l uj> by dyarchv is
dyarchy 'extremely delicate*. Hie factor of personal tem-
p(*rameiit is vital in its operation. TIu* compi’oiiiise hetw'cen
iriconipatibles that it contemplates and embodies is so precarious
that the unintended shock ot a straiglitforw ard and simple
action may suddenly tlirow tin* whole* meedi.iiiism out of gear
Apart from the fact that India cannot be reconciled to the
ideal of a truncated and heavily sategiiardod sclf-ge)Yenmient .
the feclu*nie of dyarchy cannot but evoke a feeling of scepticism
on ace'ount of its inherent defects and conflicting loyalties.
Apart from these evils which are inseparable from the
Vexatious dvarchical structure, the degree of progress contem-
rescrYations plated in the new constitution is vitiated by the
addition of reactionary encumbrances. The transfer of political
power into the hands of Indians is likely to be more apparent
lhan real, because it is accompanied by reserv atiojis and safe-
guards which an* all-pervasive in their conception and over-
whelming in their operation. A most strenuous effort seems
to have been made to discover leveiy possibility of what, in tlie
Englishman’s view, may be an abuse of power by Indians. The
vigorous exposition of this point by the Joint Parliamentary
(^^ommittee leaves no doubt about the Englishman's hopes and
fears in this respect. The reader is inevitably led to feel that
Parliament is eager to perform an impossible feat. It seems to
bo desirous of parting wdth power and at the same time retain-
ing it.
* Por a further explanation of the Instrument of Instructions, see pp. *2W-5
XXIV. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE
§1. THE BICAMEEAL SYSTEM
It is a matter of controversy whether two legislative chambers
are necessary in nnitai-y states, though they exist in practically
all of them. Since the Act of 1919 India has been living under
the bicameral system.
Tlie method of two chambers is generally believed to be
The purpose indispensable in the working of a federation. Tt
of two is a very convenient mechanism for symbolizing
^hambert essential equality of the federating units and
also their inevitable inequality in population and size. The
upper house in a federation represents the constituent states
as states, and as far as possible its scats are equally or approxi-
mately equally distributed among all of them. Here the smaller
states are in a privileged position . they are guaranteed against
tyrannical molestation and persecution by the bigger ones.
On the other hand, the lower house represents the total popula-
tion of the federation and its scats are distributed among the
states in proportion to their numbers. Here the bigger states
are protected from irresponsible caprice or jealousy on tlie pjirt
of the smaller ones. No federal law can be finally passed unh'ss
it is assented to by both the houses.
§2. THE CHAMBERS
Chapter III of Part IT of the Government of India Act and
Their the First Schedule prescribe the c()nstitntion,
conetltatlon powers and procedure of the federal legislature
in India. The upper clijjniber will be known as before as the
Council of State; the lower chamber will he kno\Mi as the
House of Assembly. The follo\Aing table shows tlieir com-
position.
Composition of the Federal Legist.attre
British
ladian Bepre-
fteolatives
Kepnescnla- 1
tives of 1
Indian Rtaics
Total
1
Namo
Chosen
nominated b>
tlu'ir Hillers
1
Elected
by the
(xovemor-
General
Total
Not more than
Not
more
than
( oUEcil of Btafe
150
i 6
)
166
104
26(1
House of Assembly
1 280 1
1
260
325
375
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 201
Election to a legislature can be either direct or indirect.
Direct and i^he former case, territorial and other consti-
indlreot tucncics are formed specifically for the purpose of
election sending representatives to a legislative chamber,
and persons chosen by them are permitted straightway to take
their seats in it. In indirect elections at least one more inter-
mediary is added. Representatives who sit in the legislature
under this system are already elected members of some other
body like ru municipality, a local board, a local legislature or a
specially constituted electoral college. There is first of all an
election of the electors and then finally election to the legislature.
The method of direct election has been commended by
AdYantages political writers. It establishes immediate con-
of direct tact between the legislator and the (dtizen and
election brings home to the former his re^ponsibility as an
elected representative. If the will of the demos is to be effec-
tively expressed and enforced, there should be no complication
or obstacle created by the presence of legalized middlemen.
Indirect election may mako the electoral machinery extremely
clumsy and obscure to the masses, and cause on the hole more
annoyance than convenience. Worse still, it offers great scope
hir political c onaiption, dishonesty and bribery
The indirect syslem existed in India even a‘rer tiie ]\rorIey-
Adoption of Minto Reforms but it was scrapped by the Joint
the indirect Parliainentarv (^ommittee ^^bich reported on the
method jjiU Qf igio. Since that time, elections to all
legislatures iu India, both central and proAincial, have been
direct. J'ho White Paper of 193^ had recommended the con-
tinuanoo of the same system. However, the Joint Parliamentary
Committee vAhicli reported on it a vear later took the
opposite Mew and recommended tliat for both the chambers
of the federal legislature the method of election should be
indirect
The Indian public protested against tin's ndrograde move,
and Parliament Avas at Inst persuaded to make a small concession.
The Act lays down that elections to the upper chamber, i.e. the
Council of State, should be direct; those to the lower chamber,
i.e. the House of Assembly, should be indirect. This is exactly
the opposite of the accepted constitutional principle and practice
that the loAver and popular chamber should be directly elected
by the people, and the upper chamber which represents the
federating units may be elected indirectly.
The chief reason given for this reactionary departure from
Reasons for the White Paper proposal Awas that in an extensive
the adoption and populous country like India, direct election
was bound to lead to one of two evils. Either the constituencies
would have to be excessively large or the number of mombors
of the legislature would have to be abnormal and unwieldy.
202 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
The committee felt that neither of the alternatives could bo
accepted.
Ho\^evL‘r, it could be contended that the maximum numerical
They are net strength of the legislature as prescribed in the
eonYincing Act could bear some increase without creating
undue confusion or inconvenience. The territorial areas of the
U.S.A., Canada and Australia ai;e much bigger than the area
of India; and at least in the U.8.A. the number of voters is not
smaller than the total population proposed to be enfranchised
in this country. Yet in none of those federations has it been
found necessary to adopt the indirect, in })referenee to the
direct, system of election for the lower house. The latter may
add to the difficutly of constitutional working; hut the former
produces the more dangerous result of diluting democracy itself
The seats in the Council of State assigned to a province
Elections to h^ distributed among territorial constituencies
the Council which A\ill be general and communal, the latter
of State for Muslims and Sikhs For election to seats
reserved for women, all members ot the pro\inciiil legislature,
men and \\omen, \\ill be electors Ab the number ol Anglo-
Indians and Europeans and Indian Christians in an individual
province will be small, special electoral colleges will be formed
for the whole of British India for election of their representatives
to the Council of State. The colleges will bo comjjosed of such
Anglo-Indians, Europeans and Indian ('’hristiaiis respectively
as are members of the Legislative Council ot the province or
of its Legislative Assembh For seats allotted to the scheduled
castes, persons of those castes who an* members )f the pro-
vincial legislature will be t‘lectors.
A high property (lualification will be reciuirod fur tlie riglit
to vote at elections 16 the (’ouncil ot State. It has vet to be
determined. But it will confer the vote on onl\ a small minority
of aristocrats and industrial and commercial magnates
Members of the House of Assembly assigned to a proviraa^
Elections to wdll not be elected direct l\ by constituencies,
the Assembly territorial and communal, specially formed for
that purpose in the jirovincial area. Thf' Legislative* Assembly
of the province will be the body of electors. Its jSIusliin and
Sikh members will elect the Muslim and Sikh representatives;
those holding general seats in it wdll vote in the election to
the general seats of the Federal Assembly. Women members
will be elected by an electoral college ot all womtn who are
members of the Legislative Assembly of any province. Anglo-
Indian, European and Indian Christian seats will be ^lled by
E ersons who are elected by electoral colleges consisting of mem-
ers of those communities who are in the provincial Legislative
A.ssemblies.
Both the federal legislatures will have elected presidents, the
Assembly president being known as the Speaker.
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 203
The Federal Assembly will have a tenure of five years, but
Taniipe may be dissolved earlier. The Council of State
will be a permanent body not subject to dissolution. One-third
of the total number of its members will retire every three years,
and the term of an individual member will be nine years. The
details of the initial retirements have been given in the schedule.
The two chambers will have legislative, administrative and
Powers • financial powers as at present and will be eo-
ordinate in almost all respects. The voting of grants of expendi-
ture in the votable portion of the budget will not be an exclusive
privilege of the lower house as at present, but has been extended
to the Council of State. Joint sittings of the chambers will
be held whenever there is a difference of opinion between them
on a legislative or financial issue.
The following tables give the allocation of seats in the
Council of State and the House of Assembly.
Council of State: Representatives of British India
Province oi community
Total seats
cr
'S
&
s
V
c
a
O
Seats for sche-
duled ca«*tes
Sikh seats
Muslim
seats
Women’s seats |
Madras
20
14
1
4
1
Bombay
16
10
1
4
1
Bengal
20
8
1
1
10
1
United Provinces
20
11
1
7
1
Punjab
16
3
. . .
4
9
i
Bihar
16
10
1
4 1
1
Central Provinces and Beiar
8
6
1
1 1
Assam
6
3
2
North-West Front loi Province
6
1
4 1
Orissa
f)
4
1 1
Sind
5
2
3
British Baluchistan
1
1 !
Delhi
1
’’i
A] mer-Merwara
1
1
Coorg
Chosen by the Governor-General
1
1
1
...
in his discretion
6
1
Anglo-Indians
1
1 ,,,
Europeans
7
...
.. i
Indian Christians
2
...
• • •
Total ...
156 '
“75'
~0
“ - 4 -
49
6"
The Federal Assembly: Representatives of British Indu
204
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
s^vds
|n«l!^8TjqQ OBipuj
S9V98
B^OOUIOjVV
jnoqvi
JOJ 8;B9g
sjap|oqpuBi
aOJ 8?B8g
^j:)8npai
pun dOJomtnoD
loj s^vag
sq'sas
n89dojn^
S^'BdS
nBipnj-oiSny
91)898
UII[8npJ
C« « *H iH rH ^
j
SO CO
CO^Oi-^C^M^^COCO-^rHCOr-ir-l ; 1
81)898 qqig
89)880 pojnpoqot.
JOJ p9Aa989J
81)898 1819 a9-0
8)898 |819a9S
JO 181)0X
€1|B9S 181)OX
1 C<J -CO SO r-l <M <N -i >-i
05f0003«D'X>C?^r-l'^ri rHi-lr-i
rH -1 — I ^ : :
t ^ Or '- l '-< 3 Q »0 0 » C >“ 3 » Oi - lCHrHr - lTT <
COCOCOCOCOOTr-4»— t
PH
: i : §
■ i,
2 rfi -- na .a
5 2
: >
•PQ • 2
p u
? p
. ^ • o
.2
5 "S
Ah «
= -3 • 2
S3 e8
ce
PQ
a
i
a
Total
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 205
Statement showing the Number of Seats assigned to the
Bigger States in the Federal Legislature
Name of State
Hyderabad
Mysore
Kashmir
Gwalior
Baroda
Kaiat
Eampur
Benares
Travancore
Cochin
Pudukkottai
Banganapallc
rfandur
Udaipur
Jaipur
Jodhpur
Bikaner
Alwar
Bharatpur
Indore
Bhopal
Rewa
Jhabua
Sailana
Sitarnau
Cutch
Idar
Nawanagar
Bhavnagar
Junagarb
Bajpipla
Palanpur
Bhrangadhra
Gondal
Porbunder
Morvi
Cambay
Dharampur
Balasinore
Bansda
Bachin
Jawbar
Danta
Dhrol
Jjimbdi
Wadhwan
Rajkot
\
I
No. of seats
m the Federal
Council of
Rtato
No. of seats
in the Federal
Legislative
Assembly
206 INDIAN administration
Statement showing the Number of Seats assigned to the*
Bigger States in the Federal Legislature
No. of seats
No of seats
Name of State
in tho Federal
C‘ouncil of
in the Federal
Legislative
State
Assembly
Kolhapur
2
. 1
Sangli
\
1
Saw ant wadi
Janjira )
Mudhol V
Bhor )
Jamkhandi
i
1
1
Mira] Senior
Mira] Junior > ...
1
1
Kurundw ad
Senior
Kurundwad Junior
1
Akalkot
Phaltan
Jat
,
1
1 '
1
Aundh
Ramdurgh /
Patiala
1
2
1 2
Khairpur
. .
1
1 1
Kapurtbsla
1
1
Nabha
1
1
Faridkot
Malerkotla
lioharu
! ■
1
1
1
Gooch Bihar
1
i
Tripura \
1
1
Manipur j
Mayurbhanj
i
1
Sonepur
§3. EFFECT OF THE CHANGES
It is necessary to explain the probable effects of the changes
that have been made in the constitution and powers of the
central legislature.
The present nominated and official bloc will vanish almost
Dlsappeufanoa completely, except for six seats in the Council of
of the nomi- State. This is a wholesome disappearance of that
nated bloc bureaucratic control of voting which offends against
the fundamentals of democratic polity. It may be argued
that the rigidity of party discipline and the loss of individuality
that it involves are equally serious defects of democracy. But
it cannot be forgotten that those installed as party leaders
occupy that position by the choice of their followers and are
liable to deposition and dismissal by them.
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 207
However, much of the good that will result from the with-
The Statei* drawal of the nominated and ofi&cial bloc may
representativeB be undone by the inevitable introduction of a
new element- The delegates from Indian States will form a
substantial portion of botli houses. The law does not prescribe,
though it does not prohibit, the election of any of them by
the subjects of States. They are to be nominated by their
.rulers. It is probable that some of the princes will cause
constituencies to be formed in their States and w'ill allow them
to elect representatives to the federal legislature. However,
such a self-imposed constitutional restraint will be the exception
and not the rule. A majorilv of the Indian State representa-
tives w^ill not be elected by the people of the States. They
will ho nominees of absolute masters and instruments of their
will. And in the delicate environment of paramountcy, the
autocratic masters themselves may prove to be unduly sus-
ceptible to the influence of the Department of the Crown’s
Representative.
However, on the assumption that the future constitution of
An ineyStable the country must he an all -India federation in-
pl»a8« ''luding the Indian States, the incongruity caused
by the presence of a large non-eleeted element in what is in-
tended to be a representative cliamher has to be faced; other-
wise the rulers of States wdll not accede to the federation.
There is comfort in the tliouglit that such a stage, though
inevitable, is likely to be temporary and transitional. It is more
than probable that the closer impact between the dynamic
ideals and activity of British India and the static outlook and
life of the States will acaaderate political colmciniNnes'- in the
siilijeets of the latter and ripen in their rulers the healthy
spirit of progressive <a)iistilutionalism.
The (’ouncil of State will be an assemblage of vested inter-
Council of csts, reactionary oligarchs and ( onstu’vative poli-
State would ticians. The franchise for its election will be ex-
bo thoroughly ceptioually high; 40 per cent of its membership
reactionary tamstitiited by State nominees. Besides,
it wall be a permanent bod^ and therefore will not he subject
to that wdiolesome cleansing whicli is periodically brought about
by a dissolution and general election. The abnormally long
term of nine a ears for members \\ill breed iiTesponsibility and
defiance in the legislators, heean^c* they will not bo restrained
by the thought of liaviiig to face their masters, the electors, at
short intervals.
Upon this narrow-based upper chamber the Act of. 1985 has
conferred a power which in a democratic polity is an exclusive
privilege of the lowaT cliamber. The voting of grants of expendi-
ture was denied to the Council of State by the Act of 1919.
But the federal counterpart of that chamber will be possessed
of that privilege. In short, everything seems to have conspired
208 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
to make the upper chamber a strong instrument for checking
the advance of democracy.
The federal budget will be divided into votable and non-
The Federal votable items as at present, and over 70 per cent
Budget of the total expenditure will be beyond the control
of the legislature. In this respect, there is no change for the
better. The absence of financial power imparts an air of un-
reality to responsible government and tends to reduce it to a
mockery.
It is pointed out by the advocates of federation that all these
Political defects, though real, may not prove so serious in
consciousnesB actual practice ns hostile critics may bo Jed lo
and the imagine. Por instance, the attempt to 'marry’
Princes democratic British India and feudal princedoms in
a single federation will be very difficult. Still, it is inevitable
that as political consciousness grows and agitation among tlie
States people for political rights becomes more and more in-
tense, Indian Princch vill ha\e to assume the status of consti-
tutional rulers like the monarchs of Europe. Paramountcy can-
not be interpreted to mean that Great Britain has the duty of
supporting a ruler in denying to his own subjects the very
rights which have been established by the authority of Parlia-
ment throughout British India. Such an interpretation was
authoritatively repudiated in Parliament. In fact the relation-
ship established by the Act between British India and the
States may not prove to be absolutely inflexible.
With regard to the special powers and responsibilities of
Emphaslfl on the Viceroy, it is stated that as the federal scheme
responsibility rests not so much on the old system of dyarchv
but on the principle of responsible government, the initiative
over the whole field of federal government, except in defence
and foreign affairs, will pass to the Ministry and gradually to
the legislature. Even in the field of defence and foreign affairs,
there will be no arbitrary division because no Viceroy will wush
to certify the military budget. He will inevitably do his best
to reach an agreement with his Ministry, for no defence policy
can be effective which does not command the loyal co-operation
of public opinion and the administrative machine.
Stress is also laid on the fact that federation is the only
Need for means of combining unity and national self-govem-
oonstitutional ment with local diversity and autonomy in so vast
a country as India. It is of the utmost importance
that the whole country should have not only a cultural but a
constitutional xmity. Its organically integrated character must
be maintained, particularly after the creation of self-governing
provincial divisions. Otherwise separatist influences will be-
come dominant and the result will be the creation of smaller
sovereignties which may be constantly at war with each other
THE FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 209
politically and economically, and may reduce the country to
chaos.
It is further argued that the commercial and industrial
Common development oi a sub-continent like India is in
economic many respects prejudiced by the absence of uni-
policy torrnity at present existing in, for example, com-
pany law, banking law, Jaw of cop3Tight and trademarks and
the like. It is most desirable that there should be established
over the whole fiscal field the greatest possible degree of unity
and uniformity. In the deternjination of tariff policies which
affect every part of India, Indian States must, in fairness to
them, be allowed to have an effective voice.
The Indian critic docs not deny the truth of these contentions.
Ill fac^, it is too obvious to be disputed. But the acceptance
of the tlieoreiical plea for the constitutional unity of India is
not equivalent to agreeing that the particular federal structure
outlined in the Act of 1935 is not vitiated and deformed in
such a way that wliat is intended to be a remedy will actually be
^^orsG lluin the disease. Indian opinion is not opposed to the
federal principle as such but to the specific scheme which was
iiiteiided to iniroduced in the country.
14
212 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
with which each generation seeks to solve its own problems.
Independent of Governments and parties, the Court’s primary
duty is to interpret the constitution. It would be its endeavour
to look at the constitution, not with the cold eyes of the
anatomist, but as a living and breathing organism which con-
tains within itself, as all life must, the seeds of future growth
and development. Its canons of interpretation would not ham-
per the free evolution of those constitutional changes for which
the Law' provided no sanction, but in which the political genius
of a people can find its most fruitful expression.
XXVI. FEDERAL FINANCE UNDER THE ACT
OF 1935
The history of centralized finance in India up to 1870, the
Change from growth of decentralization thereafter, and the re-
unitary to forms introduced by the Act of 1919 have been
federal polity explained in earlier chapters.^ It was an
evolution* towards provincial autonomy, but the change was
allowed to take place only in consistence with and within the
framew’ork of a unitary polity and government. The Act of
193.*) has distinctly provided for a federation. Even though the
federal scheme is at present held in abeyance, the provinces
}ia\e «ictually been made autonomous and self-governing to a
considerable extent. They have therefore acquired a new in-
dependence and ha\e come closer to the status of federal units.
It IS for this reason essential to understand the financial arrange-
ments that have been brought into existence after the Act of
193.*).
Th“ task of distributing sources of income betw'een the
Difficulty of centre mid the provinces in a federation presents
allocatiDg great difficulties The demands of both are ur-
revenues aent The duties that they are called upon to
perform are equally ^ital and beneficial to the whole nation.
For example, the responsibility of defence and foreign re-
lationv is entrusted to the Central Government, and its importance
to the country cannot be exaggerated. It is a very expensive
and onerous charge Se\eral matters of internal administration
which are common to the whole federal area and which require
a uniformity of oiitlodk and action are also managed by the
same .mthority. For the efficient discharge of all these obli-
gations the Federal Government must be supplied with
adecjiKite funds.
On the other hand, the Provincial Governments are directly
concerned with subjects like education, sanitation and public
health, w’hich bring about the material w'elfare and progress of
the eoinmunitv. They have an almost inexhaustible field for
the development of social services.’ In fact, the positive benefits
ot a eivilized corporate life, the tangible good of the very insti-
tution ot government, are realized to a great extent in the
provincial sphere. The monetary appetite of the provinces wdll
therefore be insatiable.
A balanced compromise has to be effected between such con-
flicting claims, and reasonable satisfaction given to both the
parties. The body of tax-payers is of course the same, whether
' Chapters xix and xx.
214 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
the tax-imposing authority is the Federal Government or the
province.
Sections 136-49 of Part VII of the Act are devoted to the
Scheme of question of finance. Other sections, dealing with
the Act the Eeserved subjects in the Federation, Indian
railways, the High Commissioner for India, etc., have also a
direct bearing on national expenditure because they impose
certain financial responsibilities on the federal exchequer. The
scheme of the allocation of revenues between the Federation
of India and its constituent units as contemplated by the Act
is based on the following principles. Eevenues derived from
items enumerated in the Federal Legislative List will be allo-
cated to the Federation. Eevenues derived from items enumer-
ated in the Provincial Legislative List will be allocated to the
provinces. There are several items in the Concurrent Legislative
List which are capable of yielding income by being taxed, but
their position does not seem to have been properly clarified in
the Act,
The following are among the sources of revenue found in
Federal eoareea the Federal Legislative List: customs duties;
of rexenue excise duties on goods manufactured pr produced
in India, except liquors, opium and narcotic drugs and
medicinal toilet preparations containing alcohol; corporation tax;
salt; taxes on income other than agricultural income; taxes on
capital; duties in respect of succession to property other than
agricultural land; stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange,
cheques, promissory notes, insurance policies, etc.; terminal
taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air; taxes on
railway freights and fares.
Out of this list, duties and taxes on the following items have
AuignmeiitB levied* and collected oy the Federation, but
from them their net proceeds in any financial year must be
assigned to the provinces and federated States and
proYlnces distributed among them in accordance with princi-
ples which may be formulated by an Act of the federal legislature :
succession to property other than agricultural land; federal stamp
duties; terminal taxes on goods and passengers carried by railway
or air; and taxes on railway fares and freights. The federal
legislature has the right to increase any of these duties or taxes
by a surcharge for federal purposes, and the whole of the proceeds
of the surcharge will go to the Federation.
Duties on salt, federal duties of excise, and export duties
have to be levied and collected by the Federation, but if an
Act of the federal legislature so provides, a part or the whole
of the proceeds must be paid out of the revenues of the
Federation to the provinces and federated States. The princi-
ples of distribution will be formulated by the federal Act. But
at least 50 per cent of the proceeds of the export duty on jute
FEDERAL FINANCE 215
must be assigned to the provinces or federated States in which
jute is grown.
A prescribed percentage, which has now been fixed at 50, of
ABBignments of the net proceeds of the taxes on income other than
income-tax agricultural income is to be assigned to the pro-
vinces and the federated States. But the federal legislature
may at any time increase the taxes by a surcharge for
federal purposes, and the whole proceeds of such a surcharge
shall go to the Federation. Similarly, out of the moneys assigned
to the provinces and federated States, the Federation may re-
tain certain prescribed sums for prescribed periods. So that
in case of financial stringency during the earlier years of the
operation of the federal machine the federal revenues will not be
depleted by grants made to the provinces and States.
The States will not be subjected to direct taxation by the
Federation except in the case of the corporation tax which may
be levied after ten years from the inauguration of the Federation.
They will also be called upon to pay special surcharges on
inconie-tax in an emergency. The corporation tax may be
commuted into a lump contribution.
Special subventions have to be given out of the revenues
Subventions n£ the Federation to make up the deficit in the
to deficit budgets of certain provinces. They have been
ppovinees fixed by an Order-in-Council, which was issued
in accordance with the recommendations of the Niemeyer
Report.^
The Federation has to pay out of its revenues sums required
Payments to by the Crown’s Representative for the discharge
the Crown’s of his functions in relation to the Indian States.
Representative signifying his acceptance of the Instrument of
Accession of any State, His Majesty may agree to remit any
cash contribution that may be payable by that State. De-
tailed provisions have been made in this connexion by section
147 of the Act.
The sources of income possessed by the Provincial Govern-
ments in the federal constitution have been described at length
ju Chapter XXXI-III, of this book.
The federal budget will be laid every year before the chambers
The federal ot the federal legislature, and will show separately
budget estimates of expenditure which are votable by
those chambers and those which are non-votable. The latter
are described as being charged upon the revenues of the
Federation and are beyond the control of the elected representa-
tives of the people. Those amounts will be spent in accordance
with the directions given by the Governor-General and his
bureaucratic advisers.
^ See chapter xxxii, §3.
216 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
The non-votable items as mentioned in section 33 are r
Non-YoUble Salaries and allowances of the Governor-GeneraU
expenditure Ministers, Counsellors, Financial Adviser, Advo-
cate-General, Chief Commissioners, staff of the Financial
Adviser, judges of the Federal Court and the High Courts; debt
charges including interest, sinking fund and redemption; ex-
penditure on defence, ecclesiastical affairs, external affairs, tribal
areas and excluded areas in the provinces; expense incurred
in discharging the functions of the Crown in relation to the
States, and in satisfying any decree, judgement or award of a
court; any other expenditure declared by the Act or by an
Act of the federal legislature to be non-votable. Section 247 (4)
also prescribes that the salary and allowances of persons appoint-
ed to a civil service or civil post by the Secretary of State are
charged upon the revenues of the Federation.
It has been calculated that all these sums put together
Cuts in would cover over foiir-rifths of the total expendi-
the Yotable ture of the Federation. The remaining fifth wilt
items can be submitted to the vote of the legislature in
be restored form of demands for grants. But any cut
in the demand made by the legislature can be restored by tho
Governor- General if he feels that it v-ould affect any of his
Special Kesponsibilities.
XXVII. INDIAN RAILWAYS AND THE FEDERAL
RAILWAY AUTHORITY
§1. IMPOETANCE OF EAILWAYS
IIaiIiWays play a very important part in the life of a modem
Economic, community. They give a powerful impetus to the
military and development of industry, trade and commerce
^Itural and bring about the economic prosperity of a
bcnefitB nation. The services rendered by them in times
of war are ot inestimable Aalue. The facility of cheap and
comfortable tra\el helps to multiply human contacts and to
eidarge tbe human mind and vision. In short, railways are the
grand aiteries not only of a nation-wide system of Comnjuni-
cations, bnt also of the realtu of knowledge, art and culture.
Every state is therefore interested in the adequacy and the
efficiency of its railway organization.
Unlike most other social utilities, the construction and
Vast capital operation of railw’ays in\olves a vast outlay of
expenditure capda^ expenditure. Difficult and costly engineer-
ing projects iik(' bridges and tunnels have to be carried out
successfully; high-powered engines and otlier types of machines
liMve to be continuously employed; a large staff of experts and
others has to la* constantlv maintained. All this means great
expense. But on the other side, the income earned by rail-
ways i'. also immense. They carr\ thousands of tons of goods
and millions ol passengers every year, and their daily gross
earnings are counted In lakhs of rupce.s.
Ilailwa%s nla^ 1)(* owned and managed by a state or by private
Business companies "incorporated within a state. But in
principles of any case the fact cannot be forgotten that, in
working a capitalistic society, they are in the nature of
necessary l)visiness concerns and require to be conducted
on sound commercial principles, consistently witli the safe-
guarding of national inteivsts as defined by progressive thinkers.
The capital investments made in railways, e^en when they
belong to pri\ate shareholders, are* a national asset and need
to be protected, though no protection can l)e granted at the
cost of social justice and the welfan^ of the community as a
w hole.
AMiether railway ownership and management vests in the
state or in private companies, a twofold objective needs to be
achieved. The freshness, elasticity and economic equilibrium
of private enterprise have to be preserved: and simultaneously
the abuses of private monopoly, unbridled lust of profit and
criminal indifference to the public good, have to be effectively
prevented
218 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
§2. RAILWAYS IN INDIA
Railway construction was first started in India in 1854
Progress of during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie,
railways and it has made rapid progress since then. There
in India are at present about 43,000 miles of railway
track in the country, and the total amount of capital invested
in them amounts to nearly 880 crores of rupees. Most of the
work was done by private joint stock companies formed in
England with English capital. They received a number of
concessions from the Government of India, including a guarantee
of interest on the capital spent. That is how the E.I., G.I.P.,
B.B.&C.I., M.&S.M., S.I. and similar other railway companies
came into existence. Specific portions of Indian territory were
allotted to them for operation.
Originally, the ownership and management of railways
GoTernment vested in these companies with certain restrictions
ownership imposed on them by the Government. When
and company the period of their contract came to an end,
management many of the companies were purchased by the
state in accordance with the terms of the contract, and state
ownership thus came to be established over many railways. But
state ownership did not mean state management. After the
purchase of the railways, the Government entered into fresh
agreements with the same companies, entrusting the working
of their railway systems to them on certain conditions. These
new contracts were terminable at the end of specified periods.
A number of defects were noticed in railway administration
Acworth policy during the Great War of 1914-18, and
Committee therefore when it was time for the contracts with
rerammen- the E.I.R. and the G.I.P.R. to come to an end,
dations Government appointed a committee under the
presidency of Sir William Acworth to investigate the whole
question and to make recommendations for reform. Two
momentous changes were introduced as a result of the com-
mittee’s report. In the case of the companies with whom the
contracts were expiring, the state took the management into
their own hands and to that extent the old method of company
management w^as abolished. Secondly, the railway budget was
separated from the general budget of the Government of India
and a fixed contribution began to be taken from the railways
towards the general revenues of the country.
The Indian people have been very critical about the railway
Indian policy pursued by the Government. No special
critlclgin of effort was made to attract Indian capital and to
railways employ Indian talent in their construction and
working. On the contrary, generous concessions were granted
to the foreign companies- which were formed for the purpose of
constructing and operating them. The guarantee of interest
INDIAN BAILWAYS AND PEDEBAL AUTHOEITY 219
on the capital invested was bound to encourage not economy
but extravagance. The capital expenditure of hundreds of crores
of rupees was not so organized and incurred as to lead to the
growth of big industries in India. In fact, the Indian railways
were often accused of injuring Indian industries by quoting un-
favourable tariff rates for the carriage of their produce. Indians
were excluded from the higher branches of railway service, and
tho conditions of travelling for third class passengers, who form
the majority of the Indian people and who contribute the major
portion of the railway income, were intolerable.
Management of railways by the state was expected to go a
Advantage long way towards removing most of these evils,
of state The private shareholders* companies incorporated
managemept foreign country were beyond the criticism and
control of the Indian people. But even a bureaucratic Govern-
ment could be reached and indirectly influenced by non-official
members of the Indian legislature. In a fully self-governing
India, railway policy and administration will be determined
by the Indian people acting through their elected legislatures
and responsible Ministers. No outside interference will then
be permissible.
At present the railway department is in charge of the Mem-
The Railway ber for Communications in the Central Executive
Board Council. Below him there is the Eailway Board
consisting of the Chief Commissioner, the Financial Com-
missioner and one member, \\ath directors, deputy-directors
and secretaries under them. The railway budget is presented
separately by the Communications Member to the central legis-
lature, which can discuss it generally and \ote a part of its
grants. The Eaihvay Board was the oxeciiti\e creation of the
Government of India for the convenience of administration and
was not the result of any Parliamentary statute. Its composition
and duties can be varied without reference to Parliament and
even its existence can be brought to an end by the orders of the
Government of India with the sanction of the Secretary of
State.
58. CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE ACT OF 1985
Tho proposed transfer of political power into the hands
Statutory Indians raised the question of control over
railway railways. Large amounts of British capital have
authority been invested in them and Parliament did not
w^ant to jeopardize this capital even remotely by any consti-
tutional changes that may be introduced in India. The matter
was considered by a sub-committee appointed by the Secretary
of State in 1933 and also by the Joint Parliamentary Committee,
and it was recommended that the actual control of the admini-
stration of Indian railways should be placed in the hands of a
220 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Statutory Railway Authority which would be free from political
interference. Accordingly, Part VIII of the Act, sections 181-
99, and the Eighth Schedule have been devoted to the subject
of railways.
It is laid down that the executive authority of the Federa-
ItB tion of India in respect of the regulation and
Constitution construction, maintenance and operation of rail-
ways shall be exercised by the Federal Railway Authority.
It will be a corporate body and will consist of seven persons to be
'•appointed by the Governor-General. Of these not less than
three are to be appointed by him in his discretion and tlie rest
presumably on the advice of his Ministers. From among the
members a President of the Authority is to be appointed by the
Governor-General in his discretion.
No person will be qualified to be a member of the Authority
Qualifioations (a) unless he has had experience in commerce,
and tenure of industry, agriculture', finance or administration or
Its memben if is^ or within the twelve , months last
preceding has been, (i) a member of the federal or any pro-
vincial legislature or (ii) in the service of the Crown in India
or (iii) a railway official in India. The tenure of a member is
to be five years and he will be eligible for reappointment for a
further term not exceeding five years. The Governor-General
exercising his indi\idual judgement may terminate the appoint-
ment of any member if he is found unable or unfit to perforn*
his duties. The salary and allowances are to be determined
by the Governor-General in his individual judgement.
At the head of the executive* staff of the Authority there will
Official staff be a Chief Railway Commissioner appointed by
the Governor-General exercising lus individual judgement after
consultation wdth the' Authority. He will be a man with
experience of railway administration. He will be assisted by a
Financial Commissioner appointed by the Governor- General and
by such additional commissioners as the Authority on the
recommendation of the Chief Commissioner may appoint. The
Chief Commissioner and Financial Commissioner will have the*
right to attend any meeting of the Authority.
The Authority in discharging their functions will have
Federal business principles, due regard being paid
control OTor to tlie interests of agriculture, industry, com-
Policj merc*e and the general public. On all questions
of policy they wdll be guided by instructions given to them by
the Federal Government. If any dispute arises as to whether
a question is or is not a question of policy the decision of the
Governor-General in his discretion will be final. He may also
issue to the Authority such directions as he may deem necessary
in respect of matters involving any of his Special Res-
ponsibilities or in regard to which he is required to act in his
INDIAN EAILWAYS AND FEDEEAL AUTHOEITY 221
discretion or in his individual judgement. The Authority must
give effect to such directions.
The Governor-General exercising his individual judgement,
Buies for ^^'^t after consultation with the Authority, may
transaction make rules for the transaction of business arising
of busineu out of the relations between the Federal Govem-
uient and the Au1;hoTity. They shall include provisions re-
quiring the Authority to transmit to the Federal Government
all such information as may be specified in the rules and to
bring to the notice of the Governor-General any matter which
involves or is likely to involve any Special Responsibility vested
in him.
The Authority is required to establish, maintain and control
The Rail- a fund to be known as the Railway Fund^ and
way Fund all nioneys received by the Authority whether
on revenue account or on capital account from any source
have to be paid into that Fund. All expenditure, whether
on revenue account or on capital account, required for the dis-
<-harge of their functions has to be defrayed out of the Fund.
Ativ surpluses on revenue account have to be apportioned
betwf'cn the Fed^o-alion and the Authority in accordance with
<i scheme to he prepareil, aiid from time to time re\iewed, by
the Federal Government.
The Governor-General may from time to time appoint a
Railway Railway Rates rommittce to give adtice to the
Committee Authority in connexion with any dispute as to
rates or traffic facilities bettveen the public and
the Authority. A Rill or amendment for regulating the rates
or fares to be cliarged on any raihvay can be introduced in
an\ chamber of the legislature only on the recommendation
of the (lOvernor-General.'
Thf*re w'ill be a Raihvay Tribunal consisting of a President
Railway and two other persons selected by the Governor-
Tribunal Gieneral in his discretion. They will be men of
raihvay, administrative or business experience. The President
wdll be a judge of the Federal Court a7id will hold office for a
period of not loss than five years as may be specified in the
appointment. It will bo the duty of the Tribunal to exercise
such jurisdiction as is conferred on it by tlie Act, and an appeal
from ils decision w’ill lie to the Federal Court on a question of
law’.
It will bo seen from this brief account of the constitution and
Results of functions of the Federal Railway Authority that
the change a special aiTangement has been proposed for the
administration of Indian railways after the inauguration of the
Federation and the introduction of partial responsibility. They
xvill not be a Reserved subject in charge of the Governor-
General and outside the competence of the legislature. But
they will not be in charge of a responsible Minister either.
222 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
The Authority to which their management is entrusted will be
dominated by the Governor-General acting in his discretion in
many ways. And no change can be brought about in its consUtu-
tion and function except with the sanction of Parliament because
it will mean an amendment of the Act of 1935. Thus Parliament’s
direct control is established over the nature of the machinery
which manages the railways of India.
PART V
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
XXVIII. THE GROWTH AND FORMATION OF PROVINCES . j 224
XXIX. THE GROWTH OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS DP TO
THE ACT OF 1919 . . . . . . . . 235
XXX. dyarchy and its working : 1921-37 . . . . 242
XXXI. THE PROVINCES IN THE FEDERAL CON3TITLTION . . 258
XXXIl. THE AMBIT OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY . . 263
XXXm. THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: THE GOVERNOR . . 274
XXXrV. THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE. THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS . . . . . 297
XXXV. THE provincial legislvtlul .. 311
XXXVI. THE relation Ji THE IXLCLTIVE TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE . . . . . . 328
XXXVn. THE WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY . . 333
XXVIII. THE GROWTH AND FORMATION
OF PROVINCES
§1. THE EARLIER SETTLEMENTS AND THEIR
OFEICIALS
The evolution of a mighty and extensive empire from small
iind unostentatious beginnings is the dominant note in the pages
of Indian history for three-quarters of the century following
the battle of Plassey. In the moral, material and intellectual
exhaustion which seems to have prostrated the vitality of India,
province after province capitulated before the might ot the
foreigner. The last gasp of the dying nation was breathed in
1857 when a desperate though feeble attempt to regain what was
lost ended in total collapse.
The conquest of India by the British race was at once a
The nature continuous and a sporadic process. The continuity
of the Indian lay in the idea; the absence of symmetry and
Conquest system was due to the varied and unequal
nature of the opposition which w'as ottered lo the conqueror
and which had to be overcome before tlie conqueror's authority
w’as established. There are w’cll-mnrked periods durinc wdiich
the work ot expansion was carried out. Periods ot iiu'essanl
and aggressive activity ahvays alternate wdlli periods of
comparative stagnation and quiet. Such spells of inaction,
indeed, seem to ha\e curiously combined in themsehes the
elements of both cause aJid effect, the latter, so far as rela\atio]i,
naturally follow^s an era of feverish energy, and the iornier. in so
far as ak undisturbed spell of peace, acts as a restorative and
invigorates the tendency to action.
Beginning with Bengal, wdiich practically became a British
Work of a possession alter the grant oi the Diwani in 1765,
century the powder of England had spread practically
lo the w'hole of India by 1857. Bengal and the Carnatic were
being simultaneously acquired during the time of Lord Clive.
With the fall of Tippu Sultan and the decline and fall ot the
Maratha power in 1818 the wliole of south Jndia, and aljnost
the wdiole of central India bordering on its eastern side Hie
British possession of Bihar, that is almost the whole of the land
with the exception of two areas on the w^estern borderland, came
under the suzerainty of the new masters. Sind followed in
18B9; the Punjab came next in 1852, and finally in 1857 came
the defeat of the forlorn endeavour of desperate impotence.
The history of this chequered period is filled by the glamour
■of the exploits of a Clive, of a Wellesley, a Hastings, and a
Dalhousie, as also by the restraining influence of a Shore, a
Minto or a Bentinck. The larger and longer the conquest,
GEOWTH AND FOBMATION OF PBOVJNCES 225
‘4;he more complicated and responsible became the task of preserv-
ing in good order the huge and incongruous acquisition.
Originally, settlements of the East India Company were
OoYernors of established in the three coastal towns of Bombay,
factorieg Madras and Calcutta, and so long as the Company's
business was strictly commercial, it was not necessary to
appoint any important political officer for the administration
of the factories. The first mention of the power of appointing
Governors and other high officers over their fortresses is made
in the Charter that was granted in 1661 during the reign of
Charles II. The Governor, along with a few senior servants
of the Company, formed what was known as the Council. The
President of the Council and the Governor were one and the
same person. Madras, Bengal and Bombay each had its own
Governor and Council and each ultimately came to be known
as a Presidency, as being the jurisdiction of the President-in-
Oouncil. There was no authority on the spot in India which*
was superior to all the three or to any one of them. Their
powers and status were co-ordinate. All of them were controlled
directly from England by the East India Company.
It is clear that the chief business of the officials in India
Early officials to negotiate for special privileges and con-
were purely cessions for their trade, to safeguard the interests
commercial of their merchants and traders and actually to
supervise their commercial transactions. They had no politi-
cal mission. Soinetiineb, indeed, their help was sought by the
reigning monarch for the suppression of his enemies; sometimes
they came into conflict with the reigning monarchs over questions
of disputed privileges which the Company claimed but which
the monarch declined to recognize. On the whole, however, till
the death of Auraiigzeb in 1707, the East India Company’s
officers were almost entirely officers^ in a business concern. Their
field of activity ^vas limited to the area of the seaports. They
had political power or jurisdiction only over their own servants
and only to the extent that was essential for conducting the
affairs of the factory. Thus the Governor and Council of each
factory were empowered to judge their servants and subjects in
all causes. They were also given power to declare war or peace
with any ‘heathen' nation in Asia or America, or to declare
martial law in their factories. The Governor was to exercise
all powers of a Captain-General of the army. In short, the
Governor-in-Council was vested with those administrative powers
which were necessary to maintain the existence and activity of
^the Company.
With the gradual transformation of the Company from a
commercial into a political body, the nature of the duties of
1ihe Governor and his Council, as also the extent and character
of their jurisdiction and power, necessarily underwent a change.
15
226
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Acceptance
of political
reiponsibility
by the Comp-
any
The acceptance of the Diwani after a complete victory in tho
battle of Buxar practically meant the acceptance
of sovereign responsibility for the provinces of
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. British authority had
also in the meantime been established over the
southern province of the Carnatic. After 1757
and till the passing of the Eegulating Act in 1774, tho
Governors and the Councils of the three Presidencies had to
watch with vigilance the rufiBied course of politics in their
respective spheres and to guard against any onslaught upon
the supremacy that they had newly acquired in north and
south India.
In these early days, the Governors of the three presidencies
Independency were all independent of each other. There was no
of the authority in India which could control any or all
proTlneial of them. And therefore every Governor looked
Ooiernors orders from his superiors abroad, who were
separated from the actual scene of operations by a distance
of 6,000 miles. So long as the Company’s business was purely
commercial and so long as no further political or military
complications were introduced, the Governor’s duties were
comparatively simple and did not involve any very great risks,
either financial or political. Control from distant England did
not prove inadequate. The keeping of regular standing armies,
the fighting of regular battles, negotiations of treaties of peace,
were no parts of the business of trade. No centralized authority,
therefore, was necessary.
§2. AFTEK THE EEGULATING ACT
The establishment of .territorial sovereignty over a vast area,.
Need for with all the responsibility of governance that it
unity of involved, urgently necessitated a reorganization of
control the whole system of the Company’s Indian
management. Unity of command and control throughout
the Company’s dominions in India, and uniformity of guidance,
were found indispensable for proper governance and safety.
The independence of the Governors, and the capricious origi-
nality in design and action which every one of them might
enthusiastically try to show, were not calculated to benefit the
administration. The system was found to be mischievous.
Madras or Bombay might not prove susceptible to the demands
and difficulties of distant Bengal, and the unseemly spectacle
might be witnessed of distant provinces assuming an attitude
of culpable indifference when another, distant province was in
danger. Considerations of this kind dictated the change that
was introduced by the Eegulating Act in 1773, amongst the
many others that were aho inaugurated by it.
One of the clauses of this Act clearly laid down that the
GEOWTH AND FOBMATION OF PEOVINCES 227
Governor of Bengal was to be supreme over the other
The Regulat- Governors. In war and peace and also in other
ing Aot important administrative matters the minor
Governors were enjoined to obey the Govemor-General-of-
Bengal-in-Council. The title of Governor-General was given to
the Governor of Bengal. The fact that he was designated
Governor-General of Bengal and not of India is indicative of
the absence of any ambition on the part of the Company’s
proprietors, to include the whole length and breadth of India
under their supreme control. The office of Governor-General
was a new creation but the person who filled the office was not
now. The Governor of Bengal himself become the Governor-
General. The duties of the two offices were combined in one
person. Direct executive responsibility for the province of
Bengal proper was not separted from the duties of the Governor-
General. Thus one and the same person was required to perform
extremely complicated and heavy duties, disposal of local
problems and imperial dictation being both left to him.
With the creation of the office of Governor-General and the
Centralization definite declaration of the supremacy of Bengal
over the other Picjsidencies, the Governors of the latter were
automatically reduced in status and were thrown comparatively
into the background. They were no longer independent. In-
deed, as has already been described, this reduction in status
and loss of power was not easily digested by the provincial
Governors immediately after the passing of the Eegulating
Act. They defied the revelant clause of the Act and took
certain steps on their owm initiative without even consulting
their newly creaied head, and put him at times into em-
barrasbing situations. Such insubordination, how'ever, could only
be temporary. Masterful personalities at the head did not brook
their defiance and matters were soon settled as they were in-
tended to be settled by the Act.
Pitt’s India Act of 1784 once more emphasized the control
Pitt’g of the Governor-General-in-Council over the other
India Act presidencies. In fact, this control wa 3 enlarged
so as to include clearly all matters connected with war, peace,
revenues, the army, etc. This measure also laid down that
each presidency was to have a Governor and three Councillors
including the Commander-in-Chief. The Governors and the
Councillors were to be appointed by the Court of Directors and
could only be removed either by the Crown or by the Directors.
From this time onwards, therefore, each presidency had a form
of government analogous to that of the Central Government.
There was a person at the head who was assisted by a few
councillors. The Governor-General-in-Council exercised powers
of superintendence and general control in all important matters
concerning the provinces.
228 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
The Charter of 1793 extended to the Governors of iMctdras
The Charter and Bombay the power of overriding their Councils
of 1793 in case of a difference of opinion between them
and their Councils, and when they felt that the peace,
safety or good government in the province would be endangered
by the attitude taken by their Councils. Such a power had
already been conceded to the Governor-General when Lord
Cornwallis, wiser by the experience of Warren Hastings,
specially stipulated for it in 1786. It was thought better to
concede a similar extraordinary power to provincial heads also,
to enable them to discharge their duties properly. The Governor's
extraordinary veto against the Executive Council thus dates
from the year 1793.
In 1807 the Governors and Councils of Madras and Bombay
were given the same power of issuing regulations that had
been enjoyed by the Governor-General-in-Council since the
Eegulating Act. The Provincial Government did not need
henceforth always to depend upon the Central Government in
order to get any legislative measure, beneficial for the province,
placed on the statute book. The Charter of 1813 gave to the
Provincial Governments the power of taxation. Tne power had
many limitations, but even then its deliberate grant was signifi-
cant, as showing the Cen.,ral Government’s appreciation of
the imporlance of Provincial Governments and the necessity
and desirability of granting them freedom generally in local affairs.
The Charter Act of 1833 tended in the direction of centrali-
The Act zation. It expressly declared that the Governor-
t)f 1833 General of Bengal should be henceforth desig-
nated the Governor-General of India. The old designation
had become an anachronism after the political events and
military conquests which took place subsequent to the passing
of the Regulating Act. This Act also deprived the Provincial
Governments of any right of law-making. That power was
exclusively vested in the Governor-Genoral-in-Council. The
Provincial Governments had merely to submit drafts if they
wished any law” to be passed for themselves. The appointment
of a special Law Member to the Govemor-General’s Executive
Council and the need for a comprehensive consolidation and
codification of the existing law were responsible for this restriction
imposed upon the Provincial Governments. Already there were
five different bodies of law in operation in India, and it was
thought better to secure uniformity by preventing Provincial
Governments from having their own codes.
This Act also proposed to divide the overgrown Presidency
of Bengal into two provinces, one with headquarters at Port
William and the other at Agra. This step had been long overdue,
thanks to the unplanned and spasmodic manner in which pro-
vinces were formed in India. Every piece of territory that was
acquired after the Diwani and that was contiguous to the
GROWTH AND FORMATION OF PROVINCES 229
possessions obtained under the arrangements of the Diwani was
■ I ^ Aftt simply added on to them. The shortsightedness
of^Lieutonant- method of allocation of new acquisition
OoTernort will be clear when it is understood that in
and Chief 1833, when the Charter Act was being passed,
Commis- Presidency of Bengal included in its terri-
Bloaera torial and political jurisdiction the present
provinces of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, and Assam and a
large portion of territory now included in the United Provinces
including Benares and Agra. It was physically impossible for
one man to be an active and efficient day-to-day administrator
of this vast tract, to supervise its affairs and at the same time
to bear the responsibility of formulating a comprehensive^ im-
perial pglicy and of superintending provincial administrations.
The Charier Act proposed to reduce this unbearable burden and
make matters more convenient by dividing the whole tract into
two provinces to be governed by separate Governors. But the
arrangement never worked out in practice and this clause of
the Act remained a dead letter.
Howe\^r, the Governor-General was empowered in 1836 to
The N.-W. create a liieutenant-Govemorship for the North-
ProYinoe V\ estein Provinces. This province w'as rechris-
or U.P. tened the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in
1902, and is still known by that name. The appointment of
a Lieutenant-Governor relieved the great pressure of work upon
the Governor-General.
The Charter Act of 1853 authorized the appointment of a
Bengal and separate Governor of Bengal, and till he was
the Punjab appointed it authorized the Directors and the
Board to nominate a Lieutenant-Governor for the province.
Such a Lieutenant-Governor w^as appointed in 1854, the appoint-
ment of a Governor being postponed till the year 1912. The
Governor- General of India was relieved of direct executive res-
ponsibility for the administration of any province and could now
devote his undivided attention to fulfilling his duties as a
supervising and controlling central pow^er. The Charter also
gave authority to the Directors either to constitute one new
province with a Governor and Council, or to appoint a Lieutenant-
Governor. Accordingly a Lieutenant-Governor for the Punjab
was created in 1859. No new Governor was appointed.
Oudh, which was Innexed in 1856 and put under the
authority of a Chief Commissioner, was merged in the North-
Western Provinces in 1877.
By an Act of 1854 the Govemor-General-in-Council, with
The C.P sanction of the Directors and the Board,
Burma, Aseam could take by proclamation under his immediate
and N.-W.F. authority and management any part of the
ProTinee territories in possession of the Company and then
give orders for its administration. The mode in w’’hich this
230 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
power was used was by the appointment of Chief Commissioners
to whom the Governor-General delegated the necessary powers.
Chief Commissioners were accordingly appointed for the Central
Provinces in 1861 and Lower Burma in 1862. Berar, taken
over from the Nizam in 1903, was linked with the Central
Provinces. On the conquest of Upper Burma and on its addi-
tion to the province of Lower Burma in 1886, a Lieutenant-
Governor was appointed as administrator in place of the old
Chief Commissioner. Assam had been annexed to Bengal in
1826 and was formed into a separate Chief Commissionership
in 1874. In the partition of Bengal in 1905, Assam, together
with the eastern half of Bengal, was converted into one
Lieutenant-Governorship. When the partition was annulled in
1912, Assam once more became a Chief Commissionership.
The North-West Frontier Province was formed in 1901 by
detaching the frontier districts from the Punjab. Delhi was
created a separate province under a Chief Commissioner when
it was made the capital in 1911.
The Government of India were empowered by the Act of
1854 to define the limits of the various provinces The Act
further expressly vested in the Governor-General-in-Council all
residuary authority not given to the local Governments. The
additions to the British territory made by Lord Dalhousie and
the urgent necessity of splitting up the tremendously over-
grown province of Bengal at last goaded the home authorities
to take steps which would authorize the formation of new pro-
vinces and help in the systematization of their management.
§3. TYPES OF PROVINCES
Henceforth three different types of provinces are visible.
Three types The first type included the old presidencies or
of provinees Governor’s provinces, the second included pro-
vinces under Lieutenant-Gtevernors and the third those under
Chief Commissioners. The first type naturally enjoyed a higher
status as they were the more ancient and enjoyed special privi-
leges. After the abolition of the East India Company, the
power of appointing Governors of the presidencies was vested
in His Majesty acting on the advice of the Secretary of State.
The Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners were ap-
pointed on the recommendation of the^Govemor-General. The
Governors had also privilege of being in direct correspondence
with the Secretary of State, it being only necessary for them
to send copies of such communications to the Governor-General.
Lieutenant-Governors and Chief Commissioners on the other
hand had a comparatively lower status, particularly the Chief
Commissioners, who were mere delegates of the Governor-
General in respect of the necessary powers of administration
that were granted to them. One more distinction has to be
GEOWTH AND FOBMATION OF PEOVINCES 231
noted. The Governors* provinces necessarily possessed Exe-
cutive Councils. It was not so with either Lieutenant-Governors'
or Chief Commissioners’ provinces.
The Eeforms Act of 1919 entirely did away with this
OhangeB distinction and all provinces were declared to be
made by the Governors* provinces. However, the old difference
Montford in the authority which made the appointments
Reforms remained. Governors of the three old presidencies
continued as before to be nominated from England on the
advice of .the Secretary of State. They were persons outside
the Indian Civil Service and had often been prominent party
leaders or Parliamentarians. They had naturally a higher status.
All the other Governors were nominated on the recommendation
of the p^overnor-General and were usually men who had put
in a successful and long period of service in India. These
were prize posts for the ambitious and capable members of
the bureaucracy and they were generally left in the gift of
the chief authority on the spot, namely the Governor-General.
Such provinces could not have, therefore, the status of the old
presidencies. The Act of 1858 expressly gave the Governor-
General the right of appointing Lieutenant-Governors.
Another distinction in the provinces was introduced when
Regulation ^he practice was initiated of administering newly
and Non- conquered territories like Assam, the Punjab,
Regulation Saugor, etc., not under the laws and regulations
ProYinces force in the old provinces like Bengal and
Bihar, but under instructions issued by the Governor-General-
in-Council. Such provinces came to be known as Non-Eegulation
Provinces as distinguished from the old Eegulation Provinces
of Madras, Bengal and Bombay. In the Non-Eegulation
Provinces great discretion was allowed to officers, and the
administration was conducted in accordance wdth simpler codes,
modified to suit the circumstances of each special case. How-
€ver, in course of time, tlie distinction practically disappeared
and was almost non-existent at the time of the introduction of
the Montford Eeforms, except for some difference in the titles
of officers. In the Non-Eegulation Provinces, for instance, the
Collector was designated the Deputy-Commissioner and the
Deputy-Collector was knowm as the Extra Assistant Com-
missioner. After the Montford Eeforms, all provinces were
raised to the dignity of Governors* provinces and therefore the
tlistinction disappeared.
§4 DEMAND FOE A EEAEEANGEMENT OP
THE PEOVINCES
The fundamental fact must be borne in mind that nearly a
century was required to achieve the conquest of the whole of
India. As a consequence, that symmetry of arrangement and
232 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
naturalness of division which might be expected to follow from
Unplaiyied a unified conception are conspicuous by their
fbrmatldn of absence in the policy that was evolved during a
ProiinooB period of successive war and peace. To take an
instance from everyday life, it was not as if an extensive and
open piece of ground was systematically developed, and a
mansion, planned with careful attention to all detail, was erected
upon it. It was on the other hand like the purchase of oner
site first and the gradual acquisition of adjoining sites after-
wards. Officials of the East India Company w’ho were called
upon to form political subdivisions of the country during the
period and process of conquest could not have the perspective
of a whole British Indian Dominion, because it had not become
a reality then.
It is obvious that a continent like India is too big, diversi-
Proper and unwieldy to be treated as one single and
principlftB In coherent unit for the purpose of administration,
the formation It had to be divided into various provinces, in
of provinces order to ensure a clear division and demarcation
of responsibility and to avoid confusion in management. There
are certain well-recognized principles on which the formation
of such provincial subdivisions ought to be based. Under
normal conditions and given a fairly numerous population,
a common language, common historical affinities, common
customs and traditions, common modes of life and thought and
a common territory are regarded as natural lines of demarcation
and division. They would represent distinct entities, each one
of which is unified by strong internal ties. It must be remember-
ed that for centuries together the larger Indian nation has been
composed of small but difierent nationalities, each confined
mainly to a particular part of the country. Political divisions
could very appropriately follow these linguistic and cultural
divisions.
No such deliberate principle of division underlies the for-
Indlan mation of provinces in India. The basis of di-
provlnces not vision is not ethnological, linguistic or cultural,
homogeneous TJig one factor that influenced and necessitated
the division was administrative convenience. And hence some
of the Indian provinces have become heterogeneous conglomer-
ations with a great variety of languages and society. The
Bombay Presidency, which consisted of four or five distinct
cultural groups, Sind, Kathiawar, Gujarat, Maharashtra and the
Karnatak, is a case in point. Sind, which was conquered in
1839 — that is, before the conquest of the Punjab — could not be
given independent status, and therefore it was merely attached
to the British province geographically nearest to it, to Bombay.
Many of the provinces were carved out of new acquisitions,
and administrative convenience being the sole underlying aim
of the division, the spectacle of homogeneous units being split
GROWTH AND FORMATION OF PROVINCES 233
up into divisions and their solidarity destroyed by their inclusion
in two different provinces is not uncommon. The Kamatak,
Maharashtra and Berar are pertinent instances. Some of the
Indian provinces are therefore mere patchwork, mere congrega-
tions of different groups which among themselves have not that
affinity which results from common characteristics and common
development.
This spasmodic and irrational method of the formation of
Demand for provinces has had an interesting sequel. There
an alteration has now arisen in many parts of the country con-
^ proTlncial siderable agitation for a rearrangement' of pro-
Doundariee vincial boundaries on more rational and equitable
lines. The growth of education has produced a selfconsciousness
in this in all other spheres of public life. People who are
closely united by tics of a common race, a common language
and a common culture, find themselves split into ineffective
political fragments. They feel that their material and intellectual,
progress is unnecessarily hampered as the result of such a
dissipation of their collective strength.
Several homogeneous groups have therefore protested against
Sind and tho'r political dismemberment by the Govern-
Orissa ment of India and have demanded that they should
separated be restored to their natural unity. Unfortunately,
communal ambitions and wranglings were greatly in evidence
even in this question, when the separation of Sind was dis-
cussed. The Act of 193t3 has recognized the claims of Sind
and Orissa to provincial independence and accordingly these
two names have been added to the list of Governors* provinces.
It would not be surprising if a few more are added in the course
of the next few years by the splitting up of glaringly hetero-
geneous areas. '
A brief reference must be made here to the other side of
New provinces this important subject. The creation of new pro-
may require vinces has been deprecated by some eminent
BubTentions critics on financial as veil as national grounds.
It is held to be a costly luxury. If the provincial area is
small, it cannot be self-sufficient in the matter of its income
and expenditure. Its administrative machinery may also prove
to be inadequate to meet all the various needs of social uplift
according to modern standards. Such lean provinces will then
become a burden upon the Federation which will have to help
them with subventions in order that their budgets should be
balanced. It has been decided, for instance, that Sind and
Orissa should be given annually about a crore and half a crore
of rupees respectively by the Central Government to enable
them to make up their deficits.
It is also pointed out that the present incongruous for-
mation of provinces has its own advantages in a larger national
234 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
sense. It brings together under one administrative system
OolllTatioii several of the smaller nationalities of which India
of a wider is made. They get an opportunity to work to-
natlonal gether and to understand each other. Such con-
outlook between diverse populations is to be desired,
as it helps in rounding oflE the angularities off a narrow pro-
vincialism and inculcates the broader national vision which is so
urgently required in India. A cosmopolitan outlook and a capacity
for assimilation are at least as essential in the modern world as
the strength which comes from innate coherence. A ;’eshuflBing
of the provincial areas may be undertaken in a spirit of reform
and justice, but even then some common meeting ground,
some common organization for the different neighbouring units
to remain in touch with each other, should be provided.
XXIX. THE GEOWTH OP PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENTS UP TO THE ACT OF 1919
§1. THE PEpVINCIAIi EXECUTIVE TILL 1919
Before the advent of provincial autonomy in April 193T, the
provinces were under a system of administration which was
known as dyarchy. It was introduced by the Montagu-Chelms-
ford Eeforms in 1921. Even before that date, of course, every
province had a Government existing and functioning in its
area. The executive and legislative aspects of the provincial
Governments had, in fact, passed through successive stages of
devolopnient with almost every important legislative measure,
from the Eegulaling Act to the Act of 1919, which was passed
by ihc British Parliament for the Government of India.
Originally, the business affairs of the East India Company in '
The Governor the three trading centres of Madras, Bombay and
Calcutta were managed by officers called Presidents, who
subsequently came to be designated as Governors. The first
mention of th^ po'ver to appoint Governors is found in the
Charter of 1661. Since then, these officers continued to be
appointed to administer the important territorial acquisitions
of the East India Company. The power of appointing them
lay with ihc Directors. After the abolition of the Company in
1858, they were nominated to hold office on the recommendation
of the Secretary of State for India. Lieutenant Governors and
Chief Commissioners, 1o whose emergence a reference has al-
ready been made, w^ere appointed on the recommendation of
the Govoriior-General. , The Governor was the head of the pro-
vincial administration and presided over the Executive Council
in the provinces where that Council existed. No important
measure could be taken by the Provincial Government without
the approval of the Governor.
By Pitt's India Act of 1784, Executive Councils were created
The Executive for the presidencies of Madras and Bombay. They
Council were to consist of three members, including the
Commander-in-Chief in the province. This number was reduced
to two in 1833, but w’as later on increased to three, and stood at
that figure till the introduction of the Montford Keforms in 1921.
After the abolition of the office of separate Commander-in-Chief
of the province, his place in the council was taken by an ordinary
member.
. It must bo understood that provinces created after Pitt's
India Act did not come under the operation of that clause of
the Act which created Executive Councils, because such newly
created provinces were given a status lower than the status of
a Governors' province. They were placed in charge of either
236 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Lieutenant Governors or Chief CommiBsioners. Thus, the North-
Western Provinces (the modem United Provinces of Agra and
Oudh), Assam, the Punjab and the Central Provinces had no
Executive Councils till the introduction of the Montford Re-
forms. The responsibility of their governance devolved upon
the heads of those to whom, in constitutional theory, necessary
powers were delegated by the Governor-General. The only
province which was not a Governor’s province and which still
had an Executive Council was the province of Bihar and Orissa,
which was created after the annulling of the partition *of Bengal
and the reshuffling of the provincial areas. Senior members of
the Indian Civil Service senung in the province were selected
to become members of the Executive Council; from the days
of the Morley-Minto reforms, one Indian was appointed.
§2. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE TILL 1919
The origin of the legislative powers of the provinces goes
Up to and back to' the year 1807. By an Act of that year
after 1833 the Governors and councils in Madras and Bombay
were given the power of making regulations, a power similar
to that which had been granted to the Governor- General -in-
Council by the Regulating Act. From that time the regulations
issued by the Governments of Madras and liombay had legal
application in their respective jurisdictions until all the existing
law was consolidated into a code, for the preparation of which
orders were given by the Charter Act of 1833. This Act deprived
the Provincial Governments of their independent law-making
power. They were now asked merely to submit to the Central
Government drafts of whatever legislation they wanted enacted
for their areas. The Goyernor-General-in-Council was declared
to be the sole reposittory of legislative authority.
But the inconvenience of this sort of centralization was
Act of 1883 obvious. The Governor- General’s Council, in which
members from the Bengal Civil Service predominated, could
not be expected to give sufficient attention to the problems of
distant provinces like Madras and Bombay. The concentration
of legislative business over the vast area comprised by the three
existing provinces of Madras, Bombay and Bengal in a single
small council was evidently unsatisfactory. The Governments
of Bombay and Madras constantly complained that their claims
and needs were not properly considered. The Act of 1853 tried
to remove the grievance of the provinces to a certain extent.
It allowed representatives of each of the four Provincial Govern-
ments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the North-Western
Provinces to hold seats in the Governor-General’s Council, which
was specially enlarged for the transaction of legislative business
by the nomination of additional members.
A more liberal step was taken by the Indian Councils Act
GROWTH OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 237
of 1861, when to the provinces was restored the power of legis-
Act of 1861 lation which had been taken away in 1833. The
Councils of the Provincial Governments were expanded for
legislative purposes by the addition of the Advocate-General ex
officio and other nominated members, not less than four and
not more than eight, at least half of whom w^ere to be non-
ofticials, as in the case of the Council of the Governor- General.
In accordance with this privilege, special bodies to transact
law-making business were established for Bengal in 1862^ for
the North-Western Provinces in 1886, for Burma and the Punjab
in 1897, for Eastern Bengal and Assam in 1905, on its creation
as a separate province after the partition of Bengal by Lord
Curzon, and for the Central Provinces in 1913.
The ^{oncession and freedom granted to Provincial Govern-
ments did not in any degree diminish the sovereignty of the
Government of India and the power of their Legislative Council
to enact laws for the whole of the country. The Act of 1861 •
expressly declared the Governor-Gcncrars law-making power to
extend to all persons and things, excepting certain Parliamentary
enactments and the general authority of Parliament and the
Crown. Ifowev^-i*, in practice, the provincial legislatures were
competent to enact ia^^ s for the peace and good government
of the provinces, subject to the restrictions imposed upon them,
and subject to the general &iiper\ising authority exercised by
the Central Government.
This measure was soon found to be inadequate. The growth
The Indian of political consciousness in the educated classes
National of the Indian public, v\hich had just passed
Congress through a course of western education and had
become familiar with the democratic idea that characterized
some of the western •governments, was a new factor in the
situation. This national awakening found organized embodi-
ment in the Indian National Congress, an institution which
was established in the eighties of the last century. This body
began to hold sessions annually, moving from •place to place,
and to agitate for the removal of administrative defects and
deficiencies. The Congress became the vehicle for the expression
of the new-born ambitions and aspirations of an awakening
nation. It also became a consolidating force which helped to
draw together and co-ordinate the national movements and
tendencies in the different provinces.
Agitation conducted by the early Indian politicians, some
of whom could be described as the creators of the Indian National
Congress, had the result of exposing the inadequacy of the Act
of 1861 and its incapacity to enlist popular contentment and
support. Hence the proposal for the Indian Councils Act of
1892. The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. (the late Lord) Curzon,
explained in Parliament that the object of the new proposal
was to give ‘further opportunities to the non-oflScial and native
2S8 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
element in Indian society to take part in the work of government,
and in that way to lend official recognition to that remarkable
development both of political interest and political capacity
that had been visible among the higher classes of Indian society
since the Government of India was taken over by the Crown
in 1858’.
This measure recommended the enlargement of the Councils
Act of 1892 by the addition of larger non-official numbers.
The method of making the addition, however, gave rise to a
considerable amount of difference of opinion. There 'was great
opposition to the democratic principle of direct election being
introduced in the then existing political and social condition of
India. On the other hand, continuance of the conservative
principle of nomination was not calculated to gratify politically-
minded Indian citizens. Ultimately a compromise was arrived
at by which the reality of election was cloaked under the garb
* of nomination.
A Regulation made under the Act stated that in the case
of corporations like municipalities and Local Boards, or associa-
tions like those of a University or a Chamber of Commerce or
landholders, it would be convenient and advantageous for the
Governor to consult their wishes in the matter of the selection
of members to represent them, and to nominate only such men*
as might be recommended by their confidence.
Thus the principle of election was indirectly initiated.
Theoretically, members continued as before to be nominated
by the Governments. In practice, however, the discretion of
the Government in making the selection of some of the nomi-
nated candidates was limited by the recommendations of re-
cognized bodies and associations. Such recommendations could
not be normally rejected.' *
Thus tile Act of 1892 introduced a double reform. It en-
larged the size of the legislatures, the number of additional
members to be nominated for legislative purposes being fixed at
eight to twenty ^f or Madras and Bombay, not more than twenty
for Bengal and not more than fifteen for the United Provinces.
It also indirectly inaugurated the principle of election in the
formation of these bodies.
This measure extended the powers wielded by the legislatures.
For the first time, they were allowed the right, subject to certain
restrictions, of asking questions bearing upon actions of the
Executive Government. They were also given the power of
discussing the annual financial statement presented by the
Finance Member and making a general criticism of the policy
adopted by the officials of the bureaucracy. Thia was an advance
over the earlier measure of 1861 which had confined the legis-
latures to strictly legislative business.
Events, however, were moving fast in India. The Act of
1892 could not cope with rapidly changing conditions in Indian
GROWTH OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 280
politics. The wider spread of western education only helped
Morley-Minto to intensify the national agitation, which
Reform!, 1909 was vigorously conducted during the first
decade of the twentieth century. Indian political life passed
through various interesting phases and vicissitudes which are
yet fresh in the memories of living men. The installation of
the Liberal Ministry in power in England, after an almost
complete ostracism of two decades roused some hopes for the
successful termination of the great struggle that had been
conducted ’ by politicians in India on the question of Indian
administrative reform. The acceptance by Lord Morley of the
post of Secretary for India was regarded as a further significant
event. In collaboration with Lord Minto, the Governor-
General, Tjc prepared a scheme and laid it before Parliament for
its sanction, which was duly given.
The Morley-Minto Reforms made important modifications
Larger in the composition and functions of the provincial ^
Councils legislatures. In the first place, the total number
of members of each of the provincial Councils was considerably
increased, the new figure in some cases being more than double
that of 1892. The maximum limit of fifty additional members
was fixed for the larger provinces and of thirty for the smaller
ones. Secondly, the proportion of official to non-official mem-
bers w’as modified so as to bring about a majority of non-official
members in the provincial Councils.
The difference in the two situations is clear. Official mem-
bers have to vote as they are asked to vote officially. They
do not have to exercise their individual judgement, but must act
according to the mandate they receive from above. With nomi-
nated non-officials, the case is different. In theory, at least,
they may vote as they* please, on the merits of the question.
Their opinion is taken to be more indicative of the popular view
than that of officials. ♦
]t must be understood that a non-official majority does not
necessarily mean an elected majority. The non-officials may
be members nominated by the Government from among persons
w'ho arc not in the Services. It has already been seen how,
under the Act of 1861, all non-official members were nominated
and how, under the Act of 3892, the principle of election was
indirectly introduced, particularly in the provincial legislatures.
The Act of 1909 openly accepted that principle as one of the
fundamentals of the Reforms scheme. How’ever, election was
not to be direct. It was also proposed to give separate represen-
tation to the important community of the Mohammedans. The
constituencies for the provincial Councils were formed out of
municipalities and District Boards giving their votes in groups.
These changes in the constitution and composition of the
provincial Councils were accompanied by an enlargement of
their functions and powers- The right to hold a general discus-
^40 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
sion of the budget, which had been conceded in 1892, was
Thelf further augmented by the right to move
fonetions resolutions in a definite form upon matters per-
inoreased taining to the budget, and to divide the Council
on them. The power of expressing opinion in the form of a
definite resolution was not confined to matters connected with
the budget, but was extended to all questions of general public
importance. Certain subjects were of course excluded; for
example the army, foreign relations and other cognate matters
were not subjects on which resolutions could be moved. The
Governor's permission was necessary for the introduction of a
resolution. The right had thus various limitations imposed
upon it. Lastly, the power of asking questions, which had been
conceded by the Act of 1892, was increased by allowing the
member who originally put the question to put further supple-
mentary questions if he was dissatisfied with the reply ^ven
' by the Government member. Thus the functions and privileges
of the legislatures were to a certain extent increased.
The Act of 1909 did not even suggest the introduction of
No intro- responsibility. Lord Morley, while making a
daction of speech in Parliament, distinctly disclaimed any
responsibility intention on his part or on the part of His
Majesty's Government to treat the reform measures as the begin-
ning of the development of self-governing institutions. The newly
created legislatures were neither representative nor democratic
in the wider sense: their constitution did not accord with a
popular form of administration; their powers W'ere limited;
they had not any effective control over the executive; and
their existence and proceedings had an air of unreality in the
absence of any greater power than that of vehement criticism
of some Gfovemment measures. Such a defective scheme could
not satisfy the aspirations of the people for Swaraj, a w^ord
which was used by the President of the National Congress,
Dadabhai Naoroji, in 1906 to describe the only remedy that
he could discover for the solution of the Indian political problem .
The constitutional status of the provinces in their relation
to the Govemor-General-in-Council till the inlro-
ooDBtltational duction of the Montford Eeforms has been already
BtatuB explained.^ The Government of India was em-
phatically a unitary government, with undivided responsibility
and authority for the peace, order and good government for
the whole land. Under such a centralized arrangement the
provincial legislatures could not enjoy any independence.
They had only a limited power and scope for operation, and
even in the field that was supposed to have been left unfettered
for their legislative competence many restraints were imposed
on their freedom of action and judgement. A greater and more
* Chapter xiz.
GBOWTH OF PEOVINCIAL GOVEENMENTS 241
genuine grant of independence and initiative to the Provincial
Governments and their legislatures had to precede any sclierne
of reforms which proposed the introduction of even partial res-
ponsibility in the provincial sphere.
XXX. DYAECHY AND ITS WOEiaNG : 1921-37
§1. THE GENESIS OF THE SCHEME
The final goal of British policy in India, as visualized by
The goal of British Parliament, was enunciated in the
British policy Announcement of 20 August 1917. It was described
in India as the progressive realization of responsible
government and the gradual development of Parliamentary
institutions. The Act of 1919 was intended to be the first
important step in implementing that promise. Parliamejit tried
to find a way out of two impossible and unacceptable situations.
On the one hand, it was pledged not to permit the Indian
constitutional structure to remain entirely bureaucratic and un-
controlled by the Indian people as in pre-War da\s. On the
other hand, it was determined not to allow the Imlian polity
to be suddenly transformed into a full-fledged democracy b\
one decisive stroke.
Any scheme of reform ^^hich is based on this hypothesis
Gradual would be essentially a compromise between the
transfer of bureaucratic and tlie democratic piinciples. It
would not bring about a total disappearance of
an irresponsible and an irremovable executive from the Indian
scene. The conduct of a large part of Indian administration
would continue to be vested in officials who are directl\ ans-
werable only to the Crown and Parliament of Britain. The
transfer of political power to India would not be complete
but partial, and also -subject to the superior control of the
Governor-General. The dyurchical plan introduced by the Act
of 1919 can be properly understood only when it is I'clated to
this fundamental assumption.
That plan was based on the following cardinal points. In
The like first place, even though the unitai\ form of
dyarohical the Indian state w^as maintained, the spheres of
plan of 1919 the Central and PiOMneial Governments wc‘re
clearly demarcated and separated from each other. They
were recognized as tw’o distinct entities, ea('h having its own
specific responsibility. Secondly, tlie control of the Central
Government w'as considerably relaxed, though it was not com-
pletely abandoned. The provincial authorities w'<'re given a good
deal of freedom in the management of tlieir own affairs. Thirdly,
the provinces, which thus acquired a status of administrative
independenoe, w^ere made the centre of a new political experi-
ment. The first instalment of self-government which was
promised by Parliament was initiated in the provincial domain.
It is necessary to grasp the two principal elements which
shape the mechanism of responsible government. Firstly, under
DYAEGHY AND ITS WOEKING: 1921-37 243
this system, the executive is completely subordinate to the
Two legislature. It is brought into offie- and rnain-
requioitoB of tained in authority only as long as it retains the
responBiblo confidence of the legislature. An adverse vote
government body results in the resignation of Ministers
and ill a change of Government. The second important requisite
is that the legislature which thus controls the executive should
be itself elected on the widest possible franchise. It must be
thoroughly representative of popular opinion and must reflect
the living -currents of the larger social life. The popular will is
broadly expressed in the legislature and the machinery of govern-
ment is conducted in the light of its mandate and direction.
The Act of 1919 contemplated a gradual evolution towards,
Dyarchy^^a Q'lid not an immediate establishment of, full pro-
transitional vincial autonomy, ft therefore devised a peculiar
method of governance to suit the period of transi-
tion. That method is known as Dyarchy. The term was new^
in political usage if noi in coinage. The scheme was actualh
inaugurated in the beginning of 1921 and worked thereafter for
over sixteen years till 1 April 1937. On lhat date it was
superseded by the Government of India Act of 1935, which
was put into opera non nearly two }ears alter it b.id been passed
l)^ Varliament.
§2. TWO DIVISIONS OF THE PEOVINCIAL
GOVEENMENT
The system of dyarchv as it operated in the Indian provinces
Reserved and based on one dominant principle, the division
Transferred of government into two sections. One of them
subjects wus wholly bureaueratic and the other w^as
popular to a great extent. The Joriner, which was known as
the Eeserved section, was managed by an iiTemovable execu-
tive council. The latter, which was called the Transferred
section, w’as given over for management to responsible Ministers.
They wxre elected members of the provincial Legislative Council
.ind answerable to it for their policies and actions. These two
set«. of officials, luuing a constitutional status fundamentally
different from each other, were harnessed, under the control of
the Governor, to carry on the work of administration. They
w’cre also associated with, and depended for legislation upon, the
same legislature, and had a common budget.
The spheres of Ministers and executive members were intend-
Demarcation sufficiently distinguished from each
of two other. Each half was held finally responsible and
lipheres competent to pass any orders wdthin its own sphere.
That is to say, Ministers could npt interfere in Eeserved matters,
nor could members interfere in Transferred matters. Mutual
friendly consultation might be held • botw^een the two halves
and such consultation and expression of opinion mights
244 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
appreciably influence their mutual policies. Legally, how-
ever, the coxiiplete independence of each of the two spheres was
guaranteed by the Act. Any dispute about jurisdiction that
might arise between them or any other matter of conflict, was
left to be decided by the arbitrament of the Governor, whose
decision in such matters was declared to be final.
However, it was discovered that the demarcation of two
Overlapping separate units in the same executive govern-
of subjects ment could not be so precise as to make the two
divisions absolutely water-tight. There was considerable en-
tanglement between the subjects of the two halves. Sir K. V.
Eeddi, a Minister in Madras, said that he was Minister for
Agriculture minus Irrigation and minus the administration of
the Agricultural Loans Act. Both the majority and the minority
reports of the Muddiman Committee discussed this question
and both came to the conclusion that a perfect differentiation
V which entirely avoids any mutual overlapping of Transfen-od
and Eeserved subjects is impossible. The opinion was endorsed
by the Bombay Government and also by some of the ex-
Minist'ers who had occasion to work out the reforms under the
dyarchical plan. The minority emphasized the impossibility of
effecting a clear-cut and mutually exclusive division of subjects
as an inherent defect which vitiated the whole system of
dyarchical government.
Wherever any ambiguity might arise as to the jurisdiction
of the Eeserved or Transferred half, the sole authority 1o remove
the ambiguity and pronounce the final judgement w^as the Gover-
nor of the province, to whom all such cases had to be I’eferred.
§3. THE PEOVINCIAL EXECDTJVE
The Governor
The Governor was the head of the province and played a
His execntive dominant part in the working of the provincial
powers government. He was invested with many po^vers,
ordinary and extraordinary. He presided over the Executive
Council, held counsel with Ministers, distributed portfolios
among Executive Councillors and Ministers, and made rules for
the transaction of their business. He was empowered, in ex-
ceptional cases, to override the Executive Council. Even in
the sphere that was supposed to have been transferred to
responsible Ministers, the Governor actively participated in the
conduct of business. He was permitted to interfere with minis-
terial decisions, if necessary. Complaints were made before the
Muddiman Committee that such interference often proved exces-
sive in practice even though the joint Parliamentary Commit-
tee had recommended^ that it should be limited to the strict
minimum.
DYARCHY AND ITS WORKING: 1921-37 2*5
All laws passed by the provincial legislature required the
Hit legis- Governor’s assent, and in some cases his previous
lativs pQwers sanction was required for the very introduction of
a Bill. If the legislature did not pass a Bill which was deemed
essential by the Governor, he could certify it into an Act in
spite of the opposition of the legislature.
The Governor’s position was further strengthened by the
His duty peculiarities of the dyarchical plan. The constitu-
as an tional status of the Reserved and Transferred
intermediary halves was incongruous. Their composition, out-
look and methods of work were greatly different. It was not
improbable that instead of moving together with harmony and
smoothness they might clash with each other and generate fric-
tion in the normal operation of the administrative machine.
To the Governor was left the important task of managing matters
in such a fashion that conflicts, as far as possible, did not arise*
at all, and when they arose, were settled in a spirit of friendli-
ness and co-operation. He had to maintain the balance between
the two warring elements and save the innovation of dyarchy
from being destroyed on the rocks of differences and disputes.
On occasions of complete deadlock at budget meetings, the
HU emer- Governor was authorized to make allotments of
gency powers funds, in his discretion, to the de])artments in the
tw^o halves. Similarly, if the majority party in the legislature
refused to accept office and also prevented others from accepting
it by refusing to vote their salaries, the Governor was empowered
to take over the Transferred subjects in his o\\n charge and
to make arrangements for their administration. The Governors
of Bengal and the Central Provinces did make use of this
emergency power.
The Executive Council
After the Montford Reforms, the diffenuicc between the
Managed status of the different provinces was abolished
Reserved and nil provinces were declared to be Governors’
subJaeU Provinces. with an Executive Council in each to
assist the Governor. The North-West Frontier Province and
the province of Delhi were originally excepted from this
arrangement. But in 1932 the North-West Frontier Province
was raised to the status of a Governor’s Province and a modified
scheme of dyarchy was introduced in it. The Reserved Pro-
vincial subjects were entrusted to the care of the Executive.
Council. This body was not responsible to the provincial legis-
lature and not removable by it.
The number of Executive Councillors varied in the differ-
Thelr ent provinces. The major provinces, that is the
coDBUtnUon older and larger provinces of Bengal, Madras and
Bombay, had Councils each consisting of four members. In
240 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
the Presidency of Bombay, however, on account of financial
pressure and the imperative need for retrenchment, the number
of Executive Councillors was reduced from four to two in 1932.
In the remaining provinces the Councils usually consisted of
two members.
It was laid down in the Act that one of the Councillors must
be a person who at the time of his appointment had been for at
least twelve years in the service of the Crown in India. Usually
half the number of the total members — one in the minor and
two in the major provinces — were selected so as to satisfy this
particular clause of the Act. The others were recruited among
non-official Indians in pursuance of the policy of the larger
association of Indians in the business of government.
It was during the time of the Morley-Minto Reforms that
one Indian was admitted into the provintual and the central
Executive Councils. This number \\as increased to two in the
major provinces. Members of the Executive Council were tech-
nically appointed by His Majesty under the Royal Sign Manual
In practice the Governor exercised considerable influence over
their appointment- Their tenure of office was for five years
The Councils worked on the portfolio system.
This part of the Government was entirely responsible to
No responBi- His Majesty’s Government through the Secretary
of State and the Governor-General. Officials in
the Executive Council wore not removable !>> an adverse vot(*
of the legislature. They were answerable for their action*? to
the two controlling authorities from above and were entirely
subordinate to them so far as the maintenance of British
interests and good administration w^‘re concerned. Their
salaries weiv not dependent on the vote* of the* legislature, whicli
had no power to dismiss them from office.
However, moneys required for the departments managed
by the Executive Council had to be provided by the provincial
legislature at its discretion in so far as the votable items of the
budget were concerned. All laws pertaining to Reserved sub-
jects had also to be passed by the Legislative (’ouncil. Thus,
in fact, if not in theory, an attempt had to be made to accommo-
date the actions of this portion of the provincial executive t(^
the will of the elected representatives of the people.
The Minister b
The other part of the provincial executive was constituted
Responsibility by what are known as Ministers. These officers
to the were newly created by the Montford Reforms in
legislatDPi fulfilment of the promise of the gradual in-
troduction of responsible government made in the Announce-
ment of August 1917. They were put in charge of those pro-
vincial subjects which were to be made subject to popular control
DYARCHY AND ITS WORKING: 1921-37 247
and which were called Transferred. Ministers were to be res-
ponsible to and removable by the legislature. Their salary and
the funds required for their departments were voted by the
Legislative Council. On an adverse vote of that chamber they
had to tender resignation of their office.
The power of appointing Ministers was vested in the Gover-
Thelf nor. But he could select only such persons as
mppointmeDl were elected members of the provincial Legis-
lative (Council and us were able to command the confidence of
that council. Jt was therefore obvious that the Governor’s
choice could not be arbitrary. The persons selected by him
to hold the office of Ministers had to have sonu* influence with
the legislature. They had to be able to command a not inconsider-
able portion of its votes. A well-organized political party,
occupying a majority of seats of'' the Legislative Council, was
naturally able to get its nun nominees appointed to the ministry
by the Governor.
The number of Ministers was not the same in every pro-
vince. Generally, in the major provinces, it was three and in
the minor province^i two. Bombay, Bengal and Madras had
three Ministers each. AfttT 1932 the niunhor of Ministers in
Bombay was reduced from three to two on account of financial
stringency and the need for leduciiiL^ the expenditure of the
Provincial Go\cn)nient
There could be no llxity ol teiuu*'^ for ministerial office as
Their tenure there was for a member of the Executive Council,
and salary Technically speaking, a Minister’s term of ?er\ice
may bo said to haAC cTidecl wdien the Legislative Council itself
was dissolved. But if he l(»st the confidence of that body before
the date of its disst)lution, he w'as bound to resign his post
immediately. On the other hand, he miglit be able to retain
his office even lor a second and third term if llie legislative
chamber so desired.
The salary of the Ministers was to be v^oted by the legis
lature. Originally by tlie Act of 1919 the same salarv was
provided for Ministers as w is given to members of the Executive
i^ouncil, but the legislature was einpow^ered to reduce it. The
legislature took action in that diretdion m several provinces. In
Bombay, for instance, the salary of the Minister was reduced
from lis. 64,000 per year to lis. 48,000 by the first Reformed
Council.
It must he admitted, however, that the presence of a propor-
Effect of the thirty per cent of nominated members in
nominated the Council — official and non-official — was a solid
element asset in tlio hands of the executive. The inevi-
table assimilation with Government members of representatives
of special constituencies — like those of land-holders on account
of financial interests or those of communal constituencies (e.g.
2m INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Europeans) on account of racial affinity — ^raised the proportion
of thirty per cent much higher.
Ministers did, as a matter of fact, prefer to win the favour
of this bloc rather than that of a majority of elected members.
These latter were divided in their opinions; they represented
different currents of thought and it was difficult to bring such
heterogeneous elements under one banner. On the other hand,
a Minister with a small faithful personal following could be
maintained in office in opposition to the wishes of a large number
of elected members if he had managed to secure official support.
E-esponsibility to the legislature thus tended to degenerate
into subservience to an irremovable executive. The Baja of
Panagal is reported to have once declared in the Madras Legis-
lative Council that he was responsible to the Governor and not
to the Council at all. And "he was the Chief Minister of the
Madras Government for two terms in succession.
Ministers were not required to work on the principle of joint
No collective and collective responsibility. They did not come
responsibility into -office and go out of office together. Nor did
of Ministers they constitute an indivisible homogeneous whole
like the British Cabinet. Their policies were not adopted after
common deliberation and agreement They were not therefore
fortified by the strength of a closely organi/.ed unit The
Governor dealt with a Minister as an individual head of a
department. He did not recognize the existence of a group
of Ministers having a cumulative responsibility for the manage-
ment of the whole mass of Transferred subjects. They had
therefore merely an individual existence Jn .^pite of their plural
number, they did not form Ministries. In fact, Ministers lacked
I’ven that lesser degree of corporate charac.tcr which was associ-
ated with the Executive Council. It is interesting to note
that some Ministers voluntarily decided to abide by the principle
ui joint responsibility and when the time came they acted up to
that self-imposed obligation.
JoiXT Working of the Two Halves
The fjict that Ministers wedc consulted individually, and
Power eon- that a practice grew up of the Governor overriding
eentrated in the Minister in case of a difference of opinion,
the Governor tended to concentrate all power in the Governor’s
hands. The tendency to regard Ministers as mere advisers to
the Governors, who might or might not accept their advice,
was considered by critics to have been one of the most insidious
and fatal impediments in the operation of dyarchy. The refusal
of the Governors to regard* themselves as mere constitutional
heads, even with regard to Transferred subjects, resulted in
converting the relaxation of control granted by the Secretary
D.YAECHY and its WORKING: 1921-37 240
of State into an addition to the autocratic powers of the irres-
ponsible Governors.
There was one peculiar feature of the division of government
Joint pnno introduced by the dyarchical scheme. Though
the provincial sphere was split into two halves, the provincial
finances were left undivided. They were looked after by a
Finance Member whose authority extended to the whole
administration. The budget of the two halves was common
and their purse was joint. There were no earmarked items of
provincial revenues specifically assigned to each. All taxation
was provincial and its proceeds were credited to the provincial
exchequer. Out of that common reservoir, in which all monies
were pooled, different sums were provided for expenditure on
the vwious activities of the Provincial Government, whether in
the Reserved or in the Transferred parts.
Executive Councillors and Ministers had therefore to meet
Joint together every year to prepare the provincial
meetings budget. The shares of expenditure to be allotted
to each department had to be judiciously and equitably
determined. All possibilities of income had to be carefully
explored in the light of the total demand. The task was not
particularly easy or simple. The outlook of an irresponsible
bureaucracy was fundamentally incompatible with the needs and
ambitions of popular Ministers. A spirit of give and take, of
mutual accommodation, of sympathy and eo-operation, was
essential for the smooth functioning of such a delicate
mechanism. If the differences became acute, the result was a
deadlock. On such critical occasion.s, tlie Governor could allo-
cate funds between the two liahes in Ins own discretion and
prevent the machine from coming to a standstill.
Dyarchy was never intended to be permanent. It was not
Mutual prescribed as the final form of the Indian Govern-
consultatiODB rrient. ^Ir. Montagu had made it abundantly clear
that the Refoniis proposed by him were in the nature of a
stopping-stone to a nobler consummation, namely, a fully self-
governing India. It was therefore recomme^ided that those-
who were called upon to operate the dyarchical plan should
interpret their opportunities and obligations in a broader vision.
Members and Ministers could take each other into confidence
and work together in the closest intimacy and co-operation.
There was no legal obstacle to their holding consultations and
discussions in all matters affecting their respective spheres.
The Governor could take the initiative in establishing traditions
of collective working. In practice, if not in law, the line
of distinction between Reserved and Transfcired subjects could
be obliterated.
However, the idea proved to be loo altruistic to be capable
of being generally realized. The Madras and Bengal Governors
250 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
accepted the spirit of these recommendations to a great extent.
Praetleal But on the whole, the Governors were not pre-
Tesult pared to accept all the implications of Mr
Montagu's concept of dyarchy. In fact, experience sho^\ed that the
Governor inevitably became the pivot and the centre of the
provincial administration. He became the connecting and the
co-ordinating link between the two halves and was the final
judge for settling conflicts between them. Ministers complained
of the undue interference of the Governor in the working of
their departments. He was often inclined to override their
•decisions if he differed from them. The interests of the Services
were to be specially safeguarded by him. In short, all govern-
mental power tended to be concentrated in his hands.
Position of the Services
The position of the Services was an interesting problem
*Special under the reformed constitution. The appoint-
'safe^ards ment, salaries, dismissals and pensions of mem-
bers of the Imperial Services continued as before to be controll-
ed by the Secretary of State. The Government of India Act
specially charged the Governor to ‘safeguard all the mernbt'rs
of our Services ... in the legitimate exercises of their functions
and in the enjoyment of all recognized riglits and privileges’.
This clause was in practice interpreted broadly to mean the
control of the Governor in everything relating to ilie Ser\iceb —
their appointments, posting.s and promotions — even tliough th(‘\
were in the Transferred departments. The Ministers, under
whom many of the officers ot the Ser\ices were called upon to
work, had not complete control over their .subordinates <ind
could not- punish them for any infringement of duty. Thi^
was of course an undesirable position becausn there was
the daaiger of the ‘Minis'ters’ policies not being loyally
carried out. h . j
The centre of political gravity had now shifted definitely
from outside India to India itself. The davs of
patriarchal government, during wliich a large
power of shaping the policy was enjoved l)\ the
Services and a large measure of the progress of
the country depended upon their efforts, had now
definitely given place to the days of popular control. The
diminution in the importance and prestige of the Services was
the inevitable consequence of the transference of pow’er from tht*
bureaucracy to the people. The constitution, methods of
recruitment and control of the Services, us they existed, w’ere
incompatible with the new democratic situation and the
possibility of its further development.
Consequences
of the
introduction
of responsi-
mtj
251
DYARCHY AND ITS WORKING: 1921-37
It is agreed that the complete subordination of the executive
to the legislature is the essence of responsible government of
the Cabinet type as it pn vails in England. __ It was no wonder
that under the altered conditions in India there should exist
considerable dissatisfaction among the Services on account of
the loss of their power, and also in the Legislature on account
of the restraints and limitation imposed upon its powers in
relation to the Services. Complaints were made before the
Reforms Inquiry Committee (Muddimau) that the members of
the permanent Services did not show sufficient loyalty and co-
operation in carrying out ihe orders of the Indian Ministers.
However, instances of such apathy o’- disobedience w^ere rare,
and on the whole tlie conclusion was that the relations between
the Ministers and the Imperial Services were cordial and
satisfactory. .
As the minority report of the Muddimau Committee pointed
Distinction friction between the Ser\iccs and their
between poll- superiors was bound to arise in the altered circum-
tical and ad- stances of India as long as the relations of the
mlnistratUe S^nvice.s and the legislature were not brought into
functions eios^T approximation with those prevailing ^ in
England or the Dominions. The old combination of admini-
strative and political functions in the Services was discordant
with the spirit of Hie Montford Reforms and inconsistent with
tile inauguration of responsibility. Tliat a sense of security
and contentment must be guaranteed to the Services was a
proposition accepted even by the minority report. It recommend-
i*d that proper legislative steps be taken so as to put the
Services beyond tht* rcfich of the fluctuatioii'i of political opinions
<ir influences iu(*idental to a s]\stem of democratic g' vernment.
But as long as tlic old basis of the relation of the Services to
tlic legislature wa^ not altered in resjionse to the altered
environment, the existing state of affairs was bound to prove an
embarrassing anachronism not in the least likely to induce
harmony and cordiality among executive officials
OoNTiioT. OF THE Finance Dep.vrtment
The last point to be noted in connexion with the working
Experluioe of the dual form of government refers to the
•f Miniiters control exercised by the Finance Departnient
over the Transferred half. The Finance Department was a
Reserved department. The Finance Member must be a member
of the Executive Council. The functions of the department
were stated to be to give advice on the financial aspect of
administrative proposals, advice which the Ministers were a
liberty to accept or reject. The evidence of almost all Mmisters
HBa INDIAN ADMIN18TEATI0N
and ex-Ministers, however, pointed to such a description of the
Finance Department's functions as being incomplete and theoreti-
cal. Not only did the department examine the financial aspect
of the new proposals, but it also examined the policy of the
proposals and its bearings upon the administration. Such an
examination by an irresponsible department of the proposals put
forth by Ministers responsible to the legislature was open to
grave objection. Nor could the Minister reject with impunity
the advice given by the Finance Department, for it could with-
hold the needed funds unless and until the Minister produced
the sanction of the Governor for the expenditure.
Besides, the Finance Member was not in charge of the
Finance Department only. He also had under him some of
the spending departments, and naturally the suspicion arose
that an unconscious desire to promote the interests of these
departments proved harmful to other departments, parti-
cularly to nation-building subjects that were left to the
administration of Ministers. This state of things called for a
radical refonn.
The Governor, who was himself responsible to Parliament
through the Secretary of State and the Governor-QeneraJ for
the administration of reserved subjects, was ill-suited to be the
supreme appellate authority in all matters of disagreement
between the Reserved and the Transferred parts, because his
verdicts were likely to be those of an interested party, if not
of a partisan.
A further point which has to be described in connexion
Lack of with the subject of finance is the unsatisfactory
funds character of what was known as the Meston
Award. All Provincial Governments had agreed in criticizing
the basis of the separation of provincial from central finance,
though on different grounds. The state of the Government of
India's finance, on the other hand, was rather alarming. They
had accumulated deficits of Rs. 62J croros during the short
period of three years from 1920 to J923, a period which
synchronized exactly with the inaugural period of the Montford
Reforms. The want of funds was a constant difficulty which
confronted the Ministers from the beginning. They were, for
that reason, unable to pursue any policy of progressive develop-
ment in the sphere of administration that was handed over to
them. The majority report of the Muddiman Committee dis-
covered, in this financial stringency, one of the most potent
factors which led to the allegation of unkind critics that the
Montford Reforms were a sham. The allegation, according
to them, could not be refuted on account of the absence of
ikdequate resources for development and expansion. That a
revision of the Meston. Settlement was urgently called for
became almost an axiomatic proposition. It was, however,
jdNdished in 1928.
DYAROHY AND ITS WORKING: 1921-37 253
Indians were dissatisfied with the whole project of dyarchy.
Dyarohy Parlianientary appearances that it suggested
condemned were tantalizing. But the hybrid structure, with
by Indian all its imperfections and inadequacies, evoked
opinion severe criticism from politically-minded India.
Those who had a personal knowledge of its inner working exposed
its contradictions and defects. The ideal manifestation of
dyarchicnl government implied the complete self-effacement of
an irresponsible bureaucracy, and such voluntary sacrifice
required a superlniman excellence of mind.
§4. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE
Tht‘ Montford Refonns regarded the provinces as proper
Now status ground tor experimentation in responsible govern-
cf the iiienb. It was therefore indispensable tliat their
legislatures legislatures should be enlarged and democratized *
and made representative of the population in the provinces
before entrusting to them the dut\ of controlling the executive
or a part of the executive. The Act of 1910 introduced sc\eral
important changes in that direction. In the first place, the
legislatures ceased to he looked upon as mere enlargements
ot the Executive Councils. Their status as independent organs
of go\ernment w’as recognized. Secondly, a large majority of
elected non-official members was provided in their structure.
The offi(‘ial and the muninated non-official element was not
•entirely removed but it was placed in a numerical minority,
and their Pre.sidenis were to be elected by tlie members of the
legislatures. Thirdly, tlie francliise tor election to ilie provin-
cial Legislative Councils was considerably lowered: for instance,
in the province of Bombay those wlio paid a house rent of
Rs- 3 per montli or land revenue to the extent of Rs. 32 per
year wore given the right to vote. Comparatively poor people
could therefore ho actively interested in the political affairs
of the province. It w^as the beginning of popular democracy.
The powers of these legislatures were also increased. In
Increase in addition to law-making, they were given greater
their powers control over the administration by means of the
rights of interpellation, adjournments, resolutions, etc. A part*
of the provincial budget was made subject to their vote. Lastly,
they were privileged to exercise supreme authority over that
portion of the provincial executive which was represented by
the Transferred half. Ministers w'ere entirely the servants of
the legislatyres. They had to conduct the affairs of state in
Jiccordance with the opinions of that body.
The information given in the following tables will facilitate
a comparison with the changes introduced by the Act of 1935
which have been described in the following pages*
254
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
TOTAL STRENGTH OF GOVERNORS' LEGISLATIVE
COUNCILS AS GIVEN BY THE SIMON COMMISSION^
03
Province
Statutory
1 minimum
Elected
Nominated
officials plu
Executive
Councillors
0 ) cd
|i
i ill
Actual tota
Madras
118
98
7 + 4
23
132
Bombay
... 1 111
86
15+4
9
111
Bengal
.. ' 125
114
12+1
* 10 1
1 10
United Provinces
118
100
15+2
6
123
Punjab
71
18 4-0
' 8 1
91
Bihar and Orissa
... 1 08
76
ld+2
12 1
303
Central Provinces
... , 70
8;4-‘2
8
73
Assam
89
5+2
7 '
53
Burma
... 92
(
bO
14 + 2
' 1
^ i
303
COMPOSITION OF THE BOMBAY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIJ.
Elected Mbmbi-aib
Muslim Bural
Muslim Urban
Non-Muslim Rural
Non-Muslim Urban •
European
Landholders
Commerce aud Industry
Bombay Uunersity
Mombori
. 22
. ’)
. rto
. 11
2
n
rr
I
1
8G
Nominated Members
Officials (including Executive Councillors)
Non-officials
(a) Depressed Classes
(h) Anglo-Indian
(c) Indian Christian
(d) Labour
(e) Others (cotton trade)
20
2
1
1
8
1
Total ... 114
* Report, vol. I, p. 134.
• Of the members of the Non-Muslim constituencies seven must be Marathas.
DYARCHY AND ITS WORKING: 1921-37
255
TABLE SHOWING, PROVIXC’E BY PROVINCE, THE PROPORTION
OF ELECTORS TO POPCLATIOV IN THE GP^VERAL CONSTITUENCIES^
I'lovinci*
Population of the
electoral areas in
1921
Electors, male and
female (women
electors show n
in biackets)
Proportion ot elec-
tors to population
I'roportion of malel
electors to adultl
in. lie population I
Proportion of female
electors to adujt
female population
Figiirefe to
the neai est 1
per
per
per
thousand |
cen<^
1 cent
cent
MacliQb
1 4,23,10,000
13,65,000
(1,16,000)
3 2
11 6
1 0
1,92,32,000
1
7,50.000
(39,000)
39
13 4
0 6
Bengal . .
' 4, 62, 41, 000
1
11,73,000
(8,000)
2 5
9 7
0 3
Uniteil Provinces
4,53,76 00(J
1
15,69,000
(51,000)
3 5
12 1
0 4
(
riinjnl)
2 06 75, 000
6,97,000
(21 ,0(10)
3 1
11 9
0 9
Bihar and Orissn
3.38,20 000
3.73,000
(ml)
1 1
4 6
'
Assam
67 35,000
2,50.(X)0
(al)out 3,000)
3 7
14 2
0 2
Central I'lOMnocs
and Bcrar
1,27.80,000
1 1,69,000
1 (ml)
1 3
5 2
(i(i\cinoi s T’ro\ inches
excluding Burma
22,72,38 00(>
1 6.1,75,000
I (2,38,000
1 in SIX
provinces)
2 8
10 4
0 6
for SIX
provinces
§5. the relation of the executive to
THE LEGISLATURE
It was intended to be a con^Ntitiitionjl prim iple that the
Control OYor exercise of the iniiltif.irions powers of the Logis-
Transferred ti\e Council in all naittiers aiising out of the
departments TiMiisferred departments sliould be absolutely un-
fettered The essence of responsible "o^ornne'nt consists
of the complete subordination ot the o\ecuti\e to tlie legislature,
and the pro\incial (’ouncils had to play the same role with
reference to Ministers as the House of Commons plays to the
British Cabinet. The Couneirs disapproval i^f the action of a
Minister must be followed by his resignation or the dissolution
of the Council and the election of a new one on the issue of tlie
disputed point.
Report t vol. I, p. 191,
266 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
The state of things, where the executive enjoys perfect im-
munity and security of tenure, and where simultaneously the
legislature is endowed with powers which dehiu'tely tend to
contix)! the executive, did not exist in the administration of the
Transferred heads. Ministers were elected members of the legis-
lature and were responsible to it. Their salary was voted by
it and so were most of the sums of money necessary for their
departments. Ministers therefore were the servants of the legis-
lature, and in the last instance, of the constituencies which elect
the Council.
The Governor’s extraordinary veto over the Ministers or over
the Legislative Council was intended to be used only in the
rare cases where a Minister’s or legislature’s action would, in
the opinion of the Governor, lead to disastrous consequences and
hamper him in the fulfilment of his responsibility towards
Parliament. In practice, therefore, the Council’s control w’as
supreme over the ministerial half of the Provincial Government
in all matters whether of policy or of detail or of finance. There
had to be complete harmony betw^een the Ministers and mem-
bers of the Legislative Council. They had to have the same
view-point and angle of vision.
In the Reserved half, on the other hand, the situation w’as
Relation to rather different. It was true that legislative and
the Reserved financial measures necessary for the conduct of
half the Reserved departments had to be passed by
the provincial legislature, which could also use its powers ^of
interpellation and moving resolutions in those matter^. Yet
there was a difference. The members in charge of the Re-
served half, with the Governor at their head, w'cre responsible
ultimately to Parliament through the Secretary of State and
the Govemor-General. ' They w'ere answ’erable to that bodv for
their actions in the management of their tnist This responsi-
bility to an extra-territorial authority made it necessary that
in case of disagreement between the IjKe(Miti\o Counci
and the legislature on questions relating to the Reserved
heads, the former should he Riven extraordinarv power to Imve
its own way even against the expressed m i-.hes of the
legislature.
Unlike the Ministers, the executive councillors wore uot re-
movable on an adverse vote of the Legislative C’ouncil ; th^ir
salaries were non-votable; their final supeivising and controlling
agency w^as not the legislature of the province, but the Goyernor-
General-in-Council and the Secretary of State. Hence if they
were kept in a situation in which they had to depend upon the
legislature for the discharge of their duties and the performance
of their functions, they would require the right of following their
own ideas in any conflict between themselves and such a con-
trolling body.
DYABCHY AND ITS WOBKING: 1921-B7 257
Therefore the Governor, like the Governor-General, ’^as
Covepnor*B given the power of what was known as eertification.
4:ertification By the use of this power he could enact any
necessary piece of legislation that was not agreed to by I lie
legislature, or restore any grant that wus rejected by that bod\.
Therefore, thougli llie budget of even the Reserved half
voted by the (’oiincil, there was the possibility of the Governor
more frequently resorting to the weapon of certification for the
restoration of rejected grants in this sphere of Government de-
partments tlian in tlie case of the Transferred ones.
Yet the legislature’s influence upon the executive must
Indirect prove to be great under such a condition of ihings.
influence of Persistent defiance of the legislature s opinion
the legislature l)y the executive would amount to acknowledging
the existence of rigid autocratic rule, w’hich would be fatal
to the smoolh w'orking of the eonstitution. Hence tliough the
•('ffective legal poweis over Reserved heads, enjoyed b\ the,
legislature could be described to be but small, the placing to-
gether of a democ'ratieallj’ edected and represciitati\ e legislature
armed with powei’h compliance and leiusal, and ot an iriie's-
poiisible and irremo\able executive working under it, could not
fail to have it's ov ii result, d’lie e\c(‘uti\e (‘ould cffeclivel^ differ
from the legislature onl\ tbnuigb the instrumentality of what
was, admitle(ll\ an extraordmar} weapon, namel} the ])owtr ot
certification. In such circumstances the indirect control exer-
cised by the legislature was far from iu'significant Questions,
res()lutK)ns, adiournnu nts, legislation and \oLiiig a part (d the
budget were important powers possessed by llie Lt..islatne
OouuciU, and their constant use w<is bound to prove m r} bene-
ficial and salutaiw.
]7
XXXI. THE PKOVINCES IN THE FEDEKAL
CONSTITUTION
§1. NEW STATUS OF THE PEOVINGES
By the Act of 1919 and the Devolution Eules made under it^
certain bubjects were ear-marked as ‘provincial’,^
and governinenial functions in respect of them
were allowed to be exercised primarily by the
provincial authorities. But the responsibilities en-
trusted in this way to the provinces were not
exclusive. The Governor-General-in-Council and the central
legislature possessed concurrent powers in the provincial sphere;
they had not ceased to possess any legal powder or authority
regarding matters falling within the provincial sphere.
The Act of 1935 has introduced an important departure from
Introduction of I'his system. The constitutional structure that
provincial it has framed is based on the concept of pro-
autonomy vincial autonomy whereby, in the w^ords of the
Joint Parliamentary Committee, ‘each of the Governors’ Pro-
vinces wull possess an Executive and a Legislature having
exclushe authority wdthin the Province in a precisely destined
sphere, and in that exclusively provincial sphere, broadly fret'
from control by the Central Government and the T^cgislaturc’.
The Act also contemplates the establishment of the Federation
of India in which the autonomous provinct's and the Indian
States will be federally united.
The status of the Indian provinces must therefore undergo
Federal change in the new Jntlian polity. Tht \
independence can na longer be considered as mere territorial
for the divisions, created by the Ccniral (iovernment
provinces fQj. j^-g conveni(Ui(*(\ and enjoying merely a
devolved and not an original authority. Their powers and
privileges cannot henceforward be attribnled to mere delegation
by the Central Government. A federal unit has an independent
existence of its owm. It possesses certain rights which are
guaranteed to it under the constitution, and which cannot be tam-
pered with or violated by the Federal Government. The powers of
supervision and control entrusted to the latter arc strictly limited
and are defined as accurately as possible.
The relations between the Government of India and the pro-
Division vinces are conceived and defined on a federal basis
of subjects in the new constitution. There is now’ a gz eater
em])hasis on the concept of equality than on the idea of subordi-
nation and obedience in formulating the status of the provinces
vis-a-vis the Central Government. A distinct sphere of activity
is marked out and assigned to each one of those two
No exclusive
sphere for
the provinces
before the
Act of 1935
PBOVINCES IN FEDEBAL CONSTITUTION 259
entities. A third common sphere is created for their concurrent
jurisdiction and action. Three separate lists of subjects are
compiled in accordance with this threefold division of govern-
ment m 1 functions. They arc exhaustively given in the Seventh
Schedule of the Act.^
It iL quite clear from sections 8, 49, 99 and 100 that the
authority of the Federation does not normally extend to subjects
oniimerated in the Provincial Legislative List. The provincial
authority alone is competent to govern in that sphere.
§2. THE PBOVINCES TODAY
Section 46 of the Act prescribes that the following shall be
Oovernors’ the Governors' Proviiv^es : Madras, Bombay,
proviiMses Bengal, the United Provincos^ the Punjab, Bihar,
the Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, the North-West
Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind. The total is eleven. Sind*
and Orissa have been newl;y created by section 289 of the Act.
Burma has been separated fronj, and has ceased to be a part
of, India.
The province of Berar was perpetually leased by the Nizam
Position i.hc British Government in 1902, and section
of Berar 47 ot ihc Act prescribes that the Central Pro-
vinces and Berar .should be governed together ns one Governor's
province. By an agreement, signed between His Majesty and
the Nizam in October 1936 His Majesty recognizes the
sovereignty of the Nizam f»vcr Berar, but it is to be adminis-
tered along with the Central Provinces as if it were a part of
British India. The Governor of the province is to be appointed
by His Majesty after consiiltaticm \\itli the Ni/am, who has
also the right to maintain an agent in its capital.
The Act provides the same kind (»f constitutional structure
Uniformity of fur all the provinces, with variations of detail
provincial appropriate' to ilieir individual requirements and
constitutions peculiaritie.s. Their administrative systems are
also likely to poss(^ss sc\tral common features in actual practice,
though in the enjoyment of its autonomous pow’ers each
province is free to develop according to its dwn ideals and
ability.
Certain areas in sonic of th(‘ Governors’ Provinces are in-
Excluded and habited by people who are almost in a primitive
Partially condition of life and are totally unfit for any kind
Excluded of advanced or democratic government. The
Areas constitutional reforms introduced by the Act of
1935 obviously could not apply to them. But Parliament de-
cided that the administration of such backward tracts and the
welfare of their uneducated inhabitants could not be entrusted
* Fcr the three Li'^ts ’^ee Ch XXTI §.2.
260 INDIAN A DM JNISTllAl’JON
to the care of responsible Indian Ministers. That duty has been
placed in tbe hands of the Governor.
Section 91 of iJie Act empowers His Majesty to declare by
an Order-in-Council that cerlain areas are to be considered as
Excluded or Partially Excluded Areas. The draft of such an
order was to be put before Parliament for its approval within
six months of the passing of the Act. The procedure was
followed, and in March 1936 an Order was issued specifying the
limits of the Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas in the
different provinces. They can be altered at any time by subse-
quent Orders -in-Council which may be issued by His Majesty.
In Bombay there are only Partially Excluded Areas, which
include the Shahada, Nandurbar and Taloda taluks of West
Khandesh District, Kalyan taluk and Peint peta of Nasik Dis-
trict, Dahanu and Shahapur taluks and Umbergaon peta of
Thana District, and Dahod taluk and Jhalod inahal of the
Broach and Panch Mahals District.
The Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas are within Ihe
Arrangements executive authority of a province; but only such
for their federal or provincial laws or portions of these law's
administration '^111 apply to them as the Governor may by
public notification direct. He may also make Kegulations for
the peace and good government of any such area. These
Begulations have to be submitted to the Governor-General forth-
with and assented to by him in his discretion. The Governor’s
functions in respect of an Excluded (not a Pnriinlly Excludi'd)
Area are to be exercised in his discretion. In the Partinlly Ex-
cluded Areas he is presumably expected to act> on the advice of
his Ministers.
A few smaller areas have been formed into independent units
Chief Cqm- fur various rt‘asons, aind special administrative
missioners* arrangements have been made for them. For
Provinces instance, Delhi as the capital of the w'hole connlry
is not incorporated in any particular province. British Baluchistan,
standing on the frontier of India, and Ajmer-Meiwvara stain
as a British island in the midst of the territory of the Eajpnt
States arc classed independently. Section 94 of the Act pres-
cribes that Delhi, British Baluchistan, Ajmer-Merwara, C’oorg,
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the area knowm as Panlh
Piploda fin Central India) shall be Chief Commissioners’
Provinces.
These provinces are within the executive authority of the
Their Federation and will be administered by the
administration Governor-General acting, to such exient as he
thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner to be appointed by
him in his dijscrotion. Section 95 prescribes that in directing
and controlling the administration of British Baluchistan, the
Governor-General will act in his discretion. Only such
PROVINCES IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 261
federal Acts or portions of such Acts will apply to it as the
(jo veriior- General by public notification directs. He may also
in his discretion make regulations for the peace and good
government of British Baluchistan, subject to disallowance by
His Majesty. Regulations may similarly be made by the
Goveriior-General lor the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
In the case of the other Chief Commissioners' Provinces,
the powers of the Governor-General, except in respect of the
appointment of the Chief Commissioner, will presumably be
exercised on the advice of the federal Ministers.
The creation of new provinces and the alteration of the
Creation of boundaries of the existing provinces arc matters
new Provinces of great constitutional importance. By section
290 of the Act, these powers are vested in His Majesty and
he Cull exercise them by issuing Orders-in-Council. But before
any such order is issued, the opinion of the Government and
the legislature of the provinces concerned, as also the opinion,
of the Federal Government and federal legislature, have to be
ascertained. In effect, therefore, this pow’er njay be now said
to be exercised wdth the approval of the Indian people. .At
least negatively speaking, it is no longer possible to cdiaiige the
boundaries of nn)\ince in a manner whicli offends Indian
opinion as happened in the case of th(‘ Bengal Partition in 1905.
Area and Population of the Provinces
As given in the Indian Delimitation Committee’s Beport, 1936
262
INDIAN ADMINISTEAPION
gl
.2 ^
.£
a M
a
*03
3
2 '’a 3 ^
^ 3 to
g
0-2
e9
c2 3
S 2 3
l> i-i
S £ S
!>. g r-.
s 3 III
s i S s s
iH CO 00 rH
O 00
S 5 s
^ g --c
s?
CO
iO f-H
^ CO O Q I—)
05 O Oi o
00 O I-H CO o 05
o ^ 05 »o wo oT
CO CO CO 50
|>i CO ®
iH 50 OI 05
C30 O
50 50
lO I-H
CO cO
CO Oi
CO
rH
oT
g i g
05 00050405055050 '-?
tr*-^< 5jO<NC0
^ 05 00 00 50
CO* r-I Ijr CO ^ 04 05
^ c5 §
(M -H 00
05 I-.
O 5fS
s s
■n'
CO
CO
05
Ol
oT
S 5
05 50
^ cT
CO
c
04
05 O
. . 50 CO
00 05 CO 50
OQ C4 CO 50
00 O 05 o
o_ ^
05* lO 05 O
CO r-l <M
r. [-
L- C5
00 50
^ (M
O (M
CC OJ CO 50
50 ^ r-t
e O
a
05 r-i
05 —
^ O
- t- 05^
S 05 00
n 2
50^ CC »0 05
CO 05 or
CO cr >-5
ot d i~
3
a
08
►5 —
eS ^
X)
V
E bo
a c s c
2« O 4; fl 3 « £
(2 pq D (I 4 ffl e
PE4
PQ
pq ^
a > n3
.2
O ^
>< a
PS -p
M PQ
.2
pQ TS
■a'S
.2 g
XXXir. THE AMBIT OF PEOVINCIAI
AUTONOMY
It has been explained in the last chapter how the provinces
have acquired a new status of independence in the federal consti-
tution, and how they have been made autonomous in a sphere
specifically assigned to them. It is necessary to understand the
extent within which their autonomy will be operative, and the
limits that have been imposed on it. The legislative, executive
and financial powers enjoyed by the provinces under the new
scheme must be properly grasped. They have been described
in the following pages.
§1. THE LAW-MAKING POWERS OF A PROVINCE
The constitutional position in respect of the powders of legis-
Definition of lation to be exercised by the Federation and the
jorisdiction provincial units has been clearly stated in section
100 ot tlie Act. The purpose of creating three different lists
of subjects is c^bvious. They are intended to bring about a
decentralization of authority. It is therefore laid down that
the federal legislature has, and the provincial legislature ha^
not, power to make laws with respect to any matter enumerated
in the Federal Legi<^lrliM* List; that the provincial legislature
has, and the federal legislature ha^ not, power to make laws
with respect to any matter enumerated in the Provincial Legis-
lative List; and that the federal legislature, and the provincial
legislature also, liave power to mak(‘ lav\s with resjiect to any
matter enumerated in the Conciirrenl T-<ogislntivo Li'^t.
A special provision is made in section 102 for cases of
Exceptional grave omergtmey when the seeunty of India is
powers in « threatened, whether by war or by internal dis-
a state of tiirbance. On such exceptional occasions the
emergency li-deral legislature will have power to make laws
for a province with respect to any matter eiiumeraled in the
Provincial Legislative List. But no Bill or aineifdment for that
purpose can be introduced without the previous sanction of the
Governor-General given in his discretion. Such a sanction is
not to be given unless it appears to him that the provision pro-
posed to be made is proper in view of the nature of the emer-
gency. It is for the Governor-General, acting in his discretion,
to declare by Proclamation that a state of emergency exists.
Such a Proclamation may oe revoked subsequently. But it
will cease to operate at Ibe expiration of six months unless
Parliament directs otherwise.
In matters falling entirely within the provincial sphere,
sometimes a common legislative action may he felt to be desirable
264 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
by two or more provinces. Their legislatures may request.
Federal laws Resolutions, that such niatters should be
for two or regulated in their individual provincial areas by
more proYinces an Act of the federal legislature. In response to
by consent such requests, it will be lawful, according to section
103, for the latter body to pass the necessary Acts. An Act so
passed may, as regards any province to which it applies, be amen-
ded or repealed by an Act of the legislature of that province.
In the actual conduct of the administrative machine, it may
Residual be revealed on some rare occasions that a parti-
powers to be cular matter which requires to be disposed of
allotted by cannot be appropriately held to fall either in the
the GoYernor- Federal or the Provincial or the Concurrent sphere,
General defined in the three Legislative Lists. The
question then arises as to who is the competent authority to
pass the necessary legislation. Every federation has to make
'provision for what are known as residual powers. In India,
those powers are vested practically in the Governor-General by
section 104 of the Act. He has been allowed, in his discretion,
to empower either the federal legislature or the provincial legis-
lature to enact laws pertaining to topics of such doubtful
jurisdiction.
In spite of the delimitation of legislative spiieres, some few
The federal instances of mutual entanglement and complicated
law to preYail relationship may be discovered in actual ex-
in cases of perience. The federal as well as a provincial
inoonsistenoy legislature may happen to have passed Acts on
an item which belongs to the Federal or to the Concurrent List.
A provision of the provincial law may be in conflict with or re-
pugnant to a provision of the federal law. In such cases it is
definitely laid down in section 107 that tlu‘ federal law shall
prevail and that the provincial law, to the t‘\tent of the repug-
nancy, shall be void. However, if the provincial law so passed
concerns a subject in the Concurrent Legislative List and if it
has received the assent of the Governor-General or His Majesty,
it will prevail in that province.
The previouj sanction of the Governor- General, gi\cn in his
PrcYiouB discretion, is made obligatory by section 108 for
sanction of the introduction of the following Bills or amend-
the GoYoraor- ments in a chamber of the provincial legislature:
uenerai which repeals, amends or is repugnant
to any provisions of any Act of Parliament extending to British
India; (ii) a Bill which repeals, amends or is repugnant to
any provisions of any Govemor-Generars Act or any ordinance
promulgated by him; (hi) a Bill which affects matters which
are in the discretion of the Governor- General; (iv) a Bill which
affects the procedure for criminal proceedings in which European-
British subjects are concerned.
No power
to pass
discriminatory
laws against
British
subjects
THE AMBIT OF PEOVINCIAL AUTONOMY 265
Chapter III of Part V of the Act, sections 111-21, contains
elaborate provisions with respect to discrimination
by the Indian legislatures against British subjects
domiciled in the United Kingdom or Burma.
They apply both to federal and provincial laws.
Provinces arc therefore precluded from passing
any kind of discriminatory legislation against
British subjects, British companies and corporations, British
ships and aircraft, British-registered medical practhioners,
British persons carrying on any occupation, trade or business,
etc. Thus even ‘provincial autonomy* has been subjected to
serious limitations and deductions, which are defined in terms
which are not only explicit but extremely wide. In the nature
of things, every attempt made by Indian Ministers to improve
India *p material condition can be easily interpreted to affect
adversely some British interest or another. The full liberty of ^
action that is supposed to have been conferred upon the pro- *
vinces is in reality very considerably diluted.
Section 110 expressly provides that nothing in the Act sl^all
Power of bo taken to affect the power of Parliament to
Parliament legislate for British India or any part of it, and
is retained nothing shall be taken to empower the
federal or provincial legislature to make any law affecting the
Sovereign or the Royal Family or the succession of the Crown,
the sovereignty, suzerainty or dominion of the (T’own, the law
of British nationality, the Army Act, the Air Force Act, the
Naval Discipline Act, or the law of Prize Courts. Similarly,
the Act of 1935 or any Order-in-Council made thereunder or
any rules made thereunder cannot be amended unless it is
expressly permitted in the Act.
§2. THE EXECUTIVE POWERS OF A PROVINCE
It JS distinctly provided that the executive allthorlt^ of
Definition of each province extends to the matters with respect
the proYincial to which the legislature of the province has
sphere power to make laws (sub-section 2#of section 49).
Within the framework of the Federation, the provincial sphere
is differentiated and it is entrusted to the Provincial (lovern-
nients. The latter are no longer under the general obligation
of obeying the orders of the Governor-General-in-Council and
of constantly and diligently informing him of their proci‘ed-
ings. They are presumed, prhna facie, to have independence
of judgement and action in their own domain. Provineial policy
.and administration are to bo determined by the people of the
province acting through their legislatures and Ministers. It is
one of the fundamental principles of provincial autonomy that
the affairs of the province should be left to be managed by those-
266 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
who live in the province and are directly affected by the nature
of its Government,
However, certain restrictions have necessarily to be imposed
Itsstrictions on fbe executive freedom of even autonomous
;the executlYo provinces when they are federated together in
authority of one composite whole. In the federal constitution
the provineoB Qf country like India, the number of such
restrictions and the scope for their operation is conspicuously
large. That is inevitable in an atmosphere of Beservations,
Safeguards and Special Eesponsibilities. It is necessary to
understand the limits which have been prescribed in the con-
duct of the provincial administration. They have been elabor-
ated in Part VI, sections 122-35, of the Act.
The Provincial Governments have no executive authority in
Administration respect of subjects which are not mentioned in
of federal the Provincial Legislative List and which are
aubjeets in not therefore within their legislative competence,
the provinces Laws passed by the federal legislature in respect
of subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List have
application in the whole country, and their administration and
execution is entrusted to the Federal Government. To that
•extent the latter has locus standi and definite right of operation
in the provincial territory.
It is laid down that the executive authority of e\er\ pro-
Respect for vince shall be so exercised as to secure respect
federal laws for the laws of the federal legislature whicli
^PP^y province. The Governor-General ina^ direct
the Governor of any province to discharge as his agent such
functions in, and in relation to, tribal areas or in relation to de-
fence, external affairs or ecclesiastical affairs as may be specified
in the direction. These functions are to be pertornied by tlie
Governor in his discretion.
The Governor-General may, with the consent of the Go\pr-
The Federation ^ province, entrust either conditionally or
may impose unconditionally to its Government or to its ros-
duties on pectivc officers functions in relation to any matter
a province which the executive authority of the Fe(hn*ation
extends. An Act of the federal legislature may ralso confer
powers and impose duties upon a province or its officers in respect
of subjects whicli are not enumerated in the Provincial or Con-
current, Legislative Lists and are therefore outside the jurisdiction
of a province. Any extra cost of administration incurred by a
province for this purpose will be paid by the Federation.
The executive authority of a province has to be exercised
The Federation so as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of
may give the executive authority of the Federation. The
directions latter can give such directions to a province as
may appear to the Federal Government necessary for that
purpose. Directions may similarly be given about carrying out
THE AMBIT OF PEOVINCIAL AUTONOMY 267
in a province federal laws which relate to matters specified
in Part II of the Concurrent Legislative List (subjects like
factories, labour welfare, trade unions, electricity, inland shipping
and navigation, cinematograph films, etc.), and about the con-
struction and maintenance of means of communication of
military importance.
The Federation may require a province to acquire any land
Purchase of situated in a province for a federal purpose at
land and the expense of the Federation. In respect of
broadcasting broadcasting it is laid down that the Federal
'(Tovornment shall not unreasonably refuse to entrust to the
Government of any province such functions as may be necessary
to enable that Governme’nt to construct and use transmitters in
the province and to regulate and impose fees in that connexion;
but thjs does not restm.t the powers of the Governor-General for
preventing any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of
India or any part of it and does not prohibit him from imposing
upon J^rovincial Governments such conditions regulating the
matter broadcast as appear to him necessary.
Disputes between the provinces about supplies of water from
Disputes an> natural source have to be referred by the
about water (Tovernor-Goneral to special ad hoc commissions
<*onsisting of ineri of expert knowledge and experience, and
after considering reports made by them the Governor-General
has to gi\e decision in the matter of the complaint and to issue
lhe lu'cessary orders. On the request of any of the provinces,
if imide before the (to\ ernor-Generars decision is given, the
matter must be referred to His Maiesty-in-Council. The orders
ot His ]\Iajesty or of the Governor-General must be given effect
to by the provinces concerned.
It will be lawful for His Majcsty-in-Council to establish,
Inter- after considering representations made to him by
Provincial the Governor-(Teneral, an Inter- Provincial Council
Council for dealing with problems affecting more than
one proMnee. It would be charged with the duty of (i) inquiring
into and advising upon disputes \vhich may ha\e arisen between
the provinces, (ii) investigating and discussing subjects in which
the provinces and the Federation have a cnmnioif interest, and
(iii) making recommendations for the belter co-ordination of
policy and action with respect to such subjects.
Clause 5 of section 126 of the Act prescribes that the
Governor- Governor-General acting in his discretion may at
Generars any time issue orders to the Governor of a pro-
powers to vince as to the manner in which its executive
issue orders authority is to be exercised for the purpose of
preventing any grave menace to the peace and tranquillity of
India or any part of it. The Joint Parliamentary Committee
explained that such a clause w'as necessary, over and above the
Governor's Special Eesponsibility for the same subject, because
268 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
the peace and order in one province may be endangered by
events taking place in another; and that as the ultimate and
residuary responsibility for the peace and tranquillity of the
whole of India rests upon the Governor-General, he should have
such wide powers to give directions to the Governor.
It will be found that the clause has been very generally
worded and can extend to and cover any action of a Provincial
Government. It was in the exercise of this power that the
Governor-General issued orders in February 1938 to the Governors
of the United Provinces and Bihar preventing the wholesale
release of political prisonei*s in those provinces in spite of the
fact that the measure was initiated and sanctioned by the
responsible Ministers of tlie provinces, backed by their respective
legislatures.
Under section 102, if the Governor-General has in his clis-
Proclamaiioii cretion declared by a Proclamation that a grave
jii emergency emergency exists whereby the security of India
is threatened whether by war or internal disturbance, the
federal legislature has power to make laws for a province or
any part of it with respect of any of the matters enumerated
in the Provincial Legislative List and therefore reserved to the
provinces under noi^mal conditions. But this did not include
the power to make rules under an Act which is an exercise not
of legislative but of executive authority. Nor was any provision
made in the Act to equip the Central Government, in such
times of emergency, with an overriding executive authority
throughout the country.
This was considered by His Majesty’s Government and the
Amendment Government of India to be a serious omission
made in 1939 in the constitutional framework, and Parliament
was persuaded to rectify the mistake by amending the Act
in 1939. The amendment added, among other things, a new
section to the Act of 1935 for the purpose of furnishing the
Central Government in times of war with supreme directioii
and control over the whole of British India. This is seed ion
126A, which consists of two clauses.
It prescribes that when a Proclamation of Emergency is in
Its proYlsions c^peration whereby the Governor-General has de-
clared that the security of India is threatened by w^ar (not
by internal disturbances; this section does not extend to them),
the Federal Government can give directions to a province as
to the manner in which its executive authority is to be exer-
cised. It also provides that a federal law made for a province
in regard to any subject can confer powers and impose duties
upon the Federation or any of its officers in respect of that
subject. They are thus authorized to take, in times of war,
executive action in the exclusively provincial sphere by appoint-
ing their own officers or agents to function in the provinces.
The Secretary of Stale, when introducing the second reading
THE AMBIT OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY 269
of the Amending Bill in the House of Lords, declared tliat it
was simply and solely a war measure and did not initiate any
new principal but merely implemented what was already pro-
vided for by section J02. He considered that in the exigencies
of a modern war it was quite necessary that the Central Goveni-
iiienl should exercise the general powers of superintendence,
.direction and control which it enjoyed in the past. On the other
hand, nationalist opinion in India severely criticized the new
measui’e as an invasion on provincial autonomy and the rig] its
<ol the Indian people.
§;h THF FINANCIAL POWERS AND RESOURCES
OF A provin(;e
The success of a democratic government depends, to a very
Democracy great extent, on the size and volume of its purse,
is expensiYO A government by and for the people must
necessarily endeavour to elevate the people and to brings
happiness and the joy of life to the masses. It must create
public seiwices and public utilities of various kinds and help to
raise the material and spiritual level of the whole commuinty.
The justification of democracy is the belit'f that it can become
a mighty forci of general progress. The fulfilment of that ideal
entails an enormous expenditure of money. If the necessary
amounts are not forthcoming, the real objective of the demo-
cratic form of go\ornment ^ill not be easily achieved.
The history of provincial finance in India is Ion? and
Revenues from chequered. A brief reference has already been
the Provincial made to it.’ The Act of 193.“) has dislrihuled
Legislative subjects between the Federal and Provincial
GoNcrnments by the compilation of separate Lists.
It must he clearly understood that all revenues derived from
subjects in the Federal List ^\lll naturally izo to the Federation
Similarly, all revenues obtained from subjects in the Provincial
liegislativi* List will he taken by the province^. But some addi-
tional sources of meome are also providetl for the latter, an. I
they liave been specified in Part VJl of tlie Act. A distinguished
financial expert, Sir Otto Xienieyer, was suhsequeutly asked
to make recommendations for determining some important
detiiils which were not laid dow'n precisely in tlie Act. His
report was published in 1930 and all the suggestions ft c(M\-
tained w^ere accepted. They v ere snb=eqiiently embodied in a
si'paraie Ordor-in-Council.
Th(’ following are the main sources of income to tlie pro-
vinces from subjects enumc'rated in the Provincial Legislative
List: land revenue; excise duties on alcoholic liquors for human
consumption, opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs;
non-narcotic drugs; medicinal and toilet preparations contain-
> See Ch XTX 5.2 and Ch XX S.2.
270 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
ing alcohol; taxes on agricultural income; taxes on lands and
buildings, hearths and windows; duties in respect of succession
to agricultural land; taxes on mineral rights; capitation taxes;
taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments; taxes on
animals and boats; taxes on the sale of goods and advertisements;
cesses on the entry of goods in a local area; taxes on luxuries,
including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and
gambling; stamp duty in respect of documents other than those
specified in the federal Legislative List; duties on passengers
and goods carried on inland waterways; tolls; fees in respect
of any matters contained in the Provincial Legislative List. The
Amendment Act added two more items, namely taxes on vehicles
suitable for use on roads whether mechanically propelled or not,
and taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity excepting
the electricity consumed by or sold to the Federal Government or
consumed in the construction, maintenance or operation of a
r federal railway.
The IT.P. Government put a wide interpretation on their
power to impose a tax on employments and callings, and enacted
in ' 1939 an Employment Tax bill which sought to impose a
substantial graded tax on incomes derived from employment in
the province. In a large number of cases the taxes would ha\t‘
amounted to ten per cent of the employee’s income. T1 ^\as
felt that this sort of imposition was nothing less than an income-
tax in disguise and that it trespassed upon the federal field of
revenue. The Bill was therefore reserved for the assent of th(‘
Governor-General. In the meantime, opportunity was taken,
when Parliament Tvas considering the Amending Bill, to put
this matter beyond dispute and make clear the distinction
between taxes on incoTne on the one hand and taxes on pro-
fessions, trades, callings and employments on the other. Muniei-
palities and local hoards in many provinces liad been empowered
to levy rates for local purposes on these items long before the Aet
of 1935, and it was to keep alive this right that they were
included in the Provincial Legislative List. The incidence of
such taxes on individual tax- payers was of course small. Tlie
Amendment Act’ limits the amount which might he levied upon
any individual^'in any one year under the heading ‘tax upon
professions, trades, callings and employments’ to Rs. 50, and
thus restricts it to the purpose for which it was originally de-
signed. The Federal and Provincial Legislative Lists have been
amended accordingly, and a new section, section 142-A, lias been
added to the Act.
Over and above the proceeds of taxation in respect of matters
Additional in their own sphere, the provinces will now have
sourcoB the following potential sources for obtaininir fur-
ther income for their own use :
’ India and Burma i Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1940 .
THE A^IT OF PBOVINCIAL AUTONOMY 271
(i) Duties in respect of succession to property other than
agricultural land; stamp duties in respect of bills of exchange,
cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, in-
surance policies, etc.; terminal taxes on goods and passengers
carried by railway or air; taxes on railway fares and freights.
All these taxes will be levied and collected by the Federation^
but their net proceeds are not to be credited to federal revenues.
They will be wholly assigned to the provinces and distributed
among them as prescribed by an Act of the federal legislature.
The Federation can however levy a surcharge on these taxes for
its own purposes.
(ii) Income-tax : this item has been a wholly central source of
revenue till now. Evea hereafter, it w’ill continue to be levied
and collected by the Federation. But section 138 provides that
a prescribed percentage of the net proceeds in any financial ^ear
of siK b a tax should be assigned to the provinces and distributed
among them in a manner prescribed. Sir Otto Niemeyer was
asked to make recommendations about these details and they
have now been carried out. It has been decided, after the
Niemeyer Keport, that 50 per cent of llie net proceeds ol lliis
tax should be assigned to the pro\inces for their use. The per-
centage of the share of each province from the total amount that
is available for (dsiribution among them is fixed as follows:
Bombay and Bengal. 20 per cent each; Madras and the United
Provinces, 15 per cent each; Bihar, 10 ])er cent; Punjab, 8 per
cent; (he Central Provinces, 5 per cent; Assam, Orissa and Sind,
2 per c*(‘nt each; and t^'c North-West Frontier Province. 1 per
('cni .
However, tliis aiTan 2 [ement was not intended to take elfeca
immediately on tlio inauGfuration of provincial autonomy. The
Government of India has been impeded by severe financial
stringency for the last eicflit years Its income has dwindled, and
there have been serious deficits in its budgets. Its expenditure
is declared to have reached an irreducible minimum. The new
constitution bus also inevitably added to i^s financial burden. Tn
su(*h a state of unstable equilibrium, it is considered ri.sky for
the Central Government to part wdth a substantial fraction of
its own assets. The Act has therefore provided that no portion
of the income-tax receipts may be granted to the provinces as
long as the Government of India feels that it cannot afford to
do so. Sir Otto Niemeyer recommended that for a period of
ten years, (he central authority should be permitted to retain
the whole or part of that amount for their own expenditure.
There was therefore no hope of any immediate assi^^tance or
relief to the provinces from this particular source.
How’cver, there was an agreeable surprise when it w'as
announced in March 1938 that the Government of India had
found it possible to allot to the provinces a small sum of Rs. 125
lakhs out of their income-tax revenue of the financial year 1937-8.
272 INDIAN ADMINISTItATION
Out of that total each province received the following amount : —
Bombay and Bengal, lis. 25 lakhs each; Madras and the United
Provinces, Us. 18^ lakhs eacli; Bihar, Ks. 12 J lakhs; the
Punjab, Es. 10 lakhs; the Central Provinces, Es. 6J lakhs;
Sind, Orissa and Assam, Es. 2^ lakhs each; and the North-
West Frontier Province, Es. IJ lakhs.
(hi) Duties on salt; federal duties of excise; export duties:
these will be levied and collected by the Federation. But the
whole or part of the net proceeds may be paid to the provinces
by an Act of the federal legislature and the principles of dis-
tribution among them will be formulated by the Act. It was
also laid down in the Act of 1935 that fifty per cent or more of
the net proceeds of the export duty on^jute shall be assigned to
the jute-producing provinces in proportion to their production.
The Nienieyer Eeport recommended — and the recommendation
was accepted — that 62^ per cent of the net proceeds of the jute
export duty be assigned to the provinces in which jute is grown.
Bengal and Assam are the chief gainers by this concession.
It is a matter of primary importance that the units of a
Financial federation should be solvent. Their respective
solvenoy of revenues and expenditure must balance. The
federal grave financial condition of any province cannot be
looked upo7i us the domestic concern of that
particular unit; it affects the whole country and must be
taken cognizance of by the Central Government. Section 142
therefore makes a provision for grants-in-aid by the Federation
to such provinces as His Majesty may determine to be in need
of money.
Accordingly, an effort w’as made to investigate the existing
Budgetary prospective budgetary position of all the pro-
position of vinces that wore propohcd to he united into the
the Indian Federation of India. Sir Otto Niemever also
provinces examined *the question. It w^as found that somu
of the provinces w^ere so deficient in resources that, with their
own revenues only, they could not maintain ho administrntion
of the minimum standard of efficiency. Tliere were also other
provinces like the North-West Frontier Province in wdiich
strategic considerations transcended all otliei* claims. The
military expenditure incurred by these units, thougli geogra])hi-
cally it falls within their area, is really incurred for the w^hole
country. That huge burden obviously should not be shifted to,
nor can it be borne by, the limited means of the province alone.
It has therefore been decided that in all such cases where the
Subventions need for assistance is clearly proved, the federal
to certain Government should make grants-in-aid every year
provinces from ils owm revenues. The following figures
have been recommended in the Niemeyer Eeport; the United
Provinces, Rs. 25 lakhs for five years; Assam, Es. 30 lakhs;
the North-West Frontier .Province, Rs. 100 lakhs, to he reeonsi-
THE AMBIT OF PBOVINCIAL AUTONOMY 273
<lered after live years; Orissa, Es. 40 lakhs, increased to Es. 47
lakhs in the first year and to Es. 43 lakhs in the second, third,
fourth and fifth years; Sind, Es. 105 lakhs, increased to Es. 110
lakhs in the first year and diminished after the tenth year by
large sums every year so that the whole subvention may be
wiped out within about forty years.
The power of borrowing money upon the security of its
The power revenue has been conferred upon the province by
borrowing section 163. The conditions and limits of such
conferred on loans are to be determined, from time to time, by
the proYinees provincial legislature. No moneys
can be borrowed outside India without the consent of the
Federation. The latter may also make loans to a province or
give a guarantee in respect of loans raised by a province.
Ufider section 167, His Majesty may appoint a separate
Auditor- Auditor-General for a province if its legislature^
‘General so desires, and charge, by an Act, his salary on *
the revenues of the province. But no such appointment uill
he made till at least three ;vears ha\e elapsed after the date
of the passing of the provimual Act. It is the duty of the
Auditor-General to prepare accounts and also to audit them. At
present that dut,v ip performed for the Central Government and
tor all the provinces by the Auditor-General of India, who is
:ipp(jinted hv His Majesty and )<^ endowed with great independ-
ence and aiithoril>.
18
XXXIII. THE PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE:
THE GOVERNOR
Two
constituents :
The Ooyernor
and the
Council of
Ministers
The executive government in the province is coiui^oned c)f tlit-
Governor and a Council of Ministers. The Gover-
nor is not merely a titiilar head, but an actual, de
/acfo, ruler. He has always been in possession of
large powers and his influence over the admini-
stration, both legal and personal, is enormous.
He was described as the keystone of the dyarchieal
structure which was inaugurated by the Montford Eeforms.
Even in the administration of autonomous provinces which have
been formed by the act of 1935, the Governor holds a unique,
pivotal position. It is necessary to understand clearl\ the pail
which he is called upon to play in the operation of self-govern-
ment in the provincial sphere. The duties of the Council of
Ministers, its composition and method of working, will also
require detailed study. For convenience, it is best to split up
the two constituents of the provincial executive and to treat
them separately. That is done in the two following sections.
§1. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATIONS AND SALARY
The office of Governor is very old in the history of British
An old and India. It has been in existence for nearh three
important centuries. Till the middle of the eighteenth cen-
offict tury, the duties of the Governors were almost
purely commercial and therefore comparatively simpK*. The
number of Governors was only three and they were located
in the cities of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta. After the Com-
pany began to fight wars and build an Empire in India, the office
of Governor-General was created by the Regulating Act. His
supremacy extended in course of time to the whole country. The
Governors of provinces lost their independence and became sub-
ordinates of tie Central Government. But none the less, they
have continued to be responsible heads of large territorial aieas
and have been invested with great prestige and authority.
The number of Governors was nine after the Montford
Equality of Reforms and has now increased to eleven m
powers oier consonance with a similar increase in the
the proTlncoB number of provinces. In the possession and exer-
cise of powers over the provincial units in their charge, all Gover-
nors are absolutely equal. Their control over the administrative
machinery of the province is defined in the same constitutional
language. The official status and privileges which they enjoy
within their respective- jurisdictions are identical in all cases.
PEOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOB 275
The factors which establish the pre-eminence of the Governor
in all aspects of provincial life are similar in every province.
Yet, in spite of this equality in prestige and power, there is
Differenees ^ of gradation even in the exalted office of
In salary and Governor. The size of all the provinces is not
allovanoes the same. Some are extensive and populous,^
others are comparatively small. Some are industrially and
commercially advanced and have therefore a large revenue.
Others are predominantly agricultural and are endowed 'with
smaller resources. Some have a historical tradition of long stand-
ing, others are of recent growth. This difference in the material
circumstances of the provinces is reflected in the salaries and
allowances that are sanctioned for their Governors. All these
high dignitaries do not receive the same emoluments. There
arc cousiderable variations, as is shown by the figures in the
statement on the following page.
There is a further important distinction. Technically, all
Differences in Governors are appointed by His Majesty. How-
qualifications: ever, it is a fundamental principle of the British
presidency constitution that the King always acts on tKe
Governors advice of his responsible Ministers. It has been
a long-establisLei practice that the Governors of the older
presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bengal are selected on the
recommendation of the Secretary of State for India. They are
men in the public life of Britain, holding a pioiainent place in
the party in power and often possessing some aniount of parlia-
inentary^ experience. In a few instances — as in the case of Sir
John Anderson, Governor of Bengal (1932-7) — they may be dis-
tinguished officials ill the British Civil Service. But these gover-
norships are definitely put beyond the reach of persons who are
serving in India. They are reserved for the ambition and talent
of influential members of the British aristocracy and serve as
some of the substantial prizes of British public life. These per-
sons are expected to possess the breadth of rision and sympathy
wliich are necessary in governing a foreign people.
On the other hand, the Governors of all the remaining pro-
Governoi^ of vinces, now eight in number, are sheeted on the
the other recommendation of the Viceroy. They are senior
provinces members of the Indian Civil Service, wdth a
long administrative experience in various departments. They
are supposed to have a brilliant official record of industry,
tact, and success in the performance of their duties. A young
civilian, standing at the West rung of the bureaucratic ladder
as assistant collector, can hope to rise, through the successive
stages of collector, commissioner, and seci-etary to Government,
to the eminence of provincial Governor,
The substantial salary and the immense pow'ers and status of
the office make it one of the strongest inducements to young
Salaries and Allowances payable to Prqvincul Governors
INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
q^aoin Jad
BQaa«MO|i«
edoiQg[ moij payaioddii
aaqii caj^ivqa
pnil ;u9nidmbg[
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PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR
277
Arguments in
f«YOur of
appointing
cifiliant as
OoYernors
Englishmen to join the I.C.S. It is naturally the keen desire
They are of the conqueror to maintain a proper level
prize posts of efficiency in the Government, as much from
the point of view of satisfying British interests and needs as for
assuring the contentment of the Indian people. Englishmen of
real merit and ability are required to achieve that object. It is
felt that the right type of Englishman can be easily persuaded to
seek a career in India, if the ultimate prize which he can aspire
to attain is big enough to gratify his ambition. The Joint Parlia-
mentary Committee strongly dissented from the suggestion that
in future Governors should always b_e appointed from the United
Kingdom and that there ^jjiould be a statutory prohibition against
the appointment of persons who are members of the Indian
Civil Service. They expressed their belief that in the futiire no
less thVln in the past, men in every way fitted for appointment
as Governors will he found among members of the Civil Service
who have distinguished themselves in India.
However, the practice has given rise to an interesting contro-
versy. It is argued that a person who is to be
appointed to the responsible post of the headship
of a province ought, on all reasonable grounds,
10 DC qualified to hold that office, not only on
grounds of intelligence or aristocratic connexions
or participation in parliamentary affairs but also on account of
extensive and varied experience and intinjate personal knowledge
of his charge. These latter qualities cannot be expected to be
possessed by a total stranger. Further, it is also considered to
be a very legitimate aspiration of those who spend a lifetime in
a particular sphere that they should have an opportunity to rise
to the top. The denial of such an opportunity would be unfair
and discouraging.
On the other hand, it is asserted with equal emphasis that
Arguments (TO\ernorships or the Viceroyalty are posts ha^•
ing .1 unique importance. Their occupants have
to deal w’ith men of diverse aptitudes and w’ith
problems of great intricacy, and it is necessary that
they shotild be gifted with wide sf^mpathy and
A ruler's qualifications cannot be correctly
mealiured only in terin^ of official standards. A bureaucratic
mind usually develops a certain rigidity and inflexibility of out-
look and becomes impervious to the absorption of new* ideas.
The head of a state, of all persons, ought to be immune from
these defects. This is given as the justification for selecting men
from the public life of Britain rather than from the bureaucracy
for the governorships of Bombay, Madras and Bengal and the
Viceroyalty of India.
After the introduction of provincial autonomy, a further
complication arises The administrative machine in the pro-
againtt
appointing
ciYiiiant as
OoYornort
im agin at ion.
278 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
vince is now entrusted, in a large measure, to responsible
A oonsUtu- Ministers. Even the most highly placed civilian
Uonal diffioulty officials have to work in subordination to their
authority. As the Governorships of eight provinces are open to
the I.C.S., it may happen that a senior commissioner or secretary
who IS working under Ministers may find himself suddenly ele-
vated, when a vacancy occurs, to the headship of the province.
That was what happened in Orissa in 1938. It would be an un-
tenable position for Ministers to have to accept as their superior
and head a person who had been actually working as their sub-
ordinate and to whom they had been giving orders as his
superiors. To carry on the goveriimei^t under him would cause
embarrassment to both the parties and would have a denioraliy
ing effect on the politics of the province.
The Congress Ministry in Orissa took strong objection to
the practice and a constitutional crisis was threatened. But
ultimately a compromise was arrived at and it is expected that
the principle that it established will be followed in all future
appointments of civilian Governors. The impropriety involved
in placing a bureaucratic subordinate over the head of his minis-
terial superiors is sought to be avoided by appointipg senior
civilians of other provinces, and not of the province concerned,
to temporary vacancies in the Governor's post.
§2. THREEFOLD CLASSIFICATION OF HIS POWEES
The powers conferred upon the Governor — as also upon the
The basis of Governor-General as previously explained — by the
c l a s s ifl ea ii an Act of 1935 can be divided into throe categories.
He has to act (i) in his discretion; or (li) in his individual judge-
ment; or (hi) on the advice of his Ministers who are responsible
to the legislature. The matters included in each one of these
three categories may pertain to any aspect of the administration.
They may be executive, legislative, financial, or may concern
the public services, and in tact cover the whole field of govern-
ment. The classification is not based on an enumeration of
.different departments. It is made by a definition of the manner
in which the*" Governor is called upon to exercise his authority
in the task of governance.
Where the Governor is empowered to act in his discretion,
Powers be is not required* to consult his Ministers at all.
exercised In He can take decisions by himself and give effect
his dIseretloB to them. To the extent to which provision is
made in the Act for the exercise of the Governor's discretionary
powers, there is a real diminution of provincial autonomy.
Popularly, elected J^nisters are deliberately precluded from
having any voice in this particular sphere. Some of the most
vital subjects of provincial administration are brought under the
operation of this arraneement. It has been calculated that there
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR 279
ure no less than 32 cases in which the exercise of this power is
])rovided.
Where the Governor is empowered to act in the exorcise of
Fevers individual judgement, he is expected to do so
exercised in after consultation with his Ministers. This infer-
his indiildual ence can be drawn from the language of the Act
judgement Instrument of Instructions and also
from the Jimplification contained in the joint Parliamentary
< committee's Report. The Governor, of course, is not bound
to accept tlie Ministers’ views and can act even in opposition to
them. But the procedure of work is so formulated that Ministers
■<*an acquaint the Governor with their considered opinions and
< hereby attempt to infiuence his decision. Legally, popular
Ministers are denied any effective control over the large number
of jjn'portant matters which are assigned to the individual judge-
ment of tlie Governor. The total number of such cases is calcu-
lated to be no less than sixteen in addition to the comprehensive^
Special Responsibilities. This is another substantial slice cut
off from provincial autonomy.
It may be added that both in the exercise of his discretionary
Possibility powers and in the exercise of his individual judge-
of voluntery ment the Governor — and also the Goveraor-General
action by tbo — is not forbidden by law to consult his Ministers
OoTornor abide by their advice. If, of his own free
will, he decides to take them into his confidence and share
his responsibilities with them, there is nothing to prevent him
ordinarily from doing so. In fact, that is the constitutional
course which he may normally be expected to follow. The
establishment of such precedents is strongly advocated and
eagerly looked forward to by politicians both British and Indian.
They ^^ould appreciably broaden the scope of ministerial, and
therefore popular, authority and dissipate the shadow cast by
special powers and safeguards. Jt is generally believed that a
practice of this nature has been set up, in a larger or smaller
measure, in most of the provinces.
However, there is one serious danger of encroachment on this
Governor- negative liberty which a sympatj^etic Governor
General’s may try to utilize for the positive purpose of
control building up healthy comentions. 3t is explicitly
laid down in section 54 that when the Governor acts in his dis-
cretion or in the exercise of his individual judgement, he will be
under the general control of the Governor-General and will have
to comply with such particular directions as may be issued by
the latter in his discretion. So that, if in an exceptional instance,
a constitutionally-minded Governor voluntarily chooses to con-
sult his Ministers and to act on their advice even in respect of
matters which are reserved for his discretion or for his individual
judgement, his iiciion may be hampered by orders issued by the
280 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
superior authority of the Governor-General or ultimately of the
Secretary of State. The British Premier’s reply to Mr Churchill,
referred to in an earlier section,^ reiterated this constitutional
position.
The third category consists of items in which the Governor
Povers ^ advice of his Ministers. And as
eiereised on the latter are members of the legislature and res-
tho odTico of ponsible to it, the concept of provincial autonomy
MiniBten i^^ay be supposed to be tangibly represented by and
ill this particular domam. The Instrument of Instructions
definitely lays down that in all matters within the scope of
the executive authority of the province, save in relation to
functions which are to be exercised in hisrdiscretion, the Governor
will be guided by the advice of his Ministers. But to be so
guided ought not to prove inconsistent with the fulfilment of
any of his Special Besponsibilities or with the proper dis-
,charge of those functions W’hich have to be performed in the
exercise of his individual judgement. Whenever they are in-
volved the Governor is instructed to act in the manner in which
he, thinks it proper to act, notwithstanding the advice of his
Ministers. But the Ministers should not be enabled to rely upon
his Special Besponsibilities in order to relieve themselves of
responsibilities w’hich are properly their own.
However, it must be noted that the Governor is not excluded
His presence from the provincial Cabinet as his master, the King
et Cabinet of England, is excluded from the British Cabinet.
meeUngs He is empowered not onh to be present at
meetings of the Council of Ministers hut also to preside over
them. He can urge his own views and argue his own points. His
participation in the debates is bound to have a considerable
effect in shaping the Minister’s attitude with regard to the general
policy of government acid the disposal of specific questions. His
influence will be particularly effective when there are no strongly
organized political parties in the province to undertake the
formation of responsible Ministries. It is a truism of constitu-
tional science that the presence of the head of the government
at Cabinet meetings inevitably tends to prevent the growth of
a homogeneous Cabinet and of the principle of joint responsibi-
lity. It is of course presumed that even if the Governor does
not see eye to eye wdth the ministers and actually dissents from
their opinions, he will allow’ them to have their own way and
not override their decisions.
EELATIONS TO MINISTEBS AND EXKf’lTlVE
POWEES
Section 49 of the Act lays downi that the executi\e authority
of a province will be exercised on behalf of His Majesty by
‘ See p. 81.
PEOVIiVCIAL EXECUTIVE- GOVEKXOll 281
the Governor. Section 50 lays down that the Governor
Exeeatlve have a .Council of Ministers to aid and
authority in advise him in the exercise of his functions,
the proTinooi excepting in so far as he is required by the Act
mta in the to exercise his functions in his discretion. He
OoTernor p^exented from exercising his individual
judgement when under the Act he is required to do so. Thus
there is no obligation to consult Ministers in the former sphere;
there is no obligation to carry out their advice in the latter
sphere even though it may be sought and given.
Ministers have to be chosen and summoned by the Govenior
He appoints in his discretion and they can be similarly dis-
Minlsters missed l)y#hiin. Tt is directed in the Instrument
of Instructions to the Governor that be should use his best
endeavour ‘to select his Ministers in the following manner,
that is to bay, to appoint, in consultation with the person mIjo in
his judgement is most likely to command a stable iiia]orit\ in
the legislature, those persons (including so far as practicable
members of imporluiit minority communities) who will best be
a position collectively to command the confidence of the
legislature. In so acting he shall bear constantly in mind the
need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Mini-
sters.* He must therefore send for the leader of the largest politi-
cal party in tlie legislature and ask him to fonn a Ministry.
Before the introduction of provincial autonomy and the
Potitioo uf s;vsleui of go\eriiment by popular Ministries ^^hich
the Secretaries ure responsible to the legislature, the Governor
before proYin- used to summon, as a matter of normal official
cial autonomy routine, the secretary to Government in every de-
partment auid to obtain from him information about every
important administrative matter. He could thus keep himself
acquainted with the detailed operation of the executive m ichine
and take an active part in its day-to-day direction. The
secretaries, who were the subordinates of Executive Council-
lors or Ministers, had the privilege of direct aeces'^ to the superior
of their superiors and of discussing administrative affairs with
the head of the goveniinent behind their backs.
Whatever may have beep the justification foi^such a system
Their poeitlOD ''ben the government Wiis almost entirely bureau-
und«r era tic, it could obviously have no reason to exist
reeponeible after the transfer of power into the hands of the
government representatives of the people. In a parliamentary
government the supreme executi\e authority must vest iu the
Ministers. Even the Joint Parliamentary Committee admitted
that *if it is to be the Council of Ministers who will in futtire
aid and advise the Govenior. it is plain that the Governor
can no longer be advised directly and independently by tlio
secretaries to government’. But as even after the Act ol 1935
282 , INDIAN ADAUNISTEATION
the Governor will continue to have not merely nominal but very
real administrative powers, particularly in reference to safe-
guards and Special Kesponsibilities, it was not considered feasible
to deprive him of the means of getting information about the
working of the administrative machine. The necessary pro-
vision was therefore made in the Act by section 59.
The Governor, in his discretion, may preside over meetings
He may Council of Ministers. He has also, in
preside o¥er his discretion but after consultation with the
the meetings
of ministers
^linisters, to make rules for the more convenient
transaction of the business of the Provincial Govern-
ment and for the allocation of poi*tfolios to Miiiisters. In
order that he should not be ignorant the happenings in tlie
various departments, the above rules shall include provision‘^
requiring a Minister to transmit to the Governor, and the apprcj-
priate secretary to Government to bring to the notice of the
Minister concerned and the Governor, all important information
concerning the business of the Provincial Government and parti-
cularly those matters which involve the Governor’s Special lles-
ponsibilities. Thus Ministers will not be left completely in the
dark about what their subordinates, the secretaries, have
communicated to the Governor. The Governor will of course
be in close touch with the course of provincial administration
from day to day and will be able to influence its general trend
as well as its details.
In the system of responsible government, the head ol ihe
Need for a state does not remain present at and actively
convention of participate in the meetings of the Cabinet. The
non-attendance Prime Minister, who is the leader of his colleagues,
of his party, and of the nation generally for the time being,
presides over Cabinet .meetings, controls the work of IVIinister'-,
and as the elected representative of the people bears the wliole
burden of policy and governance on his shoulders. If the
autonomous Indian provinces are to develop along the same
lines, the Governors ought to withdraw from Cabinet discussions.
It may be pointed out that the Act of 1985 does not make it
obligatory on }hem to preside o\er Cabinet meetings; it is left
to their discretion. They can therefore voluntarily remain
absent from them and leave all initiative and leadership to the
Prime Minister. That would be a logical corollary of Ihe new
constitutional position. Probably the practice is being partially
adopted in all the provinces, though exactly to what extent is
not known.
It must be repeated that as this is a region for the exercise
of the discretionary powers oPi>he Governor, he is subject to the
orders and directions that may be given to him by the Governor-
General and ultimately by the Secretary of State. The growth
of particular conventions will therefore be considerably influenced
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR 288
by those authorities. They can help or hinder that process ac-
cording to their inclinations.
In the scheme of provincial autonomy, the subject of law
His povevt order is entrusted to the authority of a Minis-
in respect of ter. However, Parliament was not prepared to
the Police transfer into the hands of Indians the same
Department amount of power in respect of this subject that
it was willing to concede in others. It was considered risky
to allow Indian Ministers to have unfettered sway over the
Police Department, and it was therefore decided to bring it
under the Governor’s closer supervision. This has been done
by sections 66-8 of the^ct. In making, amending, or approving
any rules, regulations, or orders relating to any police force,
whether civil or military, the Governor is required to exercise
his "individual judgement. For combating crimes of violence
which are intended to overthrow the Government, the Governor
has been given special power ‘to assume charge, to such exteiit
as he may think requisite, of any branch of government’ and to
act in his discretion in administering it. He can also, in his
discretion, make rules for securing that the sources of informa-
tion with reference to such crimes shall not be disclosed by any
member of tln^ police force except in accordance with the
direction of the Inspector-General of Police or the Commissioner
of Police, or by any other person in the service of the Crown
except in accordance with the directions of the Governor in his
discretion.
It is one of the primary principles of the Act of 1935 that
His powers ^be superior Services should be kept beyond the
in resect of reach of the Indian legislature. 'Fhe Governor
the SerYlces has a Special Responsibility in respect of the
public services and the Instrument of Instructions further
amplifies it by stating that he must be careful to safeguard the
members of the Services not only in any rights provided for them
by or under the law, but also against any action which in his
judgement would be inequitable. This constitutes of couree a
very general supervisors’ power w’hich may interfere with the
orders issued by a Minister. Even in the operation of provincial
autonomy, the Ministers and legislatures have no control oyer
officials in the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Semce
and others appointed for the province by the Secretary of Stat-e,
though their salaries are charged on the provincial revenues.
Certain posts are reserved for piersons chosen by the Secretary
of State. The Governor, in his individual judgement, has to
determine the appointments to these posts, transfers, any pr<>
motions of the persons holding them, any order relating to their
leave if it exceeds three months, and any order suspending them.
No order which punishes or formally censures any such person or
affects adversely his emoluments or pension can be made, if he
a84 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
is serving in a province, except by the Governor exercising his
individual judgement. Appointments of District Judges in a
province and their postings and promotions have to be made
by the Governor exercising his individual judgement. He has
also in his discretion to appoint the chairman and other members
of the Provincial Public Ser\’ice Commission and to make regu-
lations regarding their number, their tenure of office and condi-
tions of service. It will be easily seen from this multiplicity of
powers how even in the normal routine of purely administrative
matters, the Governor has been placed in a position of unquestion-
ed supremacy.
The Governor has to appoint, in the exercise of his indi\idual
judgement an Advocate -GAieral for the pro^ince.
He must possess the same qualifications as are
required for being appointed a high court judge,
is to hold office during the pleasure of the Gover-
nor, and receive such remuneration as the latter in the
exercise of his individual judgement may determine. It is the
duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to the Provincial
Government upon such legal matters and to perform such other
duties of a legal character as may be referred or assigned to
him by the Governor. This provision has been made in section
55. Ministers will naturally prefer to have a legal adviser in
whom they have full confidence, and the Governor in making
the appointment of the Advocate-General is expected normally
to be guided by their advice. But the convention has not been
uniformly established that the Advocate-General should, or
should be called upon by the Governor to, resign his post along
with the Ministry. It was followed in Bombay when the Con-^
gress Ministry was formed in 1937, but was not similarly followed
at that very time in th^ Central Provinces and Berar. E\en in
Bombay the Advocate-General did not resign when the (/ongress
Ministry gave up office in November 1939.
Appointment
of an
Adfoeato-
Oenoral
§4. EBLATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE AND
LEGISLATIVE POWERS
The Governor's powers in respect of the legislative chambers
SnmmoBlBtf proposed to be introduced in and pass-
•• ed by them are mentioned in several different sec-
tions of the Act.’ The Governor in his discretion
can summon the legislative chambers or chamber
in a province, can prorogue them and can dissolve
the lower house. However, as the conduct of
government, including legislation, is entrusted to responsible
ministers, this power will have to be exercised in a manner which
will suit their convenience. The initiative and decisions in this
and dlsaonring
ths Ldglsla-
ture;
to BUls
‘ See eectionq 63, 63. 74. 76, 76 , 84, 86. 106.
PEOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR
285
VLMii ralei
of procedure
in certain
mattepf
respect will therefore automatcially tend to lie more with the
Prime Minister than with the Governor. Similarly, the Governor
can address either chamber singly or both together. He can, in
his discretion, send messages to the legislature in regard to a
pending Bill or for any other purpose. Whenever there is
disagreement between the two chambers in provinces where the
bicameral system has been instituted, the Governor, in his dis-
(iretion, has to summon a Joint Sitting to remove the deadlock.
His assent, given in his discretion, is required for any Bill passed
by the provincial legislature. He may withhold that assent or
reserve the Bill for the consideration of the Governor- General.
He may also return it ^o the legislature with a message that it
should be reconsidered.
The Governor in his discretion but after consultation with the
Speaker or President has to make rules for
regulating the procedure and conduct of business
in the legislature (i) in relation to matters which
affect the discharge of those of his functions
which have to be performed in his discretion or in his indivi-
dual judgement; (ii) for securing the timely completion of
financial business; (iii) for prohibiting the discussion of or the
asking of queslions on matters connected \vith Indian States,
and (iv) for prohibiting, save with the consent of the Governor
in his discretion, the discussion or asking of questions on foreign
affairs, administration of Tribal and Excluded Areas and the
personal conduct of the Ruler of an Indian State or his family.
Twenty-nine such rules, called the Bombay Legislative Chambers
(Governor’s) Rules, have been framed for Bombay. In a province
where there are two chambers, the Governor, after consultation
with the President and the Speaker, has to make niles for fixing
the procedure of their Joint Sittings.
If the Governor in his discretion certifies that the discussion
'Stopping clause or amendment introduced or
’diBCQfflon proposed to be introduced in the legislature would
•on a BtU aflPect the discharge of his Special Responsibility
for the prevention of any grave menace to the peace and tran-
quillity of the province, he may in his discretion direct that no
proceedings shall be taken in relation to the Bill, clause or amend-
ment. This is an important reserve power w’hich can be used
against legislation introduced on the initiative of responsible
Ministers.
Unless the Govenior in his discretion thinks fit to give his
Hit pmlous previous sanction, no Bill or amendment can be
lanetlon necst- introduced in the provincial legislature if (i) it
wj in seeks to repeal or to amend or is repugnant to any
utrtatn cum Governor’s Act, or any ordinance promulgated in
his discretion by the Governor; (ii) it seeks to reped or to
amend or to affect any Act relating to any police force.
286 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Till the Act of 1935, the Governors had no power to promul-
gate ordinances. It was vested exclusively in the
Governor-General, who could issue ordinances for
a province. In consistence with their new status
as heads of federal units, that power has now been
conferred upon the Governors. Two types of ordi-
nances have been provided for. In one, the promulgation will
be made on the advice of Ministers or, in certain oases, in the
exercise of the Governor's individual judgement, if, at any
time when the legislature is not in session, the Governor is satis-
fied that immediate action is necessary. Such an ordinance
issued under section 88 of the Act must be laid before the pro-
vincial legislature and w^ill cease to ojfcrate at the expiration
of six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature or on
an adverse resolution passed by that body. The Madras Temple
Entry Indemnity Ordinance and the Bombay Fodder and Grain
Control Ordinance were issued in 1939 on the advice of the
respective Ministries in accordance with this provision.
The other type of ordinance, mentioned in section 89, is
In Wg of a more absolute character. It at any time —
discretion that is, whether the legislature is in session or
not — the Governor is satisfied that immediate action is necessary
for the discharge of those of his functions w'hich have to be
performed in his discretion or in the exercise of his individual
judgement, he may promulgate an ordinance as he thinks fit
to do. It need not be laid before the provincial legislature at
any time and can continue to be in operation for a maximum
period of six months at a stretch, to be followed by a further
extension not exceeding six months if found necessary.
The Montford Beforms had created a new weapon for use
Certification the povemor- General and the Governor. It
in a morac was called the power of Certification. The Act
direct form of 1935 has not only retained that instrument
of absolutism but made it much simpler to operate. The
process of certification required that a Bill should first go to the
legislature, should be rejected by it and then should be certified
by the Governor into an Act. In the new' system, even the sem-
blance of consultation with or consideration by the legislature
may be dispensed with. The position is made quite clear by
section 90 of the Act, and also by the comments of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee.
It is laid down that if at any time it appears to the Govemor
The Governor’s that certain legislation is necessary for the dis-
Acts charge of those of his functions which have to be
performed in his discretion or in his individual judgement, he
can adopt one of two courses: (i) he may enact forthwith a
Governor's Act containing such provisions as he considers
necessary, or (ii) he niay send to the legislature the draft of
Issuing of
ordinanoes
on the
advice of
Ministers
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR 287
a Bill which he considers necessary. In the latter case, the
legislature may present an address to the Governor, within a
period of one month, expressing its opinion on the Bill. He
may thereafter pass it into a Governor's Act, either with
such amendments as he deems necessary or in its original
form.
'^l^hese Governor’s Acts have the same force and effect as
Acts passed by the JVovinciol legislature. However, they have
to be cojiimunicated through the (io\ernor-General to the Secre-
tary of State and put before each House of Parliament by him.
A single mortal head of a I*rovincial Government is thus enabled,
ill the plenitude of his v^^sdom and authority, to defy the collec-
tive opinion of scores of eleeled representatives who constitute
the legislature of the province. Even as an extraordinary provi-
sion, "it suggests an incongruous despotism in the picture of what
js alleged to be full provincial autonomy.
§5. FINANCIAL POWERS
Tile Go\ernor ha^ c'unsiderable powers in matters of finance.’
Causing the B is hib duty to see that for every financial year
budget to a budjitt is prepared for the province and laid
be prepared before its legislature^. The statement must show
separateU items on which that bod> will be called upon to
^ote expenditure and itein^ \^hose expenditure is charged on
provincial revenues. The question whether a particular item
is or is not included in the latter category has to be decided by
the Governor in his discretion.
In respect oi the votable portion of the budget, the Legisla-
Power to Assembly of the province can assent to,
restore cuts refuse, or reduce any demand. But if, in the
in the opinion of the Governor, the refusal or reduction
Totable items of any such grant would affect the due discharge
of any of his Special Responsibilities, he can restore, wholly
or partly, the cuts that may have been made by the Assembly.
This is also a pernicious reproduction of the^ old power of
certification. No demand for a grant can be made except
on the recommendation of the Governor. The Governor has
to authenticate by his signature a schedule signifying (i) the
grants made by the Assembly in the Aotable part of the budget,
including the cuts restored by him if any, and (ii) sums required
for expenditure charged on the revenues of the province. No
expenditure from the revenues of a province is deemed to be
. duly authorized unless it is specified in the schedule so authenti-
cated.
‘ See sections 78-82 of the Act.
288 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Bills or amendment's on the following subjects cannot be
introduced in the provincial legislature except on
the recommendation of the Governor: (i) for im-
posing or increasing any tax; (ii) for regulating
the borrowing of money or the giving of any gua-
rantee by the province ; (iii) for declaring any
expenditure to be expenditure charged on the revenues of a pro-
A'ince or for increasing the amount of any such expenditure.
§6. SPECIAL EESPONSIBILITIES
The Act of 1935 is full of many resfrvations and safeguards.
The poUey The grant of political power has been invariably
of the Aet accompanied by certain restrictions or other coun-
teracting provisions which minimize the extent of the grant.
^In pursuance of that policy, a new class of obligations has been
created under the constitution. They are known as the Special
Besponsibilities of the Govemor-GeneraP and the Governor,
and those high officials are required to fulfil them in the exercise
of their individual judgement.
The following list has been enumerated for the Governor in
JKInds of section 52: (i) The prevention of any grave menace
SpeoUl Roi- to the peace and tranquillity of the province; (ii)
ponsihllliiei the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the
minorities; (iii) securing the rights and the legitimate interests
of the Sendees; (iv) the prevention of any kind of discrimination
against British citizens in the sphere of executive action,
(v) securing the peace and good government of the Partially
Excluded Areas; (vi) protection of the rights of any Indian
States and the rights and dignity of their rulers; (vii) securing
the execution of the orders and directions issued by the Governor-
General in his discretion.
The Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar has also
ProYlilonf for Special Besponsibility of securing that a
C.P. and Berar reasonable share of the revenues of the province
and Sind is expended in or for the benefit of Berar. The
Governor of Sifld has the Special Besponsibility of securing the
proper administration of the Lloyd Barrage and Canals Scheme.
It will be easily seen that the object of defining these Special
The compro* Besponsibilities is not merely to set aside a distinct
iMnalva natnro group of departments for the personal manage-
•f Speeia] ineiit and attention of the Governor. They do
RatpomiMItttaa attempt to introduce a division of the
Provincial Government into two sections, one handed over to
the Ministers in which they can have complete freedom, and
the other retained and reserved for the Governor. In fact, they
Bills to ba
Inirodoaid
on his
Taeammaa-
dation
See pp. 194-5.
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR 2«9
are generic in their conception and can be interpreted to apply
to the whole sphere of the Pro\incial Government.
For instance, as the Joint Parliamentary Committee has
Illustrations emphasized, the peace and tranquillity of a
province may be believed to be endangered by what may be
construed to be the undesirable activities of any department of
state. Similarly, the minorities and the Services are inevitably
present in every aspect of administration. The possibility of dis-
crimination against British citizens in any manner can also
exist in every subject. The range of the Governor’s supervision
and the scope for his superior action are therefore extremely
comprehensive.
Further, it must be Realized that the terms ‘grave menace',
Vague ‘legitimate interests’, ‘discrimination’, ‘peace’,
expressioiiB ‘rights’, ‘dignity’, etc., are ver^^ vague and elastic.
AccoMing to the viewpoint and interest of the user, they can
be made to yield a meaning of different degrees of intensity,
and “application. A Governor who is fond of power would find
them to be convenient excuses for inlerference. By putting
a wide construction on all their implications, he could constantly
encroach on the work of responsible Ministers.
^7. EMERGENCY POWERS
Jn the working of the parliamentary system in Jfritain, a
Rise of an constitutional crisis would lead either to ilie resig-
emergency nation ol Ministers or to the dissolution of Parlia-
ment, and the dispute is ultimately settled by the \erdict of
the electorate. There may be brought about a change, but not
a paralysis, of government. But the position in India is diHerent.
I’he Act of 1935 and the constitutional structure that it
creates are essentially based on the doctrine ot self-go\ ernment
with salegnards. The;s leave the ultimate authority oAcr India
111 main iiiqiortanl respects in the hands of the British people.
The possibility ot a gra\e conflict is inlierenl in such a
Deadlock in situation. The Governor representing the British
government J^irlianient may disagiee wilh his responsible
Ministers and the provincial legislatures on soine^erucial issues,
and neither the public o])inion in Britain nor the public* opinion
in India ma\ be in a mood to }ield. The majority party in
the provincial legislatures may then refuse to form a Ministry’
and may not allow' others to form it. There would thus be a
•complete deadlock, and the machinery of go\ ernment as pro-
vided for in the Act would fail to operate. All administration
would be threatened with stoppage.
The Act has made special provisions to meet abnormal sitiia-
iBsue of tions of this type. Section 93 empow^ers the
proclamations Governor to issue a Proclamation if at any time
he is satisfied that a situation has arisen in w'hic*h the goveru-
19
290
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
ment of the province cannot be carried on in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. By such a Proclamation the Governor
may (i) declare that his functions shall, to such extent as
may be specified in the Proclamation, be exercised by him in
his discretion, and (ii) assume all or any of the powers vested
in or exercisable by any provincial body or authority. The Pro-
clamation may contain all such incidental and consequential
provisions as may be necessary, and may suspend, in v\hole or
in part, the operation of any provision of the Act relating to any
provincial body or authority, except the High Courts.
Such a Proclamation has to be communicated forthwith
The period to the Secretary of State and to be laid by him
of their before each House of Pafliament. It must cease
oontinaance to operate at the end of six months after it is
issued, unless allowed to be further continued by resolutions
of Parliament. In no case, however, can it remain in force
•for a period of more than three years.
If by such a Proclamation the Governor has assumed to
Laws himself any power of the provincial legislature to
passed in an make laws, a* law made by him in the exercise
emergency of this power will continue to have effect for a
period of two years after the Proclamation has ceased to liave
effect. However, even before this period has elapsed such a
law made by the Governor may be repealed or re-enacted by the
provincial legislature.
This law-making power is not to be confounded with the
power, vested in the Governor by section 90, to enact wliat are
known as Governor’s Acts.^ These measures have no statutory
limit on their duration and can be issued even in normal times
when the constitution of the province is still functioning.
A Proclamation of this kind has to be issued by the Governor
Concuifence of ^ his discretion and with the concurrence of the
the Governor- Governor-General, given in his discretion. It may
be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation.
Thus all the executive and legislative work m
the province can be temporarily taken over by the Governor
directly, and the wheels of the administrative machinery can
continue to be moved by his driving force, till normal conditions
are restored.
Within less than three years of the introduction of provincial
Sospension autonomy the Governors of eight provinces —
Bengal, the Punjab and Sind were the exceptions
— were unexpectedly called upon to exercise this
emergency power, and to suspend the normal
working of the provincial constitution. The British
Government's declaration of their war aims, particularly wdtb
Genera]
necessary
of the
constitution
in eight
provinces
‘ See p. 2d8.
PROVIJ^CIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOR 291
reference to India’s right of self-determination, was considered
to be unsatisfactory by the Indian National Congress, and in
pursuance of the mandate issued by that body the Congress
Ministries resigned their posts early in November 1939. As
the Congress party held a majority of seats in the legislatures
of eight provinces, the formation of alternative Ministries in
them was impossible, ^ven the dissolution of the legislatures
would not have changed their political complexion, and matters
would not have improved.
In these exceptional circumstances, the Proclamation autho-
Appointment rized by section 93 was issued by the Governors
of Advisers to concerned with the previous concurrence of the
the Governor Governoi^General, and from the first week of
November 1939 all powers of government within their respective
territorial zones were assumed by them. Upto 1946, the
administration of these provinces was carried on by the
Governor with the assistance of Advisers, either two or three
in number, who were specially appointed by him. They were
not selected from non-official politicians but were senior members
of the l.C.S. serving in the province. There had thus been
a complete reversion to bureaucratic rule. In Assam, a new
Ministry came into office as a result of the reshuffling of the
political groups in its legislature but it could not last long.
As the period of six months since the issue of the Proclama-
tions of Emergency by the Governors in November 1939 was
corning to an end and as no solution of the political crisis in
India was in sight, both the Houses of Parliament passed in
April 1940 Resolutions permitting the continuance of the Pro-
clamations for a term of not more than twelve months. Similar
Resolutions w^ere further passed in 1941 and 1942.
The Governor of Bombay took over the government of
A Governor's province by a Proclamation issued in the begin-
Act enacted ning of November 1939. In the exercise of the powers
in Bombay whicli were thus assumed he thought it necessary
to enact a Governor’s Act in April 1940. The Congi'ess Ministry
while in office had initiated the policy of prohibition, and certain
regulations and notifications had been issued Jjy the Govern-
ment under the Abkari Act for the purpose of implementing
that, policy and preventing people from being in possession of
liquors and intoxicating drugs. But a Special Bench of the
Bombay High Court decided, after hearing certain appeals that
were referred to it, that such notifications and regulations were
ultra vires and could not have legal effect. The decision would
have had the result of frustrating a policy which had been
inaugurated by responsible Ministers wuth the full support of a
democratically elected legislature; and this too at a time when
those bodies had ceased to function and could not therefore
take prompt and effective measures to safeguard the reform.
292 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
The Governor also felt that the ruling of the High Court would
create administrative chaos because it would apply to a part of
the regulations and would leave other parts untouched.
He therefore enacted a Governor's Act to make the necessary
amendments in the Abkari Act so that dislocation of the adminis-
tration of excise policy could be avoided. The Act also indemni-
fied all officers for actions taken by tliftm in good faith before
the decision of the High Court. The experiment of prohibition
was thus kept alive and saved from an abrupt and unforeseen
wreckage, and the step taken by the Governor was highly com-
mended. It must be remembered that this Governor's Act
was not enacted under section 90,* but under powers obtained
in virtue of section 93.
§8. INSTRUMENT OF INSTRUCTIONS
The Joint Parliamentary Committee expressed the opinion
Flexibility adoption of the English constitutional
required in form need not imply the establishment in each
coBStitniional province of a system analogous in all respects 1o
derelopmeiit which prevails in England. Constiii:^tional
usages and practice* which may be eminently adapted to the
circumstances of Britain may be found unsuitable to Indian
conditions. India’s political development must be in hannon\
with her own traditions and circumstances. It must also be
marked by a flexibility and capacity for adjustment which
would make continuous progress possible without an;\ altera-
tion in the existing form of government.
The Dominion and Colonial constitutions have followed the
Precedent of British model. The Committee has pointed out
the DominionB how those who framed them had recourse to the
constitutions device of what is known as the Instrument of In-
structions in order to impart the necessary flexibility to their
working. Apart from the specific obligations imposed by a
parliamentary Act, the Instrument indicated to the Governor-
General or Governor how far he should regard him.self hound
by English precedent and analogy. It preserved a sphere* in
which constitutional evolution might continue without involv-
ing any change in the legal framework of the constitution itself.
It was recommended that Instruments of Instructions n»ight
Purpose of the similarly be issued to the Govemor-Genernl and
Instrument of Governors in India. They should amplify the
InsiruetlonB meaning and spirit of some of the provisions of
the Act, particularly those that define the powers, responsibilities
and duties assigned to and imposed on those high officials, and
lay down particular practices and procedure. That would help
to give flesh and blood to the legal skeleton of the constitution
and to mould its living shape.
' Govehtment of It^dia Act, 193 /j.
I^KOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVERNOll 293
The Joint Parliamentary Committee also explained that the
Instrument would have vital importance in the evolution of the
new Indian constitution. For example, Ministers have no consti-
tutional right, under the Act, to tender advice to the Governor
upon matters which are placed in the Governor’s discretion,
though he could and often would consult them. If at some
future time it seemed that this power of consultation might be
made mandatory and not permissive, the Committee think that
there would be nothing inconsistent with the Act in an amend-
ment of the Instrument for such a purpose.
The Instrument of Instructions w^as intended to serve two
purposes. It could ofcirify certain constitutional injunctions
contained in the Act and prescribe usages and conventions to bet
followed in certain important matierk. The Instrument could
also be utilized to stimulate constitutional progress without
introducing any structural change in the Act.
Section 58 lays down the procedure for the issue of an Instru-
ment of Instructions to the provincial Governor (and section 13
to the Governor-General). It is issued by His Majesty, but, the
draft is prepared by the Secretary of State and approved of by
both Houses of Parliament. Amendments to the Instructions
previously issued have also to be approved by Parliament. The
authority of that body in determining the stages of the political
progress of India even by such an indirect method is fully
asserted.
The Insti'U(*lions are intended to guide the Governor and
he is expected to carry them out. However, the Instrument has
not the same validity as a lav\ , and no a(*tion can be declared
illegal on ihe ground that it did not accord with tlie Instrument
of hislruelioiis. There are twenty-one clauses of the Instrument
that was issued soon after the Aet of 1985 was passed and they
refer to matters eoncernmg the exeeutive authority of the pro-
vince and the legislature.
The following is a brief summary
A. l.N'TuonrcToKV
I-VI. These clauses lay down the procedure for the taking
and administering of oaths and also recpiire that the Governor
shall not quit India without obtaining leave.
B. In Regaud to the PjXEcutive Ai tiiority
VII. Ministers should he appointed in consultation with
the person who is most likely to command a stable majority in
the legislature. As far as practicable they should include mem-
bers of the important minority communities. A sense of joint
responsibility should be fostered among them and they should
be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the
legislature.
VTTT. The Governor sliould be guided by the advice of his
294 INIDIAN ADMINISTBATION
Ministers except when he is required to act in his discretion or
in his individual judgement. But the Ministers should not be
enabled to rely upon his Special Besponsibilities in order to
relieve themselves of their own.
IX. The minorities mentioned in the Act are racial and
religious and not political. The Governor has to secure a due
proportion of appointments in the Services to the different com-
munities.
X. The Services are to be safeguarded from any inequitable
executive action, in addition to the protection of the rights
guaranteed to them.
XI. Discrimination against British r interests of any kind
is to be prevented, even if it means differing from the Ministers.
Xn. Ministers should not be allowed to take action which
would imperil the economic life of any Indian State, and affect
prejudicially any of its rights.
xn. (a) The Governor of Berar has to pay due regard to the
commercial and economic interests* of the Hyderabad State.
Xm. Buies of business should be so framed that the Fin-
ance Minister should be consulted upon all proposals that affect
the finance of the province, and reappropriations within a grant.
XIV. The Governor should keep himself well informed
about the conduct of irrigation in his province.
XV. The Governor may appoint an officer for the Excluded
or Partially Excluded Areas within his charge.
XV. (a) The Governor of the North-West Frontier Province
should be particularly careful about his duties in regard to the
Tribal Areas.
C. Matters affecting Legislatures
XVI. In giving assent to or withholding it from Bills, the
Governor should pay particular regard to his Special Respon-
sibilities.
XVII. The following Bills or clauses will have to be reserved
for the consideration of the Governor-General:
1. If it repeals or is repugnant to an Act of Parliament.
2. If it derogates from the power of a High Court.
3. If it creates a doubt that it offends against the purposes
of Chapter 3, Part V of the Act in respect of discrimination
against British interests.
4. If it alters the character of the Permanent Settlement in
Bengal and other areas. However, the Governor's previous
sanction to the introduction of a Bill on this subject is not to
be r efuse d.
XVII. (a) The Nizam's assent is to be stated in respect of
Bills that apply to Berar.
XVlll. Proceedings on a Bill or amendment should be
stayed only if its public discussion itself would endanger pence
and tranquillity.
PEOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: GOVEENOR 295
XIX. Nominations to the Legislative Council should be
made to redress inequalities and to secure representation to
women and the scheduled castes.
D. General
XX. The Governor should try to maintain standards of
good administration, to promote moral, social and economic
welfare, to secure among all classes and creeds co-operation,
goodwill and mutual respect for religious beliefs and sentiments,
etc.
XXI. These Instructions should be communicated to Minis-
ters and also published in the province.
Appendix:
Xhis contains forms of the oath of allegiance, the oath of
office and the oath of secrecy for Ministers.
§9. SECRETARIAL STAFF OF THE GOVERNOR
It will be easily realized from the foregoing description that
Appointment Governor is not merely a titular head of the
of the staff province, but is required to perform a large number
and their of duties and play an active part in the admini-
saiaries stration of the province. It is therefore consider-
ed eb&eiitial that he should have at his disposal an adequate
personal and secretarial staff to assist him in the fulfilment of
his obligations. Accordingly, section 305 of the Act provides
that every Governor (and also the Governor-General) shall have
his own secretarial staff, appointed by him in his discretion.
The salaries and allow^ances of persons so appointed and the
office accoinniodalion and other facilities to be provided for
them are to be determined by the Governor in his discretion.
All the expenses incurred in this connexion are charged on the
revenues of the province and are therefore non-votable by the
legislature.
The Joint Parliamentary Committee suggested that at the
Secretary to head of this staff there should be a capable and
the Gorernor experienced officer of high standing. He should
be fully conversant with the current affairs (ft the province
and in close contact wdth the administration. However, the
Committee did not contemplate that he should be a kind of
Deputy-Governor. In their view’ his duties w'ould vary from
time to time as constitutional usage and practice grew. In
some respects he would occupy the position formerly filled by
the Governor’s Private Secretary, but would have duties of a
wider and more responsible character. The Committee recom-
mended that he should be designated as Secretary to the Governor,
and the recommendation has been carried out. Every Governor
has now such a Secretary, who is a fairly senior member of the
I.O.S. serving in the province.
296
INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
§10. IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFICE
The curiiiilative effect of all these powers, normal and special,.
He is not ordinary and extraordinary, legislative, executive
merely a and financial, is to make the position of the
constitutional Governor extremely formidable, if not invincible,
in the working of the Provincial Government, at
least in the strictly legal interpretation of the constitution.
By no stretch of imagination can he be described, nor is he in-
tended to be, a mere constitutional head, a dignified ornament
which shines with light but is without life. Even in whnt is
advertised to be provincial autonomy, h^^can prove to be a deci-
sive force. In actual practice, however, the Governors do not
seem to have attempted to impose their will upon the popular
Ministries by threatening to exercise their legal powers. It is
hoped that this healthy convention of non-interference will help
io set up real democracies in the Indian provinces.
Even in a free country, such a dominant position of the Je
RepycscntatlTc head of the state would be incompatible with
of the the principle of ministerial responsibility. In a
conquering conquered country the situation becomes worse,
because the Governor is also the representative
of the sovereign masters. He is specially commissioned to be
the custodian of their interests and is not therefore divested of
his active constitutional authority.
XXXIV. THE PEOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
§1. APPOlNTMExNT
Demochacy is a form of government where the people govern
Features of themselves. There are dilferent types of derrio-
a responsible cracy. In a country like England it works on
democracy what is described as the parliamentary principle.
The people are fully represented in the legislature which is
elected by adult suffragt^ and the leaders of such a legislature
are invested with executive direction and authority. They
become Ministers of the state and direct its affairs as long as the
majority of the legislature and the nation has confidence in them.
In the last resort therefore the people make and control their
government.
The Indian polity has also to be shaped i)i accordance \\ith
The ideal the ideals of democracy and preferably of the
for India parliamentary or responsible type. The intro-
duction of prov iicial autonomy is RU])poRed to he a step in
that direction. Theretore the pertinent questions to be asked
are, is there a popularly elected legislature in the province, and
is the provincial executive created by and entirely subordinate
to it? To the extent to which these questions can be answered
in the affirmative, the autonomy can be said to be real. The
position of the Council of Ministers has to be examined in the
light of the final goal of responsible democracy.
Cnder the Act of 1935, the Ministers have to be chosen
Ministers to be summoned by the Governor in his discretion
appointed by and they are to hold office during his pleasure,
the Ooyernor They must of course be members of the pro-
v'incial legislature, and if any one of them is not so at the
time of bis selection, he must find a seat for himself within six
months of his appointment as Minister. It may he inferred
from the Instrument of Instructions that the constitutional prac-
tice which is associated with Cabinet formation •in responsible
governments i.s to be adopted in India. The Governor has to
send for the leader of the largest party in the legislature and
entrust him with the task of forming a Ministry. The leader
mav accept the invitation and suggest names of his political
(omrades for the different portfolios. The Governor accepts
the list and the Ministry is then installed in office.
If such n practice is scrupiilonsly and rigidly followed, the
selection of Ministers, though legally vested in the Governor,
will, in effect, he made by the people. That in fact is the
essence of parliamentary government and the genuinely demo-
cratic principle that it embodies. There are different political
*298 INDIAN ADMINISTKATION
parties in the country, each having its own organization and a
Imitation to recognized leader as its head. Each party has its
the leader of own policy and programme which is submitted
the majority for the verdict of the final masters — the electors,
party That party which is successful in capturing the
largest number of seats in a general election can be said to be the
favourite of the country. It may be taken to have received a
mandate from the people to carry out its policy and programme.
Even the Governor has to submit to the decision of the nation
and call upon the authorized leader of the largest political group
to shoulder the burden of the administration.
However, one serious difficulty may^arise in the proper opera-
k difficulty of such a salutary system. The Governor is
about the enjoined to see that, so far as is practicable,
Inclusion of members of important minority communities are
, “Inwitlei included in the Ministry. Now it may happen
that the largest party in the legislature has no member who
belongs to the minority communities. Or even if there are such
members in its ranks, the leader of the party may not think
it feasible to elevate them to the Cabinet on account of their
inexperience or for some other reason. Would the Governor,
under these conditions, endeavour to impose some other man
upon the party which is entitled to be in power on account of
its numerical strength? Can he insist on saying that a place
must be found for a stranger in the party counsels? Would
the formation of a Ministry be impeded as a result of such a
conflict?
The answer will depend on the nature of a particular situn-
Deadlock tion. If a party has an overwhelming or an ab-
unlikely solute majority in the legislature and if its disci-
pline is perfect, the' Governor dare not carry his insistence
to extremes, because thereby he will invite trouble. With
a militant majority in constitutional opposition the normal work
of government would come to a standstill. Nor could emer-
gency powers be invoked to resolve such a minor impasse. To
do so would outrage all sense of proportion. The language of
the Instruction itself is guarded. It contains the important sav-
ing clause ‘so far as is practicable'. No sensible Governor
would precipitate a crisis in the face of such a clear declaration,
though the word ‘practicable’ may be twisted somewhat to
wield a required meaning. *
Where even the largest political party does not command an
OoTernop's absolute majority in the legislature, Ihe Ministry
personal will be in the nature of a coalition of different
influeneo In groups. In such a weak state of organized politiQS
the formation within the province, the Governor can certainly
coalitions exercise a good deal of personal influence. There
is no fear of a solid bloc effectively obstructing his will by
PBOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: MINISTERS 299
going into opposition, because even the biggest bloc does not
make a majority. By the exercise of skill in his negotiations
and conversations, the Governor could in these circumstances
succeed in getting the Ministry he wanted.
The experience of the working of provincial autonomy dur-
ConYention the last five years sliows ihat the method of
actually appointing Ministers described in the foregoing
paragraphs has been almost invariably followed,
he GoTernors After elections to the new legislatures were held
in the early months of 1937 and the results of those elections
were known, the Governor of every province, with the solitary
exception of the North -Vkist Frontier Province, summoned the
leader of that party which had secured a majority, or the
largest, number, of seats in the legislature of the province, and
asked him to form a Ministry. It was only when the invitation
■was declined by the Congress leaders that interim Ministries
were allowed to be formed, as a stop-gap arrangement, by mem-
bers of the minority parties in the six provinces in w'bich the
Congress party had a clear majority.
Four months later, when the Congress decided to accept
KepreBentatlon the leader of that party in the provincial
of Muslims In legislature was entrusted with the task of forming
the Ministry the Government and of choosing his own
colleagues for that purpose. The names submitted by the
leader, who naturally became the Prime Minister, are known to
have been ahvays accepted by the Governor. The question of
giving representation in the Ministry to the Muslim minority
proved to be rather difficult. The Congress decided as a matter
of policy that only such Muslims could be included in its Minis-
try as w'ero prepared to become members of the (’ongress and to
abide by its discipline and mandates. The Muslnn League,
which held the majority of l^uslim seats in the provincial
legislatures, refused to agree to this condition, and its members
■^vere therefore excluded from the Cabinets. The Congress part^
selected some of its own Muslim members lo hold office as
Ministers.
The Muslim League has since been contending that such
The attitude of Muslim Ministers are not really the representatives
the OoYernorB of the Muslim community, because they ha^e not
the support of the majority of the Muslim members of the
legislature. On the other hand, the Congress party, in the in-
terest of the solidarity of its organization, is not willing to allow'
those who are not in its ranks to occupy the responsible post of
Minister as long as the direction of government is in its hands.
Appeals were made to the Governors concerned against this atti-
tude, but they have not interfered wdth the arrangements pro-
posed by the party which commands the confidence of the
majority of the. legislature as a wffiole No instance has yet
300 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
occurred of a Governor endeavouring to inflict upon a party a
Minister whom it was not prepared to accept.
§2. QUALIFICATIONS, TENURE AND SALARY
The qualifications of a Minister are not prescribed in the
A Minister iior could they be so prescribed, except for
must be a the requirement that he must be a member of
member of the provincial legislature. It is not laid down
the legislature ^le must be an elected and not a nominated
member or that he must belong to the lower and not to the
upper chamber. A nominated member of the latter body can
therefore be included in the Council (5f Ministers.
It is obvious that a Ministry will be composed of prominent
He is usually leading members of a political party. Indivi-
a leading dually, almost every one of them must enjoy at
member of a least that degree of popularity in the country
political party ^^hich enables him to get elected to the legislature
from one constituency or another. In the party organization,
he must stand in the front rank. That implies that he must
be known to be endowed with the gifts of intelligence, in-
dustry and character which mark him out for responsibility and
distinction.
Indeed, the test is not passed merely by a brilliant university
The qualities career, though it may count as a valuable asset,
he is expected Several Ministers of England, for instance, have
to possess possessed an excellent academic record and have
been known for their scholarship and learning, though there
are also others who have never secured a university degree.
An innate aptitude and love for public life and keen political
ambition are the qualities essential in a Minister. Tie need
not have the specialized training of an administrator or a
bureaucrat, but he must be gif^d with robust common sense,
quick grasp and sympathetic understanding and a capacit;v to
appeal to the imagination of the people and carry them with
him. He should be a man of ideas and possess the qualities of a
thinker. It is not necessary that he should be an expert in the
narrow sense f but he must be able to appreciate the services of
experts and to assimilate the fruits of their long experience and
labour. A Minister may not himself actually operate the admin-
istrative engine; but he is certainly expected to regulate the
direction and speed of its journey.
Technically speaking, a Minister holds office during the
No fixed tenure pleasure of the Governor and may be dismissed at
of office his discretion. This is however a purely theoretical
position. In the parliamentary system, a Minister is really the
servant of the legislature and the electorate, and cannot be
arbitrarily removed from office by the head of the Government.
Nor can he have a fixed tenure of office defined in law. He
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: MINISTERS 301
•continues to be in power as Jong as his party has the complete
confidence of the legislature. The maximum number of years
for which a Ministry can hold office at a stretch is equal to
the maximum period of the life of a legislature. In the Indian
provinces the lower chamber or the Legislative Assembly has
a life of five years, unless il is dissolved earlier by the Governor.
It can be said that nonnally a Minister will be in his post for
.a period of five years; if the Ministry is thrown out earlier by
a vote of no-confidence, it will be less; if the party is once
again returned to power after a general election it will be more.
It is clear that the power of dismissing, like the power of
The Prime appointing, a Minister, which legally vests in the
Minister and Governor, xtiust in practice be exercisable by the
the power Prime Minister. On an exceptional occasion,^ one
diBmj||8al Qj. i^iore members of even a homogeneous Cabinet
may find themselves in serious disagreement with a majority of
their colleagues, and under the circumstances they would ,
naturally be expected to withdraw^ from the Government. But
vhere parliamentary traditions and spirit have not been
properly assimilated, such dissenting Ministers may obstinately
refuse to resign and thus create a very embarrassing situation
for the Ministry j a whole. The impasse would have ultimately
to be ended by the (iovemor exercising, on the advice of the
Prime Minister, his power of dismissing a Minister and removing
the person or persons concerned from their posts.
11 is interesting to note that the Governor of Bengal did
Instances exer(Mse liis power of dismissal for removing
in Bengal one of the members of the Cabinet, ]\Ir Xaushir
and C.P, Ali, who had differences with the Cabinet and
when asked to resign was not preynired to do so. The Premier
thereupon tendered tlie resignation of the whole Cabinet, which
w’as accepted by tlie Governor, and llie same leader formed
u now Ministry of all his old colleagues with tlie exception of
^Ir Naiishir Ali. On the other hand, the (TO\ernor of the
(’ent ral Provinces and Berar took the step of dismissing three
of his Ministers on the advice of tlie JVime Minister in .Inly
1938, hut as the former had the support of the legislature they
had to be iinniedi*itely reinstated and the l^inie Minister
had to resign and retire.
The niaximum number of Federal Ministers has been
Number of prescribed by the Act (it is lO'l, but no such
Ministers limit has been prescribed for Ministers in tlie
provinces. The actual number is determined by the conveni-
ence of every province and by the exigencies of pdrty align-
.ments in its politics. Generally, the bigger provinces nia\ be
expected to have a larger Cabinet than the smaller ones. But
this is not always so. The Congress Ministry of Assam, which
is one of the smallest and poorest provinces, w*as composed
302
INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
of eight members while the Bombay Ministry had only seven.
The Central Provinces had five Ministers while the United
Provinces had six. There were three Ministers in Orissa, four
each in Bihar and the North-West Frontier Province. In the
non-Congress provinces, the Punjab had six Ministers, Bengal
had eleven and Sind had four till the resignation of the Allabux
Ministry early in 1940.
All the work of the Provincial Government is divided into
Distribntion of different sections according to the convenience
vork among of the Ministry and the number of its members,
tb®® and each section, called the portfolio, is assigned
to a Minister. A portfolio is made up of many departments
of government, and takes its name irom the most important
of them. The seven Congress Ministers in Bombay had, for
instance, the following seven portfolios: (i) Political and Ser-
vices, Education and Labour;^ (ii) Finance, Eural Develop-
ment and Agriculture; (iii) Home and Law; (iv) Health and
Excise; (v) Revenue; (vi) Public Works; (vii) Local Self-
Government. Each one of these portfolios also contained
several other departments in charge of the same Minister.
In regard to the salaries of Ministers, an important departure
Salaries been introduced by the Act of 1935. The
annoally voted Montford Reforms had made them entirely
under the vo table. Members of the legislature were called
upon to sanction the amount in respect of
every Minister while passing the annual budget.
They had the right and the opportunity to reduce or even to
reject the whole demand. This was a direct check on the policy
and actions of Ministers, and one of the most effective ways
of indicating the legislature’s disapproval of ministerial conduct.
Such motions, if they were passed, were equivalent to votes
of censure. and resulted in the dismissal of the Ministers
Now the system has changed. It is laid down that the
Salaries now salary of ^Ministers will be fixed by an Act of the
fixed by an provincial legislature, and the Act can be arnen-
Act of the ded whenever any changes are felt to be
legislature necessary by the people’s representatives. Thus
the remunerajion of the highest servants of the state is left to
be determined by the chamber which symbolizes democracy.
In the provinces in which the Congress party was in power,
the salary of a Minister was fixed by the provincial legislatures
at Rs. 500 per month. In Bengal and the Punjab it was
Es. 2,000.
However, the salary of particular individuals who hold the
office of Minister is not annually submitted to the legislature
for its sanction, and it cannot be varied during their term of
office. In fact, it is placed in the list of items which are charged
' This portfolio *was taken by the Prime Minister.
Montford
Reforms
PBOyiNCIAL EXECUTIVE: MINISTERS 305
on the revenues of the province and which are therefore non-
But not votable. The legislature can no longer discuss in
annually Yoted the budget session the general working of
for oYOpy ministerial departments by proposing a nominal
Minister ^.^t in the salaries of Ministers. Nor can it drive
them out of office by reducing their salaries to a ridiculously low
figure. Hereafter, the only method of direct attack on the
Ministers will be to propose a motion of no-confidence in them.
When that order to quit is passed, no Minister can continue to
hold office, at least in normal circumstances.
The Parliamentary Secretary is a type of official peculiar
The to the system of responsible govewiment. He
Parliamentary is essentie^ly a politician and comes into office
Secretary his party and goes out with it. He is
expected to possess the same qualities that are supposed to be
requisife in a member of the Cabinet. The Parliamentary Secre-
tary has to play the role of an assistant to a Minister and to>
help him in his administrative, legislative and political duties. ■*
It must be emphasized that he is not a member of the public
service of the province and can in no sense be described as a
bureaucratic official. He must nob be confounded with the
Secretary to Government, who belongs to the permanent
bureaucracy.
Tlie creation of the post of Parliamentary Secretary is
AdYantages advantageous in two ways. Firstly, it relieves
of the office the heavy strain on Cabinet Ministers by giving
them a second-in-commond on whom they can safely rely, both
on account of his efficiency and party loyalty. Secondly, it
serves as an excellent training-ground for developing ministerial
ability and talent, and provides a good reserve from which
future Ministers can be drawn. The history of the British
Cabinet bears ample testimony to these advantages.
With the advent of popular democracy in Indian provinces
Their the emergence of the Parliamentary Secretary
appointment in the provincial polity was quite natural. The
in India Montford Reforms had permitted the appoint^
ment of Council Secretaries, but no Governor thought it
necessary to avail himself of the permission. The Act of 1935
contains no specific section on this subject, and tfierefore if there
is no positive provision for the appointment of such officers,
there is no bar to their appointment if the provincial legislature
so desires.
Parliamentary Secretaries have in fact been appointed in
Tlwir salary almost all the provinces and provision has been
and number made for the payment of salaries and allowances
. to them. They are not considered to be Government servants
holding places of profit under the Crown, and are not dis-
qualified from continuing as members of the legislature in
accordance with section 69 of the Act. The salary fixed for a
304 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
Parliamentary Secretary in the Congress provinces was Es. 250
per month. Their number has varied from province to pro-
vince, but the tradition has not yet been established of every
Minister being given n parliamentary assistant of this kind.
The number of the Secretaries has generally been smaller than
that of the Ministers in a province.
§8. COLLECTIVE EESPONSIBILITY OF THE CABINET
One of the fundamental concepts of the Cabinet form of
The Cabinet government is the collective responsibility of
ie one Ministers. Their number will certainly be more
indiTisible than one — in a country ^like England it is over
twenty. But they all work as a united team,
as one corporate and indivisible unit. All of them come into
oflBce and go out of office together. All hold themselves
responsible for the mistakes or shortcomings of any one of
'the group, and each one of the group is prepared to sacrifice
himself in the interests of all. To the head of the state and
also to the public, they present a homogeneous entity, iiispired
by a common ideology and adhering to a common programme.
The formation of such a coherent council implies that its
Its members members are connected with each other by
belong to the similarity of outlook. They must possess the same
same party sympathies. Their loyalty to principles and
persons must be common to a great extent. They must feel
attracted to each other by kindred ways of thought and feelings.
In fact, the Cabinet consists of persons who are members ol
the predominant political party in the legislature, owung allegi-
ance to the same leader and pledged to carry out tlie same
programme. All these conditions will have to be automaticalh
reproduced in India .with the introduction of responsible
governmefit.
It w^as one of the greatest defects of the Montford Eeforms
The OoTernor introduce the practice of
instructed to collective responsibility. Governors of some of the
encourage joint provinces even discouraged its adoption. Political
responsibility opinion in India has always insisted that the
practice should form an integral part of any constitutional re-
form’ introduced in India. The Joint Parliamentary Committee
was not very favourable to the proposal, but a clause was ulti-
mately inserted in the Instrument of Instructions to the
Governor directing him to foster the growth of joint responsibilitv
among his Ministers
The principle has been in operation in all the provinces
Its successful during the last few years and has worked with
working in remarkable success. The Ministries have stood
the proTinces before their parties, the public and the Governors
as indivisible units, and full responsibility has been taken
PROVlXCIAi. EXECUTIVE: MINISTERS :^n5
fby the whole body for all the actions of its individual members.
In 1989, when the action of the Education Minister in the
United Provinces in making a particular appointment as
Principal of the Boorkee College was severely criticized by mem-
bers of his own, that is the Congress, party the whole Cabinet
supported him and were prepared to resign as a body. There-
upon the party made it clear that they had not lost confidence
in the Ministry and the affair was amicably closed.
The Cabinet conducts its business by what is known as the
MMning of portfolio system. The work of administration
ithe portfolio can be naturally divided into two categories,
syttom First, there are matters of routine and minor
details which may reqiflre the attention of the head of the
department but which are too insignificant to be brought before
the \t4iole .Council of Ministers. They are disposed of by a
Minister in his individual discretion and judgement, though the
responsibility even for them is shared by all his colleagues.*
Then, secondly, there are important questions of principle and
])olicy affecting a particular department. The Minister may
formulate his ow n scheme of reform and propose certain
innovations. But he cannot take any action without consulting
his colleague 5. All important issues have to be submitted to
and thrashed out by the whole Cabinet. There is a free ex-
♦change of ideas among its members. Criticisms are made and
modifications suggested, and ultimately the scheme emerges
in a form which is acceptable to all. Then it becomes the
t'ombined obligation of the %\hole unit, which is bound to stand
or fall by it.
What matters are to be considered as minor and what as
Differmci major is left to the common sense of a Minister.
ibtiwwk There can be no hard and fast rule to bind him
coUMgues ill this respect. Soiiietimes differences of opinion
may arise about his interpretations, but they can be easily
removed. Even on questions of principle, as the Cabinet is
constituted by persons who are politically alike, a serious
-cleavage of opinion between them is not very probable. There
may be differences in the degree of emphasis, but they can be
•easily reconciled. However, on an exceptional o<!basion it nia\
happen that a ^linister cannot agree with the viewrpoint of his
colleagues or his colleagues find it imp>ossible to tolerate his
notions and behaviour. He then has to resign his office and
leave a Government with which he cannot work in harmony.
If need be, be can be asked to leave the Ministry.
.§4. IMPORTANCE OF THE OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER
Whenever a body consisting of more than one person is re-
♦ quired to function, the need for someone to be its leader or
jjresident is self-evident. There must be someone to take the
20
806 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
initiative in arranging business, to give rulings on occasions of
Tht UMd f6r disputes, to co-ordinate Government activities,
a president and to supply that unifying influence which
preserves the administrative system from contradictions and
chaos. The absence of such a leader would be a great handi-
cap to the smooth working of the machinery of the state.
With the growth of the idea of parliamentary government
Self-Abnegation England, the King’s initiative and authority
of the were naturally doomed. The monarch had to-
monardi accept a self-denying ordinance and withdraw
from active politics and administration in order to make room
for the representatives of Parliament. This did not mean the
weakening or the degeneration of the executive, but a funda^
mental change in its structure. The King’s Ministers became
in reality Parliament’s Ministers, appointed, controlled and dis-
missed by that body. The King’s place as their de facto mastei
had to be appropriately filled by someone who w^as pre-emiAent
in parliamentary life and leadership.
The development of responsible institutions therefore ha*^
IneTiUble invariably been accompanied by the rise to promi-
rise of nence of a new dignitary called the Prime*
the Prime Minister, or more briefly the Premier. In England,
Minister inevitability of his emergence was not realized'
at the beginning. Members of Parliament keenly resented
what w^as wrongly believed to be an unauthorized usurpation
of power by a single individual. But the logic of circumstances
w’as overwhelming. No Government can operate and thrive
without an active chief. The Prime Minister came to symbolize
and personify the transition from monarchy to democracy, even
when the institution of kingship was retained in its nominal
majesty.
The Inauguration of self-government in the Indian provinces
and the formation of responsible Ministries in
Minlilen in them must necessarily lead to the same develop-
tha Indian ment. Clause VII of the Instrument of Instruc-
proTlnoei tions to the Governor recognizes the existence of
the leader of the largest political party in the legislature. It
is advised that he should be invited to form the Cabinet.
Emphasis is also laid on the need of fostering a sense of joint
responsibility among the Ministers and on their being able col-
lectively to command the confidence of the legislature.
Governors of provinces have in fact followed the method of
sending for'the leaders of’ the largest political party in the newly
elected legislatures and requesting them to fonn a Ministry.
Such persons are being designated as the Prime Ministers of the
provinces.
However, thei*e is a very vital difference between the condi-
tions in England and in India. The British Sovereign has no-
PBOVINCIAL EXECUTIVE': MINISTERS 307
place in the British Cabinet. He is precluded from attending
No analogy meetings or from attempting to influence or
betwoon interfere with its working in any manner. His
conditions will cannot be imposed ,on any aspect of the
*"d*?dla** administration. The Prime Minister of the country
” presides over the Cabinet, keeps himself acquaint-
ed with important transactions in every department, helps
Ministers to arrive at decisions, and generally organizes and
conducts the whole of the executive business. He serves as the
connecting link between his colleagues and the Crown. All
powers that are technically enjoyed by the latter are actually
exercised by the Prime Minister, who stands as the embodiment
of the main current of^popular opinion for the time being.
In strict legal theory, the King of England appears to be
The hneanlng of the mighty centre of all governmental authority,
constitutional However, these appearances are entirely deceptive,
monarchy In reality, the King cannot act in any matter
or in any manner except in accordance with advice tendered
to him by Ministers who are elected to Parliament and to power
by the votes of the people. It is a famous maxim of the English
constitution that the King can do no wrong, because he cannot
do anything of his own accord at all. This obliteration of the
King's personality from the domain of active government is the
essential feature of what is known as constitutional monarchy.
The strength and popularity of that institution in British polity
is due, among other things, to the fact that it has been democra-
tized and modernized.
As has been explained in the last section. Governors of
Indian Indian provinces are not intended to be mere
OoYcrnors arc constitutional or nominal beads. They have been
actire rulers entrusted with large powers, to be exercised in
their discretion or in their individual judgement, and of which
they cannot divest themselves. And even in matters that are
left to be disposed of by the Council of Ministers, the Governor
may be able to exercise a considerable influence. He is not only
not excluded from the Council but presides over its meetings and
conducts its business. The Act has specifically provided that
Ministers shall keep him informed of practically all important
matters in their respective departments. The subordinates of
Ministers, namely the secretaries, who are heads of the secretariat
staff, are required to bring to the notice not only of the Ministers
but also of the Governor all those cases which in their opinion
may affect subjects left to the discretion or to the individual
judgement of the Governors. The bureaucratic subordinates
of popular Ministers have thus a direct statutory access to the
head of the province, and an opportunity to influence his deci-
sions. It is a mischievous constitutional anomaly which may
breed very imhappy results.
308 INDIAN- ADMINISTEATION
Consequent on the presence of Oovernors at Cabinet meet-
Interml interesting practice seems to have
mteiliigt of developed in all the provinces in regard to
tho Oabinot ministerial working. The Governor is not an
active Indian politician and public leader and, in the nature of
things, his approach to public opinion in the province cannot
be other than official, alien, and distant. On the other hand,
the Prime Minister and his colleagues are representatives of the
party in power and political comrades in constant association.
They are pledged to carry out a definite programme of social
and political reform. Quite naturally they would hold their
own regular meetings for the discussion of every important ques-
tion w^hich arose in the conduct of government.
Such meetings will be informal in the sense that the Governor
D^eisioiis is not present at them. But they will also be
taken by free for that very reason, that is, because of the
absence of an outsider at the time of discussion.
It is in these meetings that the decisions of Ministers may be
finally taken after a full and frank exchange of views, senti-
ments and differences. Subsequently, in the formal meeting
over which the Governor presides, they can be presented as the
decisions of a united Ministry, and in a very large majority of
cases will be affirmed without difficulty, probably after the
Governor has expressed his own opinions. It is believed that
informal Cabinet meetings of this type are being held in
practice in every province and are sometimes even officially
recognized. They may soon come to acquire by convention a
status and legal effect which is not given to them by law\
This would be, of course, a very healthy constitutional growth.
Of the two partners in the Provincial Government, the
Governor • is superior in law, and the Prime
Minister is superior in popular support and
prestige. If autonomy and democracy in the
provinces are to be real, the people’s representative
must be allowed by the Governor to have an
entirely free hand in the work of governance. It was decided,
in response to the demands of Congress leaders, just before the
inauguration of provincial autonomy in April 1937, that no such
assurance of freedom can legally and constitutionally be given
by the Governor. Then the only alternative left for him is
voluntarily to accept the healthy convention of refraining from
exercising his ordinary or extraordinary powers in face of the
opposition of his Ministers.
It would be undue optimism to imagine that such an excep-
tional spirit of self-surrender will be invariably displayed by the
Governors. It is very difficult to part with power, particularly
when its exercise is intended to preserve and to protect the
interests of one’s own countrymen. And even if some
The iieoei^ty
•f ghrlng
the Prime
Minister
free band
PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE: MINISTERS 309
Governors on some occasions are prepared to keep theii*
Limits to authority dormant and unexercised, they may not
the lolmitary be permitted to do so by the Governor-General and
action of the the Secretary of State who are their constitutional
Oofernors superiors in several respects. However, the trend
of affairs since 1937 has been encouraging. The Governors have,
on the whole, been known to have accommodated themselves
to the wishes of their ^linisters and allowed them consider-
able freedom in carrying out their policies. This fact has been
publicly acknowledged even by the Congress Ministries.
§5. THE PQPSITION OF THE SERVICES
The position of the Services in the scheme of provincial
Control of autonomy and also in the federal structure is
the Secretary interesting. The Act has laid down that appoint-
of State ments to the Indian Civil Service and the Indiah
Police Service are to be made by the Secretary of State, and
he can also make any other appointment whenever he thinks
it necessary to do so. The rules and regulations about *the
recruitment of all such persons, about their salary, pensions,
leave, dismissal, etc., are to be made by the same authority with
the concurrence of the majority of his Advisers. It is one of
the Special Responsibilities of the Governor and the Governor-
General to safeguard all the rights and privileges of the Services,
including their postings and promotions. The Ministers under
whom these oflScers have to serve have not complete control
over their subordinates and cannot punish them as they may
desire for any infringement of orders.
There thus arises a perplexing and unfortunate situation.
Indifference or The head of the department may settle a polic y
dieobcdlenoe of and issue orders; the agency which has to carry
the Serricee them out may be lukewarm or even hostile to
the proposals made by the head. Higher officials in the
bureaucracy would be naturally conscious of the fact that their
superiors, the Ministers, cannot affect their interest adversely
or do them any harm. They may thereforg be tempted,
directly or indirectly, to sabotage a reform of which they dis-
approve, by hindering its proper execution.
Such laxity or indiscipline on the part of subordinates is not
Experience directly punishable by the Minister. He must
of the last bring it to the notice of the Governor and try to
three jean get the guilty person properly reprimanded. It
is obvious that the harnessing together of Ministers who can-
not control their servants, and servants who look upon their
position with a feeling of distrust, uncertainty, and lack of
enthusiasm, is bound to prove embarrassing to both parties.
Fortunately, during the Inst five years of the working of pro-
vincial autonomy, the relations between the Ministers and the
310 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
Services are reported, on the whole, to have been satisfactory.
It does not appear to have been found necessary in any province
to invoke the Governor’s Special Responsibility in respect of
. the Services on accoujit of a major difference of opinion between
him and his Ministers.
XXXV. THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE
§1. INTRODUCTION OF THE BICAMERAL SYSTEM
The history of the provincial legislatures before the Montford
Introductory Reforms and their further development under the
•dyarchical scheme have been explained in earlier chapters.*
The changes introduced by the Act of 1935 and the shape given
by them to the provincial legislature have now to be studied
in detail. They have been elaborated in Chapter 3, sections
^-87, of the Act.
The most important of these changes must be noticed at
Two Cambers the outset. For the first time in Indian consti-
for certain tiitional history, the bicameral principle has been
proYinces introduced in the provincial sphere. It has been,
provided in section 60 of the Act that there will be two cham-
bers in Bombay, Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihar
and Assam, and one in each of the remaining provinces. The
upper chamber is called the Legislative Council and the lower
chamber is called the Legislative Assembly.
Tlie harmful consequences of this innovation cannot be over-
Harmful looked. Even in a big unitary state, the utility
effects of the bicameral system is questionable. Some
^uninent thinkers have gone to the length of saying that it is
not indispensable even in a federation. Its introduction in
The smaller and simpler government of a province has- no jusii-
hcation, and is indeed positively harmful because to a large
•extent it counterbalances the constitutional advance that is im-
plied in the popularization of the lower chamber.
The structure of the Legislative Councils, wherever they
'Undemocratic have been created, follows the usual lines of an
upper chamber oligarchical concentration. The number of their
members is small. The franchise for their election is extremely
high and the constituencies which elect them are very narrow.
They inevitably become the focus of all kinds of vested interests
m the country. A House which is comprised %nostly of big
landlords, millionaires, merchant princes and impecunious frag-
ments of a dilapidated aristocracy becomes an organized strong-
liold of conservatism and reaction.
Such a second chamber not only duplicates the legislative
process but complicates administration. If its powers are real
tind effective, it nullifies democracy; if its objective is simply
.to postpone and to delay, it is too expensive and pedantic a
mechanism to be maintained in a Provincial Government. Its
•only function is to hinder the movement of others by. acting as
* See Chapters xxiz and xxx.
3 12 INDIAN ADMINISTKATION
a brake on their speed. In the environment of a conquered
country, an oligarchical House also automatically tends to be-
come not only indifferent but even hostile to the countrj’^'s
political freedom.
§2. TENURE OF MEIVIBERSHIP
Following the model of the federal upper chamber, nuinely
The upper the Council ot State, the provincial Legislati\e
chamber la Council is also made a permanent bod^ , never
permanent
to a wholesale dissolution. One-third of its
members have to retire every three years and an individual
member has ^ tenure of as many as nini years. This is of cour<;e
an abnormally long period for any elective chamber. It is an
essential feature of a democratic institution that the closest
aflSnity should exist between the representative and his constitu
,ency. The currents of popular opinion are liable to frequent
and profound change. Elections therefore should be held at
short intervals in order to avoid a grievous divorce between
the sentiments of the people and those of their chosen represen-
tatives. A member who, after election or nomination, is assured
of his parliamentai-y seat for the span of nearly a decade, has
no incentive to keep himself up-to-date in his knowledge of
the ever changing view-points of the public or to interpret
them loyally. As the w’hole of the Legislative Council cannot
be simultaneously dissolved at any time, it wdll always contain a
substantial element which may be out of tune with contemporary
thought and life and will be liable to run counter to the will
of the people.
The tenure of the Legislative Assembly is five vears. Tlii"
Assembly has be .considered to be a fairly reasonable period,
a tenure neither too long for real democratic working nor
fiTe years too short for continuity and efficiency. An
Assembly can be dissolved by the Governor earlier than the
period of five years if circumstances demand that an importaiit
issue should be decided by the electorate. The ministerial exe-
cutive may sometimes come into conflict wnth the legislature
and may yet fiel that the people are on its side. By dissolving
the Assembly and holding fre.sh elections, the dispute is naturallv
submitted to the arbitrament of the people who are the final
masters and judges.
§3. CONSTITUTION OF THE CHAMBERS
The numerical strength of the legislative chambers in differ-
Inereasa in ent provinces is prescribed by the Fifth Scbeduh‘
numbers of the Act and is given in the accompanying
tables. It will be seen that the numbers of the Assembly show
a considerable improvement over the limits prescribed by the
Montford Reforms. In the old Bombay Legislative Council,
ProVI\(’I \I linoiSLVTIVL ('oi NCILS
THE PROVIKCIAL LEGISI-ATURE
310
iiioip than
l'Rovl^c’lAL Legislative Assemblies
314
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
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Assam
North-West Front
Province
Orissa
Sind
THE PBOVINCIAL LEGISLATUBE 31§
for instance, there were only 67 elected members from the
Presidency proper, barring the Sind bloc. Now that number
is 175. This increase in numbers is most welcome. It reduces
the size of the constituencies and enables smaller units of
population to have seats assigned to them. A living contact can
be established between the voter and his representative if the
size of the electorate is manageable.
Another reform introduced by the new Act is the elimination
AboUUon of nominated and official elements from the
nominated and legislature. They were a great handicap to the
official popular side. Their solid voting on any question
members merely |he result of bureaucratic regimentation.
Their numbers created false appearances because their votes
were east under executive command. A small remnant of
this system is still retained in the upper chambers both in the
provinces and in the Federation. To that extent the constitu-
tion must be said to be defective.
The duties of the president of a legislature and the impor-
tance of that office have already been explained in Chapter
XVI In a democratic constitution the office is elective and
the same principle has been adopted for the Indian provinces.
The piesident of the Legislative Council is called the
Tbs President President and that of the Legislative Assembly
and Speaker is called the Speaker. There are also a deputy-
president and deputy-speaker. All these officers are elected by
the chambers from among their own members, and they must
vacate office if they cease to be members of those bodies. They
'•an be removed from office by a resolution of the chamber con-
cerned passed by a njajority of all its members (that is, nob only
ot those present). At least fourteen days’ notice is required of
the intention to mo\e a resolution of this kind.
The salaries and allo^^ances of these officers are fixed by
Their an Act of the provincial legislature. In Bombay
salariei they have been fixed at Bs. 850 per month for the
President and the Speaker with a motor car allow'ance of
Bs. 200 per month. They are also provided with furnished houses.
In the absence of the President and the i Speaker, the
Panel of deputy-president and the deputy-speaker preside
Chairmen over the sessions of their respective chambers.
Provision can be made by the rules of procedure for a person
to preside when the deputies are also absent from a meeting.
It is laid down in the Buies of the Bombay Legislative Assembly
and also of the Legislative Council that at the commencement
«pf every session the Speaker or the President, as the case may
be, shall nominate from among the members a panel of not
more than four Chairmen. Any one of these persons may
Sec pp. 132-3.
810 INDIAN ADMINI8TE ATION
preside over the chamber concerned in the absence of the
Speaker and deputy-speaker or the President and deputy-
president when asked to do so by those authorities.
The chamber or chambers of the provincial legislature must
Continuous be summoned to meet once at least in every
soBsiotts year, and between two sessions of a chamber
necossarj there cannot be an intervening period of twelve
months. In actual practice in a democratic constitution, the
legislature must be almost continuously in session, because all
important questions of policy and administration are discussed
and decided by it. With the enormous increase in modern days
of the sphere of governmental activity 4 membership of the legis-
lature in the responsible or parliamentary type of democracy
has become a w’hole-time ]ob, requiring constant presence at the
metropolis and strenuous attention to public business. After
the inauguration of provincial autonomy, the legislative cham-
'bers in the provinces are being called upon to hold long sessions,
and the initiative in this respect is taken by the Ministry iji
power.
Section 66 (3) of the Act prescribes that at least one-sixth
Quorum In the total number of members of a Legislative
tho provlnolal Assembly, and at least ten members of a Legis-
kglslftturos lative Council must be present at their respective
meetings. If the number of those present falls below' this mini-
11 um, the Speaker or the President must either adjourn the
chamber or suspend the meeting till the necessary number is
present.
A Minister may be a member of only one chamber where
Right of there is the bicameral system. But he has the
Minloion to right to address a meeting of the other cliamber
address both and to Ibake part in its proceedings but not t(v
ehamberd chamber of w’hich he is not a member
This is a salutary departure from the English model, and
enables the Government policy to be explained and justified b\
the person who is directly in charge of it. The same privilege
is extended to the Advocate -General, who has to explain to the
legislature thc^r legal position and implications of the measure^
proposed by the Government.
§4. CONSTITUENCIES AND FRANCHISE
The province is divided into small territorial areas for the
CsDStitusneles purpose of elections. The district is generallv
taken as the unit because of the homogeneity it possesses and
the facility for organization that it offers. Large cities are
formed into groups by themselves. Non-territorial constituencie*;
are formed for commerce and industry, landholders and
other special interests. The three types of electorates that
THE PROVINXIAL LEGISLATURE 317
't'xist everywhere iu India have already been explained at
length.*
An electoral roll ig prepared for every territorial constituency,
Electoral ^i^d no person who is not included in the roll is
roll and entitled to vote in that constituency. No person
age limit can become a voter unless he is twenty-one years
of age. No person can become a member of the provincial
Legislative Assembly before he attains the age of twenty-five,
or of the Legislative Council before the age of thirty. No
person can become a member of both the houses of the provin-
‘Cial legislature. Residence in the constituency for a certain
number of days, usually 180 or 120, is a necessary condition of
the franchise.
The following is a oriei summary of the principal franchise
qualifications in the different provinces. It is not of course an
•exhaustive list but contains the main items.
(1) Madr\s
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay the motgr
vehicle tax or a profession tax or a property tax or house-tax to
any municipality or local board, or who are assessed to income-
tax; (6) those who are registered landholders, inamdars, ryot-
wari pattadars, or occupancy tenants; (c) those who are literate.
"Women possessing these qualifications are allowed to vote. A
woman is also allowed to vote if her liusband is assessed to pay
income-tax or pays an annual house rent in the city of Madras
of not less than Rs. 60 or pays property or profession tax of not
less than Rs. 3 per year or holds land of an annual rental value
of not less than Rs. 10.
(ii) The Legislative Council: (a) those who pay income-tax
•on an income of not less than Rs. 7,500 per year; (6) those who
hold land of an annual rent value of not less than Rs. 300;
(c) those who hold titles not less than Rao Bahadur; (d) those
who have been members of any legislature, executive councillors,
ministers, members of a university senate, high court judges,
presidents of municipalities or district boards, or chairmen of
central co-operative banks, etc. Women possessing these quali-
fications have the right to vote. A woman can also vote if
Tier husband is assessed to income-tax on an annual income
of not less than Rs. 20,000 or bolds land the annual rent value
of which is not less than Rs. 1,500, etc.
(2) Bomb.w
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-
tax; (6) those who hold land assessed to a land revenue of not
* See Chapter XIV.
318 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
less than Bs. 8 per year; (c) those who pay an annual house rent
of not less than Bs. 60 in the city of Bombay or Bs. 18 in any
other place; (d) those who have passed the matriculation or
school leaving examination. Women possessing these qualifies*
tions can vote. A woman can also vote if her husband pays
income-tax or holds land assessed to an annual revenue of not
less than Bs. 82 or if she is literate.
(ii) The Legislative Council: (a) those who pay income-tax
on an annual income of not less than Bs. 15,000; (b) those who
hold land assessed to a land revenue of not less than Bs. 350
per year; (c) those who are sardars; (d) those who hold titles
not less than that of Bao Bahadur; (e) those who have been
members of any legislature, executiie councillors, ministers,
members of a university senate, judges of high courts, presidents
of municipalities or district local boards, chairmen of central
co-operative banks, etc. Women possessing these qualifications
have the right to vote. A woman is also allowed to vote if her
husband is assessed to income-tax on an annual income of
not less than Bs. 30,000 or if he holds land assessed to an
apnual land revenue of not less than Bs. 2,000 or if he is a
sardar, etc.
(3) Bengal
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay the motor
vehicle tax, or income-tax, or a tax or licence fee to the Calcutta
Corporation, or municipal tax of not less than As. 8 or road and
public works cess of not less than As. 8 or the chaukidari tax or
union rate of not less than As. 6, every year; (6) those who
have passed the matriculation or an equivalent examination.
Women possessing these qualifications are given the right to
vote. A woman is also entitled to vote if her husband owms or
occupies, in the city of Calcutta, a house valued for assessment
purposes at not less than Bs. 150 per annum or, in any other
city, if he pays municipal fees or taxes of not less than Be. 1-8
per year, etc.
(ii) The Legislative Council: (o) those who pay income-tax
on an annual income of not less than Bs. 5,000: (b) those who
hold titles not less than Bao Bahadur; (c) those who have been
members of any legislature, executive councillors, ministers,
members of the senate of a university, high court judges, presi-
dents of municipalities or district boards, chairmen of central
co-operative banks, etc. ; (d) those non-Muslims who in Burdwaii
and Presidency Divisions pay an annual land revenue or rent or
both of not less than Bs. 2,000, and in the divisions of Dacca,
Bajshahi and Chittagong not less than Bg. 1,600; (e) those
Muslims who pay not less than Bs. 250 per year as land revenue
or rent or both. Women possessing these qualifications have
the right to vote. A "woman can also vote if, in the case of
THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE 319*
non-Muslims, her husband pays income-tax on an annual income
of not less than Rs. 12,000, or pays as a proprietor land revenue
of not less than Rs. 7,500 per year in Burdwan and Presidency
Divisions and not less than ^s. 5,000 in Dacca, Rajshahi and
Chittagong Divisions. In the case of Muslims the husband must
pay income-tax on income of not less than Rs. 6,000 or land
revenue of not less than Rs. 600 per year.
(4) The United Provinces
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who are assessed to
income-tax or who pay municipal tax on an income of not less
than Rs. 150 per yeB>r;^b) those who are owners or tenants of
a house the rental value of which is not less than Rs. 24 per
annum; (c) those who own land which is assessed for land
revenue of not less than Rs. 5 per year or those who as tenants
pay rent of not less than Rs. 10 per annum; (d) those who have
passed the upper primary examination, etc. Women havinj^
these qualifications are allowed to vote. A woman also gets the
right to vote if her husband is the owner or tenant of a house
the rental value of which is not less than Rs. 36 per year or who
owns land assessed at not less than Rs. 25 or pays as a tenant
not less than Rs. 50 per year as rent or pays income-tax, etc.
(ii) The Legislative Council: (a) those who pay income-tax
on an annual income of not less than Rs. 4,000, hold a title not
lower tlian Rao Bahadur or have been members of any legislature,
executive councillors, ministers, members of the senate of a
university, high court judges, presidents of municipalities or
local boards, chairmen of central co-operative banks, etc.; (6)
those who pay land revenue of not less than Rs. 1,000 per year
or those who pay as tenants not less than Rs. 1,500 per year.
Women possessing these qualifications are given the right to
vote. They also get the right if the husband pays income-tax
on not less than Rs. 10,000 per year or on land revenue of not
less than Rs. 5,000 per year, etc.
•(5) The Punjab
The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pa^r income-tax or
a direct municipal tax of not less than Rs. 50 per year; (6)
those who pay land revenue of not less than Rs. 6 per year or
who are tenants of not less than six acres of irrigated or twelve
acres of unirrigated land; (c) those who own or occupy im-
movable property of a rental value of not less than Rs. ^ per
year; (d) those who have attained the primary educational stan-
•dard. Women having these qualifications are allowed to vote.
A woman can also vote if her husband pays income-tax or a
direct municipal tax of not less than Rs. 50 per year or land
revenue of not less than Rs. 25 per year, etc.
320
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
(6) Bihar
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax,
or not less than Be. 1-8 as municipal tax, or not less than As. 9
as chaukidari tax; (6) those who pay house rent of not less than
Bs. 24 per year in Jamshedpur or not less than Rs. 6 per year in
other places; (c) those who have matriculated. Women possess-
ing these qualifications have the right to vote. A woman can
also vote if her husband pays income-tax, or not leas than Rs. 3
as municipal tax, or not less than Rs. 2-8 as chaukidari tax, or
pays house rent of not less than Rs. 144 in Jamshedpur and not
less than Rs. 24 in other places per year, etc.
(ii) The Legislative Council: (a) th^se who pay income-tax
on not less than Rs. 7,500; (6) those who pay, in a Muslim
constituency, land revenue of not less than Rs. 375 per annum
or, in any other constituency, not less than Rs. 600 per year; (c)
those who hold titles not lower than Rao Bahadur; (d) those
who have been members of any legislature, executive councillors,
ministers, members of the senate of a university, high court
judges, presidents of municipalities or district boards, chairmen
of central co-operative banks, etc. Women having these qualifi-
cations can vote. A woman is also given the right to vote if her
husband pays income-tax on not less than Rs. 20,000 or holds
land paying a revenue of not less than Rs. 1,200 in the case of
Muslims and not less than Rs. 2,400 in the case of others, etc.
(7) The Central Provinces and Berar
The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax, or
a municipal tax assessed on a haiaiyat of not less than Rs. 75; (b)
those who pay land revenue of not less than Rs. 2 per year; (c)
those who own or occupy a house of an annual rental value
of not less than Rs. 6; (d) those who have passed an examina-
tion giving admission to the Nagpur University. Women possess-
ing these qualifications have the right to vote. A woman is also
qualified to vote if her husband pays not less than Rs. 35 per ^
year as land revenue or occupies a hotse of an annual rental
value of not lesfi than Rs. 36, etc.
(8) Assam
(i) The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax,
or not less than Rs. 2 (or in some areas Re. 1-8 or Re. 1, or As. 8)
as mimicipal tax or chaukidari tax per year; (6) those who pay
land revenue of not less than Rs. 7-8 per year or those who pay
Rs. 7-8 as rent; (c) those who have passed the middle school
leaving examination. Women possessing these qualifications
have the right to vote. A woman can also get the right if her
husband pays income-tax, or municipal taxes varying from
THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE 321
Rs. 2 to Re. 1 per year or if he pays land revenue of not less
than Rs. 15 per year, etc.
(ii) The legislative Council: (a) those who pay income-tax
•on not less than Rs. 3,000 per year or land revenue of not leas
than Rs. 500 per year; (b) those who hold titles not lower than
Rao Bahadur; (c) those who have been members of any legisla-
ture, executive councillors, ministers, members of the senate of
a imiversity, high court judges, presidents of municipalities or
local boards, chairmen of central co-operative banks, etc.
.Women who possess these qualifications are given the right to
vote. A woman is also allowed to vote if her husband pays
income-tax on not less ^an Rs. 6,000 or pays land revenue of
not less than Rs. 1,000 per year, etc.
(9) The North-West Frontier Province
The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax^
or not less than Rs. 50 as municipal tax, or not less than Rs. 2
as district board tax ; (b) those who occupy a house of the rental
value of not less than Rs. 48 per year; (c) those who are owifers
or tenants of not less than six acres of irrigated and not less than
twelve acres of unirrigated land or who pay land revenue of not
less than Rs. 5 per \ear; (d) those who have passed the matricu-
lation or, in rural areas, the fourth class primary examination.
Women who possess these qualifications have the right to vote.
A woman is also entitled to vote if her husband has an income
of at least Rs. 40 a mouth or if he pays income-tax or if he pays
house rent of not less than Rs. 48 per annum or pays land
revenue of not less than Rs. 10 per annum, etc.
(10) Orissa
The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax,
or not less than Re. 1-8 as municipal tax; (b) those who have
passed the matriculation examination; (c*) those who pay chauki-
dari tax of not less than As, 9 or land revenue of not less than
Rs. 2 per year, there being slight variations in the amounts
according to districts. Additional qualificationsi are also pre-
scribed for women.
(11) Sind
The Legislative Assembly: (a) those who pay income-tax;
(b) those who own or occupy as permanent tenants land assessable
for land revenue at not less than Rs. 8 per year; (c) those who
cultivate as haris land assessed at not less than Rs. 16 land
revenue per year; (d) those w’ho pay an annual house rent pf
not less than Rs. 30 in Karachi and Rs. 18 elsewhere; (e) those
who have passed the matriculation examination. Women
21
|22 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
possessing these qualifications are allowed to vote. A womans
alao»gets that right if her husband is assessed to income-tax or
pays Bs. 32 as land revenue per year or pays an annual house
rent of not less than Bs. 60 in Karachi or not less than Bs.
elsewhere.
The following persons are disqualified from being voters:
Dif. (a) those who hold any office of profit under the
qnslillcsilsii Crown in India, except Ministers and such other
officers as may be mentioned by an Act of the provincial legis-
lature, (6) those who are of unsound mind, (c) those who are
undischarged insolvents, (d) those who are guilty of election
offences, (e) those w'ho are convicted and sentenced to imprison-
ment for not less than two years; in this case the period of
disqualification is to be five years or such less number of years
as the Governor in his discretion may allow in a particular case.
A person can stand for election to more than one legislative
Chamber but he must sit as a member of only one of them. He
must make his choice soon after election results are published.
The franchise for the Legislative Assembly in every province
P«ffoentage of is fairly low. It is much more restrictive than
onftnmoh&od pure adult suffrage, but the payment of only
Be. 1-8 as house rent per month or Bs. 8 as land
revenue per year can in no way be described as a very high
demand. Even when the requirements are so insignificant, the
total enfranchised population throughout British India has been
calculated to be in the neighbourhood of thirty-five million, or
only about 14 per cent of the British Indian population. No-
thing provides more eloquent evidence of the exceptionally poor
standard of life and annual income of the average Indian.
§5. FUNCTIONS AND POWERS
The functions and powers of a provincial legislature are
Three types similar to those of the legislature of any democratic
country. They can be divided as usual into the three groups
of legislative, administrative and financial, and treated separately
under those he^ds.
The legislature is the law-making authority in the province,
Power of and all laws required to be passed in respect of
law-making subjects assigned to the provinces and enumerated
in the Provincial Legislative List have to be enacted by its
chamber or chambers. They can also enact laws on subjects
enumerated m the Concurrent Legislative List. Certain
limitations have been placed on this power, and they have been
mentioned in Chapter XXXII, §1.
The legislature has also been empowered by section 84 of the
Aet to frame rules for regulating the procedui*e and conduct
of its business, and in, the exercise of that power legislative
THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE 828
chambers in all provinces have framed elaborate rules for the
Ffambi| purpose mentioned. They follow more or less
Dra^dDM same pattern, and the rules of one chamber
P bear a very ccasiderable resemblance to those made
by another. The Bombay Begislative Assembly Buies are 149
in number and the Bombay Legislative Council Buies ftre 186.
Legislation is one of the most vital and effective instruments
Most of the conduct of government, and it is only
the Bills are natural that those who are responsible for carrying
Goiernment on the government at any time should have the
predominant share in law-making. Most of the
Bills that are put befor# the legislature are therefore initiated
by the Ministry. They are the leaders of the party which has
a majority of seats in the house and which has been placed in
power by the votes of the electorate. They have a mandate to
implement their programmes of reconstruction and reform, and.
must exercise a prior claim on the time and attention of the
legislature.
Any member of the legislative chamber of a province can
Days for give notice of a BUI which he wants to move, and
priTate mem- subject to the provisions of the Act of 1935, can
here* basinese j^eek permission to introduce it. But as in other
countries, private Bills given notice of or introduced by non-
ofiBcial members have only a small chance of being taken up
for consideration by the chamber or chambers, and are often
crowded out, or lapse, for want of time. According to the rules
of the Bombay Legislative Assembly, Government may allot
specific days for private members' business, the number of days
so allotted being not less than two days for every fourteen dajs
on which Government business is transacted.
The procedure in the provincial legislature in respect of the
Nature of passage of Bills is to a great extent similar to what
the procedure has been described in Chapter XVT.^ Provision
has been made for the translation of a Bill, after it is published
in tlie Gazette, into the recognized languages of a province,
and also for its reference, after the first reading, to a Joint
Committee of both the chambers where there are two chambers,
if it is considered expedient to do so.
If a province has two chambers, a BUI, other than a money
Aosont of Bill, can originate in either of them. Money Bills
both chambers must originate only in the lower house, that is
necessary for the Legislative Assembly. Every BiU has to pass
through three readings in each chamber, and must
be passed in identical form and language by both chambers
before it can become an Act. Separate provisions have been
* Pp. 130-».
324 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
mada for cases of disagreement between the houses. Since the
advent of provincial autonomy, many Acts of first-rate import-
ance have been placed upon the statute book by the legislature
of every province.
The legislature’s control over the provincial administration
Control over is exercised in the four ways described in Chapter
administraiioB XTV.* It may pass resolutions and thereby give
definite expression to its views on a matter of public importance.
Any of its members can put questions and supplementary
questions on administrative affairs, and Ministers are bound to
supply all the information required in this way« This is a healthy
•check on the executive machine and convenient method of
exposing any defects or high-handedness that may be noticed
in its operation. A member can also move a motion of adjoum-
inent to discuss a matter of recent occurrence and of public
importance. This gives the Government an opportimity to
explain their position and allows the legislature to express its
approval or disapproval of Government’s policy. Lastly, a direct
attack can be launched against the actions and conduct of a
Minister or Ministers by moving a motion of no-confidence in
him individually or in the whole Ministry. 6uch motions have
been tabled against the Ministers in Bengal and Sind, but
without success, though the Sind Ministry had utlimately to
resign. The procedure in respect of each one of these matters
has been prescribed by rules made by the legislative chamber
•or chambers.
A popular legislature must exercise complete control over
Financial the finances of the country in a free democracy,
powers ' , The powers of the provincial legislature in this
particular domain have increased after the introduction of
provincial autonomy. . The sources of income which are within
the competence of that body to vote have been described in
<]hapter XXXII, §3. The budget of the province for every
financial year has to be placed before the chamber or chambers
of the legislature. It shows separately the expenditure that is
charged upon the revenues of the province and is not votable
by the Assembly, and expenditure that is votable by it. How-
•ever, most of the items in the non-votable list can be thrown
open for discussion by the Governor. The votable expenditure
is to be submitted to the Legislative Assembly (and not to the
upper chamber, that is the Legislative Council if it exists in a
province) in the form of demands for grants. The Assembly has
power to assent to, to refuse, or to reduce any such demand, but
not to increase it. Any reduction made by it in an amount
demanded can be restored by the Governor if he thinks that
* Pp. 110-11.
THE PKOVINCIAL LEGISLATURE 325
the cut would aSect the discharge by him of any of his Special
Responsibilities.
In the final issue of the Civil Budget Estimates of the
Votabls and Bombay province for the year 1989-40, the
non-Yotable authenticated schedule of expenditure showed that
expeoditnre out of a total expenditure of Rs. 14*06 crores.
In Bombay 3*^2 crores were charged upon the revenues
of the province and Rs. 10*34 crores were voted by the Legislative
Assembly.
The following statement will give an idea of the budgetary
position in Bombay; it does not of course contain all the de-
tailed figures in the buderet: —
Revenue pbom, and H^xpenditure on, some Important
Heads in the Province of Bombay 1939-40
Revenue Eipindtiure ,
Rs. 1
1
Rs.
Taxes on Income
32,20,000
Land Revenue
66,63,(500
Land Eevenue
3,38,63,000
i Provincial Excise
39,37,000
Provincial Excise
1,77,10,000
I Forest
27,3-2,000
Stamps, non-judicial
75,56,000
Other Direct Demand
Q
Stamps : Judicial
68,20,000 ,
1 on Revenue
39,00,000
Forest
41,64,000 1
Police
1,71,43,000
Kegistration
11,45,000
Education
‘2,09,92,000
Motor Vehicles
43,30,000
Medical
47,79,000
Other Taxes and
Public Health
31,48,000
Duties
J, 06, 12, 000
Agriculture
13,06,000
Civil Administration
1.11,08.000
Co-operation
17,63,00(^
Industries
13,14,000
Mibcelianeous Depart-
ments
10,74,000
50. PKIVILEGES,
SALARY
AND LEAVE OF
MEMBERS
Sub]ect to the provisions of the Act of 1935 and to the rules
Freedom and standing orders regulating the procedure
of speech of the legislature, there is freedom of speech in
e\ery provincial legislature. No member is Bable to any
proceedings in any court in respect of anything said by him or
of any vote given by him in the legislative chamber or any of
its committees. No action can be taken against him in respect
of the publication by or under the authority of the chamber of
any report, paper, votes or proceedings. Other privileges of
members may be defined by an Act cl the provincial legislature.
That body cannot however have the status of a court or any
punitive or disciplinary powers other than the power to remove
or exclude persons who infringe the rules or standing orders or
behave in a disorderly manner.
326 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
Members of the Legislative Assembly and fJoimcil will be
TraYttUing entitled to receive such salaries and allowances as
and halting may from time to time be determined by an Act
allowaneea of the provincial legislature. This is an important
privilege. Members have to travel from their place of residence
to the city — this is usually the capital of the province — ^where
the sessions of the legislature are held, and to stay in that city
during the continuance of the session. It is obvious that ade-
quate travelling and halting allowances must be paid to them
for this purpose.
But in the light of modern political ideas and developments
Onerous duties this is not enough. The duties of fif legislator
of the in a democratic state ar^now very extensive and
members of exacting, and all his time and energy have to be
a legislature devoted to them. They cannot be performed, as
before, merely as an interesting hobby or pastime during intervals
which may be snatched from a busy professional life. It is
admitted that democracy, to be real, ought to enable even
a poor man with the necessary popularity and ability to become
a member of the legislature and to fulfil all the obligations of
that oflSce.
But this would mean that he must give up the vocation by
Salary neces- which he has been earning his livelihood and also,
sary in the in a majority of cases, his usual place of residence
interests of because the legislature is located in the metropolis,
soeial jussioe Evidently, a man without other means of subsis-
tence cannot afford to lose his trade or employment; to do so
will be to bring starvation and ruin to him and to his family.
Under such circumstances, the rich man of leisure will be at
a great advantage. He can enter the legislature and conduct
the government, but it will not be democracy. Many modern
constitutions have therefore provided for the payment of a
salaiy to a member of* the legislature, so that the opportunity
of participating in parliamentary life is not entirely denied to
poor but competent persons. Members of the British Parli<t-
ment get a salary of ;^600 per year.
After the introduction of provincial autonomy, the Bombay
Salary fixed legislature decided to accept the principle of
in Bombay paying a salary to its members and passed an Act
for that purpose. The amount of the salary has been
fixed at Es. 150 per month. Travelling and other allowances
have been similarly provided and detailed rules have been
prescribed in that connexion. Other province.s have also passed
Tueasures on the same lines.
If a member at any time finds that he is unable to attend the
PermiMion for meetings of a chamber for a period of sixty conse-
long abienee cutive days (no account being taken of the period
during which the chamber is prorogued, or is adjourned for more
than four consecutive days) he must apply for permission to
THE PBOVINCIAL LEGISLATUEE 827
remain so absent, and the chamber may grant the permission.
Jf a member remains absent without such permission, the
-(chamber may declare the seat of the member vacant and it
would then have to be filled by a fresh election.
§7. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CHAMBERS
Where there are two legislative chambers with co-ordinate
Oocasions of powers, there is a possibility of a serious disagree-
disagreement ment between them. A Bill passed by one
(‘hainber may not be acceptable to the other. It may propose
certain amendments which the originating chamber is not pre-
pared to endorse. The^onstitution lays down that no Bill can
become an Act unless it is passed by^both chambers of the legis-
lature. The question then arises as to whether the Bill in dispute
shouW be dropped altogether or whether some method should
be found to overcome the deadlock. To allow the ‘Noes* to
carry the day on all occasions would be hardly fair to the bigger
and more popular chamber. A more constructive remedy is
therefore required.
Section 74 of the Act of 1935 lays down that if a Bill passed
Joint Sitting by the Legislative Assembly is not passed by the
Legislative Council within twelve months of its receiving the
Bill, the Governor may summon the chambers to meet in a
doint Sitting for the purpose of deliberating and voting on the
Bill. Jn such a meeting the vote of the majority of mem-
bers present will finally decide the issue. No new amendments
can be suggested at this stage. The Governor may summon
a .Toint Sitting even before the period of twelve months is over
if he feels that the Bill under discussion relates to finance or
affects any of liis Special Responsibilities.
The President of the upper chamber will preside over a
Joint Bitting. Rules as to procedure are to be made by the
Goxernor in consultation with the President of the Coviucil and
J^he Speaker of the Assembly.
XXXVI. THE RELATION OP THE EXECUTIVE
TO THE LEGISLATUJRE
§1. THE LEGISLATURE’S CONTROL OVER
THE MINISTERS
It is one of the most vital characteristics of parliamentary
Parlimenterj government that the executive is completely sub-
praetice ordinate to the legislature. In England, for in-
stance, the House of Commons is all in all. The British Cabinet,
however great may be the men who compose it, is entirely the
servant of the British Parliament, brought into office because
of the support of its majority, and deposed from power as a
result of the expression or indication of its displeasure. The
British democracy is reflected in the British Parliament.
Through the instrumentality of that legislative body, it exercises
its ultimate and unlimited sovereignty.
If India’s political progress is to lie along democratic and
The* leidsU- parliamentary lines, the Indian legislatures must
tore's powers placed in the same position of unquestioned
In the seheme supremacy, without unduly minimizing the im-
e! prerineial portance and prestige of the executive. The claim
motonomy repeatedly made for the Act of 1935 that
it has established full provincial autonomy. It would therefore
follow that all political authority in the province is now vested
in its legislature. How far does such a state of things exist
in actual practice? To what extent does the provincial legisla-
ture control taxation, expenditure, and the executive actions
of Ministers?
The Act has laid down that the appointment of Ministers
Appointment of made by the Governor. But it is a
Ministers nKsde necessary condition that they must be members
in offset by of the provincial legislature. The Governor is-
the legislature farther instructed to endeavour to select them
in such a manner that they are able collectively to enjoy the
confidence of that popularly elected body. These are significant
provisions. Thf^ir inevitable result, in normal circumstances,
would be that the Ministers are appointed, in effect, by the legis-
lature, which is really the nation in miniature for the time being.
The recognized leaders and prominent members of differetnt
The Terdlet political parties contest the elections. They put
of the forward their policies and programmes. The voters
eleetorate w'ho are to make the final choice are naturally
must he persuaded to support that man and that party
*^®*P*®^ whose views and general outlook appeal to them.
A leader who has the overwhelming backing of the electorate is
in an extremely formidable position. No Governor can afford to
EELATION OF EXECUTIVE TO LEGISLATURE 329^
ignore him or to set him aside. To do so would be to precipi*
tate a political crisis which would be likely to end in the
Governor having to yield to the weight of popular opinion.
The salaries of Ministers, though fixed by the legislature,
Ministers* are not annually voted by it in respect of
salaries are individual Ministers. They are charged on the
non-Yotable revenues of the province and are included in the
non-votable list. It may be feared that this restriction strength-
ens the position of the Ministers and correspondingly weakens
that of the legislature, because the withholding of salaries has
ceased to be a weapon in the hands of the latter. However, it
is not likely to make nmch difference in actual practice.
A large portion of the expenditure on ministerial depart-
Refusal of ments has been made subject to the sanction of the
suppli^ and legislature. That body may refuse to sanction any
motions of amount if it disapproves of the conduct of Minis-
no-confidenoe desires that they should resign. Suclf
a refusal of supplies is bound to have an immediate effect.
In fact, the legislature is allowed to adopt even a more direct
method of telling Ministers that they are not wanted. It dan
pass a definite motion of no-confidence in them and thus command
that they should leave their office. In face of such a straight
attack, no Ministry can survive. Not even the Governor can
hope to save it from dismissal.
It is therefore clear that the Ministers’ position of subordina-
tion to the legislature is accepted in the new constitution. This
does not, however, apply to abnormal and extraordinary occa*
sions, as for example, when the majority party in the legislature
refuses to form the Ministry and also does not allow others
Iroin the minority groups to form one.
r2. CONTROL OVER FINANCE AND LEGISLATION
The real difficulties of the legislatum do not arise on account
Non-votable inadequate control over the Ministers, but
items in the on account of serious deductions made from its own
provincial powers in several ways. All the expenditure of
budget Provincial Government is not l8ft to be deter-
mined and regulated by the legislature’s will. The budget is
divided into parts, consisting of votable and non-votable items.
The latter are deliberately excluded from the authority of the
elected representatives of the people, though discussion on them
may be permitted. The non-votable expenditure amounts to
about 80 per cent of the total expenditure. This means a
considerable watering down of the very concept of provincial
autonomy.
Even in regard to items that are votable, the dictation of the
legislature is not final. Its members may make cuts in the
330 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
amounts demanded ’ by the Ministers* But if the Governor is
Power of satisfied that any such cut is likely to affect any
restoring outs of his Special Besponsibilities, he can restore it,
wholly or partly, in his own discretion. The creation of such
an extraordinary veto is incompatible with a genuine transfei'
of power to the people of the province. Its exercise will
naturally prove to be irritating, because it will be tantamount
to a deliberate defiance of popular opinion.
In matters of legislation also a similar exceptional provision
Power of been made. All laws required for the province
enacting have to be placed before the legislature for consi-
Governor’s deration and enactment, ^his is quite in keeping
w’ith the democratic prinftple. Laws which con-
cern all and have to be obeyed by all ought, in the fitness of
things, to be decided by all. However, the constitution has
further provided that the Governor, acting alone and in his
individual capacity, may enact any law which he thinks it neces-
sary to enact. There need not be even the pretence of a consul-
tation between him and the legislature or an- attempt on his
part to bring them round to his views. Such Governor’s Acts,
passed as they are by the single head of the executive in his
own autocratic judgement, woiild be irrefutable evidence of the
limitations on provincial autonomy imposed by the Act of 1935.
§3. CONTROL OVER THE SERVICES
Ministers constitute what may be described as the political
The political executive of the state. They are expected to be
•oxecntiTo men of versatile talent and of broad vision. Theii*
chief duty is to think in terms of ideals and formulate far-seeing
policies. It has already been explained that in the structure
■of provincial autonomy. Ministers are made fully responsible to
the legislliture of the province.
There is another constituent of the executive which supple-
The ments and completes the work of Ministers. It is
4idiiiiiiiBtpatloii composed of the Civil Service and is known as the
administration. Its duty is to carry out the plans and projects
of parliamentafy leaders and give them a concrete shape. That
is a responsible and difficult task and can only be accomplished
by really competent men.
The position of such a public service in a democratic state
Control of the is peculiar. The Public Services are of course
logiiUturo entirely under the control of the people, who act
through their electedt representatives in the legislature. The
latter body prescribes rules and regulations which determine
their salaries, promotion, leave, pensions, etc. Yet a democracy
is also a government. Its servants have a very important mission
to fulfil. They are not ^required to take their orders from the
KELATION OF EXECUTIVE TO LEGISLATUBE 381
man in the street, nor are they liable to chastized and dis-
missed by him.
The Public Services are established for satisfying some of
Importance the primary needs of organized human society.
of the public They have an enormous utility per «e. The
Ser¥iM8 eflScient performance of administrative functions
requires great intellectual aptitude and training. Recruitment
to the Services is therefore made by an open competitive
examination, conducted by persons of the highest attainments
and integrity. Thereby the poison of nepotism and favoritism
18 eliminated, and persons of the right calibre are selected.
Security of tenure during good behaviour is assured to every
servant. The prospectsJof his advancement are not decided by
political considerations but only on the strength of ability.
In short, the bureaucracy represents a trained body of pro-
Theii^'pcsition fessional experts, whose knowledge and experience
as experts are of the highest benefit to the state. They are
and servants treated with great deference and respect even by
their superiors, the Ministers. All the same, it must be
clearly understood that the experts are not the masters. They
are merely venerable advisers and servants of the State. Their
opinions are sure to be invited and carefully considered before
the formulation of policies, but it is the popular Minister who
takes the final decision. The politician supersedes the admini-
strator. The specialist has to adjust himself to the will of the
sovereign and place all his technical skill at his service.
As long as the Indian Government was entirely bureaucratic,
Double role of officers in the Indian Civil Service had to perform
the I.C.S. both political and administrative functions. They
decided policies and also carried them out. The Minister and
the bureaucrat were combined in the same person. The grant
of self-government to India introduces a fundamental alteration
in this privileged status. In proportion as political power is
transferred to the Indian people, the Services must inevitably
recede into the background. The Ministers and the legislature
will determine the purposes for which the mechanism of the
state should be utilized, and the bureaucracy wdll have to carry
out their wishes with efficiency and loyalty. •
That the Services must be kept immune from the capricious
Freedom from influences of mere party politics, that it would be
political disastrous to allow them to be made the sport of
influenoe party feuds and manoeuvres, is obvious. Interfer-
ence hy politicians in purely administrative details demoralizes
both administration and politics. A democracy which is tempted
into corruption is definitely on the road to ruin. The traditions
of a high standard of purity, discipline, efficiency, detachment
and self-effacement, wffiich are such a noble asset of the British
Civil Service, will have to be developed in this country’ also.
382 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
But this does nq( mean that India’s superior Services should!
SptM • be legally kept beyond the authority of the Indian
priiikgM nation. That kind of independence would be
oontirNd by thoroughly inconsistent with the reality of India’s
^ political freedom. The Act of 1036 contains a
* whole Part' devoted to an enumeration of the
special privileges guaranteed to the superior Services. Their
appointment is to be made by the Secretary of State even though
they have to work under Ministers. Their salaries, promotion,
leave, pensions, etc., are also fixed by the Secretary of State and
not by the Indian legislatures though India has to bear the
financial burden. .Certain important posts are reserved to be
fiUed by members of the I.G.S. No dfciplinary action can be
taken against these exalted subordinates by their popular super-
iors, the Ministers. The control of the legislature over this
portion of the executive is thus substantially limited. This is
^ grave drawback to provincial autonomy.
‘ Part X, seclioiLs 232-77.
XXXVII. THE WOKKING OF PROVINCIAL
AtJTONOMY
§1. CBITICISM OF SPECIAL EES-
PONSIBILITIES
What is the net achievement of the Act of 1935 in the sphere
of provincial government ? Is the autonomy conferred upon
the provinces a substantial gain? To what extent has it brought
about the real political advancement of the people? How far
has it now become coAtitutionally possible for Indian leaders
to translate into action some of their cherished ideals? Political
organization is, after all, only a means. The material happiness
of tllb community and its spiritual exaltation are the ultimate
•end. The important questions mentioned above will naturally
have to be considered in the epilogue of any constitutional study.
There was very severe criticism of the Montford Beforms
An appMent because in public opinion they were extremely 'in-
change for adequate. The Act of 1935 is supposed to go
tthe better much further than the older measure, particularly
in •the provincial sphere. The clumsy structure of dyarchy
has been abolished. The whole administrative machinery of
the province is now entrusted to Ministers who are responsible
to and removable by a popularly elected legislature. In appear-
ance, at least, all these changes indicate a remarkable degree of
political advance as compared with conditions in the past.
Unfortunately, the impression conveyed by such a broad,
Ifmiy simplified outline is not the whole truth and is
restrictions and therefore misleading. It ignores those important
safeguards provisions of the Act which are intended to
operate as a vigorous negative force. In fact, the new
constitution represents an ingenious blend of plus and minus,
of addition and subtraction, of progress and regress. The hand
tliat gave has also taken away. To what extent the two forces
working in opposite directions actually cancel each other and
what exactly is the nature and the size of thebfinal remainder
( an only be revealed by experience.
The all-pervading Special Besponsibilities of the Gk)vemor
Experience the Governor-General and the numerous re-
aloM will be servations and safeguards affecting some of the
ihe test fiiost vital aspects of the administration lurk con-
stantly behind in the constitutional picture, and may emerge
at any moment to overwhelm the normal political routine. The
'Joint Parliamentary Committee emphasized that the safeguards
are not mere paper declarations, dependent for their validity
-on the good will or timidity of those to whom the real substance
of power is transferred. It has been said that the Act of 1935
834 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
does not introduce in the provinces a system of limited monarchy
but a system of limited ministry. The Governor is not expected
to retire into sublimated obscurity like the British monarch.
His personality may prove an active force. His will may come
to be frequently pitted against the will of the electorate. How
such conflicts will end, to what extent the people will be able to-
ha\e th^ir own way, are questions which can be answered only
by time.
However, the experience of three years* working of the new
Detdlook in scheme which was inaugurated on 1 April 1937 is
Congress quite hopeful. In the first election to the provin-
proTinees oial legislatures held in^^ accordance with the
provisions of the Act, the Congress Pwty was able to secure
a clear majority of seats in six out of eleven provinces. Its
leaders were therefore invited by the respective Governors to
form Ministries. The Congress, however, demanded, as a con-
dition precedent to the acceptance of the invitation, a definite
assurance from the Governors that they would not exercise their
special powers of interference so long as the Ministers acted
within the constitution As no such assurance was given, the
majority party refused to form the government and there was
a deadlock. Interim Ministries were formed by the minority
parties and they temporarily carried on government till a mw
weeks before the legislatures were due to be summoned for their
very first session. In other provinces, popular Ministries enjoy-
ing the confidence of the legislature began to function from the
very beginning.
§2. THE VICEROY'S STATEMENT
In the meantime, in July 1937, the Viceroy issued a lengthy
The Viceroy’s and comprehensive statement to clarify the whole
statement , constitutional position and to explain how the new
machinery was expected to work in its daily routine. He
desired to remove misapprehensions and misunderstandings
that had arisen in the public mind. The following succinct
summary is taken from the statement itself. It contains an
authoritative pronouncement of the views of the Secretary of
State, the Governor-General and the provincial Governors. .
-The executive authority of a province runs in the name of
the Governor; but in the ministerial field the Governor, subject
to the qualifications already mentioned (in respect of Special
Responsibilities) is bound to exercise that executive authority
on the advice of Ministers. There are certain strictly limited
and clearly defined areas in which, while here as elsewhere the
primary responsibility rests with Ministers, the Governor re-
mains ultimately responsible to Parliament. Over the whole of
the remainder of the field Ministers are solely responsible, and
they are answerable only^ to the provincial legislature.
WORKING OF PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY 33S
'In the discharge of the Governor’s Special Responsibilities,
it is open to the Governor, and it is irideed incumbent on him,
to act otherwise than on the advice of his Ministers if he con*
eiders that the action they propose will prejudice the minorities^
or areas, or other interests affected. The decision in such cases
will rest with the Governor, and he will be responsible to Parlia-
ment for taking it. But the scope of such potential interference
is strictly defined and there is no foundation for any suggestion
that a Governor is free, or is entitled, or would have the power,
to interfere with the day-to-day administration of a province,
outside the limited range of the responsibilities specially confided
to him.
'Before taking a decilion against the advice of his Ministers
even within that limited range, a Governor will spare no pains
to make clear to his Ministers the reasons which have weighed
with him in thinking both that decision is one which it is incum-
bent on him to take and that it is the right one. He will put,
them in possession of his mind. He vrill listen to the arguments
they address to#im. He will reach his decision with full under-
standing of those arguments and with a mind open to convic-
tion. In such circumstanees, given the good will which we
can, I trust, postulate on both sides, and for which I can on
behalf of His Majesty’s Government answer so far as Governors
are concerned, conflicts need not in normal situations be
anticipated.
'The design of Parlianient, and the object of those of us who
are the servants of the Crown in India and to whom it falls to
work the provisions of the Act, must be, ajid is, to ensure the
utmost degree practicable of harmonious co-operation with the
elected representatives of the people; and to avoid in every way
consistent with the Special Responsibilities which the Act
imposes, any such clash of opinion as woulcK be calculated un-
necessarily to break down the machine of government, or to
result in a severance of that fruitful partnership between the
Governor and his Ministers w^hich is the basis of the Act, and
the ideal, the achievement of which the Secretary of State, the^
Governor-General, and the provincial Governors are all equally
concerned to secure/
§3. POPULAR MINISTRIES IN OFFICE
After the issue of this statement the Congress Party decided
Formation of accept office, and the Government in eight
CongresB provinces soon came into the hands of its leaders.
MinlBtrlOB It was found that, apart from the intrinsic
difficulties and limitations of the Act, the Governors were, on
the whole, working in a spirit of co-operation and goodwill with
Ministers, many of whom had in the past actively participated
in the struggle against a bureaucratic government and been
336 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
sent to jail for sedition or civil disobedience. A crisis did arise
in February 1938 in the United Provinces and Bihar when the
Ministries felt compelled to resign because the Governors con-
cerned and the Governor-General could not agree with them on
the question of the release of political prisoners. But even such
a grave crisis was ultimately overcome by negotiation and ex-
planation, and the Ministries returned to duty after it was made
clear that it was not the Governors* intention to obstruct them.
The same was true of the crisis that arose in Orissa over the ap-
pointment of a subordinate bureaucratic official as the Governor
of the province. After the withdrawal of the Congress Ministries
in November 1939, Mahatma Gandhi declared that the Gover-
nors on the whole had ‘played the ganSi*. It must also be said
that the Ministers on their side endeavoured to remain within
the bounds of the Act and did not give any provocation to the
Governors to exercise their special powers. The cordiality of
4;heir mutual relations was publicly testified to both by the
Ministers and the Governors.
The secret of the success of responsible parliamentary
llti^ngth of government lies in the strength and effectiveness
Ministries in of Ministers. The stuangth and effectiveness of
'vesponslble Ministers depend upon the amount of support
^ofomment which they are able to command in the legislature,
apart from the personal calibre of the men who form the
‘Cabinet. A strong, well-organized, ^ i;^ell-disciplined political
party which succeeds in capturing a clear majority of seats in an
elective chamber natmally becomes a mighty force. It reflects
contemporary public opinion and is vitalized by the knowledge
that it has a definite mandate from the public to carry out its
programme.
When the leaders of such a party, conscious of its enormous
strength, are installed .in office .as Ministers, it would be very
diffic^t tod also very imprudent for the Governor to try to
domineer over them or to treat them with contempt. A conflict
with persons who have an overwhelming backing both in the
legislature and in the nation would be really a conflict with the
people at large. No head of a province can lightly provoke such
a ^ave calamKy. He would be imable to obtain any alternative
government, and in the end the constitution would have to be
suspended.
After the establishment of popular Ministries consequent on
Three years* the introduction of provincial autonomy, the whole
ezperienee atmosphere of provincial government radically
changed. For the first time in the history of British rule in
India, the sense of an unbridgeable distance, a profound gulf,
between the government and the people has vanished to a great
•extent. The Ministers are known and felt to be of the people,
•organically one with them, leading the country and also being
WOBKING OF PBOyiNCIAL AUTONOMY 337
Jed by it. That is the role played by Ministers in responsible
<lemocracies.
In fact, ministerial programmes are being pursued vigorously,
Y&gorottt even though they often involve serious depertures
aetliity of the from the principles and practices of the old order.
Minifteri There is dynamic activity in all resMcis.
Questions like education, prohibition, tenancy, agricultural
indebtedness, rural development, industrial wages and disputes,
etc., are being tackled with promptness and energy. Most of
the pK>litical prisoners in British India have^been set free under
the orders of the provincial Ministers, and a much more liberal
concept of civil liberty J;ias come to prevail.’ Two striking in-
stances may be cited to show that in provincial subjects tiie
transfer of power to the people of the province is found to be
real., In 1938, the Bombay Ministry, with the full support of
the legislature, restored to their original owners all lands that
were confiscated by the previous bureaucratic Government as d
penalty for having participated in the Civil Disobedience move-
ments of 1930-2. At about the same time, the Madras Minii^ry
ordered the removal of the statue of General Neill from *its
prominent public situation in Madras.
This quickened tempo in legislative and executive action must
RsbuK of be attributed to the advent of provincial auto-
proTincial nomy. Governors and the Services do seem to
autonomy realize the inherent strength of a Ministry
commanding immense popular confidence, and some salutary
precedents in the operation of the new machine do seem to have
crystallized. The Bihar and United Provinces crisis, already
referred to, appears to have established the principle that when-
ever Ministers are prepared to take responsibility for the conse-
quences of measures proposed by them, they will not ordinarily
be overruled by the Governor.
Unfort.unately, since the resignation of the Congress Ministries
in November 1939, popular government in seven provinces
was suspended and their legislatures also w’ere not functioning.
In a large part of India there was thus re-established the old
system of bureaucratic rule. This abnormal situ^ion continued
till April 1946.
In a speech delivered in Bombay in February 1939, Sir Boger
Views of the Lumley, Governor of Bombay, raised ‘a part of
OoYernor the veil which shrouds the mysteries of a Governor's
of Bombay life' and gave a glimpse of the working of the
constitutional machine. The following short summary of the
speech will be found illuminating.
‘On the Governor, I suppose, in fonner days lay the main
* So far as the Congress provinces are concerned, all this was true only
jis long as the Mini8t<»rs ^ei*e functioning.
22
888 INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
roi^onsibilit^ for initiating the controlling policy. That is now
the responsibility of his Ministers . . . .and the most important
service which the Qovemor can render ... is to ensure .that that
is a reality.
‘Ihere are, I think, some people who imagine, and some wha
would like to see, a continual struggle going on between the
Oovemor and his Ministers for control of policy. They are wide
of the mark. These reforms would be meaningless if that were
the case. There ate others, I know, who have not yet become
accustomed to this change, and who look to the Governor to-
deliver them out of all their afflictions. I can assist . . . them by
ensuring that their troubles are not ovsflooked,, but the respon-
sibility for decision on their cases lies with my Ministers, and I
would not wish it to be thought otherwise. . . .
‘Instead, therefore, of the continual interference which was,
in some quarters, feared would be the result of these [the Gover-
nor's] special [powers and] responsibilities, there is rather a con-
tinual vigUanoe, watching to ensure that he should not be driven
to .use his powers, and this can lead ... to mutual co-
operation. . t .
‘[The Governor] must preserve the spirit in which the Con-
stitution was conceived, which was the spirit of self-government ;
he must be equipped to discharge the special functions laid
upon him but without, as far as he can make it possible,
disturbing that spirit; he has his own contribution to make, if
he can, to the success of government: and he must remain
impartial, a neutral in politics, not a protagonist.’’
It is a truism of political science that a constitution cannot
fBataMUhmitiit be judged ' merely by its language 6uid external
•I oonentlonB appearance. An attempt has to be made to find
out the reality of its actual working, the traditions which mould
its operation, the social purposes it strives to fulfil, the way
in wUch the community reacts to its functional existence. A
constitution often grows and takes shape by the development
of customs and conventions, as is amply evidenced by the
ftTftmplft of Britain. It is to be hoped that the special powers,
responsibilities^ and reservations which abound in the structure
of the Act of 1935 will be rendered a dead letter in actual practice.
* Times of Jtidia, 91 Feb. 1999.
PART VI
GENERAL
XXXVIII. 8UB-DIVI8ION8 OF THB PBOVINCB AND THBIB 4J>-
MINISTBATION . . . . . . .84(>
XXXIX. LOCAL 8ELF-OOVEBNMBNT . . . . . . 34.')
XL. JUDICIAL AD14NI8TBATI0N . . . . 352
XLI. LAND REVENUE . . . . . . . . 36R
XLII. THE PUBLIC SERVICES . . . . . . 377
XLIII. EDUCATION . . . . . • , . 39(^
XLIV. FAMINE RELIEF AND IRRIGATION . . . 39.')
XXXVIIT. SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE PEOVINCE
AND THEIK ADMINISTRATION
It ig proposea jio give nere a snort description of the system
JDWiiioii of of administratioii in the province as distinct from
a pioitaoo the controlling organization at headquarters. An
Indian* province comprises a vast area, very often as big as
the area of some of the larger countries of Europe. It would
therefore be physically impossible to conduct its administrative
business without further sub-dividing^ the area into smaller
units and distributing Government authority amongst sub-
ordinate ofl&cers, with a supervising agency above them. There is
^reat diversity of conditions in tbe provinces. There is also
. bome variety in the scheme of decentralization of authority within
the provincial area. However, the District ig the unit common
to all provinces.
* In* some provinces, the Districts are grouped together into
The Diflsioii bigger units called Divisions for purposes of ad-
mir^tration. In Bombay for instance there are three such
Divisions, the northern, the central and the southern, with their
headquarters in Ahmedabad, Poona and Dharwar respectively.
They follow, broadly speaking, the linguistic distribution of the
province into Gujerat, Maharashtra and Karnatak. In some
provinces, though not in Bombay, there is what is known as the
Board of Bevenue which functions in the capital. It is the
ohief revenue authority in the province and forms an appellate
-court in rent cases.
At the head of each Division there is an officer called the
The Cominis- Commissioner, who is a senior member of the
sioner Ad Indian Civil Service. He is the principal adviser
his duties of Government as to the action to be taken on
every proposal about district administration which has to go to
Government from Collectors and from some other officers. He
is also responsible for securing that the policy of Government
in various nOatters is fully carried out by Collectors and some
other officers.
The Commissioner has relations with practically every de-
partment of administration in his Division, though each operates
directly under its own chief. In some cases his control is more
efiective than in others. For example, though the Inspector-
General of Police is the head of the police department and looks
after its technical side, the .Commissioner is responsible for the
general police administration in his Division, either through the
District Magistrate or directly. Many important powers are also
exercised by him in respect of municipalities, local boards and
\ illage panchayats. *
SUB-DIVISIONS OF THE PBOVINCE 341
The Commissioner has also to hear appeals against the deci*
sions of the Collectors in matters of land revenue, and against
the orders of the District Magistrates with respect to the main-
tenance of law and order under the District Police Act.
The District is invariably the unit of administration in all
The District provinces and is therefore of vital importance. In
size the District varies from province to province and even from
place to place in the same province. Its area varies from two to
ten thousand square miles and its population from one to three
million souls. Its average size is given as 4,430 square milea
by the Montford Report. Some of the bigger Districts exceed
the population of Switzerland, or the area and population of
Denmark. The officer in charge of the District is known as the
Collector.
The Collector is the representative of the British Government
The Collector in the District, representing the concentrated
authority of British rule. He is in touch with every inch of
territory in the District through his subordinates, the Mamlat-
dars and the village officials. The Collector is much more than
the head of the revenue department in the District, and has been
described as the pivot on which the District administration turns.
He is expected to superintend the working of all the important
departments within his territorial jurisdiction, and thus serves
as an agent for maintaining the eifficiency and coherence of the
governmental machine as a whole. He has the dual capacity
of Collector and Magistrate and performs a large number of
functions of many kinds.
As a Collector he is responsible for the collection of land
revenue both on agricultural and on non-agricultural land in
the District, and also forest revenue. He holds abkari sales and
issues licences to vendors of liquors and narcotic drugs like opium,
and takes steps for preventing smuggling. It is hi& duty to
administer the Watan Act, which deals with Inams, and to make
grants of loans to needy agriculturists out of funds supplied by
Government. The Collector is in charge of the treasury and is
responsible for the ‘due accounting of all moneys received and
disbursed, the correctness of the treasury return® and the safe
custody of the valuables which it contains'. He has some
powers in respect of local bodies like mimicipalities, local boards,
and village panchayats.
As a District Magistrate, the Collector has both executive
and judicial duties. He is at the head of all the magistrates in
the District and has himself the powers of a first-class magistrate.
He can also hear appeals from the decisions of second-class and
third-class magistrates. In fact he is responsible for the adminis-
tration of the criminal law in the District. It is the duty of the
District Magistrate to maintain law and order in the District,
and for that purpose he controls the Superintendent of Police
342 INDIAN ADMINISTEATION
in administrative matters. He also issues licences under Acts
like the Arms Act and the Petroleum Act.
The Pollector is the district registrar, and as such controls
the administration of the registration department. He has also
to see to it that in matters of sanitation proper steps are taken
by the local bodies, particularly on the outbreak of epidemics.
Collectors and their staff are officers intimately known to the
people, coming into constant contact with them for a hundred
reasons, and are the vehicles for conveying the orders of the Gov-
ernment to the people at large. During a large part of the year,
the Collector has to move out to the different villages in his
District, supervising the work of his subordinates and getting into
direct touch with the people and the problems of administration.
He is the eyes, the ears, the mouth, and the hand of the Provin-
cial Government within his District and serves as its general
representative.
The organization of the collectorate is 'so close knit, so well
Varied nature established, and so thoroughly understood that it
of^dntles simultaneously discharges an immense number of
other duties with ease and efficiency. Begistration, alteration
and partition of holdings, management of indebted estates,
loans to agriculturists, settlement of disputes, and above all
famine relief, are all matters which are dealt with by this
agency*. The Collector is a 'strongly individualized worker in
every department of rural economy*. Sir John Strachey said
that because the Collector was the representative of a paternal,
not constitutional, government he had to perform a large number
of functions connected with a variety of departments like police,
jails, municipalities, roads, education, sanitation, dispensaries,
local taxation and so on. 'He should be a lawyer, an accountant,
a financier, a ready writer of State papers. He ought also to
possess po mean knowledge of agriculture, political economy and
engineering.’ He is directed to kdep himself informed and to
watch the operation of everything that passes in the District.
'The vicissitudes of trade, the state of currency, the administra-
tion of civil justice, the progress of public works* must engage
his attention much as protection of life and property and
maintenance of peace.
In short, the Collector of the District is the most important
Iraportanoe officer in the bureaucracy of India because of the
of his offlee first-hand personal knowledge that he has the
opportunity to acquire about the people and problems of ^ his
District. He is in the closest possible touch with the realities
of the situation. He enjoys a lai^ measure of local independence
and initiative. On his resource, efficiency and presence of mind
depends the smooth course of administration in the District.
Officers trained as Collectors in the various Districts of a province
and who have therefore acquired the most valuable personal
SUB-DIVISIONS or THE PROVINCE 343
•experience and knowledge of the countr^r with the government
of which they are entrusted, are raised to the ofiGices of
Commissioners and Executive Councillors, and some to those of
provincial Governors.
The capital city of the District is the Collector’s head-
other officers quarters. Here are stationed the heads and the
offices of various specialized departments which have to func-
tion within the area of the District. Establishments for irriga-
tion, mads and buildings, agriculture, industries, factories, co-
operative credit, and medical relief, exist with their heads in
most of the Districts to perform the special functions assigned
to them. The District Judge, the Executive Engineer, the Civil
Surgeon, the District Ifeuperintendent of Police, the Assistant
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, are all officers who are the
heacls of their respective departments in the territorial jurisdiction
of the District. They are controlled by their own departmental
superiors, but the Collector has a considerable voice in regard
to their administration. They have been compared to different
sets of strings connecting the Government with the people. Their
policies are influenced in a varying degree by the head of 'the
District. He is always there in the background ‘to lend his
support or, if need be, to mediate between a specialized service
and the people’.
The District is further split up into smaller divisions. These
Prant officers sub-divisions are under Prant officers who are either
and Mamlat- junior members of the Indian Civil Service called
Assistant Collectors, or members of the Provincial
Ser\ ice styled Deputy-Collectors. The general revenue and magis-
terial charge of the sub-division is vested in the sub-divisional
officer, subject to the control of the Collector. Arrangements
within the division vary in the different provinces. In Bombay,
the District is sub-divided into talukas, each of which has as its
liead an officer known as the Mamlatdar. He is to the taluka
what the Collector is to the District, though in a diminutive
measure. He has revenue and magisterial powers and has to
-supervise the w’orking of the administration within his area.
He has also other diverse duties. In fact, he is practically the
general administrative officer of the GovemmAt in the area
given to his care, namely the taluka.
Lastly, at the basis of the system comes the Indian village
Village \^ith its organization of great antiquity still finding
«ffioialt a place in the new system with certain necessary
modifications. The headman, called the Patil or Patel, is
the chief officer in the village and is responsible for the collection
of revenue and the maintenance of peace in the village. He has
the assistance of a talati or village accountant, who has to
keep the village accounts, registers of holdings and, in general,
/ill records of land revenue. The village watchman is the rural
344 INDIAN ADMINISTBATION
poltoeman. Most of these offices were formerly hereditary and
oontinued to be so till recently. The tendency, however, of
modem times is to abolish the principle of heredity and to
substitute a competitive test. The hereditary character of the
kulkami’s or accountant’s post has already disappeared and
perhaps other posts may follow suit
XXXIX. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
§1. IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
IjOcal institutions are an important part in the structure of
OoTernment * modem state. Some of the most vital and ob-
must create vious benefits of social life are obtained through
conditions them. It must be remembered that government
® * is an instrument for the preservation and welfare
of human society. After all, what is the end and purpose of
all the complex politick apparatus which civilized man has
developed and is still developing ? It is to bring about the
nioral^ and material happiness of the community, so that life can
signify energy, joy and growth even to the meanest citizen.
The constituents of this happiness in terms of visible utilities^
and services are not difficult to enumerate. They have reference*
to the actual routine of daily life.
For example, supplies of unadulterated milk, ghee, butter
Kinds of and other food-stuf 
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